Scholion. On Commutation of Satisfaction

I. Nature of sacramental commutation. Commutation of satisfaction is a certain retraction or correction of the judgment, insofar as it imposed punishment; and just as in other judgments, so also in sacramental judgment it can be made by a competent judge.

II. The persons who can commute are confessors: both the one who imposed the satisfaction and another of the same jurisdiction. Those who are not confessors cannot commute, because commutation is a judicial act to be posited by virtue of the keys. I said "another of the same jurisdiction," for it is disputed whether a simple confessor can commute satisfaction imposed for a reserved sin. With St. Alphonsus (VI, 529, doubt 2), it seems this must be denied, because the confessor lacks power over a judgment instituted concerning a case whose treatment had been withdrawn from him. The adversaries object that reservation was removed by absolution, so that the simple confessor now has power over the aforesaid case or over those sins. I respond by conceding the assertion, but he lacks power over the judgment instituted concerning that case, so that he cannot moderate it; in other words, he cannot commute the enjoined satisfaction. Note, however, that the confessor has power over reserved matters, and therefore can commute satisfaction, in the case in which the Superior cannot conveniently be approached.

III. The manner of commuting. 1. For validity it is required that commutation be made in the sacramental tribunal, or in such a way that with the absolution given or to be given by the one commuting, it constitutes at least morally one thing. The reason is that satisfaction must become sacramental by force of absolution; this cannot take place unless it is united with it. Moreover, as regards the union with absolution required, take these things:

a) The commutation is certainly valid which is made either during the course of confession, or immediately after absolution, or at least while the penitent is still in the confessional. The reason is that the judgment still morally endures, so that the act of commuting morally constitutes one thing with the absolution.

b) It is disputed whether a greater space of time, and how much, can intervene between confession and the act of commuting. Now some extend the faculty of commuting to one or another day after the confession has been completed. Others judge that no space of time stands in the way of the required conjunction. Others, with St. Alphonsus (VI, 529), judge that commutation must be made immediately after absolution, or at least while the penitent is still in the confessional. As soon as, after receiving absolution, he has departed, the judicial process is finished, so that the judicial act, in the case the act of commuting, which afterward is instituted cannot constitute one thing with it, but must be directed to a new judicial process. I said that the process is finished as soon as the penitent, after receiving absolution, has departed. This indeed is pleasing in itself, and is confirmed by the fact that in the case the confessor could no longer speak with the penitent about the confession made without violating the sacramental seal.

Objection. Just as satisfaction fulfilled after a long time, so also the commutation of the same satisfaction not yet performed will always make one moral thing with the preceding confession.

Response. I deny the parity; namely, satisfaction is not a judicial action, as commutation is. But a judicial action, in order to constitute at least morally one thing with the judicial process, must be posited before the process is finished. It is added that, if the objection is admitted, commutation can be separated from absolution by as long a time as satisfaction; which few admit. For the rest, in doubt the opinion of St. Alphonsus is to be followed, lest the validity of the commutation be exposed to danger.

2. As regards liceity, a just cause is certainly required. It is not necessary for the penitent to repeat the sins, whether he confesses to the same or to another confessor. The reason is that the one commuting must not judge about sins already judged, but only about the reason for commuting. Nevertheless, a certain confused knowledge of the state of the penitent is required, because also the penance to be imposed by the confessor commuting must be, at least of itself, in some degree proportioned to the sins; likewise medicinal. But for the said ends the knowledge suffices which the confessor can gather from the very penance to be commuted; according to it and the disposition of the penitent let him direct himself in commuting (St. Alphonsus, Homo Apostolicus, tract 16, n. 61; Theologia moralis, VI, 529, doubt 1).

Corollary I. The confessor, even when not asked, can commute satisfaction (St. Alphonsus, VI, 529, doubt 1).

Corollary II. Let commutation be made into a work more or less equally grave, unless according to what was explained above (n. 350) there is a cause for lessening satisfaction.

Corollary III. It is disputed whether the penitent after a commutation has been made can return to the former satisfaction, or whether this must be held as retracted. More commonly it is affirmed that the faculty of choosing either satisfaction remains to the penitent. Nevertheless, the matter is doubtful, because it is not clear that the confessor can proceed in such a way that it depends on the choice of the penitent which act will constitute the integral part of the sacrament.