Chapter — Slater, Cases I

Case 2. Curiosity Sinful

¶1.

To Titius, who applies himself to the study of moral theology, knowledge seems to be good, and therefore the desire for it seems unable to be bad. Theologians, however, seem to teach otherwise when they hand down that curiosity is sinful. Thus, according to them, the reading of an indecent book, inquiry by young people about sexual matters, and an indecent look are sins, at least venial, if they proceed from curiosity; but to inquire of the dead about truth out of curiosity is mortal. In order that he may resolve these difficulties, Titius asks:

¶2.
  1. What is curiosity, and in what does its malice consist?
¶3.
  1. Is the desire or pursuit of a good object always good?
¶4.
  1. Let satisfaction be given to Titius and his difficulties.
¶5.

Solution

  1. What is curiosity and in what does its malice consist ?
¶6.

Curiosity, in the sense in which the word is used by theologians, is an inordinate desire of knowledge. As St. Thomas teaches (II-II, question 167, article 1), knowledge is good in itself, but it may be bad incidentally, as when it is the cause of pride. And although knowledge is good, yet the desire of knowledge may be inordinate and vicious. The desire of knowledge becomes vicious if the end for which it is sought is bad, as if one studies medicine in order to poison an enemy. Moreover, all knowledge is not equally important, and so a desire of knowing what is less useful is inordinate if it stands in the way of acquiring knowledge which is necessary. A law student who requires all his time to qualify for his examinations would do wrong if he spent two hours daily in learning Chinese. If the means taken to acquire knowledge are bad, the desire becomes inordinate. Thus, as St. Thomas says, it is unlawful to seek to know the future from demons. Fourthly, a desire of knowledge is inordinate if it leads one to try to learn what surpasses his powers.

¶7.
  1. Is the desire or pursuit of a good object always good?
¶8.

No; in order that an action may be good, not only the object, but the end and all the circumstances must be good — good arises from an integral cause, evil from any defect whatsoever. The answer, too, is clear from what was said above.

¶9.
  1. The case. Titius, a theological student, thinks that as knowledge is good the desire of it can not be evil. This difficulty has been met already. It is clear that the desire of knowledge can be inordinate, and if it is inordinate, it is sinful. Theologians are right when they teach that curiosity is at least a venial sin and that it may be mortal. Thus the reading of an improper book out of curiosity, where there is not proximate danger of consenting to evil, is a venial sin; if the book is indecent and there is proximate danger of consenting to evil, it is mortal. Before the proper time youths should not think or talk about sexual matters, as thought and talk about such matters before the time leads to impurity. Hence to indulge curiosity about them in talk, look, or reading, is at least a venial sin, and it becomes mortal if the danger of consent be proximate. To seek to know occult matters by calling up the dead is specially forbidden in Holy Scripture, and is mortally sinful.1

1 Manual of Moral Theology, vol. i, p. 218; Lessius, De Justitia, lib. iv, c. 4, n. 84.