Chapter IV. Numerical Distinction of Sins

If a man steals five pounds from A on one day, and another five pounds from B the day after, he commits two distinct sins of theft. There is no difficulty about such cases. But how many sins does a man commit who, with the intention of seducing a woman, begins with bad talk, immodest looks and touches, and finally attains his end? Or how many sins are committed by one who is almost all day long occupied with bad desires, which are, however, interrupted by his taking his meals and by other occupations ? Or how many sins does he commit who sets fire to a building where a dozen people were asleep who all perished in the flames? In order to decide as far as possible such difficult questions as these, and enable penitents to confess the number of their sins according to the divine precept, theologians have drawn up the following rules:

Rule I.—There are as many sins as there are total objects in sinful actions. By total object is meant an object of the will which either in itself or by the intention of the agent forms a complete whole, and is not referred to another action as a part of the whole. Thus the theft of a sum of money is a complete whole in itself, and forms a total object of the will. Immodest touches may form a complete whole if the intention be restricted to them without an idea of going farther; but if immodest touches are intended as a means to commit further sin, they form one complete whole with the subsequent sin, and make one sin with it.

The reason of the rule is clear from what has been said before. The object specifies the act, and if there be one whole object from a moral point of view, there will be one complete moral action and one sin.

Rule II.—There are as many sins as there are moral interruptions in the sinful act. We say “‘ moral interruptions ” because the laws for confession are to be understood according to the common estimation of ordinary men, not according to the subtle distinctions of the philosopher. And so, if common sense tells us that on account of some interruption in the course of a bad desire, there are two human acts, and not one continuous action, there will be two sins and not one. However, the main difficulty in this question is to decide what moral interruption is sufficient and necessary to break the moral continuity in an action and to multiply the sin.

It is clear that if a person gives up his sinful design, and then returns to it again, there will be a break of continuity, and two distinct sins. Moreover, without explicitly relinquishing his evil design, there may be such an interruption in entertaining it that when it is taken up again there will be a new action and a distinct sin. The interval which is necessary for such an interruption will vary according to the nature of the act and the circumstances.

(a) In merely internal sins of thought, any complete cessation from the bad thought would seem to be sufficient to interrupt the moral continuity of the action and to multiply the sin. However, if the interval is short, and the thoughts proceed from the same impulse of passion, or one depends on another and issues from it, the moral unity will not be broken, and there will be only one sin.

(b) A determinate purpose to commit an external sin— murder, for example—is not multiplied by ordinary interruptions demanded by sleep, meals, or daily occupations. Such a purpose, persevered in for a week or so, would constitute only one sin. The same would hold for a longer period if the purpose were renewed at short intervals, and never retracted, If, however, it were not renewed within a short interval, mere lapse of time would eventually cause the purpose to evaporate and cease to exist, so that renewal of the purpose after a considerable interval would constitute a new and distinct sin, It is very difficult to define precisely what interval of time would be required to break the moral continuity of the act. Much depends upon circumstances; a longer interval would be required when the act was not renewed through forgetfulness, or because no occasion of renewal presented itself; a shorter would suffice if the ceasing to entertain the sinful purpose were voluntary. No better rule can be given than that the question of time must be left to the judgement of a prudent man.

(c) If the purpose to commit sin is from time to time externalized by the taking of some means to the end in view, the act remains one and the same for a long interval of time, and such a purpose entertained for months and years under those circumstances would constitute only one sin. Similarly a purpose persevered in for years not to pay a: debt that is owing constitutes only one sin, though, of course, it is more grievous the longer it is entertained.

It is a disputed point among theologians whether a sinful act which is directed to many distinct objects is only one or many sins. An example will illustrate the difficulty. If an anarchist throws a bomb into a crowd of people and kills a score of them, does he commit a score of distinct sins of murder which must be mentioned in confession if he goes to confession, or does he commit only one big sin, whose malice indeed equals twenty, but which is adequately confessed by saying, ‘I killed a number of people by throwing a bomb”? It will not suffice to say, “I committed homicide,” for that would mean the taking of one life only, which was not precisely what was done.

In this controverted question it would seem better to distinguish, and say that if the objects were capable of being grouped together and actually were conceived as one object by the mind, there was one act and one sin. If, however, the criminal distinctly thought of the several objects and intended to kill each and all, there will be as many sins as there are distinct objects. A priest who, when starting for a fortnight’s holiday, intends to omit his breviary during the whole time, commits one big sin; but if he executes his design, he commits a new sin every day that he neglects his duty, for the Office of each day forms one total object, and the precept of saying the divine Office is virtually multiple, and falls on each and every day.

If the means used to commit a sin are themselves evil and of the same species as the sin, and if they can be regarded as parts of one total object, as, for example, immodest talk and touches with a view to fornication, such means need not be distinctly confessed, as we saw above. If, however, the evil means are of a different species from the sinful end, as, for example, lying in order to commit a theft, the evil means are a separate sin, and must be distinctly confessed. If the means used to commit a sin are not in themselves sinful, they need not be confessed, unless the end was not attained, and in that case it will be sufficient to express in general terms in confession the use of means to give effect to a sinful purpose, by saying, for example, ‘“‘ I tried to commit theft,” if the intending thief merely entered a house, but failed to effect his design.