Chapter IV. Vows

A vow is a promise made to God about something which is good, possible, and better than its omission.

It is, then, a promise, a contract with God, a deliberate taking on one’s self of a new obligation which binds the conscience; and in this it differs from a mere purpose to do better, which imposes no new and special obligation. Such an act must be perfectly human, performed with full knowledge and with complete use of reason, so that a vow taken by a man who was half drunk, or who had not the full use of reason, would not be valid. A vow, however, does not require actual and explicit consent when the obligation is assumed; it will be sufficient if there is virtual and implicit consent. A person who receives the subdiaconate, to which he knows that the Church has annexed a solemn vow of chastity, takes the vow by the very fact of being ordained, though at the time he is not thinking of it.

A vow in the strict sense is an act of divine worship offered to God alone, and so we cannot take a vow to the Blessed Virgin Mary or to the saints.

The matter of a vow must, of course, be something which is lawful and good; it would be an insult to God to promise him to do something wrong. It must be something which is possible, both physically and morally, for there can be no obligation to do what is impossible. A vow, then, to avoid all sin, even the slightest, would be invalid, for without a special privilege of God it is impossible. The matter of a vow must not only be good, but better than its omission or its opposite. For what is promised to God in a special manner and under a fresh obligation must be something that will be pleasing to him, but a promise to do something which had better not be done cannot be pleasing to God, who desires our perfection.

A vow is absolute when it has no condition attached to it, otherwise it is conditional.

A personal vow makes a promise of some action to be performed; a real vow dedicates a thing to God.

Vows are perpetual if the obligation is undertaken for life; otherwise they are temporary.

A solemn vow is one which is invested by the Church with special force and stability, together with certain legal effects; others are simple. The vows taken by religious in regular orders specially approved by the Pope, and by those who receive sacred orders, are solemn.

Substantial mistake about the matter of a vow or about the circumstances which are regarded as entering into the substance of the matter invalidates a vow. For substantial mistake hinders consent of the will; consent was given to something which was not there, and so there was no contract. A vow, then, dedicating to God a chalice which is thought to be silver, while in reality it is gold, would be invalid, just as a sale of it would be under the same mistake. Merely accidental mistake about things of little moment which were not really the motive for taking a vow does not invalidate it. However, according to St Alphonsus,¹ it is a probable opinion that a mistake about something connected with a vow, which if it had been known before would have prevented its being taken, is sufficient to invalidate it. This doctrine may be applied to private vows, but it cannot be extended to the vows of religion, which place the religious in a permanent state of life. In order to invalidate these, mistake must be substantial. For just as the perpetuity of the state of marriage, the good of the parties concerned, and the public good, require that only substantial mistake should invalidate marriage, so for the same reasons only substantial mistake invalidates the vows of religion, by which the religious enters into mystical espousals with Christ.

Fear arising from natural causes, provided that it does not take away the use of reason, does not invalidate a vow. If, however, grave fear be unjustly caused with a view to compelling another to take a vow, the vow is null and void (Can. 1307). The same is probably true even if the fear be slight. For God cannot be supposed to accept a promise which has not been freely given, but on the contrary extorted by unjust violence,

¹ Theol. Mor., 3, n. 226.

A vow, as we have seen, imposes a special obligation on him who has taken it to perform what he has promised: “ If thou hast vowed anything to God, defer not to pay it; for an unfaithful and foolish promise displeaseth him: but whatsoever thou hast vowed, pay it.¹ If a special time was fixed for the fulfilment of the vow, with the intention that it should be fulfilled then, and at no other time, it must be fulfilled at the time appointed under pain of sin, and it no longer binds after the time has elapsed. If, on the contrary, it was intended that it should continue to bind even after the time fixed had elapsed, then the obligation still remains, The obligation should be fulfilled at the proper and reasonable time, and unreasonable delay will be sinful: ‘‘ When thou hast made a vow to the Lord thy God, thou shalt not delay to pay it... . And if thou delay, it shall be imputed to thee for a sin.”² It is not clear, however, whether even notable delay in the execution of a vow is always mortally sinful. Notable delay without just cause would be a mortal sin if the obligation of the vow were grave, and if the delay endangered its execution altogether or made the matter of the vow notably less than was promised. On the other hand, if a rich man vowed to give a large sum of money to the poor, assigning no particular time for the execution of the vow, it is probable that he would not commit a grave sin, even if he deferred giving the money until his death, and then gave it by his will. For in these circumstances the matter of the vow is not seriously affected by the delay, which therefore cannot be a grave sin.

The measure of the obligation of a vow is the will of him who takes it, much in the same way as the obligation of a law depends on the will of the lawgiver. Ordinarily it will be presumed that in grave matter, such as the Church considers to be sufficient for a precept to bind under mortal sin, a vow also binds under pain of grave sin, for the intention of him who took the vow is presumed to accommodate itself to the matter. Nothing, however, prevents him from limiting the obligation of a vow even in grave matter, so that transgressions of it will be only venial sins, if he expressly intended it. This, however, must not be understood of the essential vows of religion, nor of the solemn vow of chastity annexed to sacred orders. These vows are regulated by the Church, and according to her intention they bind under pain of grave sin in grave matter. Another exception must be made to the general rule that the obligation of a vow depends on the will of him who takes it; for if the matter be light it cannot form the ground for a grave moral obligation, when this is imposed by a human will. As a contract binds only the parties who agree to it, so no one can be bound by a vow made by someone else. In former times it was not uncommon for parents to vow a child to religion. Such a vow put no obligation on the child, but the parents were bound by it to give the child the opportunity of entering religion if he desired to do so. There are also instances of communities who have jointly taken a vow to observe a certain day as a fast or a feast. Thus the Romans, in the year 1703, vowed to observe as a fast day the vigil of the feast of the Purification of the Blessed Virgin Mary in thanksgiving for being preserved from an earthquake. The successors of those who took such a vow are bound to fulfil it, much in the same way as they are bound to pay interest on the National Debt. Their predecessors had the power to bind themselves and their successors, for the community remains the same moral entity.

We saw above that the matter of a vow must be something which is physically and morally possible. It may happen that he who took the vow may be able to fulfil it in part only and not wholly. He will be bound to do at least this when the matter is capable of being divided and is usually so treated, for the obligation of the vow then falls on the whole and on its several parts. Otherwise he will not be bound, nor will he be bound to do something which was a mere accessory of the substance of the vow, even if it be possible. And so one who should vow to fast for a week, if he found this impossible, would not be excused from fasting on the days that he could do so. But if he had vowed to build and decorate a church and afterwards found this to be impossible, he would not be bound to build a portion of it, nor to decorate some other church.

¹ Eccles. v 3.

² Deut. xxiii 21.

A vow may cease to bind for intrinsic or for extrinsic reasons. It will cease to bind intrinsically if the matter cease to be a better good or become impossible. Thus if a young man had vowed to enter religion, but his parents afterward became dependent on him so that he could not leave them without a violation of duty, his vow would cease to bind as long as the same conditions lasted. Or if a wealthy man vowed to spend a considerable sum of money in charities every year, if he became poor his vow would no longer bind him. And generally a vow, like any other promise, will cease to bind if circumstances supervene which at the outset would have prevented the vow from being taken. A vow ceases to bind extrinsically if it is annulled or dispensed or commuted. We will treat of these extrinsic causes of the cessation of a vow in the following paragraphs.

The annulment of a vow may be direct or indirect, By direct annulment the obligation of a vow is altogether removed by one who has authority over the will of the person who took the vow. For those who are placed in such a state of dependency on their superiors cannot undertake any absolute obligation; they can only bind themselves conditionally, supposing that their superior consents. If he does not consent, the obligation falls to the ground (Can. 1312).

By indirect annulment the obligation is suspended by one who has authority over the matter of the vow. For it is not just that an obligation should be undertaken which interferes with the rights of someone else. And so if a servant took a vow to hear Mass every morning, her mistress, whose rights are infringed thereby, might suspend the obligation of the vow as long as the servant remains with her, for no service is rendered to God by injuring a fellow-creature. When the term of service expired, the obligation of the vow would revive.

The annulment of a vow will be valid even when it is done without just cause and against the will of the subject, for even then a condition is wanting on which the validity of the vow depended. It will be lawful as well, if there be a reasonable cause, which need not necessarily be a very serious one.

All religious superiors can directly annul the vows taken by their subjects after their religious profession, and indirectly the vows taken by them previously, as far as they prejudice religious discipline or the rights of superiors. The vows of poverty, chastity, and obedience—the essential vows of religion by the taking of which a person becomes a religious—cannot be annulled; for it is only by them that religious superiors receive their authority over the wills of their subjects, and authority is powerless against its own source.

Parents can directly annul the vows of their children taken before the age of puberty, when children become independent of the authority of their parents in matters relating to the service of God. They can indirectly annul the vows of their adult children as long as they continue to live with them.

A husband can directly annul the vows of his wife taken after marriage, and indirectly those taken previously. A wife can annul the vows of her husband only indirectly, as far as they prejudice her rights.

A dispensation from a vow is a remission of the vow made in the name of God for a just cause by one who has spiritual jurisdiction in the external forum. The Church has always understood that the power to dispense vows is contained in the authority granted by our Lord to his Church.¹ She exercises this power in the name of God, not arbitrarily, but for just cause, which is required not merely for the lawfulness, but also for the validity of the act. As examples of a just and sufficient cause theologians give the following: the public good or the private spiritual advantage of him who is dispensed; unusual difficulty in the observance of the vow; the fact that the vow was taken without sufficient deliberation or in immature age.

The power of dispensing vows belongs to the public authority granted by God to the Church in order that she may rule and legislate for her people. It does not belong to the power of remitting sins which is exercised in the sacrament of Penance. All ecclesiastical prelates, then, who exercise jurisdiction in the external forum in their own name can dispense from vows, except in so far as their authority has been limited by a superior. Other ecclesiastics can only dispense from vows by delegated authority and according to its terms and conditions, (a) The Pope can for just cause dispense any of the faithful from any vow.

(b) For a good reason and provided that the dispensation does not injure the rights of others, local Ordinaries can dispense their subjects and also strangers from private vows which are not reserved to the Holy See. The only private vows which are now reserved to the Holy See are a vow of perfect and perpetual chastity and a vow of entering into a religion of solemn vows, if they were taken absolutely and after the completion of the eighteenth year of age (Can. 1309, 1313).

(c) Prelates of Religious Orders have quasi-episcopal jurisdiction over their own subjects, and as a general rule have the same power over these as a Bishop has over his subjects. Besides, they receive by their privileges ample delegated authority to dispense not only their own subjects, but seculars and lay people as well. The privileges granted to the respective Orders should be consulted concerning this special authority and the conditions of its exercise.

(d) Parish priests and confessors have no jurisdiction in the external forum, and can only dispense from vows by delegated authority. They should consult their faculties to know what powers they have received from their Bishop, When a vow has been made in favour of a third person and accepted by him, such a vow cannot lawfully be dispensed without his consent, otherwise justice would be violated. And so, although a Bishop has power to dispense members of diocesan congregations from the vows of religion, he cannot do this lawfully without the knowledge and consent of the superiors of the Order.² The religious vows of congregations which have in any way been approved by the Holy See are reserved to the Pope.

The vow of chastity imposes a serious and arduous obligation which should not be undertaken without mature deliberation and knowledge of one’s own strength. A confessor should be slow to approve of such a vow being taken, especially if it is to be perpetual. When there is just cause for a dispensation being granted, it is the practice of the Church to commute, rather than altogether to dispense, a perpetual vow of chastity. This practice, though not of obligation, should be adhered to by those who have authority to dispense from this vow. It may be commuted into the obligation of receiving the sacraments at least once a month, saying the rosary every day, or other works of piety.

¹ Matt. xvin 18.

² Constitution of Leo XIII, Conditae, December 8, 1900.

A vow is commuted when another good work to be performed under the same obligation is substituted for that which was promised.

All who can dispense from a vow can also commute it, for the less is contained in the greater. It is obvious, however, that it must not be done to the injury of a third person. person who is under vow may commute it into some The good work which is evidently better than what was promised, for, as the rule of canon law has it, he does not violate his promise who changes it into something better (Can. 1314). He may also commute his vow into something that is of equal merit; but to avoid the danger of self-deception, and because it is not easy to say when good works are of equal merit, it is better to have recourse to one’s confessor. Special authority is required to commute a vow into something which is less good, for such a commutation is a sort of dispensation from the vow. In order that commutation into something which is less good may be lawful, a just cause is required, though less than is required for dispensation; probably, however, if there be no just cause the commutation will be valid, but the obligation will remain of supplying the deficiency as in human transactions. No special cause is required for commuting a vow into something which is evidently better; greater readiness in fulfilling one’s obligation will be a sufficient cause for commuting a vow into something of equal merit.

One whose vow has been commuted is always at liberty to return if he pleases to the observance of his vow, for the commutation was made in his favour, and he may renounce it.

When a vow has been commuted by competent authority its obligation is extinguished or transferred to the new work, and it does not revive even if the performance of the substituted good work is found to be impossible. On the contrary, when the substitution has been made by private authority, in case the performance of the substituted work is impossible, the original obligation revives.