When an oath ceases to bind

An oath may cease to bind from intrinsic or from extrinsic causes. If circumstances produce a change in the matter of the oath so that it has become unlawful, or useless, or an obstacle to greater good, or if some condition is not fulfilled, the oath no longer binds. The same must be said when the motive of a promissory oath no longer exists, as if I swore to help a poor person with money who subsequently becomes rich (Can. 1319).

An oath may be annulled, dispensed, commuted, or relaxed, in much the same way as a vow, and it will be more convenient to treat of these extrinsic causes for being released from the obligation of an oath in the next chapter, where the doctrine is applicable to vows and oaths alike (Can. 1320).

Cessation of Obligation of Promissory Oath.—The obligation of a promissory oath, like that of a vow (see 2226), ceases intrinsically or extrinsically.

(a) Intrinsically, an oath ceases when there is a substantial change in the matter (e.g., it is or has become impossible or unlawful, as in Herod’s oath to Salome), when the principal reason for the oath has ceased (e.g., Titus swore to give an alms to Sempronius because the latter was poor, but before the alms was given Sempronius became rich), or when the time or condition by which the oath was limited terminates the obligation.

(b) Extrinsically, an oath ceases by condonation (e.g., when the State or a private person to whom a sworn promise has been made yields the right and remits the obligation), by annulment (e.g., when a father nullifies the oath of his minor child), by dispensation (e.g., when the Church absolves from an oath taken under grave compulsion), by commutation (e.g., when the Church changes the matter of a sworn vow into something more suitable). Those who can annul, dispense or commute vows have the same power over oaths; but if the dispensation of an oath is detrimental to others who are unwilling to forego the promise, only the Apostolic See can dispense, and then on account of a necessary reason (see Canon 1320).

How does the obligation of a promissory oath cease from within? - The obligation of an oath, namely a promissory oath, can cease both from within and from without. It ceases from within: 1. If what was good at the time of the oath afterwards becomes illicit on account of circumstances, or impedes a greater good, or is better omitted than fulfilled. For an oath is an act of religion, and God is not worshiped by an illicit thing, or by one which rather detracts from divine worship. 2. If you change the oath into some work plainly better and more pleasing to God; for each person can do this per se. Yet always except if you have sworn something for the advantage of a man; for God does not wish him to be defrauded. Cf. 568. 3.

If the state of the thing is notably changed, for such a change makes another object to which the intention of the one swearing does not extend. 4. If the thing sworn has become useless for the intent, especially if it is more destructive of it; for example, if correction of an impenitent son would be wholly useless, indeed he would become worse from it. 5. If those conditions so bear, which nature and the doctors teach are tacitly understood in any promissory oath. Cf. 561. 6. If its final cause ceases, for without the final cause the effect does not subsist; for example, you promised alms to a poor man, but he afterwards becomes rich. But otherwise, if only an impulsive cause ceases. L. 180, 187, 188; S. Th. 2. 2, q. 89, aa. 7, 9.

Is that change sufficient of itself, even if not notable, which nevertheless, if foreseen, one would not have emitted the oath? - The first opinion affirms from S. Thomas, 4 D. 38, q. 1 ad 1. The reason is that the intention of obliging oneself then is either lacking, or is so understood. The second opinion holds that it does not suffice, because the obligation is not to be taken from a promise which would not be made in the future, but from that which has already been made. Thus Suarez, Sanchez, Cajetan, etc. "Yet deservedly they say that the probability of the first opinion cannot be denied. Indeed they themselves, with the Salmanticenses, judge that change to be notable which, if it had been known from the beginning, the one swearing would not have promised, which certainly agrees with the first opinion." L. 187, 226; cf. 563, 564, 575, 597, 598.

How does the obligation of a promissory oath cease from without? - It ceases by annulment, dispensation, commutation, remission. Annulment is the nullification of an oath. Annulment is made by any superior having dominative power over the one swearing, concerning those things which are subject to his power, even if the matter concerns promises and contracts. For these oaths have an implicit condition: if the superior consents, if they are not revoked by him. The Supreme Pontiff has this dominative power as to ecclesiastical matters; a superior as to matters subject to his own power; a father, husband, tutor, master; and these can annul and nullify the oaths of their own in plainly the same way in which they can annul the vows of their own. Num. 30:4 seqq.; S. Th. 2. 2, q. 89, a. 9 ad 3. Cf. 599 seqq.

Dispensation is given by one having jurisdiction in the external forum; understand spiritual jurisdiction. Whoever has ordinary power of dispensing in vows can dispense in oaths and in vows, even if these are sworn. L. 189. "Dispensation which is made in an oath does not extend to this, that something be done against the oath; for this is impossible, since observance of an oath falls under a divine precept, which is indispensable. But dispensation of an oath extends to this, that what fell under the oath no longer falls under the oath, as though not existing as due matter of an oath; just as we said above concerning a vow, q. preceding, a. 10 ad 2... The matter of a promissory oath is something future, which can vary, namely in such a way that in some event it can be illicit or harmful, and consequently not be due matter of an oath; and therefore dispensation can be made in a promissory oath, because such dispensation regards the matter of the oath, and is not contrary to the divine precept concerning observance of an oath." S. Th. 2. 2, q. 89, a. 9 ad 1. "Sometimes something is promised under oath concerning which it is doubtful whether it is licit or illicit, profitable or harmful, either simply or in some case; and in this any Bishop can dispense. But sometimes something is promised under oath which is manifestly licit and useful; and in such an oath dispensation or commutation does not seem to have place, unless something better occurs to be done for the common utility, which seems especially to pertain to the power of the Pope, who has care of the universal Church; or also absolute relaxation, which also pertains to the Pope generally in all things which pertain to the dispensation of ecclesiastical affairs, over which he has fullness of power." S. Th. 2. 2, q. 89, a. 9 ad 3.

Commutation is reduced to dispensation, and is made, like it, by one having spiritual jurisdiction in the external forum. L. 191. Cf. here 566.

Remission is the relaxation of an oath made in favor of a man, by the same man, or by him to whom the one promising and the promised matter is subject. It must be noted: 1. That if a promise in favor of a man, confirmed by oath, has not yet been accepted, there is no obligation of fulfilling it, and it can be revoked; because the oath is then accessory and follows the nature of the promise. But otherwise, if the promise was principally made to God. 2. If such a promise has been accepted by the third party to whom it was made, and a right has been absolutely acquired by him, then without his consent it cannot be relaxed, not even by the Pontiff. But this latter is limited in three cases. The first is if the one swearing is a subject, and the oath concerns those things which are subject to the power of superiors. The other is if the oath cannot be kept without common harm, or is upon a contract forbidden by law. Such oaths more truly do not need relaxation, since of themselves they are null. The third is if the oath was extorted by deceit or fear; for then, even if it is valid, it can be relaxed. And this holds even if the promise is not undue, say concerning paying a true debt, but the oath was unjustly extorted; and even if the oath is extorted by light fear, at least for the internal forum, from C. Sollicite 2 and from C. Accepta 3, de Restit. spol., where only an altogether spontaneous oath cannot be relaxed. But not only the Pontiff can relax it, but also Bishops, chapters when Sees are vacant, and others having episcopal jurisdiction, and also Confessors having delegated faculty of dispensing in oaths.

3. It is certain that an oath in favor of a third party can be freely remitted by him, without relaxation of the Church, because each person can yield concerning his own right. For "from such a promise he to whom the promise was made can absolve; for it is understood that he has already paid the promise when he does concerning it according to his will." S. Th. 2. 2, q. 89, a. 9 ad 2. L. 189-193.

Can one who has delegated faculty of dispensing in vows dispense in oaths? - These words are from Suarez, de Voto, l. 6, c. 14, n. 6: "It is sufficiently probable that power delegated simply for dispensing in vows extends to dispensing in pious oaths concerning the same matter, when they stand per se and produce their own sole obligation. This is the common opinion, and without doubt can be observed in practice." And n. 19: "Even if vow and oath immediately fall upon the same matter, and each obliges per se to the honor of God, by an absolute faculty of dispensing in vows, either the vow, or the oath, or both can be removed, at the judgment of the one dispensing. For this assertion we can allege all the authors of the first, namely the preceding, assertion..., and other moderns and learned men hold it." The intrinsic reason of this opinion is that oath and vow, on account of the affinity of obligation, are equated with each other.

But others deny, because the bond of a vow and of an oath is diverse. Thus Lessius, l. 2, c. 42, n. 60, who nevertheless admits the prior opinion when the oath is accessory to the vow. For indeed, when the vow is dispensed, the oath vanishes. But an oath by its nature is accessory to the promise to which it is added. St. Alphonsus, n. 160, holds each opinion as probable; nevertheless he says that the second must altogether be held: "for the obligation of an oath already contracted, since it is certain and possesses, cannot be removed by a dispensation that is only probably valid." But if the opposite opinion is probable, it is altogether safe in practice, since, that probability standing, the superior granting the first faculty is rightly judged also to grant the latter, unless he expressly limits it. Yet S. C. de P. F., 19 May 1845, decreed: "the faculty of dispensing from vows does not per se include the faculty of dispensing from an oath." And as to sworn vows the same S. C., 3 May 1828, left the matter doubtful. L. 189, 190, 192, 254; D'Annibale, ed. 4, p. 2, n. 431, note 36; Monitore Ecclesiastico, vol. 18, pp. 139, 140; Collectan. S. C. de P. F., nn. 2085, 2087; E. M. Regulars, from special privilege, can commute oaths and also dispense in them, unless they were in favor of a third party and accepted by him. L. de Privil., 108.

455. 3. The cessation of the obligation of a promissory oath can be produced either by extrinsic causes or by intrinsic causes. From intrinsic causes the obligation of an oath ceases in almost the same way as a vow, namely, through a substantial change of matter (as if it has become unlawful or impossible); through the cessation of the essential end (as if someone promised alms by oath to poor Peter, who has now suddenly become rich or has died); through the failure of the condition under which the oath was made.⁵⁹⁶

The extrinsic causes which produce the cessation of an oath are:

a) the remission by the other person in whose favor the promise confirmed by oath was made, as is clear from the second rule, letter c), cited above.

b) invalidation, dispensation, commutation. Before the Code of Canon Law was published, certain controversies existed concerning this matter. But now c. 1320 simply establishes: "Those who can invalidate, dispense, or commute a vow have the same power and in the same manner concerning a promissory oath; but if the dispensation of an oath tends to the prejudice of others who refuse to remit the obligation, the Apostolic See alone can dispense the oath because of the necessity or utility of the Church." Therefore, e.g., betrothals confirmed by a promissory oath can be dispensed by the Holy See alone, unless, however, both betrothed parties consent to the dissolution of the betrothal. Apart from this oath in favor of a third person, no other seems to be reserved to the Holy See.⁵⁹⁷

c) Release,⁵⁹⁸ which differs from dispensation in this, that dispensation is customarily granted in favor of the person swearing, but release from an oath is commonly imposed because of grave reasons on the part of the one in whose favor the oath was pronounced. This release is similar to the invalidation of an oath, but since it tends to the prejudice of others, it is not exercised except by the Supreme Pontiff,⁵⁹⁹ and indeed:

a) for preventing harm to the common good. For a private good ought to yield to the common good. Therefore the Pope releases even sworn betrothals for a grave cause if, e.g., otherwise an unbelieving betrothed man would contract a merely civil marriage or live in concubinage. Certainly the betrothed woman thus abandoned can suffer great harm from such a release, but the Church cannot compel the unbelieving betrothed man to the promised nuptials, and on the other hand, for the sake of the common good, she must avoid merely civil marriages and concubinages as far as possible. b) As punishment for a crime committed. Therefore in ancient times the Supreme Pontiffs more than once released the citizens' oath of fidelity because of the crimes of an excommunicated prince. c) For repairing an injury which was inflicted upon the one swearing, if, namely, he was induced to the oath by fear or fraud.⁶⁰⁰

⁵⁹⁶ Cf. what was said above in n. 410 concerning the cessation of a vow, and Code of Canon Law, c. 1319, nn. 2 and 3.

⁵⁹⁷ Cf. St. Alphonsus, Theol. mor. l. 3, n. 259.

⁵⁹⁸ Eideslösung, délier d'un serment [release from an oath].

⁵⁹⁹ Cf. S. theol. 2, 2, q. 89, a. 9 ad 3; Code of Canon Law, c. 1320.

⁶⁰⁰ S. theol., l.c., a. 7 ad 3.

S. Th. II-II, q. 89, a. 7-9.

755. The intrinsic effect of a promissory oath is the obligation of executing the thing sworn from the virtue of religion. - It is certain, both from Scripture (Num. XXX, 3; Mt. V, 33), and from reason, because he who does not fulfill a promise confirmed in His name inflicts injury upon the authority of God (can. 1317, § 1).

The obligation is grave from its genus, yet probably admits lightness of matter, just as a vow does.

It is proved: 1. directly. Because the obligation of a vow is graver than the obligation of an oath as promissory.¹ For the former is caused from the fidelity which we owe to God Himself, so that we pay Him what was promised; the latter is caused from reverence toward God, from which we are bound to verify that which through His name we promised before Him. But the obligation of fidelity regards God more directly than the obligation of reverence, for infidelity contains irreverence, not conversely, and infidelity toward a lord is the greatest irreverence. Therefore we are more strictly bound to do that which we promised to God Himself than that which we promised with God only as witness (a. 8). Whence if the obligation of a vow admits lightness of matter, a fortiori the obligation of a promissory oath does.

¹ We say: as promissory. For the obligation of an oath as assertory is greater: there it is a negative precept not to swear falsely, which is directly contrary to God; here it is an affirmative precept of fulfilling a sworn promise. But a negative precept obliges more than an affirmative.

2. indirectly. Because the violation of a promissory oath is not proved to be perjury strictly so called, as the adversaries² contend, saying: He who does not fulfill an oath makes it be false and lying, because he makes God witness of a lie. For he who does not fulfill what he sincerely promised does not make a lie; because he does not say or do against his mind, but only changes his mind, inconstant and unfaithful, as St. Thomas himself explains (II-II, q. 110, a. 3, ad 5). Therefore he who does not fulfill what he sincerely swore does not make God witness of a lie, provided he had the intention of fulfilling the oath; but he only acts inconstantly or unfaithfully in a thing promised under divine authority, and thus contracts irreverence toward God, which is a grave or light sin according to the gravity or lightness of his inconstancy or infidelity.

² For example, Cajetan, Toledo, Valentia, Lessius, Gabriel, Bonacina, etc. On the contrary, St. Antoninus, Sylvester, Soto, Suarez, Laymann, Navarrus, Sylvius, Azor, the Salmanticenses, Billuart, and almost all moderns.

In other words, violation of an oath as promissory is not a sin which directly opposes a divine attribute, and therefore it is not necessarily and always mortal.

Nevertheless it does not follow that someone can oblige himself by oath under light obligation in grave matter, as for a vow. For the disparity is that to promise is nothing other than to will to oblige oneself, whence the whole obligation of a promise immediately depends upon the will of the agent, who can promise or oblige himself more or less. But an oath is not directly for obliging but for the confirmation of truth by divine testimony, from which confirmation obligation naturally follows, because of the reverence of God; whence this obligation of an oath does not depend only and immediately upon the will of the one swearing, but upon the law of reverence owed to God, because it is a consequence of the testimony invoked. For someone cannot swear more or less, or invoke God as witness more or less, but he either invokes or does not invoke, and once He is invoked, God is patron of the obligation and urges fulfillment from the law of reverence owed to Him, which is greater or less not indeed according to the intention of the one swearing, but according to the gravity of the promise or of the promised matter sworn.

756. The conditions required for the validity of a promissory oath, both on the part of the act and on the part of the matter, are almost the same as for a vow.

Yet there are two exceptions:

1. An oath made in favor of a third party need not be made concerning a better good, but it suffices that it be concerning a good useful to one's neighbor. The direct end of a vow is the greater worship and honor of God; but the direct end of an oath is the confirmation of truth, which can also be had in a lesser good.

2. Even grave and unjust fear does not invalidate an extorted oath, as is now altogether certain from canon 1317, § 2, because although it renders the act involuntary in a certain respect, nevertheless it does not simply remove the voluntary. Whence an oath remains a human act and consequently is capable of inducing obligation; which nevertheless can, in the name of God, be relaxed by an ecclesiastical superior.

Nor should you say that God does not accept an oath extorted by injury, because an oath is not made in favor of God nor must it be accepted by Him, but is a simple appeal to His testimony; that God as patron gives authority to the promise is only a consequence of the invocation. Yet in the case the one swearing can use a restriction: I will give insofar as you have a right; but if he did not do this but truly invoked, he is bound to pay the promise, yet he can immediately seek back in judgment what he paid (a. 7, ad 3).

If a condition required for the validity of an oath is lacking, sin is committed, grave or light, in the same way as was said concerning a vow (n. 721). But he who swears fictitiously or merely externally is not obliged by force of the oath from religion, but can sometimes be held because of scandal or harm inflicted.

757. The obligation of a promissory oath must be fulfilled and ceases in the same way as was said concerning the fulfillment of a vow (n. 727) or its release from obligation (n. 732). Yet the obligation of an oath ceases not only by all the things by which the obligation of a vow ceases, but also by the renunciation of the third party or by condonation made by him in whose favor it principally redounds (a. 7, ad 2 and a. 9; can. 1319).

But three things should be noted: 1. that he who can irritate, dispense, or commute a vow can by that very fact do this concerning a promissory oath (can. 1320); 2. but if the dispensation of an oath tends to the prejudice of others who refuse to remit the obligation, the Apostolic See alone can dispense, and only because of necessity or utility of the Church or the common good (ibid.); 3. probably no oaths are reserved, even if they confirm reserved vows.

758. The obligation of a promissory oath is to be interpreted strictly, because the one swearing is judged to have wished to oblige himself as little as he could. Thus especially canon 1321, conformably to St. Thomas, a. 7, ad 4.

Hence: a) An oath per se, and unless the one swearing intended otherwise, follows the nature of the act to which it is joined: the accessory follows the principal; therefore if it is added to a vow, promise, or contract, its obligation will have the same extension, the same limits, and the same expressed or tacit conditions (can. 1318, § 1). Thus, for example, an oath of keeping a secret, residence, a contract such as betrothal, the statutes of a college, fidelity toward a regime, per se does not oblige beyond what is demanded by the matter of the secret, or the law of residence, or the nature of the contract, for example, of betrothal, or the custom had concerning the statutes of a college not to be published but already published, or the fidelity of a regime insofar as it is not opposed to a superior divine and ecclesiastical right.

b) "If an oath is added to an act directly tending to the harm of another or to the prejudice of the public good or of eternal salvation, the act obtains no firmness from it" (can. 1318, § 2).

c) Although an oath does not have the force of validating and confirming invalid or rescindable contracts, nevertheless, if the contract is invalid, it can induce an obligation of religion, if it is emitted absolutely and independently of the obligation of the contract, so that the one swearing is prohibited by religion from seeking the annulment of the contract, and, with the contract irritated, the obligation of religion remains until there is dispensation in it. Then, namely, there is a mere purpose confirmed by oath and a promissory oath broadly so called or standing of itself.

d) Oaths very often used: of not selling for less or not buying for more, of not granting or accepting a favor, of chastising a subject, etc., generally do not oblige, because the intention of swearing is lacking, or the matter is vain and useless, or finally the condition understood is lacking (for example, if the matter is not otherwise more opportune), or the state of things is sufficiently changed.

Question 4. In what way does the obligation of an oath cease?

Response. The obligation induced by a promissory oath ceases:

1st. If it is remitted by him for whose advantage the oath had been emitted;

2nd. If the sworn thing is changed substantially, or, the circumstances having been changed, becomes either evil or altogether indifferent, or finally impedes a greater good;

3rd. If the final cause or condition under which perhaps the oath was given is lacking;

4th. By irritation, dispensation, commutation, according to the norm of can. 1320 (Can. 1319).

FIRST, some say this obligation is removed by not being induced, as when a Law declares it void: But this does not remove an obligation that did not exist, but only prevents it from arising. Thus the Council of Trent, sess. 25. cap. 16., declares void and null the renunciation of goods, even if sworn, before the two months of profession.

THE OBLIGATION arising from an oath is truly removed, first, if it cannot be fulfilled without sin; for an Oath is not a bond of iniquity.

NEXT, it is removed by the condonation of him in whose favor it was sworn.

THIRD, it is taken away by the voiding by superiors. See what I said disp. de Voto, a quaest. 22. et seqq. Except, however, Curators, who cannot void the oaths of minors, although they can void vows, leg. 1. et 2. Cod. si adversus vendit. It is also taken away by Commutation, as I said disp. 1. de Votis, quaest. 30. It is removed also by dispensation, in the way said loco cit. quaest. 28. et 29.

BUT those five matters there related are not reserved if they are nude sworn, not vowed; for only those oaths are reserved which are to the loss of a third party. So Navar. lib. 2. consil. de iur. conf. 3. Tabien. V. Iur. quaest. 20. Petr. Ledesm. tomo 2. tract. 11. cap. 4. dub. 2.

FOR they are commonly with a vow, and therefore are reserved: as Bassaeus warns, V. Iur. 5. num. 7. with Sanchez lib. 8. matrim. disp. 13. and lib. 3. moral. cap. 19. num 6.

DISPENSATION, however, must be for a cause, as I said disp. 1. de Voto, quaest. 37.; so also commutation, as I said there quaest. 29.

CAUSES for dispensing from an oath can be: if it was extorted by fear or fraud: If injustice intervened, as when a usurer exacts an oath about paying usury. Or when one has been gravely injured in a contract and was forced to swear it; or, not attending to the injury, he confirmed it spontaneously by oath. Or in punishment for him in whose favor it is given, if he committed a crime, whereby he deserves to be despoiled of his goods, if he is an enemy of the Church. Finally, if the common good demands it, Lessius lib. 2. cap. 42. dub. 12. num. 62. Bonacina de Iur. puncto 17. Bassaeus in calce.