Case 5. Voluntary Per Accidens

Titus, a young man, confesses that he is accustomed rather often to suffer a seminal emission when he rides horseback. When asked by the confessor whether he has given consent to the depraved pleasure, he denies it; and when asked again whether he rides horseback in order to procure those motions, at first he absolutely denies it, and says that he rides rather because that exercise pleases him greatly. But afterward, correcting himself, he says that he is not certain; perhaps because of the said effect he chooses that mode of exercise somewhat more readily. The confessor, however, having heard these things, doubts whether he ought to forbid Titus horseback riding or not. Hence it is asked:

1. What is voluntary in itself and in its cause, and when is this imputed to the agent as fault?

2. Is an effect seriously bad, voluntary only in its cause, always a mortal sin?

3. What is to be said concerning the case?

1. What is meant by voluntary in itself and voluntary in its cause, and when is the latter imputed as sin to the agent?

That is voluntary in itself which is willed in itself and which is not merely foreseen to follow from something else which is willed in itself. On the other hand, that is voluntary in its cause which is not willed in itself although it is foreseen that it will follow from something that is willed in itself.

That which is voluntary in its cause is imputable to the agent if it was foreseen, if it could be avoided, and if there was an obligation to avoid putting the action precisely because it produced the effect in question.¹

1 Manual of Moral Theology, vol. i, p. 24.

2. Is a seriously bad effect which is only voluntary in the cause always imputable to the agent as a grave sin?

No; for no evil is imputable unless it is voluntary, and evil which is only voluntary in the cause, though it would be grave if it were willed in itself, will not necessarily be grave if it is only voluntary in its cause. For this cause may be only slightly wrong, or only slightly connected with the evil effect, and then the amount of voluntariness in the effect is only slight, and can not be more than a venial sin. If the evil only follows by accident from what is voluntary in itself, it can not be truly said to be voluntary at all, and unless there is some extrinsic reason, such as the necessity of avoiding injury to others or the necessity of obeying a lawful superior, it will not prevent a useful or otherwise licit action being performed lawfully.²

2 Ibid.

3. Concerning the case. The confessor neither ought nor is able to forbid horseback riding to Titus in this case. For although he rather often suffers a seminal emission from it, nevertheless he does not give consent to this bad effect, nor is the effect voluntary in itself or in its cause, because it does not follow of itself from horseback riding but only by accident. For horseback riding contains in itself nothing unlawful or lascivious in the genus of lust, nor by reason of harm to another is he bound specially to guard against such an effect. Hence it is lawful for Titus to ride horseback, and he should be advised to cast aside every thought and fear of that bad effect, for bad motions sometimes arise from that rather than from any honorable action.¹

1 Cf. St. Alphonsus, lib. iii, nn. 483, 484.