Article IV: On the Cessation of the Obligation of Vow

S. Th. II-II, q. 88, a. 8-12.

732. The obligation of a vow ceases: 1. from within, that is, by a substantial change in the matter or in a circumstance of the vow or of the one vowing; 2. from without, or by the legitimate intervention of authority through irritation, dispensation, and commutation. Hence canon 1311:

"A vow ceases by the lapse of time added for ending the obligation, by a substantial change of the matter promised, by the failure of the condition upon which the vow depends or of its final cause, by irritation, dispensation, and commutation."

733. Cessation of a vow from within. - A vow can cease or be suspended partially or totally:

a) When the better good promised to God is no longer better, or is prohibited and thus is impeditive of a greater good, or becomes indifferent, useless, or impossible.

b) When in the matter promised to God or in the state of the one vowing comparatively to it, so grave a change occurs that morally it is believed that the one vowing did not intend to oblige himself for such a case or state: a vow does not oblige beyond the intention of the one vowing. Thus illness excuses from a votive fast, a great diminution of status from a notable alms; but a change in the disposition of the will alone of the one vowing neither removes nor suspends a vow.

c) When the final cause of the vow ceases, which the one vowing intended to attain through the execution of the vow. Thus a vow of giving alms to a poor man ceases when his poverty ceases; a vow of undertaking a pilgrimage for obtaining the health of a friend ceases when that end ceases through his death; a vow of not entering a house on account of an occasion of sin ceases when the occasion ceases; but it does not cease when its merely impulsive cause ceases.

d) By the failure of the condition upon which the vow depends, for example, while I am rich, I will give alms; or conversely, by the fulfillment of a resolutory condition.

In doubt of fact whether a sufficient change of matter is present and the vow has ceased from within: either dispensation or commutation is to be sought, or the vow must be fulfilled.

734. Irritation of a vow is its annulment or suspension by him to whose power the very will of the one vowing, or the matter of the vow, is subject: "for no one can firmly oblige himself by a promise to that which is in the power of another, but only to that which is in his own power; but he who is subject to someone, as to this, is not of his own power to do what he wills, but depends upon the will of another; therefore he cannot firmly oblige himself by vow in those things in which he is subject to another, without the consent of his superior"; whence in every vow there is implicitly contained the condition: unless the superior resists (a. 8).

Hence irritation is twofold: direct and indirect; between which there is a manifold difference. Direct irritation, and that properly so called, is the annulment of a vow (verbreking) made by him who has dominative power over the will of the one vowing, whence it touches the act itself and so dissolves it that it never revives: it is valid for vows emitted at the time of subjection, while one is under the power of a superior, even if they are to be fulfilled afterward (can. 1312, § 1). Indirect irritation, and that improperly so called, is the suspension of a vow (opschorsing) made by him who has power only over the matter of the vow; it touches the thing promised, whose obligation is impeded, and therefore it only suspends the obligation of the vow, which of itself revives as soon as the promised matter is withdrawn from the power of the one irritating it (can. 1312, § 2). Hence it is valid even for vows emitted previously, but not for vows to be fulfilled afterward (cf., for example, can. 1315).

735. They can directly irritate or annul a vow who have dominative power over the person or will of subjects (can. 1312, § 1):

1. The father (if he is lacking or far absent, the tutor, or the mother as tutrix) can annul the vows of minor children, at least those of the non-pubescent; whether also those of pubescent children not emancipated is disputed, some affirming it because of the general manner of speaking of the new law without restriction in canons 1312 and 89, others denying it because there is no reason for thinking that the legislator wished in this matter to introduce some change.

2. Religious superiors: the Supreme Pontiff, the bishop for non-exempt religious, legitimately constituted superiors, even abbesses and female superiors, can annul the vows of professed religious, except the vows of the profession itself.

3. The husband, probably, can annul the vows of his wife, because he is the head of the woman.

The Church cannot directly irritate the vows of subjects over whom it has only the power of jurisdiction; yet it can require conditions for their validity. Thus it has declared null a temporary religious profession before the completed sixteenth year; but perpetual profession if it is made before twenty-one years, or if a profession of three years has not preceded (can. 573-574).

736. They can indirectly irritate or suspend a vow* who have power, whether dominative or of jurisdiction, over the matter of the vow (can. 1312, § 2):

1. The father can suspend the vows of minor children, as long as they remain under his power, concerning things or actions which are subject to his administration and governance.

2. Spouses mutually: namely, the husband can suspend vows of the wife prejudicial to marital right, to the education of offspring, or to domestic government; and the wife, vows of the husband adverse to her rights.

3. Religious superiors can suspend the vows of the professed and even of novices, prejudicial to their exercises and probation; whence canon 1315: "Vows emitted before religious profession are suspended, as long as the one vowing remains in religion."

4. Ecclesiastical and civil superiors can suspend vows of subjects prejudicial to their rights.

5. A master can suspend the vows of servants when they do not accord with due duties: such often are vows of making a pilgrimage, fasting, hearing Mass daily.

The superior who permitted or confirmed vows nevertheless validly irritates them directly or indirectly, because he did not abdicate his power of irritating. Likewise a vow confirmed by some superior can always be irritated by a higher superior in the same order; but a vow confirmed by a higher superior cannot be irritated by an inferior of the same order.

737. Dispensation (ontslaging) is the condonation or relaxation, for a time or in perpetuity, of the debt contracted from a vow, granted by ecclesiastical authority in the name of God.

Christ granted to the Church the power of dispensing in the power of the keys (Mt. XVI, 19), as is clear from perpetual usage. There is not a dispensation in the natural law of keeping faith and standing by promises; but from the remission of the debt by God there arises a case in which that law is not applied.

Dispensation is an act of spiritual jurisdiction in the external forum, and therefore belongs to ecclesiastical authority alone; and indeed:

1. The Supreme Pontiff is able to dispense in every vow, yet not if it confirms a right acquired by a third party, unless the gratuitous promise is subordinated to the vow, because then the accessory follows the principal.

2. The local ordinary, with subjects and travelers, can dispense in all non-reserved vows, provided the dispensation does not injure a right acquired by a third party.

3. The superior of an exempt clerical religion can dispense, in non-reserved vows, with his subjects: professed, novices, and others dwelling with them according to the norm of canon 514, § 1; but abbesses and female superiors cannot.

4. By privilege, regular confessors of mendicant orders, and those who are assimilated to them in privileges, can dispense in non-reserved vows.

5. Others who are delegated to dispense by those who have ordinary power of dispensing, as happens in the time of Jubilee (can. 1313).

But parish priests and simple confessors cannot.

738 [printed 734]. Vows Reserved to the Supreme Pontiff. - Besides the vow emitted in ordination and the vows of profession in a religion approved by him, two private vows are reserved to the Supreme Pontiff, namely, of perfect and perpetual chastity, and of entering a religion of solemn vows, which have been emitted absolutely and after the completed eighteenth year of age (can. 1309).

This reservation is to be understood strictly, so that the vows must be perfect from every part: a) on the part of the act, that is, that they have been emitted with most perfect liberty, spontaneity, and discretion, without any fear inflicted by others or fraud; b) on the part of the obligation, that the vow has been emitted under grave obligation; c) on the part of the matter: namely, they are vows of perpetual and complete chastity, and of entering religion strictly so called; but not a vow of celibacy or of not marrying, of virginity alone, or of conjugal chastity, or of receiving orders, or of entering a congregation; d) on the part of the end, from love of the promised work alone, and consequently without any indetermination (as a disjunctive vow would be), or condition concerning the future (as a penal vow would be). It should be noted that the circumstances of a vow are not reserved, for example, the circumstance of time, entrance into an austere religion.

In doubt, a vow is not judged reserved.

739. Commutation (omzetting, omwisseling) is the substitution of some honest work in place of the work promised, under the same obligation and bond of the vow, or the transfer of the obligation of a vow from one matter to another. It can be made into a good which, considering all the circumstances, is better both for God and for the one vowing; or into a morally or almost equal good; or into a lesser good.

Apart from reserved vows and those which confirm the right of a third party, vows can be commuted into a better or equal good by the one vowing himself, as has been conceded in the new law, or by a confessor with the consent of the one vowing; into a lesser good by those who have the power of dispensing, because this includes a partial dispensation (can. 1314).

The one vowing can ordinarily return to the first work, because the commutation is made for his utility; except the case in which he wished to oblige himself to a better thing by a new vow. But if the substituted work becomes impossible, he is not bound to return to the first if the commutation was made by the authority of a superior, because the latter absolutely removed the obligation concerning the prior matter and transferred it to the other, in which it has been extinguished by reason of impossibility; but he is bound to return if it was made by his own authority.

740. Observations. - 1. Irritation of a vow requires no jurisdiction, but direct irritation requires dominative power; dispensation always requires jurisdiction; commutation sometimes requires jurisdiction, but not always.

2. For the validity of irritation, whether direct or indirect, of vows made through dominative power, no cause is required; for liceity, a reasonable cause is required, by the lack of which a sin is committed which of itself is venial. But for the validity of indirect irritation of personal vows through the power of jurisdiction, that is, through the imposition of a precept, a just cause is required, though less than for dispensing: for a precept does not oblige unless it is reasonable.

For the validity of dispensation a grave cause is required, proportioned to the gravity of the vow, which nevertheless need not be sufficient for excusing: for God does not relax or change a vow without reason.

For commuting into a lesser good a just cause is required, proportioned to the gravity of the vow and to the diminution, but a lesser cause suffices than for dispensing completely; for commuting into an equal good a light cause suffices, for example, greater devotion, less danger of transgression; for commuting into an evidently better good the very excess of goodness suffices: for God prefers that which is better and accepts it as a superabundant fulfillment. A commutation made without sufficient reason or by one who does not have power does not seem valid; nevertheless some affirm that it is valid, provided the defect is supplied up to equality.

3. The causes are: a) on the part of the act, an imperfect, indiscreet, coerced mode of vowing, for example, if the vow was made from fear, fraud, anger, sadness, levity, by a non-pubescent child, etc.; b) on the part of the matter: 1. if it is more difficult; 2. if it is an occasion or cause of evil, for example, of spiritual ruin: thus a great danger of transgressing the vow from frailty; 3. if it impedes a greater spiritual good, as if it is an occasion of scruples; 4. if it impedes the common good of the Church, or of the republic, or of the community. Those causes ordinarily suffice for commuting into a lesser thing, rarely for dispensing totally.

In doubt whether the cause is sufficient, the superior can grant a dispensation if some utility is hoped for and no scandal is feared; and the one vowing can acquiesce in the judgment of the superior.

4. If the cause is manifestly insufficient, the dispensation is to be held invalid; in doubt it can be judged sufficient.

5. A simple confessor can only suggest commutation into a better or equal good.