Article III: On the Extrinsic Circumstances of the Use of Marriage

158. The extrinsic circumstances of the use of marriage are: 1. the end of the one acting, that is, of the one asking for and rendering the debt; 2. the affection of the same one acting in the conjugal act toward this or another person; 3. the extrinsic impediment of the conjugal act itself from vow and affinity; 4. position; 5. time; 6. place; 7. danger to health; 8. certainty or doubt concerning an intrinsic or diriment impediment.

159. Prop. 1. The use of marriage for the sake of offspring is lawful. - The reason is that marriage is principally ordered by nature to this end.

Note. It is lawful to use marriage for the sake of offspring, "although this need not necessarily be intended while it is exercised, provided it is not positively impeded. Indeed, sometimes it is also lawfully excluded by simple affection, e.g., by a poor man, lest he be too burdened with children." L. 927.; Struggl, de Matr. n. 85.

160. "What is to be done with the wives of onanists, who indeed would not wish to offend God, but also would not wish to beget children?

Resp. Not a few wives are found who are caught in these perplexities, who indeed abhor mortal sin, because they would not wish to incur eternal damnation, but who are also deterred from begetting children. In practice it is required: 1. that they cooperate with the sin of the husband by no positive act, neither by words, nor signs, nor complaints about a more numerous offspring, etc.; 2. that they have displeasure, even external, concerning the sin committed by the spouse. But these things standing, wives are not to be disturbed with respect to onanism, although they experience notable trouble and repugnance in relation to generation; for repugnance because of the pains of childbirth, and fear of death perhaps to follow from childbirth, is natural. Nor are married women to be reproached because they desire not to have more children, since such a desire contains nothing evil, provided they neither cooperate with the sin of the husband nor take complacence in it. Wives of fearful conscience, who fear lest by an internal affection they delight in the wicked action of the husband, so that they may not beget children, are also to be restrained; because, since they for the most part abhor grave sin, they are not judged to adhere to complacences of this kind; and therefore they are to be absolved without difficulty." G. Cas. n. 1114. Cf. what was said above, n. 123 and following; Bouvier, Supplem. ad tr. de Matr. c. 1. art. 2. at the end; Sanchez, de M. l. 9. d. 8. n. 10.

161. Prop. 2. The use of marriage is lawful if it is done from the end of rendering the conjugal debt to the other party. The reason is that the rendering of the conjugal debt, on account of the right of another and one's own debt, is a formal act of justice, and therefore positively honorable.

162. Prop. 3. The use of marriage is lawful for avoiding incontinence, whether of the other party or also of oneself. The first part is proved, first, from 1 Cor. 7:5; second, because to avoid the sin of the other spouse is an act of charity toward one's neighbor. Therefore. The second part is proved, first, from the Apostle, l. c. vv. 2, 5; second, because to avoid one's own sin is an act of charity toward oneself. Therefore. Cf. St. Alph. 882.

163. Prop. 4. The use of marriage is lawful for the sake of health. The reason is that, "since marriage was principally instituted for the propagation of the species, it seems also to have been instituted secondarily for the preservation of the generating individual, since the species cannot be propagated without individuals." L. 927.; Sporer 489.

164. Prop. 5. The use of marriage is generally lawful by reason of the end, if it is done from a motive honorable in itself, and the principal end of marriage is not positively impeded. The reason is "because this is not a disorder, to choose one of the secondary honorable ends before the primary end, provided the latter is not excluded." L. 883.

165. Prop. 6. It is certain that it is illicit to have copulation for pleasure alone. Yet it is common among all that this is not mortal, but only venial sin. The first part is proved, first, from proposition 9 condemned by Innocent XI: "The work of marriage exercised for pleasure alone entirely lacks all fault and venial defect." Further, "because it is a certain perversion of order, since delight, which is intended by nature as a means to generation, becomes the end of having copulation." The second part is proved "because delight concerning some object can be mortal from only two heads, either because the object itself is gravely forbidden, or because one delights in it as in his ultimate end; but in this delight neither intervenes: not the first, as is evident; not the second, as is supposed." L. 912.; Struggl, de matrim. n. 85.

166. Prop. 7. It is admitted by all: a spouse sins mortally when in copulation with his own spouse he imagines for himself another person carnally beloved, whether by desiring to have that person here and now as partner, or by morosely delighting himself in the imagination of that person as if present here for his own spouse. The reason is that the former is true mental adultery against the ninth precept of the Decalogue; the latter is at least delight in a thing here and now mortally prohibited and illicit. Cf. n. 70.

167. Note. It is said carnally beloved; "for if the imagination and delight of one having intercourse with his own partner turns upon another person, not as carnally beloved in a base matter, but only as naturally pleasing because of beauty, or a lovable form, and at the same time such imagination has an honorable end, e.g., that thus the man may more easily provoke himself to semination, or that the wife may conceive more beautiful offspring, these doctors (Sanchez and Sporer) recognize no lethal fault, speaking of itself; yet they admit that such imagination is full of danger; because in conjugal coitus they begin to love carnally the person imagined on account of natural beauty, and thus they sin mortally." Struggl, tr. xi. q. 1. n. 95. Hence St. Alphonsus, 913, thinks that it must in no way be permitted "to excite oneself to coitus by looking at images of the different sex; especially if they were sacred, which Croix and Sporer rightly say is mortal because of grave irreverence." Cf. Sporer, de matr. n. 522, 707.

168. Prop. 8. Any spouse bound by a vow of chastity or impeded by affinity is forbidden under grave sin to ask for the debt; yet he can render it to the other spouse asking, indeed he is even bound, since the other party cannot be deprived of his or her right. But neither spouse can ask for or render the debt if either both are bound by a vow of chastity, or both have contracted affinity; for, because of the vow and the sin, each is prohibited. S. Th. Quodl. 3. q. 7. a. 18.; Quodl. 10. q. 5. a. 11.; G. v. 2. n. 909.; Cf. ibid. n. 780-783.; Laymann, l. 5. tr. 10. p. 3. c. 1. n. 10-12., and here n. 201. 204. 214. and following.

169. Corollary. One bound by vow or affinity cannot even render the debt if the partner does not yet have the right of asking, as in the first two months, or has lost it, or renounces it. Cf. here n. 204.

170. Can a spouse who is prohibited from asking by reason of vow or affinity ever lawfully exact the debt?

Resp. The doctors commonly affirm in the following cases: 1. If there is danger of incontinence in the other spouse; indeed they say that then he is bound to ask, because this obligation arises from the very institution of marriage. 2. If the other interpretatively exacts, namely when the woman is modest, and the man perceives her will concerning the rendering of the debt; for then it is rather to render than to ask. 3. It will not improbably be lawful for the impeded spouse to ask, if he himself is in danger of incontinence, and the impediment is one imposed by the Church, whose dispensation cannot be obtained shortly, and there is great danger in delay. The reason is that an ecclesiastical law does not oblige in so great a crisis. And this will be confirmed from the following question. L. 930.; Sporer 483.

171. Is it lawful to ask the debt from an excommunicated spouse, and is it lawful for the excommunicated spouse himself to ask?

Resp. To the first, affirmatively, which "is certain from c. Quoniam multos, caus. 11. q. 3., where St. Gregory VII grants it." L. 935. To the second, some indeed deny; but Suarez, Sanchez, etc., commonly and more truly affirm. "The reason is that an ecclesiastical law does not oblige with so great a danger, in which the excommunicated person would indeed be, if he could not be separated from the other spouse (as in fact he cannot), and could not ask." L. l. c.

172. Prop. 9. The natural position of conjugal copulation is that the woman be beneath and the man above; for this mode is more apt for the effusion of the male semen, and for reception into the feminine vessel for procreating offspring.

173. Corollary. "But the unnatural position is if coitus takes place otherwise, namely sitting, standing, from the side, or in a preposterous manner after the way of beasts, or if the man is beneath and the woman above... Commonly all say that all these modes do not exceed venial fault. The reason is that on the one hand, although some disorder is present, nevertheless it is not so great as to reach mortal sin, since it turns only upon the accidental things of copulation; on the other hand, the change of position does not impede generation, since the semen of the man is not received into the womb of the woman by infusion, or descent, but by attraction, while the womb of itself naturally attracts the male semen... Hence they commonly say that spouses sin not at all if they change position for a just cause, namely because of illness, or corpulence of the man, or because of danger of abortion, or scandal of others. Conversely all agree that, if it were known by experience that, when the natural position has been changed, the woman retained nothing of the semen, because of excessive looseness or moisture of the vessel, or because of some natural infirmity, as Palaus says, then it would be mortal; but Sanchez says otherwise if such effusion proceeds not from the position, but from some disease of the woman." L. 917. Cf. here n. 154.; Milne Edwards, t. 9. p. 112.

174. Is it mortal to change the position if, on that account, something of the semen is by chance poured forth?

Resp. The Salmanticenses apud St. Alphonsus 917 affirm; but Sanchez, Pontius, etc., more commonly deny. The reason is that "it is never lawful without a just cause to permit that semen be wasted, when the semen is poured outside the vessel of the wife; but not when it is inserted within and is wasted by accident, not from the act itself; because then the womb, as the aforesaid authors say, already attracts what is sufficient for generation, and expels the rest as superfluous." L. 917.

The change of position is not grave. The reason is that in a change of position the end of generation is obtained. For fecundation of the ovule, only one nemasperm is sufficient. But in the ejaculation of semen several thousand are emitted. Therefore, when something of the semen penetrates into the vagina, by the proper motion of the nemasperms these advance as far as the uterus, the tubes, and the ovaries; all the more because their vitality endures for several days, and if they meet an ovule, fecundation follows. Further, when ejaculation has been completed, and when the man has withdrawn, ordinarily the semen once infused into the vagina is no longer emitted, since then the vaginal walls adhere to each other in such a way that they touch one another, from which there is great difficulty of exit. Ant. vol. 2. p. 189. n. 381.

175. Corollary. The position which alone is possible, whatever it finally is, is in no way condemned, although a slight loss of semen follows; because that part of the semen is not necessary for generation, and is lost by accident, against the will of the spouses. G. 912. 2.

176. Prop. 10. The use of marriage is lawful during the time of menstruation.

Pre-note. Ovulation, or the ejection of ovules from the vesicles of Graaf, in which they have had their origin, is altogether natural and spontaneous, and without venereal sensation, although this sensation can accelerate erection. Up to puberty the vesicles are imperfectly developed; but at the time of puberty their volume is increased, and they attain perfect development; the same happens concerning the ovule which is contained in them. Therefore, little by little one vesicle approaches toward the surface of the ovary, in which it produces a certain prominence. Meanwhile a greater quantity of blood flows through the vessels of the vesicle, and the internal liquid is increased, until the vesicle swollen in this way is torn and the ovule is cast out. The ovum is transferred from the ovary into the tube, or oviduct, and thence is brought into the uterus.

This physiological operation brings an abundance of blood into the vessels of the uterus, because of which its surface swells. If the ovule to be brought through the tube into the uterus meets the male semen, it is fecundated; otherwise, being corrupted, it is expelled together with blood, which flows partly because of the tearing of the vessels of the uterus, partly by a certain exudation. This emission of blood from the mouth of the vagina constitutes the menses, rules, menstruations. At this time also the epithelium or mucosa of the uterus and of its neck partially falls away. Hence it happens that at first a thick and white liquid flows. In some diseases this resolution of the mucosa is permanent, and from it takes origin the disease constituting white discharges. Menstrual blood does not flow quickly; ordinarily, first mucus, afterward mucus with blood, finally blood; then little by little the emission is lessened, until after a few days it entirely ceases. For the most part it endures for two or three days, or for a whole week or eight days. A space of about twenty-eight days elapses for the return of the menstruations. They begin at the time of puberty, in the thirteenth to fifteenth year of age. It is lessened in the fortieth to fiftieth year of age, until it entirely ceases. Yet there are very many cases of the cessation of menstruation at a very late age, and even of fecundation at a late age. Likewise, once ceased, they can also reappear. Hence it happens that a woman, even at a very advanced age, retains of herself the capacity of suffering fecundation, although in fact she becomes sterile.

Menstruations, therefore, correspond to the tearing of one ovule, and are its effect. Wherefore the absence, from whatever cause, of the ovaries and therefore of the vesicles of Graaf brings about absence of menstrual flow. But whether ovulation precedes the menstruations or follows them is not yet plainly established. It is very probable that ovulation precedes menstruation. For this reason it can be held that the fecundated ovule does not pertain to the ovulation of the last menstruation, but to that ovulation which the menstruations have not yet followed. In this case the menstruations would not take place, because the fecundated ovule would turn the course of blood in the uterus elsewhere. - Ant. p. 117 and following, 130, 131.

Besides this ordinary flow, there is also another extraordinary flow, proceeding from some chronic disease, and it sometimes persists for twelve days or longer.

Now then, "it is certain," says St. Alphonsus, 925, "that it is lawful both to render and to ask" during the time of extraordinary flow; for there would be grave danger of incontinence for the man to abstain for so long a time. But as to the time of natural flow, there are three opinions. The first condemns coitus as mortal, because of the harm which frequently happens to the offspring, and because there is danger of pouring forth semen in vain, since the mother is never, or rarely, apt for generation at that time. L. 925. This opinion now has no intrinsic probability. The second opinion affirms that it is not mortal, but is not excused from venial sin, because the woman is then less apt for the suitable reception and retention of semen, and therefore coitus then is less fitting to the end of generation. L. 925. The third opinion, which seems more probable, asserts that there is no sin. The reason of this proposition is that in the new law there is no positive prohibition concerning this matter. Nor is it prohibited by natural law, since during the time of menstruation, both a little before, and during menstruation, and especially immediately afterward up to the fourteenth day, the woman is in fact more apt for generating. For experience shows that at the time of this flow the ovules are most apt for generation. And thus, just as the aptitude for generating begins when a flow of this kind begins, at the time of puberty, so when it comes to an end, at the time of old age, that aptitude is greatly diminished. Likewise the absence of this menstruation is often joined to sterility; and the same ceases during the time of pregnancy, so that by almost this sole sign women know that they have conceived. Nor is it a valid objection that the blood of the menstrual flow harms the fecundative power of the sperm. For experience likewise shows that the use of marriage at such a time does not gravely harm either the health of the parents or the health of the offspring. Therefore. Cf. Debreyne, 2. ed. art. 1. p. 105.; Longet, l. c. p. 104.

"A woman," says Antonelli, "can be fecundated at whatever time intervenes from one menstruation to the other, and sometimes during the time of menstruation fecundation can become easier... Yet copulation during the time of menstruation can bring many inconveniences to the health of the woman, and especially grave hemorrhages." Ant. vol. 2. p. 190, 191. n. 387, 388. And if the matter concerns an extraordinary flow, it can be much feared that copulation will greatly aggravate the disease. Hence, speaking of itself, from this head it will be able to be light or grave to have copulation. Ant. l. n. 390.

At whatever time a woman can be fecundated, because, as the same Antonelli also says, other causes can change the time of maturation and the exit of the ovules, namely, regularly, by the very ordering of nature, coitus and the excitation of the genitals.

177. Do spouses sin who, so that they may not have children, reserve the use of marriage for those days after the menstrual flow in which there is a greater probability that generation will not take place?

Resp. 1. From the doctrine of St. Alphonsus, 925, they sin lightly, speaking of itself, because such intercourse, by which spouses deliberately exclude the time more apt for generation, and already soon to come, and choose a time less apt, involves a certain baseness and indecency. 2. Yet they do not sin gravely at all, because in reality they do not positively impede the procreation of offspring; although they exclude it by simple affection, which in no way contains a grave disorder. L. 921. Indeed, experience also proves that those who coit more rarely conceive more easily at any time whatever. Further, to this point pertain the things which St. Alphonsus, 925, has concerning the very time of menstruation: "Although at that time there is an easy danger of frustrating the semen, nevertheless, in order to make coitus honorable, it is not required that generation follow from it, but it suffices that that coitus of itself be apt for generation, even though by accident the semen is scattered, as happens in access to a pregnant or sterile woman." Although, says Sanchez, de matr. l. 9. d. 16. n. 6, if, with the position varied, spouses agreed so that offspring would not be so certain, I would believe that they are not guilty of lethal fault, because they are not bound to choose the more certain mode for conceiving offspring, just as they are by no means bound to use some means serving easier conception; but they satisfy their obligation if they do nothing by which conception is stood against, nor is the desire of lacking offspring mortal, as I proved, l. 9. disp. 8. n. 10. Thus teaches Palacios, 4. dist. 32. disp. fol. 709. But if the intention were wholly to impede the fetus, although by lying together in these modes it would by no means be impeded, it would be a mortal sin against nature. Because, since the internal and external act are of the same malice, just as to impede generation is mortal against the nature of that act which nature has referred to the conception of offspring, so to will to impede it will be. Cf. Resp. S. Poenitent. 16 Jun. 1880, Revue des Sciences Eccles. Janvier 1882, p. 90.

178. Prop. 11. It is probably lawful for spouses to come together during the time of pregnancy, unless there is danger of abortion, which commonly is not present.

Pre-note. It is said probably, for the opinion which asserts that there is venial fault is also probable. Unless there is danger, etc.; for if there is danger of abortion, then, as is clear by reason, it would be mortal.

Pregnancy. It is the natural and physiological development of the fetus, which takes place when the fecundated ovule descends into the uterus and there comes to rest; then the pregnancy is called uterine. Although many nemasperms surround the ovule at the time of fecundation, nevertheless only one nemasperm enters the ovule, effecting fecundation; all the rest die. But since the motion of the nemasperms is slow, and the progress of the ovule through the tubes is also slow, fecundation can be effected even several days after coitus, and is not instantaneous and contemporaneous with it. But any pregnancy which occurs outside the uterus constitutes a true anomaly and irregularity of physiological pregnancy; and because it is outside the accustomed order and physiological laws, it is always the cause of most grave evils for the life of the mother and fetus. Every pregnancy which takes place outside the uterus, wherever the fetus develops itself, is called extrauterine, and the fetuses themselves are called extrauterine or ectopic.

The whole time during which the fetus remains in the uterus is called pregnancy, and it endures for a space of nine months or about 280 days. The fetus in the uterus is covered by several membranes and lies immersed in a certain whitish liquid, the amniotic liquid. In birth it is cast out from the uterus through contractions of the muscles of the uterus, which rupture the membranes enveloping the fetus, whereby it happens that the amniotic liquid begins to flow. The membranes of the fetus after birth are called the secondines.

A probable sign of pregnancy is suppression of menstruation, when previously the woman had regular menstruations. Yet it must be noted that menstruations can cease because of other causes, and even during the time of pregnancy can appear once or twice. To this are added changes in the genitals, and in part the magnitude of the belly and uterus, which moreover can grow from other causes, a greater secretion of the vagina, and swelling of the breasts, which can also secrete milk.

Extrauterine pregnancies for the most part end before the proper time, because of the tearing of the membranes enveloping the fetus. Sometimes the fetus continues a perfect development, but, as is clear, it cannot be born. In each case the life of the mother is placed in great danger. Extrauterine pregnancy supposes a uterus; for the uterus is the necessary way for the passage of the sperm. Therefore when the uterus is absent, whether from birth or by surgical operation, ectopic pregnancy is impossible. - Ant. vol. 1. p. 142 and following.

The first part is proved: both because nowhere is this had as forbidden of itself; and because it would be a most grave burden, and a thing exposed to innumerable dangers of sinning venially, if spouses were bound to abstain for so long from the use of marriage while remaining in the same bed. L. 924. Further, for coitus to be lawful in marriage, it suffices that the act of itself be suitable for generation, although this by accident does not occur. L. 925.

The second part is proved because, once the semen has been received, the womb is most tightly closed, and ordinarily is not opened again by coitus, as experience itself shows. Therefore there is no danger of abortion around the beginning of conception, which moreover can scarcely be known. But the danger vanishes especially at the time near birth, because the fetus is then so enveloped in the secondines that, although the womb were opened, the semen could in no way touch the fetus, nor therefore bring harm to it, or suffocate it. Once fecundation has been effected, the ovule is no longer emitted from the uterus, but adheres to the folds of the mucosa of the uterus, which gradually grows around it, and finally entirely covers it; this membrane is called the decidua reflexa. Yet to remove all danger of abortion and suffocation of the offspring, it is lawful to come together then in an unnatural mode. Moreover this kind of danger of abortion is difficult to know. Debreyne, l. c. And to remove the danger of abortion, it suffices not to repeat copulation several times at the same time, nor to accomplish it too vehemently and with force. Ant. vol. 2. p. 193. n. 394.

179. Prop. 12. The use of marriage is probably lawful, speaking of itself, during the time of purgation after birth.

Pre-note. By the time of purgation are understood the days which follow birth. "It is certain that spouses today are not bound to observe the time of purgation prescribed in Lev. 12., where, since the woman was barred from entering the temple for 40 days after the birth of a male and 80 after the birth of a female, the use of marriage seems also to have been interdicted to her at that time. But this precept has now ceased, and just as today women recently delivered are not bound to abstain from entering the Church, as is said in c. un. de Purific. post partum, so neither from the use of marriage, as Sanchez, etc., commonly say." L. 926. But it is said probably, because in this matter there is a threefold opinion. The first says that it is mortal, from c. fin. Dist. 5. The second probable opinion says that it is venial, because such coitus contains some indecency. The third, also probable, says that there is no sin, because uncleanness of this kind is only material, not moral. Speaking of itself, for it will sometimes be able to be mortal, if from intercourse there would threaten grave disease, or notable aggravation of disease. "A danger of this kind," says St. Alphonsus, l. c., "can prudently be feared if coitus is had immediately after birth, namely on the same day or the following."

During the first two weeks the use of marriage can harm the woman most gravely. But in the following two weeks the danger of so grave a harm is diminished. Generally, therefore, the woman is not bound to render except after six weeks, when all danger then has ceased. When this time has passed, the puerperal time has its end, and menstruations appear again, which indicate that the woman is already apt for a new pregnancy. Yet menstruations appear much later if the woman herself nurses her infant. Ant. vol. 2. p. 195. n. 399, 400, 401.

180. Prop. 13. According to the most common opinion of the doctors, it is lawful to ask for and render the debt during the time of lactation. The reason is that no prohibiting law exists. Moreover the danger of infecting the milk, by the testimony of experience, is either none or rare; at least it is not so great that spouses are bound to abstain from the use of marriage for so long a time with continual danger of sinning. Nor does lactation truly impede generation. Longet, l. c. p. 104. But if generation has followed, and, as the fetus grows, the milk is diminished, then the infant can be handed over to a nurse, or be nourished with other food, or partly with the milk of the mother and partly with other food. L. 911.

Lactation, once begun, unless something stands in the way, endures for eighteen or twenty-four months. During the time of lactation menstruations are suspended, and therefore it must be concluded that the time of lactation is less apt for a new fecundation. Yet this can still be had, and is sometimes had; and then the milk is gradually lessened until it ceases entirely. Ant. vol. 1. p. 144, 145.

181. Prop. 14. The use of marriage is lawful during sacred time; that is, 1. on feast days, fast days, and days of Rogations. The reason is that this is prohibited by no law: not by divine law, because on feasts only servile works are prohibited; not by ecclesiastical law, because on feast days and fast days, notwithstanding marital congress, spouses can well observe the things which are of precept. Yet several hold that it is venial to ask, not to render; St. Thom., etc. L. 923. - 2. On the very day of nuptials, on which the spouses have received the matrimonial blessing. For the use of marriage is honorable, and can be meritorious; but the blessing has already passed physically, and, persevering morally, does not impede the use of marriage today, just as it does not impede it tomorrow. Struggl 96. "And likewise the opinion is probable that there is no fault, speaking of itself and with contempt or scandal excluded, if spouses consummate the marriage before the blessing, although others commonly recognize venial fault." Sporer 494. The reason is that the Council of Trent, sess. 24. c. 1. de reform. matrim., only exhorts spouses that they abstain, which signifies counsel rather than precept. - 3. "It is venial to approach the Eucharist on the day when copulation has been had because of pleasure, unless some reasonable cause excuses. But if copulation was had for the sake of procreating offspring, or also of avoiding incontinence, then it is rather of counsel to abstain from Holy Communion. And thus likewise it is of counsel to abstain on the day on which a spouse rendered the debt. But after Communion has been received, there is no sin in rendering. But what about asking? Some say it is venial; others, no sin." L. 922.; Sporer 494. Since to use marriage for pleasure is not a sin, nor even venial, if it does not exceed against the order of reason, to approach Communion after copulation had altogether honorably on the preceding night is not of itself even a venial sin. And if such spouses approach Holy Communion with a right intention and devoutly, there appears no reason why rather the counsel could not be given to them that they not abstain from it.

These are the words of the Council of Trent, l. c.: "But if at any time there has been a probable suspicion that the marriage can be maliciously impeded, if so many denunciations have preceded, then let only one denunciation be made, or at least let the marriage be celebrated in the presence of the parish priest and two or three witnesses. Then before its consummation let denunciations be made in the Church, so that, if any impediments underlie it, they may more easily be detected, unless the Ordinary himself shall have judged it expedient that the aforesaid denunciations be remitted, which the holy synod leaves to his prudence and judgment... Moreover the same holy Synod exhorts that spouses not cohabit in the same house before receiving the priestly blessing in the temple... Lastly the holy Synod exhorts spouses that before they contract, or at least three days before consummation, they diligently confess their sins, and piously approach the Sacrament of the Most Holy Eucharist."

182. Prop. 15. Natural modesty itself dictates that the place ought to be secret, and the scandal of others is to be avoided. - But what is especially to be held concerning a sacred place in this matter, we have already explained above, n. 87.

183. Prop. 16. "The conjugal act at the time of disease, at least for the most part, is illicit neither under grave nor under light sin, because often no harm thence happens to the spouses; but the labor which accompanies the act, at least commonly speaking, can scarcely influence the disease." Gury n. 914. - 5. Yet it brings grave harm in diseases joined with fever, and especially in acute and inflammatory diseases, as also in cardiac vices. Ant. vol. 2. n. 434, 436. Cf. the following number here.

184. Prop. 17. The use of marriage is illicit if it is done with grave danger to life or health; unless, however, there is a grave cause, to which bodily harm seems to be postponed, e.g., danger of incontinence in oneself or in the partner. The reason is that spouses are not masters of their own life, or of the life of the other spouse.

185. Corollary 1. "Because of grave danger of disease a spouse can deny the debt, even if in the other there were danger of incontinence." Thus Busembaum apud St. Alphonsus 952. And the same holy Doctor has, from his own opinion, 950: "It is common that a wife is not bound to render the debt, if she has experienced that she cannot give birth without probable danger of death." L. 953. - "Because of notable weakness of body, those laboring under a strong fever or another grave disease are excused from rendering the debt." G. 916. 6. On the contrary, as the same Father Gury has, l. c. 5, "a wife is not excused from the debt to be rendered because of the ordinary inconveniences of childbirth, pregnancy, or nursing, nor indeed because of grave pains, but short in time, nor because of prolonged but moderate pains, e.g., of the head for several months after birth, nor because of health somewhat weakened; because all these things are annexed to the matrimonial condition; otherwise, however, if danger of life, or of a most grave disease, from the judgment of a truly prudent physician, were to be feared, Lig. 952," e.g., of the Gallic disease, or syphilis. There is a most grave danger of transmitting syphilis from a syphilitic spouse to the other spouse, and to the offspring through copulation. But as to copulation to be had in phthisis, grave danger of infection is present through kisses, and sometimes also through copulation, although through the latter it is not proximate. Nor is attention to be paid to even extraordinary difficulties of a first birth, since they are customarily greater in that very birth. Cf. L. 910.; Debreyne, 2. p. ch. 2. art. 1. Sect. 3.; Ant. vol. 2. 423, 430, 433.

2. "If the disease were chronic, and not proximately tending to death, namely such as is not accustomed to bring on death shortly and easily, as would be plague, or leonine leprosy (by which members fall away piece by piece), then it will not be illicit for the healthy spouse to ask, if there is a just cause present, namely of fostering conjugal love, or avoiding incontinence in oneself or in the other, because otherwise it would be very burdensome to abstain so long from the use of marriage, which could scarcely be without danger of incontinence." L. 909. The healthy spouse can indeed ask in this case, but is not bound; for there are other means for avoiding incontinence. - "Probably a spouse can render to the other infected spouse, even with grave danger to his own health... if the infected spouse asking were in probable danger of incontinence; for although the healthy spouse would not even in that case be bound to render with danger to his own health... both because charity does not oblige with so great a burden, and because the other is not in extreme necessity, since he can assist himself otherwise; nevertheless he can lawfully render and undergo such danger from a motive of charity; because, although a man is not master of his own life, nevertheless he can expose it for charity." L. 950. But soon afterward the holy Doctor again notes: "This is to be understood if the disease is chronic and as it were habitual, as leprosy, the Gallic disease, phthisis, etc., but not if it is of those which are accustomed to bring on death shortly and easily, as is infection of plague or of leonine leprosy." L. 950.

"But just as a healthy spouse cannot render to the infirm spouse with danger to his own health, so also the infected spouse cannot render to the healthy spouse with danger to the latter's health, even if he asks, already aware of his danger: just as it is not lawful to give back a sword to one wishing to kill himself, since no one is master of his own life; thus Sanchez, Pontius, and Bossius with Soto, Coninck, Azor, etc., commonly. Yet Busembaum with Perez, Bonacina with Cajetan, P. Soto, and Crassus and Bossius with Laymann, Pontius, and Reginald probably except if he renders to avoid danger of incontinence in himself or in the other, or to avoid dissensions, or lest he be deprived for a long time of the use of marriage, which can scarcely be without danger of incontinence. And this also is to be understood if his disease is chronic and not proximately tending to death; and likewise if the other healthy spouse asking is already aware of his disease, according to what was said n. 909, dub. 1." L. 950, 952.; Laymann, l. 3. tr. 10. p. 3. c. 6. n. 5, 6.

186. Note. "As to the bath and bloodletting, they seem to agree that conjugal access is not lawful, since it is notably dangerous; they say the same if a spouse labors under fever; as to the time after lunch or dinner, there does not seem to be grave harm in this, as the physicians themselves admit, and therefore we do not dare to condemn one asking for or rendering the debt at that time, unless from experience it were truly established concerning that grave harm." Scavini, tr. 12. d. 5. c. 1. after q. 10.; L. 910. But as to bath, bloodletting, and fever without disease, others deny that notable danger.

187. Can and is a spouse bound to render when harm to the offspring is feared?

These are the words of St. Alphonsus, 951: "They commonly and more truly affirm... The reason... although the offspring would be begotten infirm, nevertheless it is better for him thus to be, than not to be at all." But these are Sporer's words: "By the common opinion of the doctors with Sanchez, disp. 21. num. 8., the one asking then sins only venially, even if he certainly foresees danger of generating offspring defective or monstrous; but the wife will be able lawfully to render because of the importunity of the one asking: for it is better that defective, monstrous, or leprous offspring be born than not be born at all. Yet that she is then not obliged to render, against Sanchez (disp. 21. n. 2.), Sylvester, Henriquez, Bonacina, and our Marchant more rightly teach. Because what is asked with so much harm is truly asked unreasonably and unjustly; and if the other falls into incontinence, let him impute it to himself and to his impotent lust. It would be otherwise in a case of necessity, as when spouses can never ask for or render the debt without danger of defective offspring; as lepers, or those laboring under another hereditary disease," n. 515. Thus also Struggl n. 108.; Laymann, l. c. n. 8.

188. Can and is a spouse bound to render, if the wife has experienced that she gives birth to dead children?

Resp. Several deny; for it is most grave harm, both spiritual and bodily, to bring upon the offspring; and the mother herself, from the death of the offspring, is exposed to great danger to life. But some make an exception if danger of incontinence were present, which in reality would be present if because of this cause they had to abstain perpetually from the use of marriage. But several affirm, because the death of the offspring is accidental, and otherwise experience shows that women after several abortions have finally given birth happily. L. 952, 953. Cf. Debreyne, 2. p. ch. 2. art. 1. Sect. V. But Sporer has these things in the cited number: "If a woman has experienced that she can never bring forth a living fetus, Sanchez probably teaches with many that nevertheless the woman can render the debt, indeed also ask it; because partly the event is uncertain, and, by the ordinary benefit of God, not impossible, and therefore the spouses seem to remain in possession of their right both of asking and rendering the debt; partly because it seems better for the child that he exist deprived of the vision of God, than that he not exist at all, as St. Augustine indicates, lib. 9. cont. Julian. c. 8." Thus Struggl also thinks, l. c., saying: "Although a woman has experienced that she can never bring forth a living fetus, nevertheless she can render, indeed also ask, the conjugal debt; because marriage and its use, in the state of nature fallen through original sin, was instituted by God secondarily also as a remedy for the concupiscence of the spouses. Nor do they sin against charity toward offspring that will die in original sin, because in the other life it will suffer no pain of sense, and it is better for it to be, than simply not to be; as Sporer teaches with Sanchez and Laymann." Therefore, standing this variety of opinions, a wife who should decide to deny the debt "does not seem to be disturbed of itself, if that misfortune arises from some organic defect, from which childbirth is made most difficult, and the fetus, before it comes forth into the light, is extinguished. The reason is that a remedy for this evil is not available, and this begets too much grief. Yet make an exception if dissensions between the spouses would follow from the denial of the debt." G. Cas. 1082.

189. Prop. 18. A spouse certainly conscious of a diriment impediment cannot ask for or render the debt, even if the partner is wholly ignorant of such an impediment.

Proof. "The doctors commonly assert that in such a case the woman cannot render the debt; and thus teaches Villalobos, Coninck, etc., whom Sanchez cites and follows, t. 1. de matr. l. 2. disp. 39. n. 6.; whence afterward he himself, n. 8., thus asserts. From these it is inferred, as most certain to be held, that a spouse conscious of the nullity of the marriage because of a diriment impediment, whether by divine or human law, can in no event render the debt to the ignorant husband, even if she undergoes danger of life. Thus he; and the reason is clear: because if the contrary were said, it would follow that fornication is sometimes lawful, namely because of danger to reputation or life; but to say this is erroneous, since fornication is intrinsically evil; therefore in such a case even with danger to life the debt is not to be rendered, because one who renders the debt in such a case certainly knows the marriage to be null; therefore he certainly knows that he is fornicating; therefore if it were lawful in such a case to render the debt, it would consequently be lawful to fornicate; and thus this opinion is determined in cap. Inquisitioni, de Senten. excommunicat." Diana, tr. vii. de matr. Res. 176. n. 1. Thus also Sporer, nn. 469, 472. Cf. G.-Dumas, Cas. v. 2. n. 772.

190. Note. 1. As to practice in this matter, it must be recalled to memory that the Bishop can dispense in such an impediment in the case in which easy access to the Supreme Pontiff is not open, and there is danger of incontinence in delay. This power is commonly restricted to occult impediments, in a most urgent case of necessity. Yet there are not lacking more recent authors to whom it seems to be extended to public impediments. They take their argument from a Response of the Sacred Penitentiary, 5 Jul. 1831, cf. Enchir. Moral. ed. 4. n. 131, by which the doctrine of St. Alphonsus is declared safe. Cf. L. 1122. But St. Alphonsus has these things, l. c.: "Roncaglia adds with Pignatelli and Tamburini, that even if the impediment were public the Bishop can dispense, when the same reasons (of true urgent necessity) intervene which suffice for dispensing in an occult impediment. But I think this opinion can scarcely ever have place in practice, because when the impediment is public, the reason of scandal ceases if the spouses desist from such a marriage; indeed especially to avoid scandal they are bound to abstain from nuptials." Yet the aforesaid opinion of the more recent authors is favored, for the article of death, by the Response of the Holy Office, 22 Apr. 1890, to the first, Enchir. Morale ed. 4. n. 1044. Cf. L. 1121-1125. - But today there can scarcely be place for the use of such a power, since Bishops customarily receive special faculties from the Supreme Pontiff, and furthermore the following faculty has been granted:

"Any priest who, according to the norm of art. 7 of the Decree Ne temere, when danger of death is imminent, where the parish priest, or the local Ordinary, or a priest delegated by either cannot be had, can validly and lawfully assist at marriage before two witnesses, can also in the same circumstances dispense over all impediments, even public ones, diriment of marriage by ecclesiastical law, except the sacred order of the presbyterate and affinity in the direct line from licit copulation." S. C. de Sacr. 14 May 1909. Acta Apost. Sed. v. 1. p. 468. Wherefore by force of this Decree there is only the natural obligation of sincere penitence and reparation of scandal.

"Whether the faculty of dispensing from matrimonial impediments, when danger of death is imminent in the case of art. VII of the Decree Ne temere, made by the Decree of this Sacred Congregation dated 14 May 1909, is valid only for concubinarii; or also if it is not a case of concubinarii, but another cause is present for providing for conscience, and if the case calls for it, for the legitimation of offspring? - Resp. Negatively to the first part, affirmatively to the second." S. C. de Sacram. 16 Aug. 1909. A. A. S. v. 1. p. 656.

But whether in a case in which access even to the Bishop is difficult, and in delay there is a most grave danger of incontinence, the parish priest or another confessor can declare that the law of the impediment does not oblige in that case, cf. apud the same holy Doctor n. 613.

If a woman were driven to copulation by most urgent fear of death, she could indeed conduct herself merely passively, yet with every danger of consent excluded. G. 787. Cf. here n. 63.

2. "Copulation had between persons whose marriage does not subsist because of an impediment, or who otherwise have been deprived of the right of asking for the debt, then receives a special malice that must necessarily be explained in confession, when the impediment was introduced by divine or ecclesiastical law chiefly because of the copulation itself, as having a special indecency and deformity between such persons against some special virtue; either of religion, as is seen in the impediment of solemn vow, or of order, or of disparity of worship; or of piety and reverence toward those joined by blood, as in the impediment of consanguinity, affinity, spiritual and legal kinship; or against the virtue of justice, as in the impediment of the bond, etc. For in these, besides the mortal sin of fornication against the virtue of continence, that copulation receives a special species of malice against that other virtue, as of sacrilege, incest, adultery, etc., which indeed must necessarily be explained in confession. But the matter stands otherwise when the impediment of marriage was introduced not because of a special indecency of carnal copulation between such persons, but because of another cause, for example because of punishment of crime, because of protecting the liberty of marriage, etc., as may be seen in the impediment of crime, abduction, fear, etc. In which case, if someone is joined with a woman as with a spouse, he commits only simple fornication, just like others; unless perhaps they did this in contempt of the Church, or with the formal intention of not obeying; for then both by contracting and by using marriage they would commit a special sin of formal disobedience, always and in every matter mortal. Thus the very common opinion. Sanchez, etc." Sporer n. 484.

Concerning consanguinity, affinity, spiritual and legal kinship, cf. here n. 73 and following.

But concerning disparity of worship these things are furthermore to be noted for greater precision of the matter: "Fornication of a believer with an unbeliever, for instance with a Hebrew or Mohammedan woman, in the common opinion is far graver than with a Catholic woman. Indeed this circumstance of unbelief, from the continuator of Tournely, changes the species; because just as Christians are prohibited by the Church from marrying an unbeliever in honor of the Catholic faith and for removing the danger of perversion, so for the same cause any copulation with an unbeliever is judged prohibited by the Church, which always tends to the disgrace of Religion; therefore it is not only against chastity, but also against the virtue of Religion. Yet others deny that this special circumstance is mortal." Scavini, Adnot. (A) ad Tr. 4.; Billuart, diss. 6. art. 2. app. 1. And Voit says this is more probable, de praec. Decal. n. 739. - The same is to be said proportionately concerning the circumstance of marriage between a Catholic and a heretic. Cf. Lugo, de Poenit. d. 16. n. 336-341, 343.

191. In doubt concerning the validity of marriage, can someone ask for and render the debt?

Resp. 1. If, after marriage has been contracted in good faith, someone falls into doubt concerning its validity, and the doubt is negative, as being an imprudent doubt, it is to be spurned, and therefore he can render and ask for the debt. But if the doubt is positive, and remains even after diligence has been applied, and it is such that there is indeed a probable reason for the invalidity of the marriage, but none for its validity, then there is a twofold opinion: 1. affirms that one is bound to render to the other, who contracted in good faith, but cannot ask; 2. asserts that he can both render and ask. This opinion is called sufficiently probable by St. Alphonsus, n. 905. The reason is that in doubt the condition of the possessor in good faith is better. For this good-faith possession prevails over any opposed probability, and produces moral certainty. Further, the same possession gives an acquired right to the thing possessed; whence no one is to be deprived of his certain possession until it is certainly established concerning the nullity of his right. Wherefore, as such a possessor in good faith can retain the thing, so he can use it. This holds a fortiori if, besides that legitimate possession, there is also a true probable reason for the validity of the marriage. It is said after diligence has been applied; for otherwise it is certain that while the doubt lasts he can indeed and is bound to render, but he cannot ask. The first reason is because, as was just said, no one is to be deprived of certain possession which is had in good faith until it is certainly established concerning the nullity of his right. The second reason is because before diligence has been applied the ignorance is still vincible, and unless it becomes invincible, one cannot act. L. 903, 904, 905.; Ithur. Cas. 33. n. 29.

2. If marriage has been contracted with doubtful faith concerning an impediment, it is certain that while the doubt lasts, before diligence is to be applied for laying aside the doubt, the doubting spouse cannot ask, but can and is bound to render to the other asking in good faith. The reason is the same as that which was given in the first Response. But whether the doubting one, after diligence has been applied, can also ask for the debt is disputed. The first and more common opinion denies. "But the second opinion, sufficiently probable, affirms... The reason is that, granted that the doubting person cannot lay aside the doubt from the title of possession, nevertheless he can lay it aside from other principles, namely first, because in doubt one must stand for the validity of the act, as is had in L. Quoties, ff. de Rebus dubiis. Secondly, because, since marriage is a favorable cause, in doubt one must stand for its validity, as Sanchez himself proves, l. 1. d. 18. n. 6., with Covarruvias, Lopez, and Menochius, because, just as in the external forum in doubt judgment must be made for the validity of marriage, according to the common opinion there from c. fin. de Sentent. et re judic., so also judgment must be made in the internal forum, which ought to conform to the external when the latter does not rest on a false presumption." L. 906, 903. Cf. here n. 153.

3. Although St. Alphonsus has as sufficiently probable the opinion asserting that in the case of a doubt after marriage has been contracted, and also in the case of a marriage contracted with doubtful faith, after diligence has been applied, the spouse can lawfully ask for and render the debt, nevertheless he excepts the case of doubt "concerning the death of the prior spouse, whether the nuptials were entered with good faith or with doubtful faith." For the holy Doctor says that in that case "the doubting spouse will never be able to ask, unless concerning the death of the prior spouse there is had certainty, or at least so great a presumption that it establishes moral certainty." But the holy Doctor adds this reason: "both because then the probable danger of injury to the prior spouse remains; and because in that case the prior marriage possesses, until it is established that it has been dissolved." But that reason by no means seems demonstrative: for the right of the prior spouse and the possession of the prior marriage, since it is not certainly established, for it is supposed probable that the spouse has died and the marriage has been dissolved, do not present a certain right and a certain possession against which it is not lawful to use probability. Indeed, on the contrary, the later marriage, certainly contracted in good faith and certainly existing, brings a certainly acquired right to its use; and no one can now be despoiled of this right, unless the opposite right is certainly established. And indeed several and grave theologians in reality admit this. These are the words of Struggl: "If each spouse entered nuptials in good faith and certain knowledge concerning the life of the prior spouse cannot be had, each can render and ask for the debt, because in doubt the condition of the possessor is better, and each is in possession of a marriage begun in good faith." And he admits the same also in favor of the party contracting in good faith, if the other party contracted in doubtful or bad faith: "If only one party entered the marriage in bad faith, or while the doubt stood, but the other in good faith, the former is bound to render the debt to the latter asking, but cannot ask, because only one party, and not the other, is in possession of the marriage," de Matr. n. 90. But after sufficient diligence has been applied, it plainly does not appear why the other party also, who contracted while doubting, if not by force of a possession begun in good faith, at least by force of other principles, could not claim for himself the right also of asking. For if the right of the prior spouse is not certain, nor the possession certain, because his death is probable, even here one can invoke for himself those principles: in doubt one must stand for the validity of the act; favors are to be amplified; a marriage certainly contracted and certainly existing ought, in doubt, to prevail over a doubtfully existing marriage, until the certainty of the latter is established and destroys the later one. Further, as Elbel, de Matr. n. 205, teaches, one who thus doubted, and applied every diligence possible to himself in this matter, but nevertheless did not attain certainty, but only a great probability and presumption, could contract marriage; and consequently could ask for the conjugal debt. And indeed the praised author asks "what sort of certainty concerning the death of the prior spouse is required for this, that the spouse may lawfully pass to second nuptials." He immediately responds: "moral certainty is required, at least in the external forum," l. c. n. 204. But soon he adds: "Yet it has been said that moral certainty is required at least in the external forum; for in the internal forum, so that a man or woman may lawfully pass to second nuptials, Sylvester, Rosella, St. Antoninus, Sporer, and Laymann hold that a likely and most probable presumption suffices. Indeed Father Kugler, although with us he holds that moral certainty is required at least regularly, nevertheless in a case where such cannot be had, very probably with several others he thinks that it is enough that there be great probability and presumption, or a greater probability of death than of life, for this, that the ecclesiastical Judge can permit passage to second nuptials." But Laymann has these words, lib. v. tract. X. p. 3. c. 3. n. 2: "The difficulty turns on this: whether, because of a likely presumption and probable cause for believing that the death of the husband has intervened, it may be conceded to the woman to pass to second nuptials? I respond, and say, 1. The opinion of Rosella, St. Antoninus, Sylvester, and Philiarus is very probable: that a woman in such a case would sin in nothing, if with such a very probable persuasion and presumption, and a most just cause for believing that the husband is dead, and therefore in good faith if no one opposed her, she were to pass to second nuptials. Wherefore the confessor in the forum of conscience could permit this to her, and the Judge in the external forum, if after the nuptials have been celebrated he understood the cause, ought neither punish the woman nor separate her from the second husband, until it were known that the prior husband was still living. And this is plainly taken from c. Cum per bellicam, c. 34. q. 1. But the reason is that in moral matters, in which for the most part certainty cannot be had altogether, a most probable opinion or presumption, although not altogether certain, ought to suffice for man for instituting his actions."

4. If the other spouse also is not certain, but each doubts, then before diligence has been applied neither can ask, and therefore neither can render the debt. But after diligence has been applied, sufficiently probably each can ask, and therefore also render. The reason: for this openly follows from what was said in the preceding responses. G. 790.

As to the proposed questions Genicot, Theol. Mor. vol. 2. n. 493. ed. 4., says: "If one contracted with probable doubt concerning the life of the prior spouse... if, after moral diligence has been applied, the probable doubt remains, some opine that he who began possession in bad faith must always abstain from asking for the debt, until it is morally established concerning the death of the other spouse... But the common and certainly probable opinion of Sanchez, the Salmanticenses, etc., holds that then a conscience can lawfully be formed by force of a probable opinion favoring the validity of the new marriage... If each contracted with probable doubt... if after diligence has been applied the doubt remains, it is disputed whether they can render and ask for the debt, by the same reason as was said above concerning one doubting party."

The following cases resolved by the Holy Office also bear upon the matter:

Certain women in Italy after the war in Africa fruitlessly awaited their husbands returning. Since no further information was had concerning them, although diligent inquiries had been made by the Italian Government, supposing them dead in the war, they asked that they could contract another marriage. The Holy Office rescribed: "Provided that the matter concerns men who certainly were present at the battle of Adua, and, after suitable investigations have been carried out, it cannot indubitably be known whether the husband in fact fell dead, with attention to the special circumstances occurring in the case set forth, and to the valid presumption of death, the Ordinary will be able to permit passage to other nuptials." His Eminence Cardinal Gennari notes that this Document is universal, and that it is one thing that passage to other nuptials can be permitted, another thing that the death of the husband is established. The first imports only great probability of the death of the spouse; the other, absolute certainty of it. Monit. Eccles. vol. 10. part. 2. p. 145.

"A woman, when she had fruitlessly awaited the return of her husband, after three years, thinking that he was already dead, in good faith joined herself in marriage to another man; and since it is now impossible to investigate whether the first husband is still living or in fact dead, it is asked whether she can be left in the use of the second marriage contracted until certainty is had concerning the life of the first husband? - Resp. They are to be left in good faith." Holy Office, 22 Mar. 1865.

"This too must furthermore be guarded against: that if perhaps it should happen that the prior spouse, whom they thought dead, is still among the living, then the second nuptials are altogether to be made void, and, the later spouse having been dismissed, each one is bound to return to the prior." S. C. de Prop. Fid. 1792.; Enchir. Morale ed. 4. n. 1032.

192. Can spouses be separated by dissolution of the marriage, if the marriage is judged probably null?

Resp. "In doubt concerning the infirmity of a marriage already contracted, one must stand for firmness, as the common opinion of experts in both laws holds, and as is established from cap. fin. de Sent. et re judic.; cap. Ex litteris, De Probation.; cap. Licet ex quadam, de Testibus et Attestationibus, where Innocent III, in the Lateran Council, giving the reason of this our assertion: 'For it is more tolerable,' he says, 'to dismiss some who have been joined contrary to the statutes of men (attesting concerning an impediment), than to separate those legitimately joined contrary to the statutes of God.' From which it is invincibly concluded that the law must be declared for the validity of the marriage, as long as the testimonies of men prove its nullity only probably, and not evidently. Hence Hostiensis, etc., and several others, whom Sanchez and Palaus cite and follow, so amplify the favor of marriage that if the opinion is singular of someone favoring the firmness of the marriage by a solid reason, it ought to be preferred to the common opinion of others standing against firmness, unless it is supported by some evident reason, or by a manifestly contrary text." Ithur. Cas. 33. n. 27, 28. Cf. here n. 153.