Chapter VII. The Interpretation of Law

THE interpretation of law is its genuine explanation according to the mind of the lawgiver.

(a) This interpretation may be authentic, doctrinal, or customary.

Laws are authentically interpreted by the lawgiver, his successor, and by him to whom this power of interpreting the law has been granted by them.

An authentic interpretation set forth by way of law has the same force as the law itself; and if it only declares the words of the law which in themselves are certain, it does not need to be promulgated and it has a retrospective force; if it restricts or extends the law or if it explains a doubtful law, it has not a retrospective force and it should be promulgated. But if it is given by way of judicial sentence or rescript in a particular matter, it has not the force of law, and it only binds the persons and affects the matters for which it was given (Can. 17).

Doctrinal interpretation is that which doctors and lawyers make according to the recognized rules of legal interpretation. It has weight according to the knowledge, skill, experience, and standing of him who makes the interpretation.

Customary interpretation is that which a law receives from the practice and conduct of those who are subject to it. It has very great authority, for it is presumed to have at least the tacit approval of the lawgiver, and indeed, according to the adage, ‘‘ Custom is the best interpreter of law ” (Can. 29).

(6) A strict interpretation takes the words of the law in their literal meaning; a wide interpretation takes the words in a looser sense.

Many rules are given by canonists for the doctrinal interpretation of law. The following are the most important for our purpose in moral theology:

(a) The words of the law must be taken in their obvious and natural meaning. The lawgiver must be supposed to have wished to express himself as clearly as possible, and to have said what he meant. Sometimes, however, legal terms have a technical meaning which must be attended to. Thus, legitimate in ecclesiastical law is used of children who have been legitimatized as well as of those who were born in lawful wedlock.

(b) The mind of the legislator and the scope of the law must be attended to. This rule does not imply that we must try to get at the private intention and object which the lawgiver had in view in making the law. It means that we must consider the circumstances which gave rise to the law, the object which it was designed to attain as expressed in the law itself, especially in the narrative or historical portion of it. The whole law should be pondered, not merely an isolated section; and if there is question of interpreting an answer or rescript sent in reply to a question or petition, this latter must be carefully considered.

(c) Laws which impose some new burden or restriction receive a strict interpretation, those which confer a favour a wide interpretation. For the lawgiver is presumed to be benignant towards his subjects, and to have expressed himself with precision and strictness in the disagreeable task of laying burdens on his people. In such a law, then, the word clerk will only comprehend the lower ranks of the clergy, whereas it will comprehend dignitaries and religious in favourable matters.

(d) A law must not be extended from one case to another even if the same reason exist in the two cases, for the reason of the law is not the law. And so although parish priests are bound to offer Mass on holy days of obligation for their parishioners, this obligation must not be extended to a parish priest’s assistants, for such priests, though they have the care of souls, are not parish priests (Can. 475). If, however, anything unjust, inequitable, or absurd would follow from the application of this rule, then it must not be applied. And so, generally, where the law punishes the adultery of the husband, it must be applied to an adulterous wife; where power is granted to make a will, legacies may be left too. The less is contained in the greater (cf. Can. 18 ff.).

Epieikeia, or equity, is a benign and equitable interpretation of the law, by which it is not deemed to apply to some particular case. For cases arise where, if the law were applied, hardship and harm would be the result. The law is made for ordinary conditions and is intended to apply in ordinary circumstances; the lawgiver could not foresee all possible cases, and he is not presumed to intend the law to press unduly on individuals, so as to cause special hardship. So that when the observance of the law in any particular case would cause special hardship which the lawgiver cannot be presumed to have intended, the person so situated is excused from obeying the law by an equitable interpretation of it. If, for example, I should incur serious risk of contracting some disease if I went out to hear Mass on a Sunday, I am excused from obeying the precept.

Such equitable interpretations are specially permitted in affirmative laws, not in those which make an act done contrary to them null and void. The common good requires that these should be observed even with grave personal inconvenience. And so the diriment impediments of marriage do not cease to bind even when they cause serious inconvenience in particular cases,