Chapter VI. Scandal

SCANDAL in its theological sense is any word or action which has at least the appearance of evil and is the occasion of sin to another. This is the received definition of active scandal. Passive scandal is the sin which another is led to commit through active scandal. It is quite immaterial whether passive scandal be a sin of the same species as the scandal which caused it or not; a priest who gets drunk may cause scandal by inducing others to follow his example, or by causing others to speak ill of priests or of the Catholic Church.

Scandal is direct when it is foreseen and intended. If it is intended precisely in order that another may fall into sin, it is called diabolic; if it is intended on account of the advantage it will bring to him who gives it, it is simply direct scandal.

Indirect scandal is foreseen by him who gives it, but it is not intended.

Scandal of the weak is caused by the ignorance or frailty of him who suffers it; pharisaic scandal is caused by his malice, as was the case with the Pharisees taking scandal at the words and actions of our Lord and his Apostles.

Giving scandal is of itself gravely sinful, as it is against charity; and it is a special sin against the precept of fraternal correction which obliges us to do what we can to rescue a fallen brother, whereas one who scandalizes his brother causes him to fall.¹ Although of itself scandal is a grave sin, it is frequently only venial in the concrete. The gravity of the sin is not measured by the malice of the sin which causes scandal, but by the malice of the sin which he who gives scandal foresees will certainly or at least probably be caused in another. Thus a gravely sinful word or act may be a venial sin of scandal, and a venially sinful word or act may be a grave sin of scandal. It is plain, too, that not every sin committed in the sight of others is a sin of scandal, but then only when it is forese n that at least probably it will cause others to commit sin.

¹ Cf. Matt. xviii 7.

There is a twofold malice in sins of direct scandal; such sins are against charity and also against that special virtue which he who suffers scandal violates. So that when A incites B to drink to excess, A sins against charity and against temperance, which not only prescribes moderation in one’s own actions, but forbids one to be the cause of its violation by another.

The question whether indirect scandal in the same manner also contains a twofold malice is disputed among theologians, The negative opinion is probable, for although the virtue of temperance, for example, forbids me to induce another to sin against it, and I violate temperance if I do so, yet temperance does not require of me that I should prevent others from sinning against it; I may sin against charity if I do not try to prevent a sin of intemperance in another, but I do not sin against temperance. And so when indirect scandal is given, thereby causing another to drink to excess, there is a sin against charity; but the sin of scandal does not contain in addition the malice of a sin against temperance.

When A solicits B to commit sin with him and B consents, both sin against charity and also against the virtue which is specially violated; so that although solicitation causes A’s sin to be greater, it does not constitute a specific difference, and need not be confessed.

If I foresee that scandal is likely to be caused by an action of mine which has the appearance of being wrong, but which in fact is perfectly lawful, I am under the obligation of removing the danger of scandal by explaining my conduct, or omitting the action altogether if I can do so conveniently. If I cannot explain or omit the action without serious inconvenience, I am justified in performing the action and permitting the scandal, for charity does not bind to one’s own serious inconvenience.

On the other hand, I am not justified in omitting an action which is prescribed by the natural or divine law on account of the scandal which the action would give, and so when God’s honour or the salvation of my neighbour or my own requires that I should make public profession of the faith, I am bound to make it though my profession will make the enemies of the faith blaspheme.

Even a positive precept does not cease to bind on account of a general fear of scandal; whether it ceases to bind or not on account of scandal in a particular instance is a disputed point. Some theologians maintain that if a woman knows that her presence at Mass is a cause of grave sin to another and she cannot hear Mass elsewhere, she is obliged to abstain from hearing Mass at least for a Sunday or two, because the natural precept of avoiding scandal is more important than the positive precept of hearing Mass on Sundays. Others, on the contrary, hold that inasmuch as the scandal is taken and not given, the obligation of hearing Mass does not cease to bind in such a case. Practically, therefore, one is free to follow either opinion. This disputed question refers to scandal of the weak, for positive precepts do not cease to be obligatory on account of pharisaic scandal.

A good action without any appearance of evil which is not prescribed, and which can without inconvenience be omitted, should be omitted when it would cause scandal. If it cannot be abandoned without some inconvenience, there is no obligation to abstain from it; and so I may receive the sacraments even when they are not obligatory from a priest whom I know to be in a state of sin and unworthy to administer them.

If I suspect the honesty of a servant, I do nothing wrong if I leave a sum of money where I know he will see it with the object of finding out whether he will steal it. If he is an honest man, no harm will follow; if he is a thief, my action does not make him one; I do but furnish the opportunity for him to betray himself, and in my own defence I am justified in doing that. It is of course morally wrong to use agents provocateurs in order to detect criminals; they are the cause of another’s sin, not merely the occasion.

If I know that someone has made up his mind to commit sin and there is no other way of preventing him, I may lawfully induce him to be satisfied with some less offence of God than he was bent on committing. And so if a man was determined to commit adultery, I do nothing morally wrong, but rather the contrary, by persuading him to commit fornication instead. Many theologians, indeed, deny this doctrine on the ground that we must not do evil that good may come of it. But there is no question here of doing evil one’s self; we are not justified in doing a less moral evil instead of a greater; we must abstain from all evil, great and small. The question is whether it is an evil action to persuade someone bent on committing a great sin to be satisfied with a less. This is denied by those who defend the above doctrine. And reasonably so, for it is a good action to persuade another to do less evil than he was bent upon doing. To lessen evil is surely to do good. This is the more probable view, according to St Alphonsus.¹

¹ Theol. Mor., 2, n. 57.