Chapter VII. Co-operation in Another's Sin

CLOSELY connected with scandal is the subject of co-operation or participation in the sin of another; indeed, they are often treated of together, but on account of the importance of the latter it seems desirable to devote a special chapter to it.

Co-operation, then, may be formal or material. Formal co-operation is concurrence in the bad action of another and in the bad intention with which it is performed. Material co-operation is the concurrence in the external action of another but not in the evil intention with which it is done.

Co-operation is proximate or remote according as the action of the secondary agent is more closely connected with the action of the principal agent or less so.

One is said to co-operate positively when he does something which influences the action of the principal agent; one is said to co-operate negatively when he does not hinder a bad action which he is bound to prevent.

It is never lawful to co-operate formally with another’s sin, for it is obviously to wish evil, which is always sinful. Nor is it lawful to co-operate materially with the sin of another when the action of the secondary agent is itself wrong, as is also clear. But provided the action of the secondary agent is not itself wrong, but right, or at least indifferent, and he has no evil intention, and furthermore there is a just cause for permitting the sin of the principal agent, material co-operation in the sin of another is not wrong. In such circumstances, the secondary agent does nothing that is wrong in itself; he foresees, it is true, that another will take advantage of his action in order to commit sin, but the secondary agent is only bound to prevent this out of charity, which does not bind with relatively serious inconvenience, and this is present whenever there is a just cause for permitting the sin of the principal agent. This is merely the application of the principle of a double effect which was laid down in the Book on Human Acts.¹

The cases to which this doctrine may be applied are very 732) numerous, but the safe application is difficult and attended with risk. The chief difficulty lies in determining the gravity of the cause which will justify one in co-operating materially in another’s sin. No general rule can be laid down on the point beyond saying that a graver cause is required when there is question of a graver sin, when the co-operation is more proximate, and when it is more probable that the sin would not be committed at all if the co-operation were denied. The following examples taken from approved authors are given as illustrating the application of the doctrine, and they may be used to show what may be done in similar cases.

(a) I may lawfully ask for the sacraments from a bad priest, though he commits sin in administering them, for he need not sin thereby unless he likes, and his malice should not deprive me of the benefit of the sacraments to which I have a right.

(b) A dealer may sell to all buyers things which are in themselves indifferent, though they can be put to a bad use, as firearms, unless he is certain that they are required for a bad purpose. Even in the latter case a correspondingly serious inconvenience or loss will excuse his selling, especially if his refusal will not hinder the sin on account of the buyer being easily able to procure what he wants elsewhere.

(c) Intoxicating drink may not be sold to one who has already had too much. Many authors, however, allow this to be done when it cannot be refused without provoking to violence and quarrelling. This excuse would rarely avail in England at present, because the law forbids such sale, the strong arm of the law thus being on the side of morality.

(d) It is not lawful to sell things of which the use is ordinarily sinful, except when their lawful use is guaranteed. And so booksellers are not allowed to sell infidel or immoral books except to such as require them for good reasons and with the requisite permission. The same doctrine applies to drugs and instruments used for immoral purposes, as well as to poisons. Publishers, too, sin by publishing books which are dangerous to faith or morals. Compositors and others employed in printing should not work for firms which are known to publish bad books; as they are usually ignorant of the nature of the work which they help to bring out, their ignorance, the remoteness of their co-operation, and the ease with which other workmen can be found to supply their place, will ordinarily excuse them from sin if an odd bad book or two are published by an otherwise respectable firm.

(e) Dancing may be a perfectly innocent amusement and it may be a dangerous occasion of sin. No general rule, therefore, can be given as to when dancing must be avoided. Much depends upon the company who join in the dance, upon the way of dancing, and upon the subjective disposition of the dancers. If there be nothing objectionable in any of these respects, there is no reason why a young man or a young woman should not be allowed to dance with due caution. If there be ground for objection, and especially if sin has already been frequently committed in similar circumstances, there is an obligation to abstain, unless the occasion of sin is necessary and can be made remote by taking proper precautions. If sin only follows occasionally, there will be no strict obligation to abstain from dancing, provided due precautions be taken in future.

(f) The question of theatre-going is settled on similar grounds. There are all sorts of theatres and all sorts of plays represented in them, and.all sorts of actors and actresses. To go and listen to a bad and suggestive play arouses the passions, leads to sin, and encourages evil in many ways. It will, then, as a rule, be grievously sinful to go to the theatre to see such a play. The confessor will usually be able to judge best whether in any particular case it is lawful to go to the theatre by asking whether in the past it has frequently led to sin. If it has done so, it is a proximate occasion of sin, and must be avoided as far as possible. In other cases, unless the play or the theatre is known to be bad, there will be no strict obligation to refrain from going.

¹ St Alphonsus, lib. 2, tract. 3, n. 63.