Article I. De Pollutione

Pollution is the voluntary emission of human seed outside intercourse, whence it is also called the solitary sin. It is called voluntary either in itself or in its cause, to distinguish it from the involuntary kind, which can arise from various causes and especially occurs naturally in sleep to relieve a superfluity. It is called an emission of seed to distinguish it from that discharge by which a less dense fluid, of an altogether different kind, flows from the urethra in those of and under the age of puberty, whether with venereal excitement or without it.

Directly voluntary pollution is intrinsically evil and a mortal sin. This is established from Holy Scripture and from the constant teaching of the Church. Innocent XI condemned this proposition: "Self-abuse is not forbidden by the law of nature. Hence, if God had not forbidden it, it would often be good and sometimes obligatory under pain of mortal sin." The same is proved from the very bad effects which follow from this vice, both to the individual, by weakening the powers of his mind and body, and to society, inasmuch as those entangled in this vice, content with solitary pleasure, would shun the grave burdens of marriage, to the ruin of the human race. In every case it is unlawful, so that no exception is admitted; for, because of men's very great proneness to this kind of sin, if it were ever permitted they would readily invent occasions of indulging themselves, to their own ruin. Hence it must never be lawful, not even to save life. Several of the older Doctors taught, probably, according to St Alphonsus, that it is lawful to expel corrupt seed without any sensation of lust. Modern writers, however, deny that seed is ever corrupted, so that the foundation of that opinion appears to be wanting.

it is lawful, and expedient, to remove what has gathered under the foreskin in order to lessen irritation,

¹ 1 Cor. vi 10.

² Theol. Mor., 3, n. 478.

Indirectly voluntary pollution is a grave sin, or a slight one, or none at all, according to the circumstances. If it arises from a cause gravely evil in the matter of lust it is a mortal sin, because in willing such a cause a man implicitly wills the pollution also. If it arises from a cause slightly evil in the matter of lust, as from the curious reading of a less than decent book, the pollution itself is more probably only venial, “because, since the pollution is not willed in itself but only in its cause, it will be evil in the degree in which the cause itself is evil.” If it is foreseen as following incidentally from an honourable action, as from riding, or from a manner of lying down adopted for a reasonable cause, there will be no sin. But if it follows incidentally from an action evil under some heading other than lust, as from drunkenness or from breaking a fast, it seems to be venial, since some fault against chastity as well is admitted when pollution is foreseen as following from an action one has no right to perform. Some excuse from all fault, even venial, a pollution which follows incidentally from an action only venially evil under a heading other than lust. As is clear, in this question we leave aside the danger of consenting to the pleasure arising from the pollution, which we have not supposed. Pollution in sleep which happens as a result of a previous mortal sin in the matter of lust is itself a mortal sin; if it follows from a venial sin in the matter of lust, or from the mortal sin of drunkenness, it is itself venial; otherwise it is no sin. If anyone awakes while undergoing a pollution, there is no obligation positively to suppress it, provided no consent is given: the mind ought to be turned to God or to other things lest it consent to the evil. Provided there is a just and proportionate cause for performing actions — as with physicians who treat women — from which a pollution is foreseen as following which is neither intended nor consented to, this will be no sin, as is clear from the principle of the double effect.

¹ St Alphonsus, Theol. Mor., 3, n. 484.

² ibid.

Although women do not furnish seed but an ovum to be fertilised by seed in the conjugal act, they are nevertheless capable of a like complete pleasure in solitude, as the male sex is. Hence, just as in men the incomplete sin of immodest touch and pollution are distinguished in kind, so in women the consummated solitary sin is distinguished in kind from the non-consummated. So it seems must be held with the common opinion. Not always, however, in women who undergo a pollution

is there an emission outside the vessel, but the discharge remains within. From pollution, moreover, as is clear, the menses are carefully to be distinguished, which after puberty is reached and until the menopause nearly all women experience every month without any heat of lust.

Those under the age of puberty, who have no generative seed, are incapable of the complete pleasure which accompanies a consummated sin, and hence at least probably cannot physically commit the sin of pollution. By voluntarily taking pleasure in immodest motions those under puberty do indeed sin mortally, but probably, for the reason stated, it is only the sin of immodest touch.

We have seen that a pollution which follows from a cause only slightly evil in the matter of lust, and which is not voluntary in itself, is only a venial sin. But it is a question controverted among the Doctors whether, if because of some particular disposition or weakness of a person a pollution almost always follows from such a cause, he is bound under grave sin to refrain from performing the action — on the ground that the cause is then judged to influence the effect gravely — or only under slight sin. If there is proximate danger of giving consent, all admit that there is a grave obligation to abstain from performing the action; otherwise the opinion of many seems probable, that the obligation is only slight. For the reason assigned by St Alphonsus for the doctrine given above still holds good: “because, since the pollution is not willed in itself but only in its cause, it will be evil in the degree in which the cause itself is evil.” And the reason why the cause seems in this case to influence the effect more gravely is the subjective disposition of the agent, which is not willed, and therefore does not affect the imputability of the effect.