Article II: On Cooperation with Infidelity and Heresy

761. Cooperation with infidelity or heresy is concurrence furnished to them. It is twofold: one immediate, which is participation in their very establishment, propagation, or worship; this is intrinsically evil and always unlawful. The other is mediate, which is the supplying of matter, faculty, or means for their conservation, propagation, or worship. This is per se unlawful, because it gives another the means or occasion of sinning, from which we are rather bound to turn him away, and in this it is evil; per accidens it can be lawful, if the action of the cooperator is not intrinsically evil and there is a proportionately grave cause, namely, a good which compensates the evil, that is, the occasion of sinning given. Hence a cause is required which is the graver the graver the evil is to which cooperation is made, and the nearer the cooperation is and the more it influences that evil (nn. 489-490).

762. As regards the Sacraments: 1. It is never lawful for parents positively to cooperate or to permit (for example, by asking, willing, or consenting) that their children be baptized by a heretical (schismatic, juring) minister, because to ask or to will the Baptism of heretics is an implicit acknowledgment of the sect, which is intrinsically evil (Holy Office, September 26, 1668; November 29, 1672; can. 2319). But negatively to permit this and to behave passively will not be lawful except on account of very grave inconvenience, because cooperation is made to a very grave evil.

2. Similarly for Catholics, even those serving in a hospital, it is unlawful, when a sick heretic asks, directly to call the minister of his sect so that he may receive the helps of religion (likewise so that the minister may perform funeral rites): thus the Holy Office, May 14, 1848 and December 26, 1898. Yet for this they can use a person belonging to the same sect (January 31, 1872).

But if such a person is lacking, according to some it is lawful to call the minister, saying: such a person wishes to speak with you, or something similar, but only on account of the common good, in a non-ordinary case, namely, so that great public hatred against the Catholic religion may be avoided, or the cessation of many goods to be furnished by those serving the hospital; otherwise not, because it is a question of the greatest evil of a private person, namely, of the eternal harm of the dying man.¹

¹ Indeed Lehmkuhl (likewise Prummer, Marc, Vermeersch) thinks that in such circumstances it is also lawful for the attendant to prepare a table for the non-Catholic minister on which he wishes to perform his rites, and to offer utensils, bread, and wine. But this certainly cannot be done during the rite itself, because it is communication in worship. - Catholics can, however, stir up the dying man to faith in the truths to be confessed by necessity of means, and to contrition and love of God.

763. As regards the offices of worship and sermons of heretics:

1. It is never lawful to cooperate in the offices of heretics by singing or by musical instruments, as was said in the preceding article (n. 758, 3), because the cooperation is immediate, or participation in the very exercise of worship.

2. Nor is it lawful to invite others to the offices or sermons of heretics, whether by persuasion, or by authority or counsel, or by any other inducements whatsoever, because it is directly to induce to sinning, which is intrinsically evil.

3. Indeed, to ring bells as a sign that a heretical office or sermon begins (on the contrary, in honor of the king), because ordinarily it is taken for an invitation or is altogether closely connected with invitation; unless perhaps someone shows that he acts thus from a very grave cause, for example, in grave or quasi-extreme necessity.

764. As regards the building of temples and altars:

1. It will never be lawful to adorn idols and their altars or temples, because it is intrinsically evil.

2. To build their temples or altars is generally unlawful, because it is wont to be held as a sign of profession of a false faith and to stir up scandal (Holy Office, December 7, 1626; September 5, 1736; January 8, 1851); otherwise it will not be lawful except from a most grave cause, because it is a question of a thing altogether depraved (July 2, 1827).

3. To build temples of Mohammedans, scandal excluded, is lawful from fear of grave evil (Prop. F., November 21, 1837).

4. To build temples of heretics, Jews, or schismatics:

a) for masons and subordinate workmen, it is lawful from a lighter cause, provided it is not held as profession or approval of heresy, scandal is absent, and it is not required in contempt of religion, because the cooperation is remote and secondary (Holy Office, January 13, 1818; July 7, 1864);

b) but for architects, contractors, and overseers of works, in places in which Catholics have already for a long time lived mixed with non-Catholics, it is not lawful except from a grave cause, such as gain alone is not, because the cooperation is more principal;

c) for the same, in places altogether Catholic, it is generally gravely unlawful (instruction of the Cardinal Vicar of Rome, July 12, 1878).

5. The same seems to be said concerning the buildings of Freemasons or of another impious society.

6. But for leasing a house so that it may serve the worship of heretics or the congregation of Freemasons or of another impious sect, a graver cause is required, because the cooperation is nearer.

765. As regards the making and sale of things destined for false worship:

1. If they cannot have another good or indifferent use, it is never lawful, because it is intrinsically evil.

2. If they can have another use but must serve false worship, it can be lawful on account of a motive the graver according as the cooperation is greater.

In particular: a) generally it is lawful, from a lighter cause, to make organs, a pulpit, altars, vestments for heretics, because the cooperation is remote;

b) but if they are expressly and formally sought on account of an evil use, it will not be lawful except for a grave cause, because the cooperation is nearer; indeed sometimes a most grave cause is required, if the matter is most grave, for example, to make or sell hosts which enemies of the Church are going to abuse;

c) finally, it is unlawful to fabricate idols, sacred vestments destined for superstitious use, superstitious signs, signs and emblems of Freemasons, since the things almost never have a good use;

d) if those things are made for an indifferent or good use, it is lawful, as to make an idol for adorning a garden or for stage plays.

766. As regards non-Catholic religious works, or works which are ordered to a false religion:

1. To contribute money to them either spontaneously or because they regard religion is never lawful, because it is formally to protect, which is intrinsically evil.

2. To do this under coercion and without an evil intention, if the works are religious (for example, a temple, festivities, ceremonies), is regularly unlawful, unless a) on account of a very grave cause, because to foster a false religion is a fairly proximate cooperation and more proximate than the construction of a temple, and b) provided it is clear that there is no consent to false superstitions or ceremonies (S. C. P. F., July 2, 1827; Holy Office, April 21, 1847): as, for example, Catholics can do so that they may free themselves from simultaneity of worship (S. Penit., 1822), and deputies who, on account of the good of public peace, confer subsidies from the public treasury upon heretical works just as upon Catholic works.

3. If they are not ordered only to religion, but have another good end, for example, education, care of the sick, the poor..., a grave cause would suffice, provided it is not considered as favor of heresy, scandal is lacking, and the money is not used for perverting Catholics. This will more easily be lawful in places long mixed, than in places altogether Catholic.

4. The same seems to be said concerning the works of other enemies of the Church, for example, liberals, socialists, in regions where these words indicate opposition to the Church.

5. Nevertheless it is unlawful to give one's name to such societies which directly have an evil end; but if they are only indirectly ordered to an evil end, and have a direct good end, for example, an economic one, it will be lawful from a grave cause and with scandal removed.

Thus it is unlawful to give one's name to theosophical societies (July 4, 1919), likewise to the London society "for promoting the unity of Christianity" (July 18, 1919), or even to the association Y. M. C. A. (November 5, 1920), which spreads religious indifferentism.

767. As regards evil or prohibited writings: books, journals, dictionaries, encyclopedias, periodicals, newspapers, or others of this kind.1

A. To be written: 1. For editors to defend false principles and to compose writings according to those principles is never lawful, because it is immediate cooperation and always a grave sin.

2. To cooperate with articles indifferent of themselves (for example, concerning a literary, scientific, or artistic matter), and indeed frequently or ordinarily, is a cooperation more or less proximate according as in that way the depraved writing is more or less commended and defended, and therefore it is not lawful except, scandal excluded, and on account of a cause more or less grave, such as greater gain is not, but only gain necessary for sustenance.

3. Sometimes and extraordinarily to insert indifferent articles is a more remote cooperation, which nevertheless is not lawful without a cause, but for which a moderately grave cause suffices, such as certainly is to set forth or defend good principles occasionally, or to impede an evil article, provided the reputation of the evil writing is not increased thereby, nor a very bad writing promoted with great scandal of the faithful (can. 1386, § 2).

B. To be printed: 1. For the publisher himself or the owner of a printing house, it is never lawful to undertake the printing, because this is not only to cooperate proximately but also to induce others to cooperate (can. 2318, § 1).

2. To cooperate altogether proximately with the printing, by directing the printing house, setting the characters or type, correcting printed sheets, is not lawful except in a very rare case, for a brief time and on account of grave necessity (such as dismissal from service is not), except in the case in which the book is so evil that it cannot have a good end (July 12, 1878).

3. To cooperate more remotely, although still fairly proximately, by placing the paper under the type, turning the press, preparing paper or ink, arranging and joining the printed sheets, or carrying them to purchasers, moving the machine and caring for it, is lawful from a lesser cause, nevertheless always a grave one.

4. To act most remotely, for example, by selling ink, paper, machines, and other things necessary for printing, is lawful for the sake of gain alone.

From this it follows that there is an obligation of leaving a printing house in which almost only depraved books and depraved journals are printed: absolutely for those who cooperate altogether proximately; indeed for those who cooperate more remotely, as also for those who work in printing houses in which good and evil books are printed indiscriminately, if they can depart without notable detriment.

C. To be sold (a fortiori, to be leased, distributed, conceded): 1. To sell a prohibited writing which is wholly evil, so that it has no good use, is in no way lawful, except to one who is certainly known to be about to read it by office, for example, an inquisitor.

2. To expose publicly and to sell in shops or on the streets those things which are not evil in every part but contain useful things, either to one who is going to abuse them, or indiscriminately to all, is not lawful except on account of very grave inconvenience, and until another means of acquiring a livelihood is present.1

3. A fortiori, to invite or positively induce another to buy evil writings is unlawful, because it is to induce to sinning, and therefore intrinsically evil.

4. To sell a separate copy can be lawful from a lesser cause, namely, one moderately grave (not on account of gain alone or competition alone); indeed it will in no way be unlawful if it can be presumed that the purchaser has a just cause for reading.

But it should be noted that booksellers are not bound to inquire for what end books are bought, but they can sell them to all whom, considering their quality, they prudently judge to seek them lawfully; otherwise too grave a burden would be imposed (cf. can. 1404).

D. To be exposed: 1. For innkeepers, tavern-keepers, owners of hotels, and barbers to expose for all to read writings altogether evil (which are scarcely not opposed to faith or morals) is a grave sin, even if they are sought by many who would on that account leave the tavern: grave damage does not sufficiently compensate the spiritual ruin of many.

2. To hand over to be read by those who ask writings which more rarely contain something evil is lawful for avoiding grave damage.

3. For those to whom it is clear by experience that almost all ask for such writings and otherwise would leave the tavern, it will not be unlawful to expose them publicly; it is preferable to expose good ones at the same time.

E. To be promoted and sustained: 1. To give one's name and buy shares for the sake of establishing a society for publishing or propagating depraved writings,² likewise to subscribe to their publication and to sustain it with money, is unlawful, because no necessity seems to make the cooperation honorable; this is most certain if the writings are professedly impious or depraved, or if without the cooperation the society would not be established.

² The dissertation of Ill. Waffelaert deserves to be consulted: Etude sur la Cooperation et l'espece morale du scandale.

2. To subscribe to a society already effected or to a writing already being published, since it is proximate cooperation, will not be lawful unless there is a grave cause proportioned to the influence of the cooperation and to the evil to be feared, the danger of scandal and perversion is absent, and the writing is not published manifestly in hatred of religion.

3. To buy a separate number or special copy is a more remote cooperation, for which, scandal excluded, a reasonable cause, even a light one, suffices, for example, the utility of reading; and a somewhat greater cause if it is done more frequently. It should nevertheless be noted that the reading itself is unlawful, if it is positively prohibited.

4. To furnish indifferent notices concerning things to be sold, leased, bought, etc., is not lawful except with scandal excluded and from a just cause, the greater according as the advertisements bring it about that the writings are propagated more widely and sustained more easily. When it contributes little, a less grave reason suffices.

1. A lesser reason is required, but nevertheless a grave one, for him who, excluding obscene and very impious writings and with scandal removed, would sell journals of whatever kind, good and evil, if a custom of acting thus exists somewhere; a fortiori he could do this if from the public administration he had bought the right or monopoly of selling journals in public places, for example, in squares or stations of railways, under the law that journals of every political faction are equally sold.

1. To retain purchased shares is not lawful if otherwise the evil can be impeded, but it is lawful for avoiding a greater evil.

768. As regards the elections of deputies in the assemblies of the kingdom, province, or municipality:

1. Spontaneously, that is, from conviction and approval, to elect a candidate hostile to the Church is gravely unlawful, because it is formal cooperation and therefore intrinsically evil.

2. Merely materially and under coercion, from fear of evil, to elect such a one is not intrinsically evil, because the mandate which the elector confers is not determined to evil, but is ordered to evil by the malice or abuse of the one elected; hence the elector is not a true cause but only an occasion of the evil to be brought in. But since it is a question of a most grave evil of religion and society, no cause of utility can excuse such cooperation, but only grave necessity (such as loss of office can be), especially if the outcome of the election appears truly doubtful and perhaps depends upon a few votes; in which case at least it will be a mortal sin, because then the vote can exercise a great influence upon a great evil. Therefore the friendship of the candidate or his greater skill does not suffice, nor the advantage to be hoped from his election: for these things do not compensate the assistance furnished to the grave harm of the Church or of the republic.

3. To abstain from casting a vote is unlawful for the same reasons, namely, if the election of the unworthy candidate can probably be impeded: for it is the negative cooperation of one who does not do what he is bound to do by office, namely, of legal justice. Indeed it is a grave sin when from this it can probably be feared that a sufficient number of good candidates will not be elected and thus a great evil will be perpetrated by the perverse; or if the one abstaining is of such authority that by his example he would draw many and effectively influence the success of the election (which rarely happens).

4. To elect a neutral candidate is unlawful if from this the election of a good candidate is probably impeded, or the election of an unworthy candidate is not impeded; indeed it can be a grave sin in the same way as was said in the preceding solution.

5. To promise a vote to a candidate seeking and compelling it, but with an internal restriction (as far as I can, and as you have a right), or to answer him equivocally, is lawful for avoiding grave inconvenience, because then the circumstances sufficiently indicate the sense of the response, namely, that the one responding intends only to free himself from troublesome coercion. Such a promise evidently does not oblige.

6. To elect a depraved or unworthy candidate, a fortiori a neutral one, can per accidens be lawful, for example, if there is no hope that a list of good candidates will be elected unless evil candidates who are contained in the same list are also elected; likewise if the candidates to be elected are only evil: for then the less evil candidate can be elected, especially if thus a greater evil to be feared from others would have to be averted.