Case 8. On Referring One's Actions to God

Gregory, a priest, in a certain catechetical instruction, in order to show the excellence of charity toward God, asserts that the goodness and merit of every human action flow from charity. For actions to be good without qualification, they must be directed to God by an actual or virtual intention, according to the precept of the Apostle: “Whether you eat or drink, or do anything else, do all things for the glory of God”; “Let all your things be done in charity”; and therefore they must proceed from a beginning of charity. Moreover, in order that the actions of a just man may be meritorious in strict justice, he says that they must be performed from an act of charity, at least virtually, so that, if you ask someone why he acts, he can immediately answer: “For the pleasure and glory of God.” Having heard these things, Liberius, a priest, contends that this doctrine smacks of the errors of the Jansenists, asserting that the words of the Apostle contain only a counsel, and that actions do not have to be referred virtually to the glory of God in order to be good; otherwise unbelievers, who neither think about God nor acknowledge Him, would always sin when acting, which has been condemned by the Church. He further contends that, for merit in strict justice, it is sufficient that a morally good work be performed by a man established in the state of grace. Hence it is asked:

1. Must every act be referred to God in order to be good?

2. In order that acts may be meritorious in strict justice, is the influence of charity required in such a way that they must proceed from it either actually or virtually? And, insofar as the answer is affirmative, how is that “virtually” to be understood?

1. Ought every act to be referred to God, in order that it may be morally good ?

Theologians agree that every action in order to be morally good must be referred to God, our ultimate end, in some way. The Jansenists said that this reference to God must be explicit, for the Apostle says: “Whether you eat or drink or whatsoever else you do, do all to the glory of God.”¹ The common opinion of Catholic theologians is that an implicit or virtual reference to God is sufficient, which consists in this, that the agent apprehends that the action is in accordance with right reason, or is not sinful, and that at stated times he refers himself and all that he is and does to God.²

1 1 Cor. x. 31.

2 Tepe, Instit. Theol. Mor., vol. i, n. 96.

2. In order that an action may be meritorious in strict justice must it proceed actually or virtually from charity, and if virtually, how is this to be understood?

This is a disputed point among theologians. Some think with Suarez that it is enough if an action is done out of any supernatural motive for it to be meritorious in strict justice if the other conditions are verified. Thomists require that an action should proceed from charity in order to be meritorious in strict justice. But in requiring the influx of charity they only require that the agent should be in the state of grace, and that at the proper time he should have referred himself and all that he does to God by an act of charity. How often that act of charity must be elicited they do not accurately define. If these conditions be fulfilled, the act proceeds virtually from charity, even though the agent does not expressly think of God.¹

1 Tanquerey, Synop. Theol. Mor., vol. ii, n. 203.

It follows from what has been said that in general Gregory is right according to the opinion of the Thomists. But he should not propose a theological opinion as if it were Catholic doctrine, and he should be careful not to exaggerate, for there is some slight exaggeration in that he says that if the agent is asked why he does something, he should be able to answer at once, “For God's honor and glory.” On the contrary, according to the Thomist opinion, any honest motive will be sufficient for merit in one who is in the state of grace, for the action will then proceed virtually from charity.

Liberius was wrong in saying that Gregory’s teaching was Jansenistic, for he expressly stated that a virtual reference to God is sufficient. In holding that the words of the Apostle contain only a counsel Liberius followed the opinion of St. Bonaventure and many others. Much depends on what he meant by virtually, but if he denied that our actions must be virtually referred to God in the sense that the agent must apprehend that they are according to right reason, and thus referable to our last end, he was wrong. Nor does it follow from this that the actions of those who do not think of God are sinful, for if they apprehend them as good and intend them as such, they virtually refer them to God. In asserting that it is sufficient for merit that an action should be done by one who is in the state of grace, he follows St. Thomas and many others, but to complete the theory he should mention the influx of the act of charity which must be elicited at the proper time; otherwise the state of grace will be lost, inasmuch as a grave precept has not been fulfilled.