Applications: Cases of Cooperation

a. Just as sins, so also cooperations in sins occur in every kind of life (religious, moral, political, social, economic, etc.) and are furnished by men of any condition; therefore the questions to be solved are most diverse and sometimes sufficiently difficult.

b. The following questions are considered only under the aspect of cooperation; but from the character of scandal and from the intention of the one cooperating, which could be evil, abstraction is made. It is clear that a greater cause is required for an action to become licit in which the character of cooperation and the character of scandal are joined, as in the printing of an evil book.

122. On cooperation in false rites. a. To build churches of heretics, unless labors of this kind are demanded in hatred of the Christian religion or for profession of false worship, is of itself material cooperation, and remote; yet it is not equal in all who concur in such a work. Wherefore it is not licit to cooperate in building or restoring a church of this kind in the office of architect or overseer of the building except from a grave cause; but in the office of a secondary worker it is licit from a lighter cause, yet not from the sole reason of the profit to be received from the wage paid.

a. Moreover, the circumstances of this cooperation must be considered. For if it concerns a recent sect, or a place where the sect has not hitherto been admitted, cooperation of this kind takes on the appearance of favor toward heresy, and therefore of formal cooperation; wherefore, at least for architects and overseers of the building, it would be licit only from a very grave cause, from which the cooperation itself would be understood to be only material. A similar judgment must be made concerning buildings which serve impious sects, such as Freemasons or socialists, for their meetings.

b. Although the Holy See has permitted cooperation in building Mohammedan temples from a grave cause,¹ nevertheless it has never permitted, not even for avoiding death, that Christians apply their labor to building temples of idols.² This seems to have been done because in individual cases it was established that the erection of the temple was held as a protestative fact of false worship; hence outside this case cooperation in building temples of idols seems to be permitted. Yet a much graver cause is required for cooperation in building temples of idols to become licit.³

b. To sell utensils necessary for a non-Catholic rite, for example benches, tables, cloths, lamps, etc., is remote cooperation, for which the mere reason of profit to be received from the sale excuses. But the more the use of these things is required for the false rite itself, such as vestments with which they are clothed in exercising rites, or bread which they use in the supper, the graver the cause required for their making and sale to become licit, because the cooperation is nearer.

c. To make works of art for the heretics themselves requesting them, for adorning a non-Catholic church, if the work itself is good or indifferent, for example an image of the crucified one, organs, bells, and things of this kind, is not licit from the sole reason of profit, because these things contribute to increasing the splendor of the rite and to promoting the sect. Since therefore in this case the character of scandal also is added, a greater cause is required in order that both cooperation and scandal can be permitted.

d. Whether it is licit to contribute money to idolatries. a. If money is contributed spontaneously, the cooperation is formal and illicit. b. If money is contributed under compulsion, and indeed as a tax offered to the community, which from it also contributes to heretical or superstitious worship, the difficulty is less, because the tax offered can also be applied to indifferent ends. c. If money is contributed under compulsion, and indeed immediately for superstitious worship or for building a temple, the contribution contains in itself external consent with the evil intention of heretics or unbelievers, and external favor furnished to heresy or idolatry. But if in some way it can be brought about that consent with heretics is excluded from the contribution, for example by a protestation made beforehand, the contribution can be licit.⁴ From the same cause and under the same conditions it is also licit to contribute money for building churches of heretics; for although it is known that the money is applied only to an evil use, nevertheless the action itself is not intrinsically evil, because it does not necessarily contain approval of the false sect.

a. Concerning this matter the response of the Sacred Penitentiary (1822) must be noted: that contributing money for building heretical churches is licit only if in this way Catholics, who celebrate worship in the same church with Protestants, can free themselves from this scandalous simultaneity. From this response two things are gathered: first indeed, that the very action of contributing money is not evil in itself; but then, that the Sacred Penitentiary indicated only a cause of common damage as sufficient for this cooperation to be excused. Nevertheless authors think that a grave cause of private damage can also excuse this cooperation.⁵

b. In places in which Catholics live mixed with Protestants, it is licit for Catholics to contribute money for building or sustaining schools or orphanages of Protestants: for the end of these buildings is not religious, but one of providing instruction or mercy. Yet a twofold condition is required: that scandal arising from this be absent, namely that the contribution of money not be considered as favor furnished to a false sect, and that it be established that the money is not applied to perverting Catholics who are received in these institutions.⁶

c. Whether it is a sin to give money to some socialist or liberal association depends on the end of the association. If the end is evil in every respect, as to attack the Catholic Church, to promote heresy, to help the election of a socialist candidate, the donation is intrinsically evil: for to give money to an association of this kind is the same as to promote its end. If the end of the association is honorable (care of the sick, support of the poor, education, etc.), nevertheless it is not licit without an excusing cause, because in pursuing the end the evil principles of the association supply the norm.

d. To summon a heretical minister to a dying person who asks that minister to administer to him the religious rite of his sect is illicit induction to evil; but if nothing else is said to the minister except that there is a sick person who asks for him, it is an indifferent thing, yet nevertheless proximate cooperation, which from the circumstances can easily be understood wrongly; therefore it seems to be excused only from a grave cause of necessity.⁷

Whether it is licit to take care that an illicit action to be furnished by office be furnished by another because of conscience. It is not licit to ask another that he himself furnish the illicit action in one's place: for this would be to induce another to sin, which is not licit even when the other commits only material sin. But it is licit to permit another to have to perform an illicit action in one's place. If Christian servants hire out their work to a community together with unbelievers, they can ask the prefect, indeed even make an agreement with him, that superstitious works not be assigned to them, although they foresee that pagans will perform them: in the case, they permit what they cannot prevent.

¹ Sacred Congregation de Propaganda Fide, November 21, 1837.

² Holy Office, January 8, 1851, and several other times.

³ Cf. Th. Gallo, Suppetiae missionariorum, Rome and Turin: Marietti, 1872, I, p. 197.

⁴ Holy Office, April 21, 1847.

⁵ Cf. Genicot, I, n. 237.

⁶ Lehmkuhl, I, n. 660.

⁷ Holy Office, December 26, 1898.

123. On the cooperation of craftsmen and merchants. a. Those who make or sell things evil in themselves, which neither have nor can have a good use, can never be excused from the sin of formal cooperation.

b. Those who make or sell indifferent things which buyers can abuse for evil, for example dice, cosmetics, swords, feminine ornaments, etc., are excused from sin, although they foresee that several (indeterminate) buyers will abuse them; for no greater cause is required to render this sale honorable than the ordinary profit which is received from their sale. Yet if it were certain that a determinate buyer was going to abuse that thing, the loss of the price to be received from it would not be a sufficient cause of making or selling the thing; but a greater cause would be required, yet not a grave one, where the matter concerns a thing saleable even otherwise, so that by denied sale the sin would not be prevented. But where the sin of the buyer can be prevented by denied sale, the sale is licit only because of a grave cause.

c. To make or sell things which are indeed indifferent in themselves but by their nature very rarely have a good use (as idols, ornaments which are used only for the worship of idolatry, signs of Freemasons, obscene images and statues, and things of this kind), and are manifestly sought or bought from an evil intention, is licit only from a gravest cause, and therefore commonly is altogether illicit (n. 120).

Merchants are not ordinarily bound to inquire for what use things indifferent in themselves are bought, since this burden would be too grave. Yet if some thing to be sold is accustomed to be applied to a harmful use (as certain poisons), it is not licit to sell it unless it is morally established that the buyer is not going to abuse it, or a gravest cause urges.

According to the same norms, the case which St. Alphonsus (n. 69) seems to solve more strictly will also have to be solved. For he judges that it is not licit to sell wine to one who will then sell wine mixed with water, except from a gravest cause, namely from fear of death or infamy. Other authors permit this if the wine cannot be sold to other buyers without great loss.¹

¹ Lehmkuhl, I, n. 673.

124. On cooperation in evil newspapers.¹ Several concur in publishing evil newspapers and in the sins which are committed by the reading of them.

a. Readers: some sometimes buy and read the paper; others are subscribers and by their subscription cooperate in preserving and propagating the newspaper. And the first indeed cooperate very remotely; therefore any light cause excuses them from sin on this side, scandal being excluded, for example the utility of reading, recreation, etc. Those who subscribe to the paper and sustain it with their money cooperate proximately; therefore only a grave cause excuses these from sin, for example great utility in managing their business.

One who from a reasonable cause can licitly subscribe to an evil paper ought to guard against two things: a. danger of perversion; wherefore, besides those things which pertain to his business, he can licitly read nothing except merely indifferent things; b. scandal, which household members and outsiders can take; wherefore on the one hand he ought to declare that he has a just cause for reading that paper, but that he rejects its principles, and on the other hand he ought to take care that the paper does not fall into the hands of household members.

b. Writers: some are editors, others collaborators, and these indeed are either ordinary or extraordinary, who only sometimes insert an article in an evil paper.

a. Editors and writers who acknowledge the principles defended by the paper and according to the same principles edit the paper or compose articles manifestly cooperate formally, and therefore cannot be excused from grave sin.

b. Ordinary writers who do not acknowledge the principles, and therefore cooperate materially and write articles indifferent and harmless of themselves, sin by cooperation more or less proximate according as by their articles the paper is commended and propagated more or less; wherefore only a more or less grave cause can excuse them from sin. Such certainly is not the greater profit which they receive from it, but only the profit which they need for the support of themselves or their dependents. But they must always take care that scandal be prevented, which can be prepared for those who have knowledge of the cooperation.

c. Extraordinary writers cooperate remotely; wherefore without a just cause it is not licit to insert one's productions in evil papers, yet a moderately grave cause excuses from this cooperation. Likewise to insert announcements of sales, rentals, and things of this kind (Inserate) in evil papers is not licit without a just cause excusing this cooperation. But the cause must be greater the more announcements of this kind cause the papers to be propagated more widely and sustained more easily. Wherefore, since the announcements of individual persons ordinarily do not contribute much to this, a light advantage received from it excuses from this cooperation.

It can happen that the circumstances of newspapers and of readers otherwise heretical are such that one who takes care that his good articles be inserted in them obtains an occasion of setting forth true and good principles to the readers. In these circumstances the cooperation is not illicit, provided the esteem of the evil newspaper and its number are not increased.²

c. Those who sell, distribute, etc., evil newspapers indeed cooperate proximately, yet not so proximately as those who print them; wherefore these also can licitly be occupied in this work only to avoid very grave inconvenience, until they have found another means of obtaining a livelihood.

¹ Cf. Villada, Casus conscientiae, 2nd ed., I, p. 95 ff.

² Cf. the Constitution Officiorum ac munerum of Leo XIII (January 25, 1897), n. 22: "Let no one of the Catholics, especially of ecclesiastical men, publish anything in newspapers, papers, or periodical booklets of this kind, unless a just and reasonable cause advises it."

125. On the cooperation of innkeepers. Innkeepers can cooperate in the sins of others chiefly in three ways:

1. By furnishing forbidden foods. a. It is not licit voluntarily to offer forbidden foods to guests: for this would be to invite them to sin.

b. It is licit to serve meats on prohibited days to those asking for them, because it would be too hard and dangerous to ask individuals whether they have a legitimate cause; but if it is established that they are not excused, meats can be supplied only from a grave reason of notable damage, as if otherwise the gathering of guests would be notably diminished.

c. Hence if they foresee that there will be guests who ask for prohibited foods, they can set the table with licit and illicit foods; and if they foresee that no one will ask for fasting foods, they can prepare only meat foods. But they are bound to admonish the guests that they can receive fasting foods, and they ought to serve such foods to those asking.

In a private family in which a table is provided for outsiders for a paid price, it is not licit without a special cause to cooperate in violating abstinence; therefore even to those asking, forbidden foods cannot so easily be supplied. Yet a moderately grave cause excuses this cooperation if the sin cannot be prevented by denied supplying.

2. By serving wine. a. It is never licit spontaneously to offer wine to one who is foreseen as going to become drunk from it; for this supplying would be formal cooperation.

b. It is licit from the sole cause of profit to serve wine to guests flowing in indiscriminately, although it is foreseen in a confused way that some of them will sin by drunkenness, quarrels, and blasphemies, both because the sins cannot be prevented (for wine will be supplied to them in other taverns), and because the innkeeper would undergo grave damage; for since sins of this kind ordinarily happen in taverns, he would suffer a great loss of guests.

c. But in a particular case it is not licit to serve wine which he asks for to a guest who will become drunk, from the sole cause of profit nor because of the guest's indignation; but for cooperation in a determinate and certain sin to be licit, a graver cause is required, for example fear of a quarrel, blasphemy, or notable damage from the diminution of guests.¹

3. By proposing evil newspapers. a. It is not licit to expose newspapers which are altogether evil, namely which almost always are opposed to faith or good morals, although they may be asked for by many who on that account will leave the inn; for the damage of the innkeeper, although grave, cannot be a sufficient cause for permitting the spiritual ruin of many which would follow from it. It is added that newspapers of this kind are also prohibited by ecclesiastical law.²

b. Newspapers which only more rarely contain something that is opposed to faith or good morals can be supplied to those asking in a separate place if otherwise they would suffer notable damage.

c. Only if it is established by experience that almost all guests ask for those papers and otherwise would leave the inn, can they be publicly proposed, provided good newspapers are also exposed at the same time. Thus in greater cities it can scarcely any longer be prevented that papers of this kind are now publicly exposed by innkeepers.

¹ Cf. Ethel-Bierbaum, Theologia moralis, 2nd ed., I, pr. 1, n. 17.

² Constitution Officiorum ac munerum, n. 21.

126. On the cooperation of a bookseller through evil books. a. To sell a prohibited book which is altogether evil or harmful to faith and good morals, so that it has no good use, is in no way licit.

b. To sell a prohibited book which is not evil in every respect, but also contains useful things, which nevertheless the buyer is going to abuse, is licit from a grave cause of necessity.

c. Booksellers are not bound to inquire for what end a book is bought, but they can sell it to all whom, with regard to their quality, they prudently think to ask for it licitly; otherwise a too grave burden would be imposed upon them. If they doubt concerning the good use of the book, they can sell it, because no one is to be presumed evil.¹

¹ Cf. Constitution Officiorum ac munerum, n. 46.

127. On the cooperation of printers. All who are occupied in print shops help the publisher of a book in publishing an evil work, some remotely, others more or less proximately.

a. The printer himself, or owner of the print shop, can never licitly undertake the printing of an evil book: for to undertake to print a written book is to cooperate formally and to induce others to cooperate.

b. The cooperation of those who direct the print shop, set the type, and correct the pages is proximate; since their action is not evil in itself, it is licit for them to cooperate from a gravest cause (as if otherwise they would lack necessary support for themselves and their dependents), except in the case in which the book is so evil that it cannot have a good end.

Those correcting the printed pages are referred by all authors both to those reading an evil book and to those cooperating in its publication, but by some to those cooperating proximately, by others to those cooperating remotely.

c. The cooperation of those who place the paper on the types, prepare the ink and paper, arrange and bind the pages already printed, move the machines and take care of them, is rather proximate; from a grave cause it is licit for these to cooperate.

d. The cooperation of those who sell to the printer ink, paper, machines, and other things necessary for the printing of a book is remote; wherefore the price to be received from the sale already excuses this cooperation.

In a print shop in which almost exclusively perverse books and evil newspapers are printed, it is not licit to place one's work. Those who cooperate in a print shop of this kind are bound under grave obligation to leave it if they cooperate proximately in the evil; but if they cooperate only rather proximately or remotely, they can remain if they cannot withdraw without notable damage. In a print shop in which good and evil books are printed indiscriminately, it is licit to take work for a light cause or only for a grave cause according to the diversity of cooperation.

128. On cooperation through dances. a. Dances must be considered in a twofold way: insofar as they are an occasion of sinning for those taking part, and insofar as for those arranging them they contain cooperation in the sins of others. Of dances considered in the first way there is discussion elsewhere; concerning dances under this other aspect something must be said here. The matter concerns the arranging of dances (Veranstaltung einer Tanzunterhaltung), which several persons indeterminately abuse for sin.

b. Among those cooperating through dances, the first place is held by those arranging and inviting to them; the second, musicians; the third, those renting their houses or halls for this end.

c. Those arranging and inviting sin gravely if the dances are gravely dishonorable; they sin lightly if the dances are lightly dishonorable: for they induce to a thing gravely or lightly evil. If the dances are honorable, they do not indeed sin by inviting; but by arranging the dances they cooperate in the sins which are committed in them.

d. Musicians, if the dances are dishonorable, cannot licitly concur except from a graver cause, because the sounds directing dishonorable dances constitute part of the dishonorable dance itself and therefore proximate cooperation. If the dances are not dishonorable, it is licit to concur from a light cause.

e. Those renting halls cooperate remotely; wherefore already the cause of losing profit excuses them, even if the dances are dishonorable, when, if they do not rent, there are others who will rent their house for this end. But if the dances would be prevented by their not renting, a greater cause is required.

129. On the cooperation of servants in the sins of masters. a. Actions which concur only remotely in the sin of the master, which cannot be prevented by denied cooperation, are excused because of the mere reason of service. Therefore from this cause alone it is licit to set wine before a master about to become drunk, to prepare meats on a day of abstinence, to buy or bring evil books or evil papers, to drive the master by carriage to the house of a mistress, to carry gifts to a mistress, etc.

b. Actions which cooperate rather proximately or proximately in the sin of the master are not excused unless another proportionately grave cause is added to the reason of service. How great this must be should be determined in a particular case by prudent judgment, with all its circumstances considered. Therefore only for avoiding grave damage is it licit to carry love letters written by a master to a mistress, or to keep watch while the master is with a mistress.

It can be permitted to drivers that they furnish their service indiscriminately to all, both because they are not bound to ask individuals for what end they seek a determinate place, and because, even if they know the evil end, nevertheless they cannot prevent the sin, and finally because they incur grave damage unless they offer their office to all.

With this resolution agrees the response of the Holy Office that Christians are not to be disturbed who, by boats or sedan chairs by which all persons indiscriminately are customarily transferred from place to place, convey even those gentiles who go to the sepulchers of their ancestors to exercise superstitions there.¹

¹ Holy Office, July 12, 1854.

I. Cooperation in non-Catholic worship. 1. To contribute money for building temples of non-Catholics is lawful "only in order to free oneself and one's own temples from that inconvenient and scandalous simultaneity with Protestants."¹ It is more easily lawful, yet only for a grave cause, to contribute money for constructing institutions, for example schools, orphanages, whose primary end is social rather than religious. Yet care should be taken lest the subsidies given be regarded as favor furnished to a false sect; and this, indeed, with respect to deputies who vote for subsidies of this kind, is already sufficiently clear, so that a special protestation is not required. Finally, even Catholic deputies, with the necessary conditions posited, can vote for subsidies for temples, schools, etc., of non-Catholics, because the cooperation is only material, and the common good demands that they be able to cooperate.

2. To construct temples and altars of idols; likewise to make idols and sell them to idolaters, according to declarations of the Sacred Congregations, is never lawful.² The reason seems to be that they contain (material) cooperation in a work so injurious to God that no cause excuses. Yet it is lawful to doubt whether the aforesaid things must be urged in such a way that, for example, for masons and other subordinate workmen they would not become lawful even for a most grave cause. Moreover it is lawful to make and sell idols if they are sought, for example, to be displayed in museums, gardens, etc.

3. To build temples of Muslims, Jews, and heretics is not lawful except for a grave cause; for a graver cause if there is question of a sect which does not yet have temples in that place, but especially if there is question of a recently arisen sect. Moreover, subordinate workmen are more easily excused than architects and contractors.³ The same must be said of the manufacture, sale, and placing of implements (for example, organs) serving for the use of heretics; likewise of building the houses of Freemasons or of other impious societies, for example of Socialists; likewise of constructing theaters which commonly will serve for evil use (St. Alphonsus, II, 72).

4. To ring bells in a non-Catholic temple seems lawful from a very grave cause; since by its nature it seems to be a sign or announcement of some thing rather than a true invitation. Yet a very grave cause is required, because it is easily regarded as an invitation, and therefore the character of scandal is found in an act of this kind in a higher degree.

5. To play the organ, likewise to direct singing in a non-Catholic religious function, is always prohibited, because it is a part and ornament of a perverse rite. With regard to the playing of the organ there is added a response of the Holy Office approved by Leo XIII.⁴ The same seems to have to be said of directing singing and playing the organ outside the rite, but performed in order toward it, because preparation for a perverse rite seems to imbibe the malice of that rite.

6. To call a minister of a false religion for a sick non-Catholic who asks for that minister is illicit.⁵ Yet it is lawful, in order to call him, to use a person belonging to the same sect.⁶ Besides, for a grave cause it is lawful merely to notify the non-Catholic minister that there is a dying person who desires his visit. Now, with respect to Catholic hospitals, commonly a sufficiently abundant cause is present, since from denial of a service of this kind greater evils would easily threaten, such as hatred of the Catholic Religion and the interception of the faculty of furnishing many good things. Moreover, as far as possible, care must be taken that provision be made for the eternal salvation of the dying person, especially by eliciting with him, after the other acts necessary by necessity of means, an act of perfect contrition.

7. For a non-Catholic minister who is going to perform his rite, to prepare a table, and in the rite itself to hand over utensils, bread, and wine, is material cooperation, yet nearer than that of which there was discussion under 6. But since in this case the minister is more prepared for acting, it is lawful for a grave cause. Yet, insofar as it can be done, care must be taken that service not be furnished immediately in the rite itself.

¹ Sacred Penitentiary, 1822, in Konings, Theol. Mor., n. 313.

² C. C. de Prop. Fid., December 7, 1626; Holy Office, January 8, 1851 (Collect., nn. 29 and 1055).

³ S. C. de Prop. Fide, November 21, 1837 (Collect., n. 862); Holy Office, July 7, 1864, responded that subordinate workers are not to be disturbed, provided scandal is absent and it is not done in contempt of religion (Collect., n. 1257).

⁴ June 19, 1889.

⁵ Holy Office, December 14, 1898 (Collect., n. 2030), compared with Holy Office, March 15, 1848 (Collect., n. 2030, note 2).

⁶ Holy Office, December 14, 1898, compared with Holy Office, February 5, 1872 (Collect., n. 2030, note 3).

II. Cooperation in bad books, newspapers, etc. 1. It is illicit to compose, publish, and undertake for printing bad writings, because those acting thus harm the common good most gravely. There is added the fact that those who compose act in this way, while others easily proceed in this way with the intention that the bad writings be bought and worn out by use; in which case they must be charged with formal cooperation (n. 555).

2. It is lawful for a grave cause to perform those things which are remotely related to printing or reading, such as procuring paper and other implements, preparing paper, arranging printed sheets or books, carrying bought books to buyers. This follows from what has been said about remote cooperation in common harm (n. 556). For a very grave cause those things are lawful which are less remotely related to printing and reading, such as arranging type or inking it, placing paper underneath, turning the press, correcting printed sheets. Yet if there is question of a printing shop specially erected to attack good morals or religion, for example by communistic, socialistic writings, etc., by reason of scandal it will scarcely ever be right to remain in it. Moreover, everyone should strive that provision for support be made in another way.

3. It is illicit to circulate bad writings by commending them, because there is formal cooperation. Nor is it of itself lawful to expose them publicly or announce them, for example in shops, in newspapers, at railway stations. Yet these things of themselves involve mere pronouncement (notification), not invitation, and therefore of themselves contain material cooperation only; and this, even with common estimation considered, is sufficiently probable. From intention, indeed, commonly approval and invitation are had; but if one proceeds in the name of another, that is, of the one commanding, abstraction can be made from a depraved intention. This being posited, on the part of the agent there remains only material cooperation, which seems to be excused for a very grave cause. Yet one should strive that as soon as possible he obtain a livelihood in another way.

4. With respect to the sale of bad writings, first note these things from the Code: "The prohibition of books¹ brings this about, that a book without due permission can neither be published, nor read, nor retained, nor sold, nor translated into another language, nor communicated with others in any way" (can. 1398, § 1). Sellers of books should not sell, lend, or retain books treating professedly of obscene matters; they should not have other prohibited books for sale unless they have obtained due permission from the Apostolic See, nor should they sell them to anyone unless they can prudently judge that they are legitimately sought by the buyer (can. 1404). With these things noted, I say:

a) Owners of bad bookstores not only most gravely violate public honorableness and most gravely harm the common good, but also, since they proceed with this intention, that others buy and wear out by use what has been bought, are guilty of formal cooperation (n. 555). I have said owners of bad bookstores; since a somewhat milder judgment must be made concerning lower assistants: for on the one hand they are more easily immune from that depraved intention; on the other hand the acts placed by them do not necessarily involve approval of sin - neither of themselves, as is clear, nor from the circumstances, because it can be believed that they intend only the support of life. Hence they can be immune from formal cooperation (n. 555), and therefore can be excused for a proportionate cause. Yet, with scandal and the danger to which the faith and morals of the assistants are often exposed considered, a proportionate cause will be present only with difficulty. Moreover, one must always strive that livelihood be provided in another way.

b) With respect to others - for example, to owners of bookstores which cannot be called bad, and their assistants - this must be said: to sell bad writings is of itself illicit, unless there is question of those to whom it is sufficiently clear that reading is lawful; to commend the purchase of bad writings is simply illicit, unless again there is discussion of those who enjoy permission to read them.

5. To write, from time to time, some article for a bad newspaper is lawful for a reasonable and just cause. Yet attention must be paid to can. 1386.²

6. To subscribe to a bad newspaper is lawful for a grave cause, for example if someone needs it for conducting business.

7. To announce in a bad newspaper one's things to be sold is lawful for a middling cause. Yet work must be done so that announcements of this kind do not become necessary, and that they be made in good rather than bad newspapers.

8. To display bad papers in one's inns or houses is illicit; nor is it lawful from the fact that those gathering there seek them, otherwise being about to go elsewhere. Yet if such a paper is asked for on account of announced matters necessary to know, it is lawful to display it in a separate place. Further, on account of notable loss of profit otherwise to be feared, it is lawful to display those newspapers which only now and then contain something dangerous.

Moreover, what is to be said about the prior censorship of books and their prohibition and about penalties should be compared.

¹ "The things prescribed under this title concerning books are to be applied to publications, newspapers, periodicals, and any other published writings, unless something else is clear" (can. 1384, § 2).

² Canon 1386 states: 1. Concerning secular clerics: "Secular clerics are forbidden without the consent of their Ordinaries, and religious without the permission of their major Superior and the Ordinary of the place, to publish books, even those which treat of profane matters, and to write in newspapers, sheets, or periodical pamphlets, or to moderate the same" (§ 1). 2. Concerning Catholic lay persons: "In newspapers, sheets, or periodical pamphlets which are accustomed to attack the Catholic religion or good morals, not even Catholic lay persons should write anything, unless a just and reasonable cause advises it, approved by the Ordinary of the place" (§ 2).

III. Cooperation in dangerous amusements. 1. To perform plays or dances notably dishonorable is gravely illicit, and no excusing cause seems able to be admitted. The same must be said of plays notably contrary to religion (cf. St. Alphonsus, III, 428). A somewhat milder judgment seems to have to be made about musicians.

2. To concur in introducing plays of this kind, if the concurrence is necessary, cannot be excused. Nor in practice will an excusing cause be present, even if the concurrence is not necessary. But to favor plays or dances of this kind by applause is formal cooperation.

3. To introduce amusements which indeed are not in themselves dishonorable, but are dangerous to very many, is of itself a grave sin (n. 551).

IV. To sell or rent a house to prostitutes is lawful "in cities in which this has been permitted for the sake of avoiding a greater evil; especially if other tenants are lacking: unless, however, the prostitutes would gravely harm honest neighbors, or on account of the location would give a greater occasion of sins" (St. Alphonsus, II, 70). The same must be said of renting a house to a tavern-keeper who permits dishonorable dances, or intends to introduce or alone sustain honorable ones.

To sell or rent a house to a man or group who will abuse it to public harm, for example to a Masonic, socialistic, spiritistic group, etc., is not lawful if other suitable buildings cannot be found. Otherwise it is lawful for a grave cause, unless however the character of scandal requires a graver cause.

V. To cast an illicit work upon another, that is, to agree that another perform a prohibited work in your place, is formal cooperation. Yet it is lawful to agree that another take your place, for example that in your place he exercise the office of judge, for example if, with the law considered, an unjust sentence would have to be rendered.

VI. To paint the image of a person for someone whom he knows to be affected toward that person with filthy love is not lawful except for a cause of grave necessity. But to paint truly obscene images, since they can scarcely serve any other end than sin, is almost simply illicit. To buy images of this kind already painted for a master can be permitted for avoiding notable harm.

VII. To make notably dishonorable feminine adornment is not lawful except for a grave cause; if there is question of adornment only slightly dishonorable, a lesser cause suffices.

¹ Cf. Waffelaert, Dissertations morales, 1st series, La cooperation au mal; Sleumer, Die Mitwirkung zur fremden Suende; Bender, in Ned. Kath. Stemmen, 1929, p. 137 sq. and 165 sq.

I. Cooperation of servants. 1. For servants, for a middling cause, such as service commonly brings with it, those things are lawful which are remotely related to the sins of masters; of this kind are: to prepare forbidden foods, at the command of the master to count out money to be given at unjust interest and enter it in the book, at the command of a master who is about to go out to commit adultery to saddle the horse, to adorn a mistress who is a prostitute, to open the door to the master's concubine when she comes and to prepare the bed for her (cf. St. Alphonsus, II, 64, 66, 67).

2. For servants, for a grave cause, that is, because of fear of notable loss, those things are lawful which are proximately related to the master's sin. Of this kind are: to serve forbidden foods,¹ to conduct the master to a concubine and conversely (St. Alphonsus, II, 64, 68, 69). The same must be said of drivers conveying someone to a brothel (St. Alphonsus, II, 75); nevertheless in practice it will commonly be lawful for these persons to provide service to all indiscriminately, since it would have to be feared that they would turn many away from themselves if they involved themselves in the reasons of travelers. Besides, if they are under the service of others, they would soon be dismissed.

3. It is sharply disputed whether, for a grave cause, it is lawful for a servant to carry gifts, or to write or carry shamefully amorous letters, to a person shamefully loved by the master. But with St. Alphonsus (II, 65, 67) it seems that this must be denied, because he who does such things not only cooperates in the sin of the master and of the mistress, but also, as one acting in the name of the master, seems to complete and consummate the act or sin by which the master fosters the shameful love both of himself and of the mistress; and this is intrinsically evil. "And I judge that this must be said even... in doubt whether the letters contain amorous things; because, since shameful love is established, it is morally believed that they contain shameful things" (St. Alphonsus, II, 67).

4. Finally, note thesis 51 condemned by Innocent XI: "A servant who, with shoulders placed under him, knowingly helps his master climb through windows to deflower a virgin, and many times serves him by carrying a ladder, opening the door, or cooperating in some similar thing, does not sin mortally if he does this from fear of notable loss, for example lest he be treated badly by his master, lest he be looked upon with stern eyes, lest he be expelled from the house."² Since in this case there is question of harm to a third party, nothing excuses except fear of equal harm, which in this case falls upon fear of death or similar gravest harm (St. Alphonsus, II, 66).

¹ Sacred Congregation de Propaganda Fide, June 26, 1820 (Collectanea, n. 747).

² Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 1201.

II. Cooperation of workmen and merchants. 1. It is lawful to make and sell indifferent things, even under the sole title of ordinary profit; and this holds even if you know that many will abuse them. Nor is there an obligation of inquiring into the intention of buyers. If in a particular case abuse is rightly feared, a cause proportionately grave is required, and it must be graver if harm to be inflicted on a third party is feared. Hence in practice it will scarcely ever be lawful, for example, to sell weapons which evidently are sought for killing, or a drug which is judged to be bought for procuring abortion (St. Alphonsus, II, 66, with note f., 71, 76; III, 571, 697).

2. Things to which a great danger of abuse is attached, such as poisons, it is not lawful to sell unless there is sufficient certainty about a right intention (St. Alphonsus, II, 72).

3. Things which can serve almost only for sin - such as instruments destined for preventing conception, obscene images - are to be judged thus with respect to making and selling: owners of factories and shops, as was said about owners of bad bookstores, not only most gravely harm public decency and the common good, but also proceed with the intention that others buy and, having bought, use them up; and for this reason they are guilty of formal cooperation (n. 558). But concerning lower ministers, what we said about lower ministers of bad bookstores in the cited number must be said.

4. With respect to the advertising and display of bad things, apply what was said about the publication (n. 558) and display (n. cited) of bad writings.

III. Cooperation of innkeepers. 1. For a grave cause it is lawful to give drink to those about to become drunk. A grave cause - besides fear of a grave quarrel or blasphemies - would be a decrease of patrons and notable loss of profit otherwise going to follow; yet this will scarcely have place (St. Alphonsus, II, 69). In addition, because of public laws against drunkenness, they are more difficultly excused today.

2. For the same cause it is lawful to serve meats to those asking for them; likewise to prepare a meal with meats, if it is foreseen that many will ask for meats, provided however that an opportunity of doing so is supplied to those who wish to observe the law. Besides, through dispensations now in force almost everywhere, in practice the difficulty has been removed.

3. Where it is customary, they can permit decent dances; but not indecent ones, nor introduce (or alone maintain) decent ones.

4. They cannot designate secret rooms for sinning; nor grant a place if they know that it is being sought for sinning.

5. On the display of bad newspapers see n. 558.

Cooperation in Sin.—Cooperation or participation in sin, strictly understood, is help afforded another, whom one has not seduced, to carry out his purpose of sinning.

(a) Hence, cooperation differs from scandal and solicitation, for these lead into sin one who had not decided on sin, while cooperation supposes that the other party had already made up his mind to sin. The scandalizer leads into sin, but does not help in its commission; the cooperator does not lead into sin but he helps in its commission.

(b) Cooperation, however, may include scandal and solicitation as regards future sins or as regards third parties. Example: Balbus, who had decided on his own initiative to steal, finds to his surprise that his conduct receives aid and comfort from Titus, a person of some authority. This cooperation will act as an example or incitement to Balbus to repeat the offense, and will likewise be an occasion of sin to others.

Cooperation is also different from complicity as follows: (a) The cooperator acts as assistant or subordinate agent to the one who commits sin, providing him with moral or physical help, or supplying him with the means requisite for the act of sin. Thus, he whose services are commandeered by robbers and who carries away the stolen goods, or who puts a revolver into the hand of one bent on murder or obscene books into the hands of one bent on the corruption of youth, is a cooperator. (b) The accomplice acts as an equiprincipal or coordinate agent with another in the commission of the same sin, performing his own proper part or share of the joint act of sin. Thus, he who enlists as a member of a robber band and acts as their chauffeur or lookout at the time of “hold-ups,” or who fights a duel, or who carries on an obscene dialogue, or listens willingly to obscene talk, is an accomplice. The accomplice is always guilty, but the cooperator may be guiltless.

Kinds of Cooperation.—Divisions of Cooperation according to Different Kinds of Acts.—(a) From the viewpoint of the internal act, cooperation is either formal or material, according as one does or does not intend the sin whose external commission one is aiding. Examples: Caius offers a burglar information as to ways of climbing into a second-story window. Claudius, being covered by a revolver, makes no resistance or outcry while bandits are rifling his employer’s office. Caius is an abettor of crime and a formal cooperator on account of his guilty intent; Claudius aids the commission of burglary, but he is only a material cooperator, since he does not intend what the criminals intend.

(b) From the viewpoint of the external act, cooperation is positive or negative, according as one does something to help the principal agent, or does nothing to impede him. In the examples given above, Caius was a positive, Claudius a negative cooperator. Positive cooperation is given in a moral manner, as when one votes for an unjust law or sentence, or cheers a sinful remark; or in a physical manner, as when one helps bandits to bind and gag their victims, or leaves doors and windows unfastened for the convenience of thieves.

Divisions of Cooperation according to its Degree of Influence.—(a) From the viewpoint of its activity, cooperation is either occasional or effective. By occasional cooperation is understood that which leads another into sin, or allows him to be drawn into sin, but does not assist him to commit sin (e.g., scandalous example, failure to give a fraternal correction or admonition). By effective cooperation is understood assistance given another enabling him to carry out, or to carry out more easily, an act of sin on which he had resolved. As is clear from the explanation given above (see 1506), there is question here only of effective cooperation.

(b) From the viewpoint of its nearness to the act of the principal agent, cooperation is either immediate or mediate, according as one shares in the sinful act of the principal agent, or in some act that preceded or followed it. Thus, he who helps a thief to carry away stolen goods is an immediate cooperator, while he who supplied the thief with necessary keys before the theft, and he who offered refuge to the thief or concealment for the stolen goods after the theft, are mediate cooperators.

(c) From the viewpoint of the dependence on it of what is done, cooperation is either indispensable or not indispensable, according as the principal agent cannot act without it, or can. Example: Balbus supplies intoxicants to Titus and Sempronius, who are intemperate. Titus cannot secure intoxicants except from Balbus; Sempronius can secure them elsewhere. Balbus’ cooperation is indispensable for Titus, but not for Sempronius.

Cooperation is also divided from the viewpoint of responsibility or of the consequences incurred through it, into unjust cooperation and merely unlawful cooperation.

(a) Unjust cooperation is participation in the guilt of an injury done to a third party which involves the duty of restitution or strict reparation. Thus, those who act as “fences” or receivers of stolen goods, cooperate in injustice and are bound to restitution to the rightful owners.

(b) Unlawful cooperation is participation in a sin that contains no injustice to a third party, and that entails only the obligations of repentance and satisfaction, and, if the case requires it, of amends for scandal, proofs of sincerity, avoidance of dangers and submission to penalty. Thus, those who cooperate by marrying illegally, or by providing obscene literature to persons who demand it and insist on having it, are guilty of sin and also fall under various punishments prescribed in law. Cooperation, in so far as it is unjust, will be treated specially under the head of Justice (see Vol. II); here we are concerned with cooperation in general, and as it is a sin against charity.

Formal cooperation is either explicit or implicit. (a) It is explicit, when the end intended by the cooperator (finis operantis) is the sin of the principal agent. Examples: Balbus gives incense money to an idolater, because he approves of idolatry and wishes to see idolatrous rites performed. Caius joins an anarchistic society because he agrees with its aims and wishes to help in their fulfillment.

(b) Formal cooperation is implicit, when the cooperator does not directly intend to associate himself with the sin of the principal agent, but the end of the external act (finis operis), which for the sake of some advantage or interest the cooperator docs intend, includes from its nature or from circumstances the guilt of the sin of the principal agent. Examples: Balbus detests idolatry, but in order to show courtesy he helps a pagan to burn incense before an idol, or he assists in the repairing of a pagan shrine, though his act is looked on as a sign of worship. Caius joins a freethinking society, not because he likes its principles, but because he wishes to obtain through membership certain social or financial advantages which he cannot obtain in any other way.

Mediate cooperation is also subdivided into proximate and remote. (a) It is proximate or remote by reason of nearness, according as the act of sin will follow closely or otherwise on the act of cooperation. Thus, he who gives a ladder to a burglar cooperates in a remote preparation; he who holds the ladder while the burglar goes up cooperates in a proximate preparation. (b) Mediate cooperation is proximate or remote as to definiteness, according as the preparation points clearly or only vaguely to the commission of sin. Proximate cooperation is an action which, from its nature or circumstances, is regarded as morally connected with the evil action of the principal agent, while remote cooperation is an action that has no such moral connection with the sin that is committed. Thus, he who sells a revolver to a gunman who is preparing for a murder cooperates proximately, while he who sells the materials for this weapon cooperates only remotely. Again, if one sells to a burglar a “jimmy,” a dark lantern, a mask, a revolver, and explosives, the cooperation is definite, since the circumstances indicate that robbery is contemplated. But if one sells a burglar a pair of soft-sounding shoes, the cooperation is indefinite, for the burglar may wish them in order to give no disturbance in his own home, and not in order to attract no attention in the homes of others.

The Sinfulness of Cooperation.—The Sinfulness of Formal Cooperation.—(a) Formal cooperation is always sinful, for it includes the approval of the sin of another and the willing participation in the guilt of that sin.

(b) Formal cooperation is from its nature opposed to charity; for charity disapproves of the sins of others and strives to prevent them, while formal cooperation, on the contrary, approves and assists the sins of others.

(c) Formal cooperation is also opposed to the virtue violated by the sin of the principal agent, in so far as the will of the cooperator delights in or approves of the circumstance of help given to the sin of the other (see 1468). Thus, if one opens the door to a caller whom one suspects to be a burglar and at the same time mentally sympathizes with the act of burglary, one is guilty in will of the act one approves.

(d) Formal cooperation as to its external act is opposed to the virtue violated by the cooperator, when the external act has a malice of its own. Thus, if one swears falsely in order to conceal the presence of a burglar hidden in the house, one is guilty of perjury; if one disobeys the laws of the Church by marrying clandestinely, one is guilty of disobedience; if one scandalizes third parties by cooperating with sin, one is guilty of scandal; if one shares in fraud, one is guilty of injustice, etc. Hence, in confession it does not suffice to say that one has cooperated in sin, but one must also tell the sin committed and the necessary circumstances.

The Sinfulness of Material Cooperation.—(a) Material cooperation, in itself, is sinful; for charity commands that one strive to prevent the sin of another, and much more therefore does it forbid one to help in the sin of another. (b) Material cooperation, in case of great necessity, is not sinful; for charity does not oblige under serious inconvenience to self, and it does not forbid one to cooperate by an indifferent act to prevent a neighbor from committing a greater evil than the evil he has in mind. He who cooperates materially through necessity does not cause sin, but uses his own right, which the bad will of the other abuses and makes an occasion of sin (see 1447 d).

Special Cases of Cooperation.—The cases of cooperation, like those involving scandal, are innumerable, but there are certain cases which occur today more frequently than others, namely, those of cooperation with evil publications, dances, and theatres, and those of the cooperation of merchants, innkeepers, renters, servants, and workingmen. Cooperation in sins against faith and sins against justice are treated in their proper places, but it will be useful here to speak of these other special kinds of cooperation, since they offer many difficulties and a consideration of them now will illustrate the general principles on cooperation just given. However, the following points should be noted:

(a) The application of the definitions and rules about cooperation to particular cases is one of the most difficult tasks of Moral Theology, and hence there will be found great diversity of opinion among theologians on particular points. Space forbids a discussion here of the opposing opinions, and we shall have to content ourselves, in some of the illustrations that follow, with solutions that are likely, but whose opposites are also likely.

(b) The cases that follow are treated according to the principles of cooperation. But frequently in actual life there will be other factors to be considered, such as the occasion of sin to oneself or scandal to others. It should be remembered, then, that when a particular kind of material cooperation is here said to be lawful, this must be understood as abstractly speaking; for in an individual instance there may be circumstances of danger or disedification which would make it unlawful—a thing that often happens.

Unlawful Cooperation of Servants, Employees, and Workingmen.—(a) Cooperation is formal if these intend the sin of their employer with which they cooperate, or if the act of cooperation is itself intrinsically evil. Thus, a bookkeeper does no wrong in merely keeping a record of receipts and expenses; but, if he notices many instances of great frauds and injustices done by his firm and keeps at his post in order that dishonesty may be covered up and continued, he becomes a formal cooperator. But a bookkeeper who falsifies or destroys records in order that his business may be able to issue an incorrect statement of its financial condition is involved in its guilt, even though his motive is pity or loyalty. Other examples of formal cooperation are those of a secretary who takes down dictation which contains blasphemous or obscene expressions, and of a taxi-driver who tells his passengers how to get to gambling dens, or who helps a criminal to get away by driving him through dark streets.

(b) Cooperation is material and unlawful, when the intention and the act itself are not evil, but when there is no sufficient reason for the cooperation. Thus, the following proposition was condemned by Innocent XI in 1679 as scandalous and pernicious: “Famulus qui submissis humeris scienter adjuvat herum suum ascendere per fenestras ad stuprandam virginem, et multoties eidem subservit deferendo scalam, aperiendo januam, aut quid simile cooperando, non peccat mortaliter, si id faciat metu notabilis detrimenti, puta ne a domino male tractetur, ne torvis oculis aspiciatur, ne domo expellatur” (Denzinger, n. 1201). Though the acts of cooperation of the servant here mentioned are not intrinsically evil, the cooperation is proximate and positive and habitual, and the wrong done so serious that only a most grave reason, such as fear of death, could justify the help given by the servant to his master.

Lawful Cooperation of Servants, Workingmen, or Employees.—(a) If cooperation is remote and is not indispensable to the sin to be committed, the mere fact that one is employed by the principal cause will excuse; for the employee is not supposed to question the employer about the reasons of orders given, and he is not responsible for the intentions of the employer, but for the performance of what is assigned to himself. Hence, the following kinds of cooperation are held permissible for no other reason than that of service: carrying liquor or food to an employer who wishes to make himself drunk or to break the fast, buying and carrying to him papers which he should not read, giving him his hat and coat or getting his car ready as he starts out to attack an enemy, opening the door to a slanderer whom the mistress of the house wishes to employ. Also, a public taxi-driver may take his patrons to clubs or road-houses where they will become intoxicated, if he is in no way responsible for their intention and shows no approval of it, and they can go just as well without him.

(b) If cooperation is proximate, the mere fact that one is employed is not sufficient as an excuse for cooperation; there must be some other reason that is sufficiently weighty in view of the gravity of the sin and the other circumstances. Thus, to drive one’s employer to the place where he is to receive stolen valuables is justifiable, if one is under threat of great bodily harm if one refuses. Item ob incommodum gravius evitandum permittitur famulo deferre litteras heri amatorias ad amasiam cum qua illicitum commercium habet, tempus et locum conveniendi amasiae nuntiare, excubias agere dum simul adsint. But a servant who is called on habitually to cooperate in these ways should secure another position, if possible.

The principles given as to servants should be applied likewise to other persons who are subordinates, with due allowance made for the difference of circumstances.

(a) Thus, children, wives, pupils, etc., may be less excusable in cooperation than servants, since the former may be in a better position to remonstrate against what is ordered. Hence, if the master of the house who sometimes goes on a spree orders a servant to bring him his demijohn, disobedience might be more difficult than if the same order was given the wife.

(b) Children, wives, pupils, etc., may be more excusable, since unlike the servants they may be unable to go elsewhere. Those who agree to work at places known as vicious resorts, or who let their employer understand that they will not see or hear many things, or who habitually perform services proximately related to sin (what is called “dirty work”), are guilty of formal cooperation, at least when they can secure good employment elsewhere. Children, on the contrary, may be so dependent on a tyrannical father that they cannot refuse cooperation without serious consequences to themselves.

44. 3° On the cooperation of the wife with onanistic copula. (A) If the cooperation is formal, so that the wife truly consents to it or rejoices in it, or a fortiori herself uses means for preventing conception, she certainly sins gravely. The same must be said if morally and efficaciously she cooperates with this crime, by complaining about numerous offspring, about the pains of childbirth, and at the same time foreseeing that by these complaints the man is induced to onanistic congress.

If the wife rejoices not in the sin itself, but in the pleasure which is experienced in copula of this sort before the man withdraws himself, or in the effects of this sin, e.g., in preservation from the troubles and labors of pregnancy or childbirth, by that very fact she is not guilty of mortal fault; for, strictly speaking, she can rejoice concerning these, provided she detests that sin and seriously tries to impede it. Nevertheless, since it is greatly to be feared lest complacency concerning the effects pass into complacency concerning the sin itself, it is to be advised to her that she quickly turn her mind away from that joy, and before God protest that she does not approve such abuse.

45. (B) If the cooperation is material, i.e., if the wife suffers or permits onanistic copula, without approving it in any way, a distinction must be made: (a) when onanism is performed by the withdrawal of the man alone, the cooperation of the woman is permitted from a grave cause, e.g., for avoiding quarrels, or the adultery of the husband, or her own incontinence; indeed the wife can ask the debt from an onanistic man, because of a grave reason, e.g., because it is grave for her to abstain so long from the use of marriage. For there is question of an act which in itself is licit, and which the man can furnish in a licit mode, if he wishes; and, even if it is foreseen that he will sin from his own malice, this can be permitted, provided there is sufficient reason. Hence in this case the wife can consent to the pleasure arising from this copula, since she herself completes the conjugal act in a legitimate mode.

Nevertheless by prayers, blandishments, admonitions, signs of displeasure, or other means she ought to induce the man to have copula in a legitimate mode; to this she is held, not indeed on each single occasion, but at an opportune time, both by the obligation of fraternal correction, and lest otherwise she seem to consent¹.

¹ "Nevertheless let the petitioner admonish a wife of this sort, that she not cease prudently to warn her husband that he desist from this turpitude." (Sacred Penitentiary, Nov. 5, 1816).

46. (b) But when onanism is performed condomistically, i.e., with the instrument commonly called a condom, within which the virile seed is retained, regularly not even the material cooperation of the wife is licit; for such congress is intrinsically evil already from the beginning, since it renders conception impossible: and to cooperate with it is a grave sin. Therefore the wife ought positively to resist with all her strength. For the man in this case is deservedly equated with an oppressor, and therefore the woman ought to oppose that resistance which a virgin opposes to an invader, as the Sacred Penitentiary declared, June 3, 1916². Nevertheless, just as a woman oppressed by a man is not bound to resist him even to death: then she does not permit, but only suffers the abuse of marriage, every affection toward evil delight having been excluded.

² Apud Marc, n. 2117.

This doctrine is confirmed by the response of the Holy Office, April 6, 1853: "1° Whether the imperfect use of marriage, whether it be done onanistically or condomistically, according as in the case, is licit? - Negatively; for it is intrinsically evil. 2° Whether a wife, knowing, in condomistic congress can passively offer herself? - Negatively; for she would give assistance to a thing intrinsically illicit."¹

¹ Apud Ami du Clerge, loc. cit., p. 1077.

Thus a servant is allowed to perform acts for which he is hired, even though he knows that he is furnishing his master a remote occasion of sin or assists materially in carrying out a sinful plan. But he is never permitted to furnish a proximate occasion of sin, not even for the purpose of avoiding great harm to himself.³ To render a licit service to another may amount to formal co-operation in sin, as, e. g., loaning or selling a gun to a notorious poacher or "boot-legger." If there is no reason for suspecting the intention of the purchaser, it is permissible to sell him dangerous weapons, poison, etc., unless there is a statutory law to the contrary.

³ Prop. Damn. sub Innoc. XI, n. 51: “A servant who with lowered shoulders knowingly helps his master climb to the windows to violate a virgin, and repeatedly serves him by carrying a ladder, opening a door, or cooperating in some similar way, does not sin mortally if he does this through fear of notable harm, for instance lest he be badly treated by his master, looked upon with stern eyes, or expelled from the house.” (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 1201).

A priest may give holy Communion to a secret sinner if the latter demands it publicly.

It is forbidden to make images which one knows to be intended for idolatrous worship, except for a very grave cause.⁴

⁴ S. C. Offic. d. d. Ian. 14, 1818: “Those who build temples of heretics or synagogues of Jews are not to be disturbed, provided scandal is absent and it is not done in contempt of religion.”

A Catholic is never allowed to play the organ, to sing or to direct the choir at religious services in a heretical church,⁵ or to call in a non-Catholic minister to give the "Lord's Supper" to a sick man.⁶ But to advise the minister that some one desires his services or to prepare the table for him is an indifferent act.⁷

⁵ S. C. Officii, d. d. 19 Iunii 1889.—Cfr. the Theol.-praktische Quartalschrift, of Linz, Austria, 1900, pp. 842 sqq.

⁶ S. C. Officii, d. d. 15 Mart. 1848: “Is it lawful for nuns caring for the sick in a hospital to summon a heretical minister who is requested for reasons of religion by a sick heretic? Resp.: According to the points set forth, it is not lawful; let them conduct themselves passively.”

⁷ C. S. Officii, d. d. 31 Ian. 1872; 14. Dec. 1898.

In deciding whether and to what extent Catholic officials are permitted to co-operate in the enforcement of unjust laws, for instance, a law compelling Catholic children to attend irreligious schools or assisting in a divorce case, we must first of all consider the question whether the act under consideration is one of tolerance or of positive command, and, secondly, whether or not the object directly aimed at is intrinsically evil. If it is evil, official or authoritative co-operation can not be permitted.⁸

⁸ Lehmkuhl in the Theol.-prakt. Quartalschrift, 1898, pp. 89 sqq.; P. Schnitzer, Kath. Eherecht, 5th ed., pp. 78 sqq.

There is one kind of cooperatio in malum which deserves special attention in our days, and that is what Fr. Noldin calls the cooperatio ad pravas ephemerides—co-operating with an evil press. This sin is incurred not only by the publishers, editors, and printers of wicked and scandalous newspapers and magazines, but also by their readers. Those who occasionally buy and read such a publication co-operate with the publishers only in a remote manner and may therefore be excused if the offense is not too frequently repeated and there is no danger of scandal. Those, on the other hand, who subscribe to such publications, are guilty of proximate co-operation, and their conduct can be excused only by some grave cause, such as business necessity. If any one has to subscribe to a bad newspaper or magazine for some reasonable cause, let him take due precautions: (a) against the danger of perversion, and therefore read only what he needs to know; (b) against giving scandal to the members of his household or to outsiders. This he can do by letting it be known that he has just reason for keeping the publication in question, but that he disap- proves its general tendency, and by keeping it away from those entrusted to his care.

The publishers and editors of such sheets are, of course, guilty of formal co-operation in evil. Regular contributors, who do not approve of the publication's tendency, and write only indifferent and harmless articles, can hardly be excused from more or less proximate co-operation, while occasional contributors co-operate only in a remote way, and may therefore be excused more easily.

Catholics must also refrain from supporting anti-Christian and immoral publications by advertising in them.

Those who sell or distribute such publications co-operate proximately in the evil done by them, though less proximately than those who print them; those engaged in such work should try to obtain other employment if they can.⁹

⁹ Noldin, Summa Theol. Mor., Vol. II, pp. 141 sq.

As the Holy Father has no intention of coming down to details of practical morality, we must evidently have recourse to approved authorities and to former declarations of the Holy See. According to this teaching, there is question of cooperation in an act which was begun in the right way, and which the other party alone interrupts in such a way as to violate nature.

We are therefore, for our part, unable to agree with the passage in which Reverend John Ryan of Washington, in his notes on the moral teaching of the Encyclical, insinuates that the Encyclical may extend the field of permissible material cooperation in the face of the common opinion now existing on the subject.¹ The distinctions which the moralists make are founded on a certain principle and are confirmed by the replies of the Sacred Penitentiary of April 3 and June 3, 1916.²

¹ “The Moral Teaching of the Encyclical,” Ecclesiastical Review (1931), p. 266.

² Cf. Vermeersch, De Castitate, n. 253.

621. 2. Cooperation of servants is judged to be material and licit: a) To prepare forbidden foods on days of fast. For they can form for themselves the conscience that the master has a dispensation for eating those foods. b) To open the door to visitors, although they come for an evil end, provided the danger of perversion is absent, which indeed will rarely be absent in that case. c) To accompany the master to a Protestant temple or to a synagogue, if this is required by them by reason of service and not in hatred of the faith. It is required, however, that such accompaniment not appear as a protestation of false religion, nor that the servants actively participate in the false worship.¹⁴⁷ d) To carry letters or other things to some person with whom the master has illicit intercourse.¹⁴⁸ The reason is that the servant by force of office is bound to perform works of this kind, nor does it belong to him to investigate what is contained in those letters or for what end such things are sent by the master.

Nor is St. Alphonsus opposed to this solution except apparently; for he seems to suppose that the servant has full confidence, as they say, of his master, and proximately and positively helps him by his works toward an evil end; and this indeed is certainly not licit. But in our times and in our regions servants are not accustomed to have the confidence of their masters in this way, but works are enjoined upon them simply, and it does not pertain to them to care what in particular the master intended by some enjoined work. Certainly it would be illicit cooperation if a male or female servant were to hide or help the evil actions of the sons of the family, lest they be detected by the parents. The proposition condemned by Innocent XI also seems to have to be understood of such proximate and positive cooperation in the evil action itself: "A servant who, with shoulders bent down, knowingly helps his master to ascend through a window to violate a virgin, and many times serves him in the same thing by carrying the ladder, opening the door, or cooperating in some similar way, does not sin mortally if he does this through fear of notable detriment, for instance lest he be badly treated by the master, lest he be looked upon with stern eyes, lest he be expelled from the house."¹⁴⁹ For although such cooperation is not intrinsically evil, as St. Alphonsus rightly teaches,¹⁵⁰ nevertheless the excusing causes brought forward do not suffice to render it licit.

¹⁴⁷ Cf. what was said above n. 525 sq. concerning active communication in false worship.

¹⁴⁸ Cf. Noldin, De praeceptis n. 129; Lehmkuhl, Theol. mor. I 828.

¹⁴⁹ Dens, n. 1201; cf. Lehmkuhl, Theol. mor. I, n. 830.

¹⁵⁰ Theol. mor. l. 3, n. 571.

623. 4. Cooperation of merchants. a) It is never licit to sell things which by their very nature have no use except an evil use. Hence, e.g., it is not licit to sell those instruments which serve for the abuse of marriage; likewise it is not licit to sell obscene images. b) It is licit from a reasonable cause to sell other things, in themselves indifferent, which perhaps from the malice of the buyer are employed for an evil end; for this is only material cooperation. And this excusing cause ought to be the graver in proportion as the abuse of the thing sold is foreseen to be graver. Hence it is licit from a proportionate cause to sell poison, weapons, organs and a pulpit also for the temples of Protestants, etc. c) It is not licit in newspapers which are wholly bad, i.e. openly fighting against religion or good morals, to advertise one's things to be rented or sold; for this would be cooperation toward sustaining those worst papers. But if the newspapers are not so manifestly bad, it would be licit, there being a just and grave cause, to advertise things pertaining to commerce; whence Leo XIII established in the Constitution Officiorum ac munerum: "Let no one from Catholics, especially from ecclesiastical men, publish anything in newspapers, or papers, or periodical booklets of this kind, unless a just and reasonable cause urges it." Likewise it is not licit, except from a reasonable cause, to sell or buy those newspapers, especially habitually by the so-called subscription. But one must always guard against both one's own perversion and the scandal of others. Those newspapers and periodicals are accustomed to pay a great salary to those who write well for them. Nevertheless, for the sake of profit alone, a Catholic seems unable to write in them. For the Code of Canon Law establishes, c. 1386, § 2: "In newspapers, papers, or periodical booklets which are accustomed to attack the Catholic religion or good morals, let Catholic laymen also write nothing unless a just and reasonable cause urges it, approved by the Ordinary of the place."

Scholion. There are still almost innumerable cases of cooperation. But all can be rightly solved if attention is given to the principles concerning the indirectly voluntary and if the circumstances of different places, times, and persons are kept before one's eyes. It is also to be noted that in present times not all the resolutions of the old theologians have force any longer, since times and circumstances have been much changed.¹⁵²

¹⁵² Cf. Lehmkuhl, Theol. mor. I, n. 809-838.

761. Cooperation with infidelity or heresy is concurrence furnished to them. It is twofold: one immediate, which is participation in their very establishment, propagation, or worship; this is intrinsically evil and always unlawful. The other is mediate, which is the supplying of matter, faculty, or means for their conservation, propagation, or worship. This is per se unlawful, because it gives another the means or occasion of sinning, from which we are rather bound to turn him away, and in this it is evil; per accidens it can be lawful, if the action of the cooperator is not intrinsically evil and there is a proportionately grave cause, namely, a good which compensates the evil, that is, the occasion of sinning given. Hence a cause is required which is the graver the graver the evil is to which cooperation is made, and the nearer the cooperation is and the more it influences that evil (nn. 489-490).

762. As regards the Sacraments: 1. It is never lawful for parents positively to cooperate or to permit (for example, by asking, willing, or consenting) that their children be baptized by a heretical (schismatic, juring) minister, because to ask or to will the Baptism of heretics is an implicit acknowledgment of the sect, which is intrinsically evil (Holy Office, September 26, 1668; November 29, 1672; can. 2319). But negatively to permit this and to behave passively will not be lawful except on account of very grave inconvenience, because cooperation is made to a very grave evil.

2. Similarly for Catholics, even those serving in a hospital, it is unlawful, when a sick heretic asks, directly to call the minister of his sect so that he may receive the helps of religion (likewise so that the minister may perform funeral rites): thus the Holy Office, May 14, 1848 and December 26, 1898. Yet for this they can use a person belonging to the same sect (January 31, 1872).

But if such a person is lacking, according to some it is lawful to call the minister, saying: such a person wishes to speak with you, or something similar, but only on account of the common good, in a non-ordinary case, namely, so that great public hatred against the Catholic religion may be avoided, or the cessation of many goods to be furnished by those serving the hospital; otherwise not, because it is a question of the greatest evil of a private person, namely, of the eternal harm of the dying man.¹

¹ Indeed Lehmkuhl (likewise Prummer, Marc, Vermeersch) thinks that in such circumstances it is also lawful for the attendant to prepare a table for the non-Catholic minister on which he wishes to perform his rites, and to offer utensils, bread, and wine. But this certainly cannot be done during the rite itself, because it is communication in worship. - Catholics can, however, stir up the dying man to faith in the truths to be confessed by necessity of means, and to contrition and love of God.

763. As regards the offices of worship and sermons of heretics:

1. It is never lawful to cooperate in the offices of heretics by singing or by musical instruments, as was said in the preceding article (n. 758, 3), because the cooperation is immediate, or participation in the very exercise of worship.

2. Nor is it lawful to invite others to the offices or sermons of heretics, whether by persuasion, or by authority or counsel, or by any other inducements whatsoever, because it is directly to induce to sinning, which is intrinsically evil.

3. Indeed, to ring bells as a sign that a heretical office or sermon begins (on the contrary, in honor of the king), because ordinarily it is taken for an invitation or is altogether closely connected with invitation; unless perhaps someone shows that he acts thus from a very grave cause, for example, in grave or quasi-extreme necessity.

764. As regards the building of temples and altars:

1. It will never be lawful to adorn idols and their altars or temples, because it is intrinsically evil.

2. To build their temples or altars is generally unlawful, because it is wont to be held as a sign of profession of a false faith and to stir up scandal (Holy Office, December 7, 1626; September 5, 1736; January 8, 1851); otherwise it will not be lawful except from a most grave cause, because it is a question of a thing altogether depraved (July 2, 1827).

3. To build temples of Mohammedans, scandal excluded, is lawful from fear of grave evil (Prop. F., November 21, 1837).

4. To build temples of heretics, Jews, or schismatics:

a) for masons and subordinate workmen, it is lawful from a lighter cause, provided it is not held as profession or approval of heresy, scandal is absent, and it is not required in contempt of religion, because the cooperation is remote and secondary (Holy Office, January 13, 1818; July 7, 1864);

b) but for architects, contractors, and overseers of works, in places in which Catholics have already for a long time lived mixed with non-Catholics, it is not lawful except from a grave cause, such as gain alone is not, because the cooperation is more principal;

c) for the same, in places altogether Catholic, it is generally gravely unlawful (instruction of the Cardinal Vicar of Rome, July 12, 1878).

5. The same seems to be said concerning the buildings of Freemasons or of another impious society.

6. But for leasing a house so that it may serve the worship of heretics or the congregation of Freemasons or of another impious sect, a graver cause is required, because the cooperation is nearer.

765. As regards the making and sale of things destined for false worship:

1. If they cannot have another good or indifferent use, it is never lawful, because it is intrinsically evil.

2. If they can have another use but must serve false worship, it can be lawful on account of a motive the graver according as the cooperation is greater.

In particular: a) generally it is lawful, from a lighter cause, to make organs, a pulpit, altars, vestments for heretics, because the cooperation is remote;

b) but if they are expressly and formally sought on account of an evil use, it will not be lawful except for a grave cause, because the cooperation is nearer; indeed sometimes a most grave cause is required, if the matter is most grave, for example, to make or sell hosts which enemies of the Church are going to abuse;

c) finally, it is unlawful to fabricate idols, sacred vestments destined for superstitious use, superstitious signs, signs and emblems of Freemasons, since the things almost never have a good use;

d) if those things are made for an indifferent or good use, it is lawful, as to make an idol for adorning a garden or for stage plays.

766. As regards non-Catholic religious works, or works which are ordered to a false religion:

1. To contribute money to them either spontaneously or because they regard religion is never lawful, because it is formally to protect, which is intrinsically evil.

2. To do this under coercion and without an evil intention, if the works are religious (for example, a temple, festivities, ceremonies), is regularly unlawful, unless a) on account of a very grave cause, because to foster a false religion is a fairly proximate cooperation and more proximate than the construction of a temple, and b) provided it is clear that there is no consent to false superstitions or ceremonies (S. C. P. F., July 2, 1827; Holy Office, April 21, 1847): as, for example, Catholics can do so that they may free themselves from simultaneity of worship (S. Penit., 1822), and deputies who, on account of the good of public peace, confer subsidies from the public treasury upon heretical works just as upon Catholic works.

3. If they are not ordered only to religion, but have another good end, for example, education, care of the sick, the poor..., a grave cause would suffice, provided it is not considered as favor of heresy, scandal is lacking, and the money is not used for perverting Catholics. This will more easily be lawful in places long mixed, than in places altogether Catholic.

4. The same seems to be said concerning the works of other enemies of the Church, for example, liberals, socialists, in regions where these words indicate opposition to the Church.

5. Nevertheless it is unlawful to give one's name to such societies which directly have an evil end; but if they are only indirectly ordered to an evil end, and have a direct good end, for example, an economic one, it will be lawful from a grave cause and with scandal removed.

Thus it is unlawful to give one's name to theosophical societies (July 4, 1919), likewise to the London society "for promoting the unity of Christianity" (July 18, 1919), or even to the association Y. M. C. A. (November 5, 1920), which spreads religious indifferentism.

767. As regards evil or prohibited writings: books, journals, dictionaries, encyclopedias, periodicals, newspapers, or others of this kind.1

A. To be written: 1. For editors to defend false principles and to compose writings according to those principles is never lawful, because it is immediate cooperation and always a grave sin.

2. To cooperate with articles indifferent of themselves (for example, concerning a literary, scientific, or artistic matter), and indeed frequently or ordinarily, is a cooperation more or less proximate according as in that way the depraved writing is more or less commended and defended, and therefore it is not lawful except, scandal excluded, and on account of a cause more or less grave, such as greater gain is not, but only gain necessary for sustenance.

3. Sometimes and extraordinarily to insert indifferent articles is a more remote cooperation, which nevertheless is not lawful without a cause, but for which a moderately grave cause suffices, such as certainly is to set forth or defend good principles occasionally, or to impede an evil article, provided the reputation of the evil writing is not increased thereby, nor a very bad writing promoted with great scandal of the faithful (can. 1386, § 2).

B. To be printed: 1. For the publisher himself or the owner of a printing house, it is never lawful to undertake the printing, because this is not only to cooperate proximately but also to induce others to cooperate (can. 2318, § 1).

2. To cooperate altogether proximately with the printing, by directing the printing house, setting the characters or type, correcting printed sheets, is not lawful except in a very rare case, for a brief time and on account of grave necessity (such as dismissal from service is not), except in the case in which the book is so evil that it cannot have a good end (July 12, 1878).

3. To cooperate more remotely, although still fairly proximately, by placing the paper under the type, turning the press, preparing paper or ink, arranging and joining the printed sheets, or carrying them to purchasers, moving the machine and caring for it, is lawful from a lesser cause, nevertheless always a grave one.

4. To act most remotely, for example, by selling ink, paper, machines, and other things necessary for printing, is lawful for the sake of gain alone.

Question 3. Is it sometimes licit to cooperate in publishing bad books?

Response. It is licit for a grave cause to cooperate mediately or remotely, for example, to prepare ink or paper or arrange printed books. But to cooperate immediately in the printing of such books, for example, to arrange the type, to direct the printing, etc., generally speaking, does not seem licit. I said generally speaking, because in a case of most grave detriment, for a brief time, Laymann indicates that some such thing can be furnished materially, de Caritate, chap. 13, n. 5.

3. The case. Mary, a Catholic, is matron in an orphanage. She goes to the Catholic Church, but is asked by the Anglican minister, who conducts the Anglican service in the orphanage, to sing at the service, as she has a good voice, and the service is held after Mass, so that it will not prevent her going to her own Church. Mary consents, and still further conciliates the minister by urging all the Anglicans in the house to attend the service. From reading a book on indifferentism, she gets a scruple about the lawfulness of these actions, and asks her confessor about them.

Her confessor will tell Mary that she had done wrong, although she was excused on account of her good faith. She did wrong in taking part in non-Catholic religious services, for, as we saw above (p. 148), all such action is wrong. In urging others to join in Anglican worship, which she knew or ought to have known to be false, she also did wrong, although, of course, Anglicans, believing in it in good faith, join in it without committing sin. Mary should allow the inmates to follow their consciences with regard to their religious duties, and she should see that the time allowed for this purpose in the institution is not interfered with, but for the rest she should leave them alone.

3. How does an occasion of another's sin differ from a cause of it, and is it lawful to put either?

An occasion of sin is given when something is done which another takes advantage of to commit sin although what was done did not cause the sin either physically or morally.

The occasion may have suggested the sin, but it did not cause it; the sin is wholly due to him who takes advantage of the occasion to do wrong. A cause of sin on the other hand produces it, or effects it, either physically or morally. Thus one who induces another by persuasion to commit theft is the moral cause of his sin; if he merely committed theft himself without saying anything to the other, who thereupon followed his example, the former would be the occasion of the latter's sin.

The case. The London police had information about some forgers of bank notes. In order to be able to convict them they induced Caius to buy some of the forged notes for them at the rate of fifty shillings for each five pound note. When two priests, Titius and Julius, read of this in the papers, they disagreed about the lawfulness of the proceeding. Titius said that it was all right; Julius denied this, on the ground that it is never lawful to incite anyone to do wrong, and this Caius did by inducing the forgers to sell worthless bits of paper for fifty shillings.

Titius was right and Julius was wrong. Caius knew what he was doing and there was nothing wrong in it from his point of view. He was willing to pay fifty shillings in order to get certain evidence of the crime committed by the forgers. For the common good he furnished them with an opportunity of betraying themselves, and they took it. The forgers always had the habitual intention of selling their worthless notes; whenever they did this, they committed sin. But Caius had good reason for furnishing them with an occasion of selling their notes though they committed sin thereby. With this sin Caius only co-operated materially, not formally.¹

1 St. Alphonsus, book ii, treatise 3, no. 47.

Bertha in Confession asks her confessor if it would be sinful for her to act as bridesmaid for her friend Stella, who is a Protestant, about to marry a Protestant, and in a Protestant church. The confessor replies that in his opinion Bertha would not sin, inasmuch as the contracting parties' action is not sinful, scl., marrying coram ministro; and, since the contracting parties are the ministri, Bertha is only a witness to the contract, and, strictly speaking, does not take part in heretical services any more than the other friends present to see Stella married. The witnesses take no part actively in the religious ceremony—they are only passive witnesses to it. However, the confessor advises Bertha that it is not expedient for her to act as bridesmaid, since it might possibly give scandal, and she promises not to do so.

Afterward, in discussing the case with some brother priests, the confessor is condemned for his opinion that Bertha would not sin; on the contrary, it is asserted that the confessor would have done wrong to give Bertha absolution in the event of her refusing to follow his advice. It was asserted that a case was referred to a certain seminary faculty, where a young lady wished to act as bridesmaid for Protestants; and it was alleged that a negative was given, and absolution forbidden if she did so.

It was also stated that in Germany, in some dioceses, it would be excommunication to act as witnesses to a Protestant marriage. The confessor still maintains his opinion that absolution is not to be denied if the penitent persists in her design of acting. And he maintains that as the other friends are not held in these parts to commit any sin in going to the church to witness the wedding in pews, so Bertha, a more prominent witness, is taking no more real part in heretical worship than they in the body of the church.

The principle which governs the solution of this case is the principle laid down by all theologians, that it is not lawful for Catholics to take part in a false worship. If acting as bridesmaid at a non- Catholic wedding in a non-Catholic church in this country is considered a "communicatio in divinis," then it is not lawful for a Catholic to act in such capacity. If, however, acting as bridesmaid at a non-Catholic wedding in a non-Catholic church—in the United States—is not generally considered a "communicatio in divinis," then it may be lawful for a Catholic to act as such, provided it does not become unlawful for some other reason, v. g., on account of the scandal it might occasion, or the danger of perversion, or because it has been forbidden by the statutes of the diocese.

About the principle that it is not lawful for a Catholic to take part in a false worship, there is no dispute. The difficulty lies in determining whether the case before us comes under the principle.

We do not deny that in a very special case it might be evidently unlawful for a Catholic to act as bridesmaid at a non-Catholic marriage, because such conduct could scarcely be viewed in any other light than as a "communicatio in divinis," owing to the distinctly religious coloring given to the ceremony by the religious opinions of the contracting parties and the officiating minister. But the case before us is this: Is the marriage of non-Catholics in this country, though performed by a minister and in a Protestant church, generally looked upon as a religious rite, or is it considered merely as a civil contract? The mere fact that a marriage is performed by a minister of the Gospel, or in a Protestant church, does not make it a religious rite. It is made a religious rite by the beliefs and intentions of the contracting parties and the minister, as well as of the religious denomination to which they belong, and the view that the public takes of it. If these perform it as a religious rite, and view it as such, then indeed it becomes a religious rite, and consequently a false worship. If, however, they do not consider it or perform it as a religious rite, then the mere fact that it is performed by a preacher, or in a non-Catholic church, does not constitute it a religious rite. The question, therefore, is reduced to this: Are non-Catholic marriages in this country looked upon, either by the parties contracting them or by the religious denomination to which such parties belong, or by the community generally, as a religious rite?

To this question American theologians answer in the negative. Non-Catholic marriages in the United States, although performed by a minister in a Protestant church, are not looked upon, as a general rule, as anything else than a civil proceeding, a serious social contract.

Archbishop Kenrick (Th. Mor. tr. XIII. n. 33) says: “To be present at the celebration of a wedding is generally regarded as a mark of courtesy toward the spouses without the heretical rite being approved.”

Father Konings (I. n. 254) says:

“Kenrick likewise says that it is not a sin to be present with others at the celebration of a wedding contracted before a heretical minister, since this is generally regarded not as approval of a heretical rite but as a mark of courtesy toward the spouses. Whether the same can be said of those who on this occasion perform the office of paranymph (groomsman or bridesmaid), I leave to wiser men to decide; much in this matter must be attributed to the common estimation prevailing among the people, for what is judged to be merely civil courtesy, with no participation whatever in a heretical rite, cannot be regarded as a profession of false religion.”

Father Sabetti, S.J., (Am. Eccl. Rev. June, 1890) says: “The same solution must be given concerning attendance at a marriage; for an action of this kind is regarded among us as a merely civil office and a sign of friendship. Nor should the circumstance that Veronica acted the part of the principal assisting girl (first bridesmaid) cause any difficulty; for those girls are ordinarily chosen for such an office who, on the one hand, are more suited to fulfill it by reason of age and civil condition, and, on the other, are borne toward the bride by greater friendship and a closer bond of goodwill. This shows that according to our customs an office of this kind is not regarded as religious and does not entail any participation in worship.”

That the vast majority of non-Catholics in the United States look upon the marriage contract as a purely civil contract, possessing no sacramental or religious character, is a statement that hardly admits of question. All legislation concerning it is handed over to the State, and the minister performing the ceremony considers himself as acting for and in the name of the State, and marries all persons, who are allowed by the State to contract marriage, whether they belong to his particular religious denomination or another, or to no denomination at all. He marries believers and unbelievers alike, baptized and unbaptized, only solicitous that they be authorized by the civil law to marry. "The fact that weddings are usually ratified in a church is due partially to a traditional instinct which retains the solemnity of a sacred function for an act regarded merely as a grave social and civil contract" (Am. Ecc. Rev., Vol. vi., p. 465).

European theologians take a somewhat stricter view of this question, influenced, no doubt, by conditions of society obtaining in Europe.

Thus Genicot, SJ. (I., n. 200), says: “Moreover, one must abstain from those functions which involve recognition of a sect, for example, the office of a witness who lends authority to the marriage contract.”

Lehmkuhl (I. 295) says: “But to attend the wedding or burial of a non-Catholic, since it is regarded merely as a civil honor, is commonly lawful.

Nevertheless, even in these actions attention must be paid to whether, because of the circumstances, scandal, danger of perversion, or a special prohibition is present.”

Ballerini-Palmieri (n. 96) says: “Is it lawful for Catholics to attend the weddings of heretics, which the heretics celebrate validly indeed, but before a heretical minister and with a heretical rite? A distinction must be made between those who are simply present and those who, performing the office of witnesses, lend authority to the contract. For the latter communicate with heretics in their sacred affair and implicitly recognize the authority of that sect and its ministers, which, as we have said, is not lawful.”

It may be interesting to quote an author of as long ago as Lugo, though times and conditions have undergone vast changes since his day. Lugo, in his tract on faith (no. 157), says about acting as groomsman or bridesmaid at a non-Catholic wedding:

“Thirdly, it may be doubted whether a Catholic may not only lawfully attend the weddings of heretics, but also in the same cases perform the office of paranymph, when paranymphs are used at the solemnities, who customarily conduct the spouses to the churches. I answer from what has been said that one must consider what the office of the paranymph is, who is called a pronubus by others and an auspex by the ancients. If it belongs to him only to hand the bride over to the groom, or conversely, after they have been lawfully joined, nothing unlawful appears in that office, since it is a merely civil action. But if his office is, as it were, to bring the spouses to the minister so that he may join them, then he seems to participate in the rites by which the heretical minister joins them, to have recourse to him as a minister of the Church, and to approve his ministry, which is unlawful.”

In the year 1719, the Propaganda laid down the general rule for missionaries, “that communication in sacred things with heretics and schismatics is regularly to be regarded in practice as unlawful, either because of the danger of perversion in the Catholic faith, or because of the danger of participation in a heretical and schismatic rite, or finally because of the danger and occasion of scandal.”

On May 10, 1770, the Congregation of the Holy Office answered, “His Holiness decreed that Catholics are not regularly permitted to attend the sermons, baptisms, or marriages of heretics or schismatics.”

We are inclined to think, therefore, that as far as the United States is concerned, non-Catholic weddings are not, as a rule, religious affairs, but rather mere civil contracts, and to assist at them or to act as groomsman or bridesmaid is not a "communicatio in divinis," and is not, therefore, on these grounds, unlawful for Catholics. In a given instance, as we have remarked above, a non-Catholic marriage may be a religious rite, and, in that case, it would not be lawful for Catholics to take part in them as groomsman or bridesmaid.

But on other grounds it may be unlawful for Catholics to act as groomsman or bridesmaid at a non-Catholic wedding, namely, where such conduct would give scandal or create danger for the Catholic's faith, or where it has been forbidden by the diocesan authorities. And as these dangers may exist in any given case, each case should be considered on its own individual merits.

Where there is a good reason for a Catholic girl, for instance, to act as bridesmaid at a non-Catholic wedding, and where the marriage ceremony can not be considered a sacred rite, and where no scandal is given and no risk taken for her faith, a priest in the United States is justified in permitting such a girl to take part in the wedding, and would scarcely act wisely in refusing her absolution, if she would not promise not to take part.

But where there is no serious reason for a Catholic girl to act as bridesmaid at such a marriage, and where she may decline without serious inconvenience to herself and to others, we think it the part of prudence for a confessor or pastor to induce her to decline.

A firm manufacturing stained glass, owned by a Catholic, received a handsome order from a Protestant community. The head of the firm asks Father A. whether he can properly and with a clear conscience undertake the commission.

Father A. forbids this, absolutely, as it would be assisting in building a temple for heretics. Subsequently Father B. is asked, who at once permits the firm to do the work.

Who is right? What justification is there for obeying one and not the other?

If Fathers A. and B. gave their decision without further inquiry into the status of the case, they both erred. We will explain this more fully. What is here really concerned? A Protestant house of worship is in need of stained glass windows; if the house were intended for profane purpose there would be no difficulty whatsoever. But the windows are to adorn a place where will be held worship the participation in which is forbidden by the Church, consequently a co-operation in something prohibited, a cooperatio ad rem malam, can not be denied. In the cooperatio, however, the first question is, can it be designated as formal? If so, there can be no permission, because it would be an actual participation in the sinfulness of the act, therefore a sin; if not formal, then it is material, and the act of the co-operation is neither bad of itself nor of its intention, it would solely become wrong through the guilt of the performer. That is sufficient, however, to render such co-operation unpermissible. The law of charity requires us to prevent evil as much as possible, primarily, therefore, not to assist in it in any way at all. The obligations of charity, however—we must not overlook this—exalted as they are, do not oblige us in general under great sacrifices, i. e., for sufficient reasons to suffer evil to be done is not sinful. Hence the principle that a material co-operation is permissible for comparatively grave reasons. In material co-operation the question of the importance of the motives for the action are of great import. The more sinful the act, the greater the injury, the worse the scandal— on the one hand; on the other hand the more closely the material co-operation is connected with the act, the more necessary the co-operation for its accomplishment—then the more weighty must be the reason that is to render such material assistance permissible.

Let us apply this principle to the case before us. It is here a question of material support of a heretical sect; therefore the greatest good, the faith, is at stake. If by refusal of assistance the faith could be preserved, or a real injury to it averted, then our duty is clearly defined. Such would be the case if a new sect was being founded, or if a sect newly entered a locality theretofore free from all heresy. Hence the great severity of the rescript of the Cardinal Vicar of July 12, 1878.

If, however, a sect is tolerated to prevent greater evil, and officially recognized by temporal authorities, the case is a little different. The danger to the faith has become chronic, not so burning; the scandal has become lessened by conventionalism, though unfortunately not, without spreading indifference in matters of faith. For the Catholic there remains the duty of abstaining from material co-operation, especially one directly connected with the promotion of heresy, as, for instance, contributing money to build heretic churches, contributing, or helping, at bazaars for the same purpose, etc. Archi-tects must not make plans for such churches, nor erect the building, unless a more important reason exists than the gain itself. Frequently, however, it will be best not to say anything about this, and not to disturb the good faith that has arisen from long existing practise. The decoration of churches appears to be less intimately connected with the prohibited worship than the building of the church itself. For this reason the furnishing of stained glass work might more easily be permitted; yet there should be a weightier reason than the ordinary gain, for instance actual lack of work which threatens the business, or which necessitates the discharge of workmen, who then would only with difficulty obtain other positions, and similar reasons, such as great improvement of the firm. If such reasons exist, and the locality in question is one of mixed religions, if there is no scandal to fear, or if it may be removed by explanation, the firm may undertake the work. The pictures must of course not bear even a trace of heresy.

W. Stentrup, S.J.

In a small town there is an orchestra of which Torquatus is a member. He is a man with family and obtains his sole income from this profession, making a fairly good living. He is often called upon to play at Protestant funerals, also at dances—not infrequently immodest dances. The leader of the orchestra declares that Torquatus must play at all engagements or be dismissed. Torquatus, a conscientious Catholic, asks his confessor what to do under these circumstances. What answer should be given him?

If Torquatus can find other employment, by which he can support his family respectably, he should be advised, without doubt, to quit the orchestra. If this is not possible, then the question is whether the situation excuses him in co-operating, in the manner mentioned, at Protestant funerals and at dances. The twofold danger, of injuring his own soul and of giving scandal to others and co-operating in their sins, appears to prohibit him from so doing.

As regards the actual danger it should not be difficult for a conscientious father of a family to render this danger very remote, especially by purity of intention and by vigilance and prayer.

His participation in an act of non-Catholic worship, and in the sins of others on the dance floor, appears to be more important. For this reason these two points may receive closer attention.

1. As regards playing at Protestant funerals, a distinction must be made as to whether the co-operation must be regarded as formal, or merely as material. Such participation is formal if it forms part of the forbidden ritual, or if it is part of the same, as for instance playing the organ, or singing at non-Catholic services. In such cases the participation can not be excused for any necessity whatever, because it is essentially wrong. In this sense moralists prohibit Catholics from singing, making responses, or playing the organ at non-

Catholic services (Compare Marc, n. 433 (2); LEHMKUHL, n. 656).

If the orchestra, of which Torquatus is a member, plays funeral marches, etc., at Protestant funerals, the same as at other purely profane occasions, this co-operation can as little be considered as formal participation as that of mourners accompanying a funeral; both could be considered only material participation, for this reason taking part in a Protestant funeral procession is allowed for just reasons, for example as an act of civic decency. “To accompany a funeral as far as the doors of the church or cemetery is considered a civil observance (Marc, n. 432, 2). And (LEHMKUHL, n. 656, 2), permits “A concert of musical instruments during a religious rite, but not as a part or ornament of it—for example, in honor of a non-Catholic prince who is present.”

2. The second question is whether Torquatus’ musical co-operation at dances—not infrequently immoral dances—is not formal co-operation, and as such positively forbidden. “Formal co-operation in another’s sin is always intrinsically evil, and therefore never lawful” (Aertnys, I, II, n. 77). The same authority says: “Co-operation is formal either from the end of the work or from the end of the agent” (n. 76). The latter is evidently not the case with Torquatus, who certainly does not intend the sins of others. As regards the finis operis the rule is: “Co-operation is formal when it concurs with the evil will of another by furnishing assistance which by its own nature is ordered to evil or is a part of it.” It would be difficult to establish that the playing of a musical instrument, even in the rendering of an immodest piece, is to be considered as an act which by its own nature is ordered to evil or is a part of it. It would be quite another matter with the singing of shameful songs.