Article — Noldin, Summa of Moral Theology
Article Fourth. On Temperance.
283. Its nature. 1. Temperance, insofar as it is a cardinal virtue, is the virtue which moderates the appetite in the pleasures of taste and touch.
a. Temperance in general, or accepted in the broader sense, restrains and moderates the concupiscible appetite, even spiritual, in any matter whatever which entices against the prescriptions of reason, especially with regard to honors and pleasures; special temperance restrains the sensitive concupiscible appetite with regard to the sensible pleasures of taste and touch, which, since they are most vehement, need a special virtue moderating them.
b. Therefore temperance also orders man not to another, but to himself.
- The proximate material object is the pleasures of taste and touch; the remote material object is foods and drinks and venereal acts, to which those pleasures are referred as to their object. The formal object is natural honesty, which consists in this, that those actions be exercised with that moderation which befits the dignity of rational nature.
Therefore special temperance turns about the pleasures which are perceived in those actions which by their nature are ordered to the conservation of the individual and of the species. Indeed God joined vehement pleasures to the necessary actions by which the human race is preserved and propagated, so that men would be invited and enticed to those actions. Therefore from the intention of the author of nature nothing prevents man, in placing those actions, from being moved by pleasure and intending it, provided that he exclude neither explicitly nor implicitly the primary end, which is the conservation and propagation of the species, and that in all things he allow himself to be ruled according to the prescriptions of reason.
284. Opposed vices. The vices opposed to temperance in general are two: insensibility by defect and intemperance by excess.
a. Insensibility or stupor is the vice by which someone so flees honors and pleasures that he does not wish to use them when or where or as much as is fitting according to right reason. A most rare vice.
b. Intemperance is the vice by which someone, in seeking and enjoying honors and pleasures, exceeds the dictate of right reason.
285. Parts of temperance. 1. The integral parts of temperance are modest shame and honesty.
a. Modest shame (Schamhaftigkeit) is a certain disturbance of soul or fear rising from consideration of some deed bringing confusion or disgrace. Deeds of this kind are especially sins of intemperance.
b. Honesty (Ehrbarheit) is a moral perfection averting man from dishonest pleasures and inclining him to the decorum which shines forth in abstinence from illicit pleasures.
- The subjective parts of temperance are abstinence, sobriety, and chastity, of which two temper taste, but the third tempers touch.
a. Abstinence is the virtue moderating the appetite and use of food and of non-inebriating drink; opposed to it is the vice of gluttony.
Abstinence accepted in this sense is more often called temperance than abstinence, and by the name abstinence (Enthaltsamkeit) there is rather designated a subtraction of foods which is greater than the nature of temperance of itself demands. This abstinence, from a motive of virtue, abstains from licit things.
Its act is fasting.
b. Sobriety is the virtue moderating the appetite and use of inebriating drink; opposed to it is drunkenness.
c. Chastity is the virtue moderating or excluding the appetite and use of venereal things; opposed to it is lust.
- The potential parts of temperance are those virtues annexed to temperance which bring about moderation concerning matters which are not so difficult to moderate as the concupiscences of taste and touch. Virtues of this kind are four: continence, meekness, clemency, and modesty.
a. Continence is the virtue firming the will for resisting concupiscence which impels especially to the venereal pleasures of touch.
The name continence is also taken in another sense, in which it signifies the same as chastity, namely abstinence from every venereal pleasure.
b. Meekness is the virtue which moderates anger according to the prescription of right reason. Opposed to meekness by excess is irascibility; by defect, lenity or excessive indulgence.
c. Clemency is the virtue which moderates external vindication or punishment according to the norm of reason. Opposed to clemency by excess is cruelty; by defect, excessive lenity.
d. Modesty is the virtue by which someone preserves the mode fitting to himself in internal and external movements and in the whole arrangement of his things. There are four species of modesty: humility, studiousness, modesty of morals, and modesty of attire.