Case 9. A Passive Resister

Titius, a Catholic layman, in order to show how far the efforts of those who passively resist the payment of the tax for schools extend, and because he thinks that unjust burdens are imposed upon Catholics by the school law, refused to pay the school tax as being against conscience. Paul, however, a Catholic magistrate, compelled Titius, when brought before him, to pay the tax under penalty of undergoing imprisonment. Philip, another Catholic, being scandalized by this, thought that either the one or the other must necessarily have done wrong. Hence it is asked:

1. What kind of obligation do English civil laws impose upon subjects?

2. Can or must unjust laws be obeyed?

3. Is it lawful for a Catholic judge to pronounce sentence according to an unjust law?

4. What is to be said concerning the case?

1. See this question answered, p. 90; also see Manual of Moral Theology, p. 127.

2. May one and ought one to obey unjust laws?

We may not obey a law which commands us to do something contrary to the law of God, for “we ought to obey God rather than men.” If the law is unjust because it lays an unjust burden on a particular person or class, it will not be morally wrong, as a rule, to submit to it, for we may, without sin, forego our strict right. Whether we ought to submit to it or not, will depend upon circumstances. If resistance would produce greater harm than good, as is often the case, there will be a duty of submission to prevent greater evil. If the contrary is true, we are not bound to submit.

3. May a Catholic judge pass sentence according to an unjust law?

Here we must distinguish. If the law prescribes the doing of something that is against the law of God, as idolatry, for example, a judge may not give sentence according to such a law. To command any one to commit idolatry is, and must be, always wrong. Sometimes civil laws are unjust because they are against the rights of the Church. In such cases, if the Church can forego her right, she sometimes does so. Thus, although the civil laws about judicial separation of Catholic married couples are a usurpation of ecclesiastical jurisdiction, yet the Church permits such cases to be tried in the civil courts in England with due precautions.¹

1 Holy Office, Jan. 23, 1886.

If the law is unjust because it is against the rights of the subject, we must distinguish again. Some rights, as that to life, are inalienable; and a judge can not pass sentence according to a law which unjustly imposes the death penalty. If the law merely imposes a fine or imprisonment, such a penalty may be submitted to without sin, and if the judge can not escape the obligation of imposing the penalty without forfeiting his position, it is a probable opinion that he may impose it, and the subject should then submit to it for the common good, at any rate, when resistance would be useless, or would cause greater harm.²

2 Bucceroni, vol. ii, no. 19.

4. The case. Titius, a Catholic, refused to pay the school rate in order to give an object-lesson to the passive resisters, and because he thought it unjust to Catholics. Titius can be excused from sin on the general principle that English law does not bind under pain of sin, and because of his good faith, and also because his assertion is well grounded that Catholics are unduly burdened, inasmuch as they do not get a fair share of the public money contributed to education. Nor does this doctrine excuse the passive resisters, whose case is quite different. For they combine together to resist the law without justification, seeing that they get more than their share of public money for education. Whether they are in good faith or not can be known only to God.

Titius was brought up before Paul, a Catholic magistrate, who sentenced him to go to prison or to pay the tax. Paul acted rightly in passing sentence according to law, as is clear from what was said above. Nor need Philip be scandalized, for neither Titius nor Paul need necessarily have committed any sin in acting as they did.