Changing or commuting the penance

Although a penitent may not of his own authority substitute another penance for that which was imposed by his confessor, yet he may for good reason get this commuted either by the same or by a different confessor. The same confessor may commute the penance which he himself imposed either in or out of confession, provided that so long an interval has not elapsed that the commutation cannot be considered one moral act with the confession and the imposition of the penance which is commuted. If the penitent goes to another confessor and asks for a commutation of a penance which has been enjoined him, the commutation must be granted in confession, otherwise the new confessor will have no jurisdiction over the penitent. The former confession need not be repeated; it is probable that it will be sufficient if the new confessor knows the penance which was given and for which a commutation is asked, together with the difficulty which the penitent feels in executing it.

I. Nature of sacramental commutation. Commutation of satisfaction is a certain retraction or correction of the judgment, insofar as it imposed punishment; and just as in other judgments, so also in sacramental judgment it can be made by a competent judge.

II. The persons who can commute are confessors: both the one who imposed the satisfaction and another of the same jurisdiction. Those who are not confessors cannot commute, because commutation is a judicial act to be posited by virtue of the keys. I said "another of the same jurisdiction," for it is disputed whether a simple confessor can commute satisfaction imposed for a reserved sin. With St. Alphonsus (VI, 529, doubt 2), it seems this must be denied, because the confessor lacks power over a judgment instituted concerning a case whose treatment had been withdrawn from him. The adversaries object that reservation was removed by absolution, so that the simple confessor now has power over the aforesaid case or over those sins. I respond by conceding the assertion, but he lacks power over the judgment instituted concerning that case, so that he cannot moderate it; in other words, he cannot commute the enjoined satisfaction. Note, however, that the confessor has power over reserved matters, and therefore can commute satisfaction, in the case in which the Superior cannot conveniently be approached.

III. The manner of commuting. 1. For validity it is required that commutation be made in the sacramental tribunal, or in such a way that with the absolution given or to be given by the one commuting, it constitutes at least morally one thing. The reason is that satisfaction must become sacramental by force of absolution; this cannot take place unless it is united with it. Moreover, as regards the union with absolution required, take these things:

a) The commutation is certainly valid which is made either during the course of confession, or immediately after absolution, or at least while the penitent is still in the confessional. The reason is that the judgment still morally endures, so that the act of commuting morally constitutes one thing with the absolution.

b) It is disputed whether a greater space of time, and how much, can intervene between confession and the act of commuting. Now some extend the faculty of commuting to one or another day after the confession has been completed. Others judge that no space of time stands in the way of the required conjunction. Others, with St. Alphonsus (VI, 529), judge that commutation must be made immediately after absolution, or at least while the penitent is still in the confessional. As soon as, after receiving absolution, he has departed, the judicial process is finished, so that the judicial act, in the case the act of commuting, which afterward is instituted cannot constitute one thing with it, but must be directed to a new judicial process. I said that the process is finished as soon as the penitent, after receiving absolution, has departed. This indeed is pleasing in itself, and is confirmed by the fact that in the case the confessor could no longer speak with the penitent about the confession made without violating the sacramental seal.

Objection. Just as satisfaction fulfilled after a long time, so also the commutation of the same satisfaction not yet performed will always make one moral thing with the preceding confession.

Response. I deny the parity; namely, satisfaction is not a judicial action, as commutation is. But a judicial action, in order to constitute at least morally one thing with the judicial process, must be posited before the process is finished. It is added that, if the objection is admitted, commutation can be separated from absolution by as long a time as satisfaction; which few admit. For the rest, in doubt the opinion of St. Alphonsus is to be followed, lest the validity of the commutation be exposed to danger.

2. As regards liceity, a just cause is certainly required. It is not necessary for the penitent to repeat the sins, whether he confesses to the same or to another confessor. The reason is that the one commuting must not judge about sins already judged, but only about the reason for commuting. Nevertheless, a certain confused knowledge of the state of the penitent is required, because also the penance to be imposed by the confessor commuting must be, at least of itself, in some degree proportioned to the sins; likewise medicinal. But for the said ends the knowledge suffices which the confessor can gather from the very penance to be commuted; according to it and the disposition of the penitent let him direct himself in commuting (St. Alphonsus, Homo Apostolicus, tract 16, n. 61; Theologia moralis, VI, 529, doubt 1).

Corollary I. The confessor, even when not asked, can commute satisfaction (St. Alphonsus, VI, 529, doubt 1).

Corollary II. Let commutation be made into a work more or less equally grave, unless according to what was explained above (n. 350) there is a cause for lessening satisfaction.

Corollary III. It is disputed whether the penitent after a commutation has been made can return to the former satisfaction, or whether this must be held as retracted. More commonly it is affirmed that the faculty of choosing either satisfaction remains to the penitent. Nevertheless, the matter is doubtful, because it is not clear that the confessor can proceed in such a way that it depends on the choice of the penitent which act will constitute the integral part of the sacrament.

Who can commute a penance and for what cause? - Resp. To the first: It can never be commuted by the penitent himself, not even into a better one, although a vow can be changed by the one vowing it into an evidently better work. The reason is that penance cannot be elevated to the merit of sacramental satisfaction unless it has been imposed by the minister himself of the sacrament of penance. - It can be commuted: 1. by the confessor who imposed it, because a legislator can change his own law; 2. by any other confessor, because any other confessor can be judge of the same cause if the penitent submits himself to his tribunal; for a successor in the same authority can do whatever the predecessor could. Nevertheless an exception seems to be made, according to the more common opinion, if the penance was imposed by the superior himself for reserved cases, because an inferior cannot change the sentence of a superior; unless, however, a grave cause is present, or the consent of the superior can easily be presumed. Yet others deny this, because once the reservation of sins has been removed through the absolution of the superior, the power of the superior and the inferior confessor is the same.

Resp. To the second: For a commutation to be made licitly, a just cause is required, such as: 1. if the penance seems difficult; 2. if it is foreseen that the penitent is not going to satisfy it because of repugnance, frailty, forgetfulness, etc. - L. 528, 529.

Is the penitent bound to repeat the Confession to obtain commutation of the penance? - If he approaches the same confessor, it will not be necessary to repeat the Confession when the confessor remembers the state of the penitent's conscience in some way confusedly. - If he approaches another confessor, or even the same one no longer mindful of the sins, it suffices that he confess summarily, so that the confessor may acquire a confused knowledge of that state.

But whether this summary Confession is also required if the confessor, at least confusedly, does not know the state of the penitent is disputed. The first opinion affirms it. The reason is that the confessor cannot commute the penance except by sacramental judgment; but he cannot exercise this judgment unless the penitent opens the state of his conscience to him. The second opinion probably denies this, because it is not a question of a judgment to be rendered concerning faults destroyed in a preceding Confession, where the judgment about them has already been formed, but only of commuting the penance. But for this the knowledge of the prior penance and the notion of frailty or difficulty for fulfilling it suffices, namely so that a new one in some way equivalent may be imposed. Hence the confessor, hearing the penitent say that he has not fulfilled the penance and is not going to fulfill it, believing him, will be able to commute the penance even if he does not ask. - L. 529.

Can the confessor commute a penance outside Confession? - Resp. In the negative, if the confessor is different. The reason is that the confessor has no power except in sacramental judgment. For penance must be joined with the absolution received. - If that confessor is the one who imposed the penance, he can change it immediately after absolution, before the penitent departs; but not afterward, at least more probably. The reason is that for this it is required and suffices that the preceding judgment of the confessor morally persevere, which does not seem to have place if the penitent approaches the confessor outside the tribunal of penance. St. Alphonsus, 529, says that this is the truer and more common opinion. Nevertheless others say that commutation of penance can be made by the same confessor outside Confession within the space of one day, within two days, a week, and even a longer time, because then it still seems to be morally united with the preceding sacramental judgment. For just as a longer space does not prevent sorrow, or Confession, or even fulfillment of satisfaction from being morally united with absolution, so one can judge also about the change of penance. Lugo, d. 25, nn. 111, 112.

Note: If the penitent, after accepting a penance from one confessor, repeats the Confession before another in order to obtain a milder penance, or even for another cause, he is by no means freed from the former penance unless he mentions the preceding Confession and the penance accepted. The reason is that for commuting the penance on the part of the confessor, a positive act of the will is required by which the prior obligation is revoked.

531. • QUESTION 8. Who can commute a penance?

Reply 1. It can never be commuted by the penitent himself, not even into something better, although a vow can be changed by the one vowing it into a manifestly better work. The reason is that a penance cannot be elevated to the merit of sacramental satisfaction unless it was imposed by the Minister himself of the Sacrament of Penance.

Reply 2. It can be commuted: 1. by the Confessor who imposed it, because a legislator can change his own law; 2. by any other Confessor, because any other Confessor can be judge of the same cause if the penitent submits himself to his tribunal; for a successor in the same authority can do whatever his predecessor could.

Nevertheless, it seems that an exception must be made if the penance was imposed by the Superior himself for reserved cases, because an inferior cannot change the sentence of a Superior, unless, however, a grave cause is present or the consent of the Superior can readily be presumed. - St. Lig., nos. 528 and 529.

For a commutation to be made licitly, however, a just cause is required, such as: 1. if the penance seems difficult; 2. if it is foreseen that the penitent will not fulfill it because of repugnance, frailty, forgetfulness, etc. - St. Lig., no. 528.

533. • QUESTION 10. Can the Confessor commute a penance outside confession?

Reply 1. Negative, if the Confessor is a different one. The reason is that the Confessor has no power except in sacramental judgment.

Reply 2. If the Confessor is the one who imposed the penance, he can change it immediately after absolution, before the penitent departs; but not afterward, at least more probably. The reason is that for this it is required and suffices that the preceding judgment of the Confessor morally persevere, which does not seem to have place if the penitent approaches the Confessor outside the tribunal of Penance. Therefore, etc. - Thus St. Lig., no. 529, where he says that this is the truer and more common opinion with Suarez, the Salmanticenses, etc. But others say that the commutation of penance can be made by the same Confessor outside confession within the space of one day ¹⁰, because it then still seems to be morally united with the preceding sacramental judgment. For just as a longer interval does not prevent either sorrow, confession, or even the fulfillment of satisfaction from being morally united with absolution, so also can judgment be made concerning the change of penance. - Lugo, disp., no. 112; Voit, no. 632.

¹⁰ Cardinal De Lugo, whose opinion is explained here, nowhere restricted the matter to the space of one day. And if this commutation can indeed be as distant from confession as sorrow from confession, confession from absolution, or finally satisfaction from absolution, it readily appears that this measure of one day is inserted here beside the point.

357. I. Principle: Sacramental penance already enjoined can be changed for a just cause, not indeed by the penitent himself, but by a confessor having authority. It is certain.

1° It cannot be changed, even into a more perfect one, by the penitent himself; for the changing of penance imports a new judgment, which cannot be passed except by a judge; moreover no work can be elevated to the dignity and efficacy of sacramental satisfaction except by the authority of the minister himself.

2° It can be changed either by the same confessor or by another having jurisdiction; for penance is enjoined by way of a particular law; now a law can be changed either by the legislator or by his successor, but in sacramental confession.

It is controverted whether a penance imposed by a superior on account of reserved cases can be commuted by an inferior. Some affirm this probably with Vasquez;³ for, once the reservation has been removed by the absolution of the superior, any confessor can pass judgment concerning these sins and therefore impose a new penance. But many more probably deny this with Lugo and St. Alphonsus;⁴ for the accessory follows the principal; but judgment in the principal cause, namely in reserved sins, pertains only to the superior; therefore likewise judgment concerning the accessory, namely concerning the penance. - Nevertheless St. Alphonsus concedes that this can be done if a grave cause is present and access to the superior is not easy: for then the consent of the superior is deservedly presumed. For the same reason this can be admitted if the penitent would approach the superior only reluctantly.

³ Vasquez, q. 94, a. 2, dub. 3, n. 9; Elbel-Bierb., n. 242; Ball. P., n. 533.

⁴ Lugo, n. 104; St. Alphonsus, n. 529.

358. II. Conditions so that penance can be changed. 1° There must be a moral union between the commutation of penance and absolution; for the elevation of some work to the dignity of sacramental satisfaction cannot be done, even by the minister, except insofar as he is judge, or insofar as he pronounces absolution.

Hence (a) the same confessor can certainly change the penance immediately after absolution, before the penitent departs, because the judgment already pronounced still morally perseveres. Indeed grave authors, such as Lugo,¹ probably hold that this can be done outside confession, even after a notable time, provided the confessor remembers the sins at least confusedly; for even in this case the penance is morally united with the absolution: for if today's absolution can be united with a confession made eight days before, the changing of penance, even after eight days, is morally united also with the past absolution; nor can the judgment be said to be altogether complete except by the execution of the sentence, or the fulfillment of the penance. Nevertheless St. Alphonsus contradicts this (n. 529, dub. 3), because, if such an interval is present, a new judgment is made and a new absolution is required so that the penance can be changed. It is expedient to follow this opinion at least with respect to those who confess frequently; but if there is question of those who approach the sacred tribunal only rarely, Lugo's opinion can be brought into practice without scruple, since here there is no question of the validity of the sacrament.

¹ Lugo, disp. XXV, n. 112.

(b) But if the commutation of penance is sought from another confessor, he cannot change it except in the sacred tribunal, after some confession has been heard, and with a new absolution: otherwise there would be no union between satisfaction and absolution.

359. 2° For making a commutation there is further required sufficient knowledge of the state of the penitent; otherwise the new penance can be neither proportioned nor medicinal.

Hence, if the penitent approaches the same confessor, who remembers the state of the penitent at least confusedly, it is not necessary to repeat the confession; if he approaches another confessor, more probably it is not necessary to repeat the entire confession, but it suffices either to declare the penance already previously imposed, or to make a summary confession: for this suffices for knowing the state of the penitent with respect to the penance to be enjoined.

360. 3° A just cause is also required, which can be either notable usefulness for the penitent, or difficulty in the execution of the prior penance. Hence a change can be made even if it is not requested by the penitent, provided however that he consents; for he can indeed oppose the change if he regards it as a burden.

But once the commutation has been made, much more probably the penitent can, if he wishes, choose the satisfaction previously enjoined, because the commutation, as favoring the penitent, is judged to be made under this condition: unless the penitent wishes to return to the former one.¹

¹ Thus St. Alphonsus, H. A., tr. XVI, n. 61, with the authors cited there.

404. 1. For requesting or granting the commutation of a penance, a reasonable cause is required, namely, the spiritual good of the penitent. Before absolution has been received, the satisfaction can more easily be commuted for the penitent, since the sacramental judgment is not yet complete. Indeed, if the confessor were unwilling to acquiesce in the petition, the penitent could, provided that a reasonable cause exists, leave the confessional and confess again to another confessor and be absolved.

2. After absolution has already been received, the penitent can for a just cause obtain a change of the satisfaction enjoined, either from the same or from another confessor, but not from himself or from another person who does not have jurisdiction to hear confessions.

The reason is that satisfaction is the complement of sacramental absolution, and therefore it must always have a relation to it, and no one except one who is able to impart absolution can commute the satisfaction.

From this principle it follows: a) that the penitent or a lay person can never commute sacramental satisfaction, not even into an evidently better work. Thus all authors. b) That a penance imposed for reserved sins ordinarily cannot be commuted by another confessor who is unable to absolve from those reserved sins, unless, however, recourse to the superior is difficult. For then it is permissible to presume the requisite permission and to grant the commutation. Thus the more common opinion, which pleases St. Alphonsus.²⁷²

3. The same confessor certainly can make a commutation immediately after absolution, since the judgment still morally continues. Several authors, for example Lugo, Ballerini, Noldin, and others, think that the confessor can commute the satisfaction imposed even outside the sacrament, and indeed for as long as the change is morally united with the sacramental judgment, for example, for some days, or even, according to Lugo,²⁷³ after "a long time," even if the confessor no longer remembers the sins. Whatever may be the probability of that opinion, it must more truly be held with St. Alphonsus²⁷⁴ that this commutation is not permissible except immediately after absolution; and therefore, if the penitent returns after some days asking for a commutation, he must be absolved again after at least a general accusation of sins has been made beforehand.

4. Another confessor, however, cannot commute the satisfaction except by virtue of absolution to be given either now or afterward. In this case, however, it suffices that the penitent manifest the state of his soul to the confessor in a general manner, so that he may be able to receive absolution. For it is not necessary that the confessor judge concerning the individual sins which have already been duly accused and remitted. Nevertheless, some theologians teach with sufficient probability that a penance can be changed by another confessor without the sins being accused again.²⁷⁵

²⁷² L.c., n. 529, dub. 2.

²⁷³ De sacr. poenit., disp. 25, n. 112.

²⁷⁴ Theol. mor. l. 6, n. 529, dub. 3.

²⁷⁵ St. Alphonsus, l.c., n. 529, dub. 3.

562. Principle IV. Sacramental penance can be commuted, for a just cause, not indeed by the penitent himself, but by a confessor who has equal power with him who imposed it.

A. Satisfaction cannot be commuted by the penitent, nor by another, whether layman or priest lacking jurisdiction, not even into a more perfect or graver one, otherwise than for a vow, where the one vowing is his own legislator. For 1) a change of penance imports a new judgment which cannot be rendered except by a judge; - 2) an inferior cannot commute the law of a superior even into something better; - 3) no work can be elevated to the dignity and efficacy of sacramental satisfaction except by the power of the minister himself, by force of the keys. This is also clear from the condemned prop. 15 of Alexander VII, already cited in n. 560, A, 2.

B. It can be changed either by the same confessor or by another having equal power. For penance is imposed by way of particular law; but law can be changed either by the legislator, or by a successor, or by a superior. Likewise satisfaction is the complement of absolution; therefore no one except him who can absolve from sin can also commute satisfaction: for the accessory follows the principal. Hence a penance imposed by a superior for a reserved case can be commuted only by a confessor having power to absolve from reserved cases, unless a grave inconvenience for the penitent is present and access to the superior is not easy, in which case the reservation itself can cease (can. 900).

But that satisfaction can be commuted, three conditions are required:

1. The very exercise of judicial power or of sacramental judgment, and therefore moral union between the commutation and absolution: for satisfaction is the complement of absolution, and the elevation of a work to the dignity of sacramental satisfaction cannot be done by the minister except insofar as he is judge and insofar as he exercises sacramental judgment and pronounces absolution. Hence:

a) The same confessor can change the penance immediately after absolution before the penitent departs, because the same judgment morally perseveres; indeed also outside confession for one day or perhaps even for several days, provided the confessor remembers the sins at least in a confused way, because the new penance imposed is morally united with the absolution given; it is the same judgment continued. - But if the time were a little longer, for security a new confession would have to be instituted and a new absolution granted, so that the commutation certainly may be valid, and the new penance certainly valid and sacramental. Namely, the safer thing must be done in favor of the penitent, who has a certain right to this, and because it concerns the validity of sacramental penance.

b) But if commutation is sought from another confessor, because he does not have the power of commuting except in sacramental judgment, he cannot change it except in confession and with the granting of a new absolution, whether to be given at once or afterward; otherwise the injunction of penance would not be a judicial act, nor would the satisfaction itself be sacramental.

2. Sufficient knowledge of the state of the penitent; otherwise the new penance could be neither proportioned nor medicinal. Hence:

a) If the penitent approaches the same confessor, who remembers at least in a confused way the state of the penitent, it is not necessary to repeat the confession.

b) If he approaches another confessor, neither is it necessary to repeat the confession integrally, but it suffices to make a summary one, or even, in the confession of other sins, to declare the penance previously imposed, if this suffices for knowing the state of the penitent sufficiently.

3. A just cause, namely, the spiritual good of the penitent. For the power conferred by Christ is not judged to be conferred unto destruction but unto edification; indeed power which is exercised in the name of God is granted only to be exercised reasonably. But a just cause is judged to be necessity, notable utility of the penitent, such as spiritual progress or a more opportune medicine, excess in the former penance or grave difficulty in its execution, danger of transgression, etc. Hence:

a) The petition alone of the penitent is not sufficient: in that case let the confessor urge fulfillment, say that the penance is proportioned to the sins, etc., unless he fears, because of frailty, that the penitent will not fulfill it.

b) Provided a just cause is present, a change can be made even if it is not sought by the penitent, provided nevertheless he consents; for indeed he can stand in the way of the change if he regards it as a burden.

c) Although medicinal penances can validly be changed, nevertheless let them not be commuted if they have not become morally impossible.

563. Corollaries. - 1. The penitent can discharge the enjoined penance even while he fulfills another prescribed work; for example, by hearing Sunday Mass he can recite prayers or the rosary for the penance: for when the Church prescribes good works, she does not exclude other pious works compossible with them.

2. Enjoined prayers, unless something else is expressly determined, are imposed in that manner in which generally according to the practice of the Church they are discharged; for example, psalms, litanies, the rosary, can be recited alternately with a companion; the hearing of daily Mass is to be understood so that on Sunday it is heard only once, etc. On the other hand, prayers which are customarily recited vocally by the faithful, such as psalms, litanies, and other things, it does not suffice to run through with the eyes and mind only, from a book; the contrary is true for meditation. If penitents as to these things are in good faith and think mental recitation suffices, they are not to be disturbed, because it does not regard the value of the sacrament; but if they ask how the penance is to be discharged, they must be instructed according to the principles handed down.

3. Once commutation has been made, the penitent can, if he wills, choose the satisfaction previously enjoined, because commutation, as favoring the penitent, is judged to be made under this condition: unless the penitent wishes to return to the former one.

4. The penitent is by no means freed from the first penance if, by repeating the confession before another confessor, he makes no mention of the prior confession and penance, both because he is bound to render the first sacrament integral, and because for commuting the penance there is required on the part of the confessor a positive act of will by which the prior obligation is revoked.

5. Many judge, because of some saying of St. Thomas,³ that by the prayer: The Passion of Our Lord Jesus Christ..., all subsequent good works of the penitent, or "whatever good he has done and evil he has sustained," are elevated by the confessor to the dignity of sacramental satisfaction. Yet this has no foundation at all, "for the words, in the way in which they are pronounced, seem rather to be the prayer of a priest imploring that all things be well for the penitent: for he does not elevate to sacramental being the Passion of Christ, the merits of the Blessed Virgin, and of all the Saints." Thus Billuart, de Poen., diss. IX, art. 9, who nevertheless adds that this can be admitted if the confessor intended this concerning the future goods of the penitent, and indicated this to him. - Since the matter is very doubtful, there is no reason for diminishing the sacramental penance to be imposed on penitents.

³ Quodl. III, q. 13, a. 28.