Chapter II. The Effects of Betrothal

As betrothal is a contract Of Betrothal and the matter is serious, the betrothed are under a grave obligation in justice to fulfil their engagement. If a special time was agreed upon, they must keep to the appointed time, otherwise they must marry at a reasonable time after the engagement has been concluded. As grave inconveniences are likely to arise from a too prolonged betrothal, it is the duty of those who have the cure of souls to admonish those engaged that they should marry if without just cause they defer doing so too long. A delay of over a year without good reason seems excessive.

After betrothal the parties are under a special obligation to live chastely, and if either commit a sin of impurity with a third person the sin has a special malice on account of his violation of the fidelity which he owes to his betrothed. It is a disputed point whether the circumstance of betrothal changes the species of the sin so that mention of it must be made in confession, or whether it merely aggravates its malice, It is probable that it does not change the species of the sin, for betrothal does not, like marriage, give one party a right in the other, but gives only a right to have the other when the engagement is executed.

Betrothal to one prevents valid betrothal to another as long as the former tie lasts, for a promise to do what is unlawful has no binding force. If, however, in spite of betrothal to one the party marries someone else, the marriage will be valid but illicit, just as the sale of a house to one person is valid in spite of a previous promise to sell it to someone else. Betrothal, in other words, is a prohibitory, not a diriment impediment of marriage with third persons,

The consent of the parents of the parties is certainly not necessary for the validity of marriage. The Council of Trent teaches this¹ Nor is it necessary per se for the lawfulness and the validity of betrothal, because in the choice of a state of life every man is his own master. It does not follow, however, from this doctrine, that children need not consult their parents about marriage and about a partner for life. In a matter of such importance for the future happiness of the child, and because the marriage of a member of the family concerns not merely the individual, but the whole family, and especially the head of it, a dutiful child will ordinarily consult his parents before entering on an engagement to marry. If a child wishes to contract an unsuitable marriage, as if the heir of an honoured house wishes to marry an actress of doubtful reputation, the parents have a right to object to such a marriage; and if they forbid it, the son is bound to obey, and he commits sin if he goes against his parents’ commands. An engagement contrary to the reasonable commands of one’s parents is unlawful and therefore invalid. Mere inequality of rank between the parties of itself is not a sufficient reason why parents should forbid a marriage, but a difficulty arises when inequality of rank will be the cause of dissension and ill-feeling in the family. Even in this case a son who wishes to marry someone of inferior rank is not always bound in conscience to submit to the wishes of his parents. If he is satisfied that the woman he loves will make him a good wife, and he is not prepared to take anybody else, he is not bound to sacrifice his own happiness in deference to the wishes of his parents, especially when these originate in social prejudice rather than in a desire for the welfare of their child.

English civil law requires the consent of the father or guardian for the lawfulness of the marriage of a minor. In most of the United States of America the law is similar.

Canon 1034 bids parish priests seriously to warn minors against contracting marriage without their parents’ knowledge and consent. If minors insist on doing this, parish priests should not assist at the marriage without consulting the Ordinary.

¹ Sess. xxiv, c. 1, de ref. Matr.