Complements of Temperance

283. Its nature. 1. Temperance, insofar as it is a cardinal virtue, is the virtue which moderates the appetite in the pleasures of taste and touch.

a. Temperance in general, or accepted in the broader sense, restrains and moderates the concupiscible appetite, even spiritual, in any matter whatever which entices against the prescriptions of reason, especially with regard to honors and pleasures; special temperance restrains the sensitive concupiscible appetite with regard to the sensible pleasures of taste and touch, which, since they are most vehement, need a special virtue moderating them.

b. Therefore temperance also orders man not to another, but to himself.

2. The proximate material object is the pleasures of taste and touch; the remote material object is foods and drinks and venereal acts, to which those pleasures are referred as to their object. The formal object is natural honesty, which consists in this, that those actions be exercised with that moderation which befits the dignity of rational nature.

Therefore special temperance turns about the pleasures which are perceived in those actions which by their nature are ordered to the conservation of the individual and of the species. Indeed God joined vehement pleasures to the necessary actions by which the human race is preserved and propagated, so that men would be invited and enticed to those actions. Therefore from the intention of the author of nature nothing prevents man, in placing those actions, from being moved by pleasure and intending it, provided that he exclude neither explicitly nor implicitly the primary end, which is the conservation and propagation of the species, and that in all things he allow himself to be ruled according to the prescriptions of reason.

284. Opposed vices. The vices opposed to temperance in general are two: insensibility by defect and intemperance by excess.

a. Insensibility or stupor is the vice by which someone so flees honors and pleasures that he does not wish to use them when or where or as much as is fitting according to right reason. A most rare vice.

b. Intemperance is the vice by which someone, in seeking and enjoying honors and pleasures, exceeds the dictate of right reason.

285. Parts of temperance. 1. The integral parts of temperance are modest shame and honesty.

a. Modest shame (Schamhaftigkeit) is a certain disturbance of soul or fear rising from consideration of some deed bringing confusion or disgrace. Deeds of this kind are especially sins of intemperance.

b. Honesty (Ehrbarheit) is a moral perfection averting man from dishonest pleasures and inclining him to the decorum which shines forth in abstinence from illicit pleasures.

2. The subjective parts of temperance are abstinence, sobriety, and chastity, of which two temper taste, but the third tempers touch.

a. Abstinence is the virtue moderating the appetite and use of food and of non-inebriating drink; opposed to it is the vice of gluttony.

Abstinence accepted in this sense is more often called temperance than abstinence, and by the name abstinence (Enthaltsamkeit) there is rather designated a subtraction of foods which is greater than the nature of temperance of itself demands. This abstinence, from a motive of virtue, abstains from licit things.

Its act is fasting.

b. Sobriety is the virtue moderating the appetite and use of inebriating drink; opposed to it is drunkenness.

c. Chastity is the virtue moderating or excluding the appetite and use of venereal things; opposed to it is lust.

3. The potential parts of temperance are those virtues annexed to temperance which bring about moderation concerning matters which are not so difficult to moderate as the concupiscences of taste and touch. Virtues of this kind are four: continence, meekness, clemency, and modesty.

a. Continence is the virtue firming the will for resisting concupiscence which impels especially to the venereal pleasures of touch.

The name continence is also taken in another sense, in which it signifies the same as chastity, namely abstinence from every venereal pleasure.

b. Meekness is the virtue which moderates anger according to the prescription of right reason. Opposed to meekness by excess is irascibility; by defect, lenity or excessive indulgence.

c. Clemency is the virtue which moderates external vindication or punishment according to the norm of reason. Opposed to clemency by excess is cruelty; by defect, excessive lenity.

d. Modesty is the virtue by which someone preserves the mode fitting to himself in internal and external movements and in the whole arrangement of his things. There are four species of modesty: humility, studiousness, modesty of morals, and modesty of attire.

Complements of the Virtue of Temperance.—(a) The Gift of the Holy Ghost that perfects temperance is fear of the Lord. The virtue of temperance makes one abstain from unlawful pleasures because to do so is reasonable; fear of the Lord inclines one to the same abstinence from reverence. The Gift of Fear looks first to the greatness of the Heavenly Father, before whom the nations are as a drop in the bucket and are counted as the smallest grain of the balance and the islands as but a little dust (Is., xl. 15); and in this respect it represses presumption and serves the virtue of hope (see 1041 sqq.). But secondarily it looks to the insignificance of every delight that is apart from God, and sees that these inferior joys are passing, insipid and bitter, like dust blown away by the wind, like a thin froth dispersed by the storm, like smoke scattered by the breeze (Wis., v. 15), like a sweet poison that turns to gall and destroys (Job, xx. 12 sqq.); and in this respect fear of God sustains temperance, which must regulate the cravings of the flesh and lower appetites. Fear of God, then, makes one fly from those things which chiefly allure one to offend Him, and hence the Psalmist (Ps. cxviii. 120) prays: “Pierce Thou my flesh with Thy fear.”

(b) The Beatitude that corresponds to the present Gift is the second: “Blessed are they that mourn, for they shall be comforted.” Those who have the fear of God perceive the true nature of illicit joys and the evil end that awaits those who chase after them. They prefer, then, to be sorrowful, that is, to deprive themselves of every wicked pleasure and love for the sake of the love of God in this life and the enjoyment of God in the life to come: “Your sorrow shall be changed into joy” (John, xx. 16).

(c) The fruits of fear of the Lord are modesty, continency and chastity. Like a good tree that produces a rich harvest of delightful fruits, filial reverence for God brings forth acts of virtue that have in them a delicious savor more enjoyable and more lasting than the fruits of the flesh. These goodly and pleasant fruits of the spirit of fear of God are modesty in words, deeds and external things, continency of the single and chastity of the married in thoughts and desires.

S. Th. II-II, q. 143, 144, 145, 160.

944. The integral parts of temperance, or the dispositions or conditions without which the act of temperance is not perfect, are two:

1. Shamefacedness (pudeur; schaamte), which is a certain laudable passion of fear by which someone flees the turpitude contrary to temperance, which consists in this, that someone seeks pleasure in those things which are lowest in man and agree with him according to bestial nature, where there is nothing of the light of reason.

2. Special honesty (eerbaarheid), by which someone loves the beauty or decorum of temperance, which it has from this, that reason restrains the bestial concupiscences, which are most base, and reduces them to due proportion.

For the whole office of temperance consists in two things: in flight from turpitude and in love of decorum.

Hence it is especially fitting that they be cultivated, especially in the education of children: for they are the guardians of sobriety and chastity.¹

¹ Shamefacedness is fear of reproach. It is an imperfection consisting in fear of blame on account of those things which are held by men as base, for example, concerning poverty, defect of hair, etc.: thus it is not a virtue. But if it is according to reason, because someone has committed a base thing or because he fears lest something truly base happen to him, then it is truly good and a disposition to virtue, because it casts horror of turpitude into one; yet it is not a virtue, because one who is perfect does not apprehend what is base as possible for himself or as though difficult to avoid. Hence, according to St. Thomas, it is not a part entering the essence of virtue, but disposing itself toward it: it lays the foundations of temperance. - But honesty is a condition of temperance.

945. The subjective parts or species of temperance are three. - For temperance is concerned with pleasures of touch, of which some are ordained to nourishment, and in these, with respect to food and common drink, there is abstinence, and with respect to intoxicating drink there is sobriety; some are ordained to the generative power, and concerning these there is chastity, which is also concerned with the pleasure of the act of generation itself, to which pudicity is reduced, which properly concerns certain surrounding pleasures.

To these three vices of intemperance are opposed: gluttony - drunkenness - lust, to which is reduced immodesty, which is imperfect lust.

946. The potential parts of temperance are annexed habits which are concerned with a less principal or secondary matter, namely, pleasures less difficult to moderate. By a general name they are called modesty.

Modesty is named from mode or moderation; therefore it is a virtue moderative of those things which have a middling difficulty. For where there is a special virtue concerning something greatest, there must be virtues concerning those things which hold themselves moderately, because human life ought to be regulated by virtue as to all things. Temperance applies moderation concerning the more difficult pleasures of touch; therefore there must be a virtue which applies moderation in other things which are not so difficult to moderate, especially concerning smallest things, such as gestures, garments, movements of the body, and exterior things. Therefore in a general way "it is a virtue by which someone contains himself within the mode and limits of his state, character, and fortune, as to internal movements, external gestures, and every apparatus of his things"; or, a moderation by which someone, content with his own measure, restrains his internal and external movements and every apparatus of his things within the measure congruent to him.

There are several modesties, of which the principal ones have obtained a special name. For according to right reason there can be tempered:

1. pleasures in the internal movements of the soul:

a) the movement of the will stirred by the impulse of passion, concerning pleasures of touch, and this continence moderates, from which it comes about that although man suffers immoderate concupiscences, nevertheless the will is not conquered;

b) or the movement of anger tending both toward vengeance, which meekness moderates, and toward external punishment, concerning which clemency is exercised;

c) or the movement of hope (and daring) tending toward a certain excellence, and this humility moderates;

d) or the movement of desire tending toward knowledge, and this studiousness moderates;

2. pleasures in exterior movements, which modesty of exterior movements moderates, so that they may be done decently and honestly:

a) either in those things which are done seriously, to which eutaxia pertains, which includes decency through fittingness to the agent according to himself, and good ordering through fittingness toward others;

b) or in those things which are done in play, to which eutrapelia belongs, or according to others austerity;

3. pleasures in exterior things, concerning which there is modesty of external equipment or apparatus, to which are reduced thrift or self-sufficiency, and moderation and simplicity.

THREEFOLD are the parts of Temperance, as of the other Cardinal virtues. Some are integral; some subjective; some potential.

THE quasi-integral parts are two, namely Shamefacedness, by which one shuns the baseness contrary to temperance: and Honesty, by which the beauty of Temperance is loved.

SHAMEFACEDNESS is described by St. Bonaventure 3. part. Centil. sect. 42: Shamefacedness is to preserve honesty in gesture and word. And opusc. declarat. terminorum Theol.: Shamefacedness is the observance of honesty in gesture and word. He describes it from the Fathers in S. Ductor lib. 4. Pharetrae, cap. 14.

HONESTY is described by St. Bonaventure loc. cit. 12 Centiloquii: It is neither to seek daintier foods, nor to give pains in outward show. He means to say that it is that affection toward honesty, or toward the works of temperance worthy of honor. But the works of temperance are called honest, or worthy of honor, because they are opposed to the disgraceful and infamous sins of intemperance.

THE subjective parts of the Virtue of Temperance, which are diverse by object, are four. For the delectations of touch, in curbing which Temperance is engaged, are divided into two kinds: some are ordered to nourishment, and in these, as regards food, there is Abstinence; as regards drink, Sobriety. Some indeed are ordered to the generative power, and in these, as regards the principal delectation of coition itself, there is Chastity; as regards the delectations surrounding it, such as looks, kisses, touches, it is called Pudicity. Yet it is the same as chastity; and it is called Pudicity inasmuch as shame is wont to be present about the use, as St. Augustine says 14. de Civit. cap. 17. and 18, and Aristotle 2. Rhet. cap. 6. Whence St. Thomas says that Pudicity is chastity as affected by shame even about the signs themselves. So Valentia disp. 9. quaest. 1. puncto 2, Tannerus disp. 3. quaest. 3. dub. 6.

IN Chastity the principal place is held by Virginity, which keeps itself untouched from every venereal act, as St. Ambrose says lib. de Virginibus: Virginal chastity is an integrity devoid of contagion. By integrity of the body, however, I understand that which has been violated by no voluntary obscenity, as St. Augustine admonishes lib. 1. de Civitate Dei, cap. 18. and 25; but once corrupted it cannot be restored, as St. Jerome has it epist. 22. cap. 2, and St. Thomas quaest. 152. art. 1.

INFERIOR indeed is abstinence from illicit coition; which is twofold: conjugal; and widowed. See all this in St. Bonaventure 3. part. Centil. sect. 42, and the other places to be cited quaest. 9. and 10.

THE potential parts of Temperance are certain virtues which are engaged in moderating delectable things; yet they fall short of the perfection of Temperance, because they labor not about things so difficult, such as the delectable things of touch; and these are eight, namely Continence, Mildness, Clemency, Modesty, Humility, Studiosity, Eutrapelia, Parsimony, or simplicity, or moderation.

CONTINENCE is the virtue restraining the exorbitant motions of the will, which usually arise from the impulse of the passions of the sensitive appetite, moving the will toward things contrary to right reason. On this St. Thomas quaest. 155, and Aristotle, 7. Ethic.

MILDNESS is the virtue establishing moderation in the appetite for vengeance. So St. Thomas quaest. 157.

CLEMENCY is the virtue applying a measure convenient to right reason in external punishment, and thus it belongs to superiors toward subjects, as St. Thomas teaches loco citato.

MODESTY is the virtue placing moderation in the external actions of the body.

HUMILITY is the virtue curbing by fear the motions of daring and of hope, so that one should not wish anything beyond one's merit attributed to oneself.

STUDIOSITY is the virtue prescribing a measure to the appetite in the desire of knowing.

EUTRAPELIA is the virtue placing a measure in honest recreations and jests.

PARSIMONY is the virtue that makes use in moderation of external things pertaining to the body, such as ornament, clothing, etc. See this in St. Bonaventure sermone 5. Hexaëmer., and the other places alleged. It is also had in 3. part. Centil. sect. 43.

SHAMEFACEDNESS properly is not a virtue, although it is a certain laudable passion. So St. Thomas art. 1, Aristotle 2. Eth. cap. 7, and lib. 4. last cap.

THE REASON is, for Virtue is an elective habit, or one operating by election, and if it has the perfect state it excludes in the agent the fear of a base and disgraceful thing, as of an evil difficult and arduous to avoid; nor does it actually admit anything base, wherefrom disgrace would be feared. But Shamefacedness, since it is nothing else than fear of some base and disgraceful thing, properly is not a habit but a passion; nor is its motion by election, but from a certain impulse of passion; nor does it exclude the fear, or opinion, of a base thing as possible, arduous, or difficult to avoid, but rather includes it.

BUT its subject is not the old, nor the wicked, nor the perfect. For since shamefacedness is the fear of some baseness, two things are required for it: that the baseness be held evil by you, and that to the one feeling shame it be esteemed difficult to avoid. From defect of the former condition wicked men lack shamefacedness, of whom Hierem. 3: Thou hast the forehead of a harlot, thou wouldst not blush. From defect of the second condition the old and the perfect lack shamefacedness, who are nevertheless so disposed that, if anything base were in them, they would be ashamed, as Aristotle says 4. Eth. last cap.

WHENCE St. Ambrose, lib. 1. off. cap. 18: Beautiful is the virtue of the young, shamefacedness, and its sweet grace, which is seen not only in deeds but also in their very words. See St. Bonaventure lib. 1. Pharetrae, cap. 30.

AND St. Jerome epist. 14, cited by St. Bonaventure lib. 4. Pharetrae, cap. 14: Let shamefacedness adorn prudence, and let modesty, which has ever been the chief thing in women, surpass all virtues in thee.

AND St. Bernard serm. 86. in Cant.: Shamefacedness is the special glory of conscience, the first-fruits of the virtues, and the mark of all honesty.

HE also there recites many Fathers admitting shamefacedness even in perfect men, not in order to evil, or present baseness, but to what is past, inasmuch as it is present in memory and has imminent evil effects.

IN 4. dist. 16. part. 1. dub. 11. he places shamefacedness unto repentance in great sinners. Again he confirms this from the Fathers, loc. cit. Pharetrae. But no wonder: for they no longer have the character of the wicked, while they repent of their sins.

IN MANY ways Honestum is taken. First, for what is exterior in the prosperity of fortitude, and the dignity of nobility; and a person worthy of honor is called honest; and for the seemliness of morals in exterior conversation, and for all things which have an external semblance together with honesty, as St. Bonaventure notes in primo, dist. 1. art. 3. quaest. 2. ad 4, and on those words of Wisd. 10: Honored him; it is taken also for seemliness in the face of men; thus an impediment of public honesty is placed by betrothal for contracting with the relatives of the spouse. It also signifies every good desirable per se. Simply, however, Honesty regards the good of virtue, as the Holy Doctor admonishes p. p. Centil. sect. 9.

THEREFORE Honestum, says St. Thomas quaest. cit. art. 2, from St. Augustine lib. 83. qq. quaest. 30, is spiritual comeliness. For that is beautiful and comely which has its parts proportionately disposed, from St. Dionysius c. 4. de div. nom. part. 1. Thus therefore spiritual comeliness is placed in this, that the life and morals of a man be well proportioned according to the spiritual clarity of right reason, which pertains to the character of the honest, and of virtue.

HONESTY therefore is called an integral part of Temperance by way of a certain condition which shines in Temperance itself with a special reason. So St. Thomas, from Macrob. lib. 1. in somn. Scip., Ambrose lib. 1. de off. c. 43.

THE REASON is, because, although honesty is common to every virtue, yet it is ascribed to Temperance by a certain special reason, which repels from man that which is most base and most unseemly, namely brutal voluptuousness; which indeed is the condition, or affection, of the virtue of Temperance.