The advocate's duties to his client

With reference to the duties of the advocate toward his client, he must, of course, have the requisite knowledge and skill to undertake the case according to the reasonable expectations of his client, and he must exercise due care and diligence in the execution of the duty which he has undertaken. If in these respects he is culpably negligent, he will be guilty of injustice and bound to make restitution for the harm he does. Furthermore, if his client has no case, and no chance of success in the suit, the advocate must make this known to him; he must avoid useless delays, keep the strictest faith with his client, and use only just means to gain his cause.

English law will not enable a barrister to institute legal proceedings for the recovery of his honorarium if it is withheld. This, however, does not prevent the obligations of a contract existing between an advocate and his client, so that as the former is bound in justice to do his part for the latter, so is the client bound in justice to recompense his lawyer according to the terms which were explicitly or implicitly agreed upon, With regard to solicitors the law sufficiently provides against extortion in the matter of fees.

By the general law of charity a lawyer should be prepared to give his assistance for the love of God to the poor who cannot pay the usual fees. Indeed, if an accused person has no one to defend him, the judge will usually request someone to undertake the office.

English solicitors frequently fulfil the functions of notaries public, and as such receive all acts and contracts which must or are wished to be clothed with an authentic form, confer on such acts the required authenticity, establish their date, and prepare and attest instruments going abroad.

What are the obligations of advocates in the defense of cases? - Advocates are bound first of all to have competent knowledge of laws, of the form of judgments, and of the manner of preparing instruments. Then they must diligently examine the case, manifest its justice or injustice and the certitude or probability of winning or losing it, guard against damaging delays, preserve fidelity, and finally defend the case, and only a just one, without lies, frauds, or other unjust means. The reason is that by legal justice toward society, and by commutative justice toward the client, they are obliged to defend his rights and guard against his damage, but toward the contrary party, lest they become cooperators in injustice. Wherefore, acting otherwise, they are held concerning damages. C. Si culpa ult. de Iniur.; L. 14 de Iudic. C.

S. Th. 2. 2. q. 71. a. 3.

You will resolve: Advocates sin against justice toward the client if, when they do not have due knowledge of the laws, they undertake cases to be defended; if they reveal the foundations or secrets of the case to the adverse party, or if they serve both parties; if, because they seem to themselves to bring forward peremptory arguments, they neglect others not to be despised, because perhaps the judges would be moved by those neglected motives; if they do not sufficiently prepare themselves to plead the case, etc. The same persons sin against justice toward the adverse party if they cite false or abrogated laws, or turn them aside into a foreign sense with damage to the adversary; if they use deceit or lies, from which judges or jurors are drawn away into an unjust sentence or vote; likewise if they impose false crimes or vices on the adverse party, etc. Wherefore they do not seem to sin if they ingeniously twist laws from their obvious sense so that the defendant may escape punishment. L. 226; S. Th. 2. 2. q. 71. a. 3; Kenrick 144.

Note: St. Thomas, l. c. ad 3, teaches that "it is lawful for an advocate defending a just case prudently to conceal those things by which its process could be impeded," because this would not be to deceive the adversary, but to allow him to deceive himself.

Whether and how does an advocate sin who defends a just case by unjust means, for example, if he substitutes a new promissory note in place of an earlier one that has been lost, etc.? - He sins against fidelity and truth. For it is an officious lie. And this lie is grave, because it is to the grave damage of public order, public faith, and security. Hence notaries who prepare such a document also sin gravely. "To say grave lies in judgment is against the common good, since it is to pervert the whole order of justice." L. 1. 5, n. 277. In itself he does not sin against justice if the right of the client is certain. For no injustice appears as to the substance of the case. Certain; for if that right is doubtful, and through the promissory note it is rendered certain, namely because a promissory note is supposed which never existed, he would indeed sin against justice. For since every probability is destroyed by certitude, the right of the adverse party would be injured. But accidentally he can sin against justice if from this damage comes either to the adverse party or to his client. Sometimes he can sin gravely against charity toward himself, if he exposes himself to proximate danger of the gravest penalties because the falsity is discovered. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 71. a. 4 ad 3.

To what is an advocate bound by reason of the honorarium or stipend? - An advocate, as also a physician and others, can licitly and justly exact an honorarium or stipend for his work. "Augustine says that an advocate licitly sells just patronage, and a jurist true counsel.... It must be said that those things which someone is not bound to furnish to another, he can justly receive compensation for furnishing them. But it is manifest that an advocate is not always bound to furnish patronage, or to give counsel to the cases of others. And therefore, if he sells his patronage or counsel, he does not act against justice. And the same reason holds concerning a physician bringing help for healing, and concerning all other persons of this kind, provided nevertheless that they receive moderately, with the condition of persons, and of affairs, and of labor, and the custom of the country considered. But if through improbitas they extort something immoderately, they sin against justice. Hence Augustine says to Macedonius that things extorted by these persons through immoderate improbitas are customarily demanded back, but things given through tolerable custom are not customarily demanded back." S. Th. 2. 2. q. 71. a. 4 c.

Moreover, generally speaking, he can receive nothing beyond the just honorarium, which is determined either by law, or by custom, or by the judgment of prudent men, or by agreement of the parties, with account had of the business, labor, and skill of the advocate. If he has an annual stipend, he can receive it, although lawsuits do not occur in that year. For it is as it were an aleatory contract, whether the lawsuits are many or none. If during the time of the lawsuit he is sick for a longer time, unless he substitutes another, he must renounce part of the stipend which was established by agreement. Those who make an agreement with clients that they will ask nothing beyond the expenses made, unless they win the case, and that a greater fee is to be given to them if they win, can exact this, especially if the case is of a very doubtful outcome, by reason of the aleatory contract. If, after agreement has been made concerning the stipend, the client abandons the case begun, the advocate can exact the whole, if it does not stand through him that he does not prosecute the lawsuit; not otherwise than one renting his work for some fee can exact this, if it stands through the hirer that the work is not completed. Except, however, if a just cause intervened for abandoning the lawsuit, since this condition is always understood in the agreement.

By positive Roman Law he cannot, while a case is being treated, establish a fee, nor establish as a fee a proportional part, for example, a third, a half, of the goods concerning which the lawsuit is conducted. This prohibition rests upon a presumption, not of fact, but of danger of fraud, namely of procuring victory even by illicit means. Hence it obliges even if the contrary has been done. But if injustice and fraud are absent, if there is an urgent and just cause for such an agreement, and if the advocate has asked an unjust fee, he is not obliged to restitution.

According to C. I. 1458, "judges, public officials of the ministry, chancellors, ushers, advocates, procurators or patrons, and notaries cannot be assignees of lawsuits, of reasons, and of litigious actions of the competence of the court, tribunal, or praetorship of which they are part, or in whose jurisdiction they exercise their functions, under penalty of nullity, damages, and expenses. Excepted is the case in which it concerns hereditary actions among coheirs, or assignments in satisfaction of creditors, or for defense of goods possessed. Moreover, advocates and procurators can neither by themselves nor through an interposed person establish any agreement with their own clients, nor make with them any contract of sale, donation, exchange, or another similar contract concerning the things comprehended in the cases in which they furnish their patronage, under penalty of nullity, damages, and expenses." C. G. 1597; C. H. 1459.

Although he spontaneously offers himself to treating the lawsuit of a relative or friend, nevertheless he can exact a just remuneration. Yet, if from charity he is bound to assist the poor, he is especially bound toward those joined to him, according to that saying 1 Tim. 5, 8: If anyone does not have care of his own, and especially of those of his household, he has denied the faith. As regards the poor in particular, he is bound to assist gratuitously, even with grave inconvenience to himself, those who are in extreme necessity. Likewise he is bound to patronize gratis those who are in grave necessity, and indeed under mortal sin, yet not with notable inconvenience to himself. Finally, even in common necessity he is bound from charity to protect the cases of the poor, yet not with grave inconvenience; namely, it suffices that he bestow something of his work on them when he is free from others. Then the judge provides for the defendant by commanding one of the advocates who act in that tribunal to defend the accused gratis. But the aforesaid necessity is present when the defendant, unless aided by patronage, is going to lose the case, or be punished with an unjust death, or be despoiled of his goods and reduced into grave poverty. The same also holds concerning physicians, notaries, procurators, and others who discharge a public office of this kind. L. 53 de Pact.; C. I. 1458; Lugo d. 41, n. 12; L. H. A. tr. 13, n. 69, 70; S. Th. 2. 2. q. 71. a. 1, 4; q. 32. a. 5.

Advocates before the S. Rota and the Apostolic Signatura are bound to furnish gratuitous patronage or gratuitous assistance to those to whom the S. Rota or Apostolic Signatura has granted this benefit. It is wicked for the same persons to buy a lawsuit, or to bargain concerning an extraordinary emolument or an immoderate part of the litigious thing vindicated to themselves. If they have done these things, besides the nullity of the agreement, they can be punished by the S. Rota with a suitable penalty. They can be marked with a note of reprehension, punished with a monetary penalty, suspended, or even struck from the register of advocates. Proper Law of the S. R. R., canon 45.

S. Th. II-II, q. 71.

643. The duties of an advocate as regards the cause. An advocate or pleader is one who has undertaken the cause of litigants to be defended in judgment. He furnishes this both by giving suitable counsels and by pleading the cause before the judge, whether orally or in writings, according as the custom of the region bears. Hence he must excel in competent knowledge, in the same way as was said concerning the judge; otherwise he would expose himself to the danger of inflicting damage upon him whose cause he defends.

Now, as regards the cause, he has a threefold duty:

1. He cannot undertake a cause to be defended unless he has competent knowledge for this; otherwise he exposes himself to the danger of harming the cause and the client;

2. He cannot defend a cause unless it is just; otherwise he exposes himself to the danger of harming and inflicting damage at least upon the other party; and therefore he cannot be absolved who is prepared to defend any causes whatever;

3. He cannot defend even a just cause except by just means; otherwise he exposes himself to the danger of inflicting damage both upon the client and upon the other party.

Hence A. in a civil matter, an advocate:

a) Cannot undertake a cause which he certainly knows to be unjust: for if he wins, he unjustly cooperates in the damage which is inflicted upon the opposing party; if he is defeated, he inflicts damage upon his client, who incurs useless expenses (a. 3 and ad 1).

b) Therefore, if in the course of a judicial process he certainly knows that the cause which he had undertaken in good faith to defend is unjust, he must abandon it and warn the client concerning this (ad 2).

c) But if the cause is doubtful from the beginning, the advocate can undertake it, with the client having been warned, since tribunals have been instituted precisely for settling controversies; and elsewhere a cause which at the beginning seemed doubtful can in the course of the process become certainly just.

d) While the cause remains doubtful, the advocate can advise a friendly settlement; but when it appears certainly unjust, he cannot settle at least with damage to the adversary, but nothing now remains except that the cause be abandoned (ibid.).

B. In a criminal cause, an advocate:

a) Can licitly defend the accused, even if it is certain that he is harmful and culpable; indeed, among civilized peoples the custom has prevailed that an advocate be assigned to every accused person. Hence such a cause is just, if not by reason of the matter, at least by reason of the precept of law, by which the accused has a right to an advocate: for the common good demands that an apt defense be procured for anyone cited into judgment. And therefore the advocate can help the accused by the legitimate means which are available to him, but not by unjust or dishonorable means.

b) But he cannot licitly protect the parts of the accuser, if the accused is certainly or very probably innocent: for thus he would unjustly cooperate in the unjust condemnation of an innocent person, or expose himself to this danger.

C. In a cause both civil and criminal, an advocate:

a) Can hide those things by which his cause is impeded, indeed in a criminal matter he can also deny in the same way as the accused (n. 641), whose parts he plays and whom he represents (ad 3).

b) But he cannot licitly use unjust or dishonorable means, such as frauds, false witnesses or documents, indeed neither can he use lies, because fraud and deceit ought to patronize no one (ibid.).

c) Hence he cannot insist upon these if they are produced; but in a civil matter he cannot fail to produce those things which must be produced.

d) And if an authentic document has been lost, he cannot substitute for it a fraudulent copy: for this is a lie, which is also forbidden by law, lest a way be opened to all frauds with great public detriment.

An advocate who has unjustly inflicted damage, whether upon the client or upon the opposing party, is held to repair it.

644. The duties of an advocate toward the client. An advocate, by force of his office, is held to plead diligently and faithfully the cause which he undertakes.

1. Before he undertakes the cause, he must:

a) Diligently examine whether he is capable of patronizing it; otherwise let him take care to refer it to one more expert;

b) Examine the cause itself with that diligence which the gravity of the matter requires, then sincerely warn the client concerning the justice or injustice of the cause, and also concerning the probability of winning or losing, so that the client, thus duly instructed, can avoid useless expenses.

But if the advocate culpably omits these things, he is held to repair the damages which certainly followed from this.

2. After he has undertaken the cause, he must expedite and defend it diligently, with that diligence and fidelity which prudent men are accustomed to employ in a similar business. Hence he sins gravely:

a) Who is notably negligent in considering the cause, reading the documents, approaching the judges, developing the arguments, etc., and on this account exposes the client to the danger of incurring grave damage;

b) Who deliberately handles the cause badly, so that he may favor the other party, or deserts a lawsuit already begun so that he may patronize the opposing party (which is also prohibited by civil law), or reveals secrets to the other party, even if he now holds the cause deserted by him to be certainly unjust (ad 2).

An advocate who from culpable negligence or deliberately has inflicted damage must repair it.

3. After he has defended the cause or given counsel in it, he can exact a just stipend (a. 4). This is to be determined by prudent estimation, "with consideration of the condition of persons, and of affairs, and of labor, and of the custom of the fatherland" (a. 4); hence it can moderately increase with greater skill or labor of the advocate; on the contrary, if the client, even with a price agreed upon, desists from litigating for a just reason, it must now be diminished: for then the price is not owed, but only compensation for the labor already expended. But if the advocate extorts something immoderately through dishonesty, he sins against justice (a. 4).

As regards the mode of defining the rate of the due price, the principles handed down for assessing the stipend of physicians come to be applied here (n. 381), as also those things which we said there concerning the gratuitous assistance of the poor. Namely, in extreme necessity an advocate is held to defend a poor man gratuitously even with grave inconvenience; likewise in grave necessity with light inconvenience; but in common necessity under light obligation only, when another is lacking and it can be done without inconvenience.

I. QUESTION I. What are the obligations of advocates? ANSWER. First of all it is necessary that advocates have the knowledge and skill by which they may be able to exercise their profession. A precise rule of that knowledge cannot be designated. Advocates must be awake, of keen talent, and endowed with force of eloquence. Those who are slow of talent and barren of tongue expose themselves to a most grave danger, no otherwise than those who, by nature weak, fearful, and timorous, undertake a war.

The practice of all Tribunals plainly demonstrates that this office is not to be permitted promiscuously to all, but to one or another, whom they are accustomed to name Advocate.

An ADVOCATE, moreover, is said to be he who, before him who presides over the jurisdiction, pleads his own or a friend's cause, or contradicts that of another. So the Doctors on Leg. Papin. ff. de postulat.

The office of Advocate is noble, and Cassaneus treats it more fully in the Catalogo gloriae mundi, part. 7. consider. 28; and it appears from Leg. Laudabile, Cod. de Advocat. diversorum iudicum, and Leg. 1, ff. de Iustitia, et Iure.

Cassaneus shows first the honorableness of this office, consider. 29, with D. Bonaventura ad 10. Lucae, where Christ himself exercised this office, taking up Magdalene's cause to defend against Martha; just as in cap. 7 he defends her from the Pharisee, and in Matth. 16 from the disciples, as D. Bernardus observes in assumptione Beatae Virginis, serm. 3, where also S. Bonaventura notes there that the judicial sentence was subdivided for Mary. And so Christ became Mary's Advocate, who had been the Judge appealed to; moreover he became Judge, and in Ioan. 8 he became the advocate of the adulteress. Similarly he was also the advocate of the disciples, Lucae 6, Matth. 12, and it is found in cap. discipulos, de consecr. dist. 5, and the Gloss on Leg. Neminem, Cod. de sacros. Ecclesia. Finally Christ himself ascended into heaven, that he might appear as our Advocate before God, Heb 9.

FINALLY, in the first Iuan. 2, "We have an Advocate with the Father, Jesus Christ," and the Blessed Virgin, the Mother of God most high, is our Advocate, as the Church sings. The Saintly Doctor pursues this at length in the Diaeta, titulo 3, c. 2. Among the distinguished saints, D. Ambrose exercised the office of Advocate at Rome for ten years. B. Germanus, D. Lipardus, B. Luo, and others; see Cassaneus consider. 29.

THEREFORE many are excluded from this office for unfitness, such as excommunicates, infamies, heretics, infidels, and those condemned of grave crimes. Some also for incapacity, such as the insane, children, the mute, the deaf, the blind. So D. Thom. here, Caietanus there, Sylvester, V. Advocatus, Nauarrus summa, cap. 25, num. 28, Panormitanus in rubr. de postulat., Bartolus in Leg. 1, ff. eodem, Leg. Nemo, 2, Cod. de Episcop. aud., Tannerus disput. 4, quaest. 4, dub 6, num. 123.

OTHERS are barred because they are consecrated to higher things, as clerics and Monks, cap. fin. de postulat. extra; ne clerici, vel monachi. Yet necessity removes the unfitness.

The AFFIRMATIVE answer is given by Villalobos Tomo 2, Tract. 10, diff. 4; Iom. Valer. in differ. utriusque fori, V. damnum, differ. 1, num. 7; Ledesma summa, part. 2, Tract. 8, cap. 36; Salon. 2, 2, quaest. 71, art. 2, controv. unica, conclus. 2; Rebell. part. 2, lib. 1, quaest. 10, num. 7; Molina Tom. 3, tract. 2, disp. 730; Sayrus L. 10, tract. 2, cap. 8, num. 11; Reginaldus tract. 2, Lib. 10, cap. 9, sect. 3, num. 90; Navarrus in restit., lib. 3, cap. 3, num. 3; Bannes 2, 2, quaest. 71, art. 4, dub. 2; Cruz in direct., part. 1, prac. 8, art. 5, dub. 19.

BUT this opinion would be the ruin of Advocates. Therefore the opposite is maintained by Lessius lib. 2, cap. 7, num. 31; Azorius part. 3, lib. 13, cap. 29, dub. 5; Malderus 2, 2, tract. 6, cap. 3, disp. 10; Fernandez in exam., Lib. 4, q. 44; Graff., decis., part. 1, lib. 3, cap. 8; Navarrus, man., cap. 25, num. 28; Rodriquez, sum., tom. 1, cap. 6, num. 6; Ortiz, summa, cap. 8, numero 3; Turrianus, Tom. 2, 2, 2, disp. 11, dub. 4, num. 5, etc.; Diana, p. p., Tract. 15, resol. 59.

The same is D. Bonaventura's, in speculo animae, cap. 3, where he condemns only grave fault in the undertaking of the office. Therefore if he loses the cause, he is not bound to restitution, because he acted quite prudently, even if negligently in a light way. Bassaeus implies this, V. Advocat., num. 3.

The negative seems to be answered from Florus de mera var. qq., lib. 1, quaest. 8, num. 54; Azorius, part. 3, lib. 13, cap. 10, quaestio 10, where, from Bartolus on Leg. diem functo, ff. de offic. assessorum, he says the salary is owed only pro rata temporis.

The opposite is followed by Gattierez in praxi qq., Lib. 1, quaest. 52; Matthaeus de Afflictis, in consti. Regni Siciliae, rub. 81, de salario Advoc.; Azevedo, in Lib. 10, tit. 16, lib. 2, num. 4.

Diana walks the middle path, p. p., Tract. 15, resol. 41, saying that in the forum of conscience at least he is bound to pay, yet not the whole, but a part, in the judgment of a prudent man. So also Bobadilla in politic., tract. 2, lib. 3, cap. 14, num. 63. But if the Advocate were of a genius more for laboring than for idling, nothing of the salary should be diminished, he says, unless another cause were present. It seems to be in the mind of Rebellus, de oblig. iust., part. 1, lib. 14, num. 7.

I assert that in grave and extreme necessity of a poor Defendant, when he is about to be condemned unjustly to the galleys, to death, to the scourge, or to harsh imprisonment, or believed to be about to contract a grave illness by losing the suit, if he cannot otherwise be helped, the Advocate is bound under mortal fault to show him his advocacy gratis, provided there remains for him time beyond what is necessary for preserving his own state; but in extreme necessity he is bound to render the advocacy even of his time and industry, necessary to his state. So D. Thom. 2, 2, quaest. 71, art. 1; Caietanus there; Sylvester, V. Advocatus, num. 16; Lessius, Lib. 2, cap. 71, dub. 7, num. 46; Sotus, Lib. 5, de iustitia, quaest. 8, art. 1; Armilla, V. Advocatus, num. 10; Filliucius, Tom. 21, tract. 40, cap. 10, num. 187; Navarrus, summa Lat., cap. 25, num. 29; Fagundez, lib. 8, cap. 38, num. 20; Tannesius, disp. 4, quaest. 4, num. 125; and others with Bassaeus, V. Advoc., num. 5, who proves it from the first of Ioan. 3, Whoever hath substance, etc.

The reason is that whoever has superfluity is bound in grave necessity to spend of the things necessary to his own state. This doctrine accords with D. Bonaventura, as I said in the disput. de Eleemosyna.

Therefore the Judge is bound to give an Advocate to miserable persons who have not a man, Leg. nec quicquam, ff. de offic. praesul., §. finali; and if an Advocate refuse without cause, the Judge can remove him perpetually from the office of advocacy, Leg. Providendum, Cod. eodem tit.

Where a certain Honorarium or stipend for the office of Advocacy has been established by the Prince, or by custom, Advocates cannot receive anything beyond it; and if they receive, it will be subject to restitution. It is common among the Doctors; so D. Bonaventura, in speculo animae, cap. 2, §. Quartus fructus rapina; Filliutius, Tom. 2, tract. 40, cap. 10, num. 190; Navarrus, sum. Lat., cap. 25, num. 30; and it appears from what was said in the preceding disput., quaest. 3, and the disp. de Iudice.

The first part is proved by D. Thom., 2, 2, quaest. 71, art. 4, in corpore, and D. Bonaventura at the place cited, because when one is not bound to render something to another, he can justly receive something for its rendering; but on the contrary (and thus the other part is proved), when one is bound to exhibit something for a price, he exhibits nothing saleable. An Honorarium not fixed by law Bassaeus commends to each one's discretion, num. 7.

You will ask: Whether a stipend is owed to an Advocate who, in his own cause, pleaded against an adversary in a suit and drew up the writings.

Some deny it, because of that rule drawn from Leg. properandum, §. si autem alterutra, Cod. de iudiciis, on which Menochius, q. 74, de arbitriis adjudicates that the expenses are to be made by the loser which he made, not those which he did not make. So Paulus Castrensis infers, ad leg. finali, Cod. de fructu, et litium expensis.

Yet Valafius asserts the opposite, tract. 1, concl. 26, num. 23.

The reason is that the expenses made on the Advocate were for creating him an Advocate; nor should the Advocate's learning render him in a worse condition.

Moreover, the condemnation of expenses is made on account of the contumacy of the bad litigant, as appears from the said Leg. Properandum, and from the Doctors there. Therefore Fagundez subscribes to this, lib. 8, cap. 38, num. 31.

Fagundez notes at num. 39 that no one can plead against him from whom he has received some gratuitous benefit, or a liberal donation without defect, without the sin of an ungrateful mind — not if he pleads for himself, or for father or mother, or for his own cause, or for another miserable person; otherwise the donation can be revoked. The first appears from the final cap., de postulat.; the second from the Law Papinianus, ff. de inofficioso testam, and the final cap., de donationib.

I shall produce certain instructions for Advocates from D. Bonaventura, Lib. 1, Pharetra, cap. 26, from St. Gregory, homil. 7, in Ezech.: A just advocate in no way accepts unjust causes, nor consents to give words for injustice.

From the same, lib. 20, moral., cap. 15, on these words of Job 30: But now the younger mock me. In poverty and famine sterile, whose fathers I did not deem worthy to set with the dogs of my flock, who ate grass, and the bark of trees, and the root of junipers was their bread. The Vulgate continues: Who, snatching these things from the valleys, as soon as they had found anything, ran with a cry to them. The Hebrew: They cried out against them as against a thief.

The Vulgate continues: They dwelt in the deserts of the torrents, and in the caverns of the earth, or upon the gravel. Who rejoiced in such things, and esteemed it a delight to be under the brambles. Where the Hebrew reads: Among the shrubs they crept beneath the nettle. Where D. Gregory says: With a cry they hasten to meet whatever is found in the valley — from the occasions of causes arising, even to litigate for a wicked stock.

Now the most Excellent One SEEMS to urge Advocates to devote their aid to the poor even for a small alms, and to defend them gratis and faithfully; just as the Molossians defend the flock, and would have Mallow, their medicine, applied to their abscesses, and the nettles — that is, unpolished words — removed from them.

Then the Saintly Doctor cries out with D. Bernardus, Lib. 1, de consider.: Daily the Laws clamor in the palace, but the Laws of Justinian, not of the Lord. Wherefore he urges that they meditate in the law of the Lord: for the law of the Lord is unspotted, etc. But these are not so much laws as lawsuits, and the cavillations subverting judgment are of Advocates, who have taught their tongues to speak a lie: eloquent against justice: learned for falsehood: they are wise to do evil: eloquent to assail the truth. Such must not faithful Advocates be.

FINALLY he admonishes from the same D. Bernardus, Lib. 3, that they appeal not without cause: Unjust (he says) is every appeal to which the want of justice has not compelled. It is lawful to appeal, not that you may oppress, but lest you be oppressed. He who appeals when not oppressed, it is clear, either intends to oppress, or to redeem time.

From what has been said, gather the four conditions of a good Advocate: the first is sufficient knowledge; the second diligence; the third truth; the fourth justice, as Fagundez also relates, loco cit., num. 34; Bassaeus a num. 3, with others.

It is NOT lawful for an Advocate to contract with a Client for a portion of the matter in suit, Leg. si quis, Cod. de postulando, et Leg. sumptus, ff. de pactis, lest a way be opened for frauds to defeat suits. Yet it does not seem a sin, fraud removed, as Victorellus teaches, in manu; Navarrus cap. 25; Diana part. 2, tract. 2, miscell., Resol. 49; Valerius in differ. utriusque contract., diff. 3; Bassaeus num. 8. But he may contract for such a price, whether the cause be obtained or not; and then the Advocate is bound to pursue the whole cause.

But if by the client's fault the cause be cut off, he is bound to pay the whole price.

SEE Sayrus, lib. 12, cap. 23, num. 33; Sylvest., V. Advocat., quaest. 22; Azor, part. 3, lib. 13, cap. 29, dub. 10; Bonac., disp. 10, quaest. 3, punct. 4; Filliu., tract. 40, n. 293; Regin., lib. 25, num. 678; Rodriquez, part. 1 sum., cap. 4; Bassaeus, num. 9, where they add much.