Damage to spiritual and mental goods

464. Obligation of restoring. In this place a fitting occasion offers itself also to treat of the obligation of restoring because of damage inflicted in spiritual goods. Spiritual goods are understood not only as supernatural goods, which conduce to the eternal salvation of the soul, but also natural goods such as sciences and arts, the use of reason and of free will. To supernatural goods also pertains the good of the priestly and religious state.

Assertions. 1. He who by an unjust means (fraud, lie, force, fear instilled) inflicts spiritual damage on another, or impedes another from obtaining a spiritual good, is bound to repair the damage inflicted if it can be repaired in the same order: for anyone has a right to demand that evil not be inflicted on him by an unjust means.

a. Therefore he who induced another to sin by fraud or instilled fear is bound from justice to call him back if he cannot of himself return to the former state. But if of himself he can do this and does not do it, the damager is bound to nothing: for since the damaged person voluntarily perseveres in evil, by this very fact he is considered to remit the injury to the damager.

b. He who by fraud induced another into practical error, from which another evil can follow, for example, that reputation unjustly taken away from the neighbor need not be restored, is bound to recall the error and compensate the damages arising from it and foreseen in some way.

c. He who by fraud induced another into speculative error, for example, that there is no purgatory, generally does not commit a grave injury unless the error concerns the principal dogmas of faith, or unless the errors are many and of great moment.

d. He who by poison or other illicit means deprives another of the use of reason, memory, or free will, injures justice, but is not bound to restitution because of this spiritual damage itself inflicted, because it cannot be repaired in the same order; yet he is bound to repair temporal damage, if any was suffered by him who was deprived of the use of reason. The same must be said if someone by force, fear, or fraud turns another away from the study of letters or arts, or does not permit him to use the science or art acquired.

2. He who without an unjust means inflicts spiritual damage on another, or impedes him from obtaining a spiritual good, is bound not from justice but only from charity to repair the damage inflicted, if he can: for where no injury is inflicted, no obligation of restitution is had.

He who by evil example or persuasion induces another to sin is bound to call him back only from charity, not from justice.¹

¹ Cf. on this matter Lugo, disp. 9, n. 1 ss.; Elbel-Bierbaum, Theologia moralis II, pr. 6, n. 180-205.

He who by fraud, violence, or other unjust means leads another to commit sin, or deprives him of any supernatural or natural good belonging to the soul and mind, is guilty of injustice, and is bound to make reparation to the injured party. If the same effect is produced by persuasion or other not unjust means, a sin of scandal is committed; but justice is not violated, nor is there any obligation to make restitution. These principles are not only applicable to sin, but to vocation to the religious state and to sound doctrine, especially of the practical order. Priests or masters, who by their office are bound to instruct others and teach them the truth, are in a special manner obliged to correct any false instruction which they may have given. Better leave people in ignorance than imbue their minds with falsehood.

Goods of the soul are distinguished into natural and supernatural goods.

I. Natural goods are: intellect, will, memory, sciences, arts, and the use of these. In this matter, injustice is committed either by unjustly harming someone in the said goods or in their use, for example by inducing someone unwilling or ignorant into drunkenness or by casting him into a hypnotic state; or by unjustly impeding someone from obtaining a good of this sort, for example knowledge; or by not procuring for someone a good, for example an art, although one is held from justice to procure it. Now:

1. He who has committed injustice according to what has been said is held from justice: 1° to remove the cause of the damage, for example fear that has been instilled, and to prevent, insofar as can be done, damages threatening from it; 2° to restore damages or ceasing profit that have followed or will follow for the injured person, for example ceasing profit from the fact that someone is unfit for his office; 3° to return, according to the proportion of negligence, the stipend agreed upon and accepted, if someone, for example, has not duly performed the office of teaching.

Corollary. He who harmed someone only by persuasion, entreaties, or example is commonly not guilty of injustice, and therefore contracts only an obligation of charity. I have said commonly, because he who by persuasion or entreaties led another into a sin of injustice is held from justice to restitution with respect to the injured person.

II. Supernatural goods are: grace, virtues, vocation to the religious state, etc. Now:

1. He who unjustly, for example by lies or fear, led another into a harmful error or into sin, or led him away from a good work, for example from Religion, is held as was said under I about him who unjustly harmed someone in the natural goods of the soul.

2. He who only by persuasion or example led another to evil, or led him away from good, is not held to restitution; nevertheless he is held from charity, more than others, to promote his conversion. There are some who judge that he is held to this from justice; but because he did not sin against justice, no obligation of justice can arise.

In general, each person is held from justice to repair the damage which he has effectively and unjustly brought upon his neighbor in the goods, both natural and supernatural, of the soul, provided that damage can be repaired in the same order. For each person has no less strict a right not to be injured in goods of this kind than not to be injured in goods of fortune.

723. Resolves. - As regards damage in supernatural goods:

1. He who by force, lie, fraud, or unjust fear has induced someone into mortal sin, is held under mortal sin from justice to the reparation of the damage, by removing the force or seduction, manifesting the error, etc. But he who without force or fraud, but only by counsel, has induced someone to sin mortally, is indeed held from charity to revoke that counsel, but not from justice, because injury is not done to one knowing and willing. - St. Lig., n. 660-661. ¹.

¹ The Author, both in the present resolution and in the following resolutions, omits the hypothesis of damage of which you really were the cause, but without deceit, as when, for example, you narrate to another certain false things which you thought true. To this point pertain the things which the Author handed down above, n. 662, q. 3, concerning one not impeding damages to which he has inculpably given cause.

2. He who by deceit induced another into error, especially practical error, from which grave damage can arise for him in the matter of morals, is held from justice to repair the damages which thence proceed, and therefore with all care to remove him from the error. Say the same of speculative error concerning the articles of Faith.

3. He who through force, grave fear, or fraud impeded someone from entering Religion, or induced one already entered to desert religion, is held from justice to remove the fraud and deceit; for each one has a right not to be unjustly impeded or drawn away from the attainment or possession of so great a good. - St. Lig., n. 662.

724. • As regards damage in natural goods:

1. He who deprived another of memory, reason, etc., through poison, a love-potion, etc., is held from justice to repair all that is reparable from the damage unjustly inflicted.

2. He who by fraud impedes another from learning science, art, etc., or from teaching others, is held to drive away the fraud, and to repair the temporal damages which have arisen thence.

3. He who from office must teach an art or science is held to correct errors, if he has admitted any of some moment. The same obligation also lies upon him if through carelessness or levity he has mixed probable things with improbable ones.

4. But if someone gratuitously and without obligation of pact or office were to teach badly from negligence or ignorance, fraud and deceit being excluded, he would not be held to reparation ².

² According to the mind of the Author, he who teaches badly is here to be understood as one from whose teaching either no progress or only slight progress is drawn, but not as one who imbues his hearers with errors. For in this second hypothesis the badly unoccupied teacher would have to be equated at least with one who, without formal injury, inflicts damage upon someone, for example, one who has in no way professed the medical art and inconsiderately counsels some harmful medicine to a sick person; for when he adverts to his error, he is certainly held to forestall the damage with less or greater inconvenience to himself according to the greater or lesser fault of his negligence and temerity, and the greater or lesser danger of another's damage.

364. After the things said concerning injuries concerning the goods of the body, we must now treat of injuries concerning the goods of the soul. Now the principal goods of the soul are: (a) reputation, or the good estimation which we enjoy among others, which is injured in two ways: internally by rash judgment, but externally by detraction or defamation; (b) honor, which consists in the acknowledgment of our excellence, and is offended by contumely; (c) truth, to which are opposed lying, when what is false is said, and violation of a secret, when truth is revealed which ought to have been kept silent.

1. He who intentionally, or in a manner which he could have foreseen, injures his neighbor mentally, for instance, by giving alcohol to a child, or habit-forming drugs to an adult, or by fraud, deception, lying, or other unjust means, or deprives him of some knowledge or skill which he needs in his profession or occupation, is bound in justice to make restitution. This applies particularly to those who, ex officio or ex contractu, are obliged to instruct others, but neglect to secure the necessary qualifications or fail to offer their pupils sufficient opportunities to acquire the knowledge or skill which they need. If the injury thus inflicted extends into the future, this circumstance must be taken into account in making restitution.¹

¹ Gury, Comp. Theol. Mor., Vol. I, n. 694: 1. “He who has deprived another of memory, reason, etc., by poison or a potion, is bound in justice to repair everything that is reparable in the damage unjustly and efficaciously caused. 2. He who by fraud prevented another from learning knowledge, an art, . . . or from teaching others, is bound to remove the fraud and repair the temporal damages which arose from it. 3. He who by office must teach an art or science is bound to correct errors if he has admitted any and they are of some importance. The same obligation also rests upon him if through carelessness or levity he has mixed probable things with improbable ones. 4. If someone, gratuitously and without an obligation of contract or office, taught badly through negligence or ignorance, fraud and deceit being excluded, he would not be bound to reparation.”—Noldin, Summa Theol. Mor., II, 4th ed., n. 455: “He who deprives another of the use of reason is not bound to restitution for this spiritual damage inflicted in itself, because it cannot be repaired in the same order; he is, however, bound to repair temporal damage, if any was suffered by the one who was deprived of the use of reason.”

2. He who unjustly injures another in his supernatural possessions (bona supernaturalia), for instance, by purposely leading him into error in matters of faith or morals, or by seducing him to sin, or, what is still worse, robbing him of his most precious gifts, faith and hope, or who otherwise gives grave scandal, is obliged under pain of mortal sin to repair the damage thus inflicted so far as lies in his power. Means to this end are: recantation of the lies told, refutation of the errors inculcated, admonition and exhortation, good example, prayer, and, if scandal has been given (e. g., through offensive writings), public reparation.

It is furthermore necessary to repair any temporal damage that may have been caused to others by the spreading of false reports, the commission of a sin, or the giving of scandal. This duty of restitution binds even in cases where the offender had no direct intention of causing spiritual damage to others by word, deed or omission, and extends to all the evil consequences of the offence committed,—both those that were directly intended and those that might have been foreseen under the circumstances of the case.²

² Gury, Comp. Theol. Mor., Vol. I, n. 693: “1. He who by force, a lie, fraud, or unjust fear induced another into mortal sin is bound under pain of mortal sin, in justice, to reparation of the damage by removing the force or seduction and disclosing the error. But he who, without force or fraud, induced someone to sin mortally merely by counsel is indeed bound by charity to retract that counsel, but not by justice, because no injury is done to one who knows and wills. 2. He who by deceit induced another into error, especially practical error, from which grave damage could arise for him in the matter of morals, is bound in justice to repair the damages which result therefrom and to remove him from the error by every effort. The same must be held concerning speculative error about the principal articles of faith.”

If spiritual damage has been caused without the employment of means per se unjust,—for instance, by request, admonition or counsel,—the seducer is bound, at least ex caritate, under pain of mortal sin, to repair the damage inflicted and to undo its consequences to the best of his ability.

He who, by force or fraud, restrains another from entering a religious institute (order or congregation), or causes him to leave the same, is bound in strict justice to desist and make restitution of the damage inflicted, both to the misguided individual and to the monastery which he deserted. He who, without a just cause, deters another from joining a religious order or congregation, even though he employ no unjust means, commits a grievous sin against charity, but is not bound to make restitution because no offence against justice is involved.

A religious who at an election refuses to vote for the admission of a novice, sins and is obliged to make restitution, unless a sufficient cause existed for rejecting the novice, e. g., disease or lack of talent, and there was consequently reason to fear that the candidate might become a burden to the order.³

³ Cfr. F. A. Göpfert, Moraltheologie, Vol. II, 6th ed., 301.—Gury, Comp. Theol. Mor., I, n. 693, 3: “For everyone has a right not to be unjustly hindered or withdrawn from the attainment or possession of so great a good.”

Priests or teachers who are bound by their office to instruct others in the truth, must carefully correct any false instruction which they may have given, for, as Fr. Slater says, it is better to leave people in ignorance than to imbue their minds with falsehood.⁴

⁴ Slater, A Manual of Moral Theology, I, 414 (notes to Part II, Ch. I).

Readings.—Sporer-Bierbaum, Theol. Mor., Vol. II, 2nd ed., tr. 5, n. 117–149.—J. P. Gury, S. J., Comp. Theol. Mor., Vol. I, n. 693–694.—H. Noldin, S. J., Summa Theol. Mor., Vol. II, pp. 488 sq.

Generally each one is bound from justice to repair damage which he has efficaciously and unjustly brought upon the neighbor in goods of the soul, both natural and supernatural, provided that this damage can be repaired in the same order. For no one has a less strict right not to be injured in goods of this kind than not to be injured in goods of fortune.

805. Resolutions. - I. As to damage in supernatural goods:

1° He who by force, lie, fraud, or unjust fear induced someone into lethal sin is bound under mortal sin from justice to reparation of the damage, by taking away the force or seduction, by manifesting the error, etc. But one who without force or fraud, but only by counsel, induced someone to sin lethally, is indeed bound from charity to revoke that counsel, but not from justice, because no injury is done to one knowing and willing.

2° He who by deceit induced another into error, especially practical, from which grave damage can arise to him in matter of morals, is bound from justice to repair the damages which come from it, and therefore with all care to remove him from error. Say the same concerning speculative error about the articles of Faith.

3° He who by force, grave fear, or fraud impeded someone from entrance into Religion, or induced one already entered to desert Religion, is bound from justice to remove the fraud and deceit; for each one has a right not to be unjustly impeded or drawn away from the obtaining or possession of so great a good. He is likewise bound to repair damages caused to the monastery or Order through the departure of a professed religious, or even more probably of a novice.²

4° He who inculpably placed a cause of damage in spiritual goods, for example preaching false things in a moral matter which he thought true, is bound to the same thing as a material damager who can still impede the damage. Recall what was said n. 749. q. 3°.

806. • II. As to damage in natural goods:

1° He who deprived another of memory, reason, etc., through poison, a love-potion, etc., is bound from justice to repair everything which is reparable from the damage unjustly inflicted.

2° He who by fraud impedes another from learning a science, an art, ... or from teaching others, is bound to dispel the fraud and to repair temporal damages which have arisen from it.

3° He who from office ought to teach an art or science is bound to correct errors, if he has admitted any of some moment. The same obligation also lies upon him if from negligence or levity he has mixed probable things with improbable.

4° But if someone gratuitously and without the obligation of agreement or office were to teach badly, that is, without any or with slight progress of the pupil, from negligence or ignorance, fraud and deceit being set aside, he would not be bound to reparation.

5° He who inculpably placed a cause of damage in natural goods is bound to the same thing as he concerning whom in the next preceding number under 4° it was said.

344. Injury can be done in spiritual goods. - Spiritual goods are understood as not only supernatural goods which are immediately ordered to eternal salvation, namely, the grace of God, infused virtues, the right to the sacraments, etc., to which the clerical and religious state also pertain, but also natural goods such as the use of reason and free will, natural sciences, arts, and other things of this kind. Concerning all these there can be injury, because for these to be increased, obtained by use, acquired, or not omitted, everyone can have a strictly so-called right, and therefore there can be an obligation of restoring, if restitution is possible.

Whence 1) he who by an unjust means (fraud, force, fear instilled) inflicts spiritual damage on another or impedes him from obtaining a spiritual good (for example, entrance into religion), is bound to repair the damage inflicted as much as is possible; namely, he must remove force, fear, fraud, if they still endure, repair goods taken away or impeded if this is possible, and make good real damages following therefrom and foreseen at least in confusion: for everyone has a strict right that evil not be inflicted on him by an unjust means.

Likewise 2) he who from justice, namely, from office, stipend received, or contract, is bound to instruct, warn, correct his neighbor, refresh him with the sacraments, and neglects this, is guilty of injury and is bound, as much as he can, to repair the negligence and make good damages following from it, for example, a pastor who has been negligent.

On the contrary 3) he who without an unjust means inflicts spiritual damage on another or impedes him from obtaining a spiritual good (for example, by bad example, counsel, illicit prayers), is bound not from justice but only from charity to repair the damage: for injury is not inflicted on one who knows and consents, and therefore there is no obligation of restoring, unless nevertheless someone is bound from office to draw him back from evil.

345. General conclusions are easily deduced from the foregoing:

1. He who, by poison, medicine, or other means, deprives another not consenting of the use of reason, memory, free will, is guilty of grave injury and is bound to employ means, if there are any, by which the use may be recovered, and to repair damages following therefrom and foreseen at least in confusion.

2. Similarly if someone by force, fear, fraud, turns someone away from the study of letters or arts, or does not allow him to use acquired knowledge or art.

1. If someone teaches a practical error from which some evil besides the error follows for someone, he is bound to revoke the error, and to compensate the whole damage which has arisen therefrom for the one deceived or for a third party and was in some way foreseen.

2. If the error is merely speculative, for example, concerning the number of the stars, per se there is no obligation of restoring, because it is against truth alone, not against justice; nevertheless an exception is made:

a) if the error inflicts damage, as if it is concerned with dogmas of faith, especially principal ones, or with a very fundamental or universal principle from which many false conclusions arise in a matter of great moment, because such an error would pervert the intellect;

b) if the one deceiving is a teacher from office, or from contract, indeed even if without stipend and voluntarily he has undertaken the office of teaching.

In these cases he must withdraw the error.

1. If someone by force or fraud induces another to sin or draws him back from obtaining a special good, for example, from religious profession, from frequenting the sacraments, he is bound from justice to restore, that is, to remove the unjust means and to recall the other to the good, if the latter cannot of himself return to the former state: for although the other consented by sinning, nevertheless the consent is not full because he did not consent to the deception and violence employed.

2. He who without an unjust means (by bad example, persuasion, prayers) induces to sin, does not sin against justice, but against charity alone, because injury is not done to one who knows and consents. Whence there is no obligation of restoring, unless someone from office is bound to draw him back from evil (for example, a superior), or induces him to sin against justice, because then he is unjust, not toward him whom he induces to consent, but toward the third party whom he affects with injury, since he cooperates with the sin.

3. If there is question of material sin to which by force or fraud someone induces another, it does not seem per se to be a sin against justice, although per accidens it can be, if it inflicts grave detriment, as if it causes a habit of sinning or infamy.

346. Special conclusion as to the religious state.

1. If someone by force or deceit impedes another from entrance into religion, or draws a novice out of religion, he is bound from justice to restitution, by removing the force and deceit, retracting what he falsely said, compensating the spiritual or temporal damages which have arisen; but once force or fraud has been removed, no obligation of justice exists.

2. But if by force or fraud he draws a professed person out of religion, he is bound to restitution also toward the religion itself.

3. Those who without any motive refuse profession to a novice sin against justice, because, by admission into the novitiate, the novice acquires a right to profession, from the implicit contract by which the religion obligates itself to admit him if he is found worthy and duly performs the required offices.

4. A novice who in bad faith, namely with the intention afterward of going away and not professing, enters religion, is bound when leaving to compensate the food which he received, the value of useful works which he furnished being deducted.

347. Danger for the use of reason and liberty, as also for morals, is apt to arise from hypnotism.

Its origin was animal magnetism, which first, in the year 1774, Dr. Mesmer (+ 1815), a Viennese physician, set forth doctrinally. He thought that he had found a marvelous means of healing in a subtle fluid which, similar to magnetic force, is supposed to flow from the bodies of animals, indeed to pervade absolutely all bodies, and to be able to be transmitted through suitable means, and that by it diseases are healed.

The effects are: a sweet heat, deeper sleep, general or partial insensibility, somnambulism. It is produced by gestures of the hands, magnetized substances, a simple nod of the will expressed by words. It gave rise to rotating tables, and gradually degenerated into diabolical superstitions by which women see, hear, speak, know hidden, distant, marvelous things which otherwise are unknown to them. Hence per se it is not illicit; but per accidens, as to preternatural phenomena or superstition (S. Off., 28 July 1847 and 4 Aug. 1856). Braid attributed the phenomena produced to suggestion, and thus hypnotism was born.^{1 2}

¹ [§347] Yet there is, as Prummer testifies, a difference: in magnetism the use of reason and liberty is never lost, which happens in hypnotism.

² [§347] Concerning hypnotism, among others, the following can be consulted: Mercier, Psychologie; Bernheim, De la suggestion et de ses applications a la therapeutique; Franco, L'hypnotisme revenu a la mode; Masoin and Lefebvre, Rapport et discussion sur l'hypnotisme a l'Academie de medecine de Belgique; Guibert, Essai sur l'hypnotisme; Moreau, L'Hypnotisme, etude scientifique et religieuse; Surbled, La morale dans ses rapports avec la medecine; Lescoeur, La science et les faits surnaturels contemporains; Meric, Le merveilleux et la science; Coconnier, L'Hypnotisme franc; Imbert, L'Hypnotisme et la Stigmatisation; Lapponi, Hypnotisme et Spiritisme; Castelein, Les phenomenes de l'hypnotisme et le surnaturel; Schneider, Der Hypnotismus (French trans.); Grasset, L'Hypnotisme et la Suggestion; Dr. Joire, Manuel d'Hypnotisme (German trans.); Van Velsen, Hypnotisme, suggestion, psychotherapie. Among theologians: Tanquerey, Th. M. fundamentalis, n. 133 sq. and 916.

Hypnotism is customarily defined: the induction of a peculiar state, analogous to sleep, which is called hypnosis, in which state a man constituted in it marvelously undergoes the suggestions of the hypnotizer. It is induced by most diverse means, which nevertheless probably are all reduced to one, namely, the suggestion of sleep; but it has several grades from simple drowsiness to perfect somnambulism.

To it are attributed effects of three kinds:

1. Phenomena proved by clear experience which are produced among persons either of healthy or hysterical condition: by suggestion arise paralysis and rigidity of members, and on the contrary ceaseless movement; insensibility, exaltation of the senses; illusions and hallucinations, both positive, by which they sense what is not, and negative, by which they do not perceive what is; defect of memory (partial or total) and pseudo-recollection of a fictitious event; and in subjects disposed before others: suggestions to be fulfilled after a long time and fulfilled with marvelous precision; the assumption of an alien, double, or multiple personality; blistering or exudation of a little blood.

2. Phenomena proper to hysterical persons, in whom the three states of lethargy, catalepsy, and somnambulism are produced successively and regularly, and certain other marvelous things, not indeed by suggestion but by physical means.

3. Phenomena altogether marvelous and extraordinary: clear vision of an object altogether hidden, transposition of the senses, instantaneous acquisition of an unknown science or language, reading of thoughts, knowledge of hidden and future things, etc. These are produced rather on the occasion than by force of customary hypnotism; whence they are more to be ascribed to magnetism, occultism, or spiritism.

Now it seems scientifically most probable and morally certain that phenomena of the first and second kind are natural, although learned men dispute about their interpretation; concerning effects of the third kind generally there is no certainty, and they are not customarily produced by men skilled in the hypnotic art; whence they are either fictitious, or produced by fraudulent arts, or finally, if sometimes they are real, they pertain to spiritism: in which case not all can be attributed to unknown forces, but some would have to be ascribed to the intervention of the demon.

348. Is the practice of hypnotism licit? - In the present matter we are not treating effects of the third kind (concerning which we shall speak where we treat superstition and spiritism), but customary and properly so-called hypnotism, which in itself is not superstitious. Its practice, however, will often be illicit for other reasons, namely whenever it is employed unjustly or without grave cause and great caution. For:

a) The one hypnotized is deprived of the ready use of reason (and of dominion over the lower powers), which ordinarily by his own powers he will recover with difficulty without the nod of the hypnotizer; he hands himself over to the will of the hypnotizer, by whom he can quite efficaciously and often invincibly be led to perpetrating illicit and unjust things, and ordinarily can be reduced into the same state even while resisting.³ Such privation of the use of reason, and abdication of liberty, involving of itself grave danger for morals, is prohibited whenever a proportionately grave cause and cautions for removing the danger are lacking.

³ [§348, p. 349] Yet Fr. Vermeersch notes (Th. M. I, n. 101) that this permanent dependence can be avoided by the suggestion of liberty or independence, added in the final command. Yet hypnotizers are not accustomed to act in this way.

b) Hypnotism, unless it is employed with great prudence, exposes the health of soul and body to grave harm; whence the removal of such danger is required, or at least a founded hope of obtaining a greater good.

c) But if someone through abuse of hypnotism subjects a non-consenting person to his commands, or exercises the art in circumstances in which it is harmful, he commits grave injury and from justice is bound by suitable means to render that person his own master and to repair all damages.

d) Finally other inconveniences can accede from the public exhibition of hypnotism (harmful excitation of the nerves in those looking on, and occasion given to common people of knowing hypnosis and abusing it for evils), from a dishonorable mode of inducing hypnosis, from an occasion of lust, etc. Whence deservedly the spectacle of hypnotism was prohibited by severe penalties in the Belgian law of 30 May 1892, and the exercise of hypnotism upon minors and the insane was circumscribed within certain limits.

A sufficient cause is not the cause of recreation or of gain alone, but sometimes the cause of scientific investigation (S. Off., 26 July 1899), provided that the expert selects a person to whom hypnosis appears not harmful but rather profitable; more often a cause of medical treatment, whether for quieting the senses in a surgical incision, or for curing a disease of the nerves or rheumatism;⁴ also a cause of removing or diminishing evil propensities (for example, to suicide, drunkenness, lust, theft, etc.) when in an extraordinary case⁵ they almost take away liberty or weaken the will. Then also caution will have to be employed: let no one be employed except a very skilled and prudent and entirely faithful physician, who uses only honorable and harmless suggestions and only for the intended end; let a faithful witness also be joined (who remains at least nearby) on account of the good of the hypnotizer himself, but especially of the one hypnotized.

⁴ [§348, p. 349] It should be noted that now the salutary effects of hypnotism are already being more restricted or called into doubt.

⁵ [§348, p. 350] For the ordinary means of formation, education, and dominion of oneself is the exercise of one's own reason and liberty. Besides, suggestions ordinarily weaken the will more than they strengthen it.

I say. Each one is held from justice to repair damage which he efficaciously and unjustly brought upon his neighbor in the goods, both natural and supernatural, of the soul, provided that that damage can be repaired in the same order. The reason for the obligation is that each one has a right no less strict not to be injured in goods of this sort than in goods of fortune. But the reason for the condition added is that otherwise reparation is not possible.

You Will Resolve. - 1st. He who by force, lying, fraud, unjust fear, induced someone into lethal sin, is held under mortal sin from justice to reparation of the damage, by removing the force or seduction, by manifesting the error, etc. But he who without force or fraud but only by counsel induced someone to sin lethally, is indeed held from charity to revoke that counsel, but not from justice, because to one knowing and willing no injury is done. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, nn. 660 and 661.

2nd. He who by deceit induced another into error, especially practical error, from which grave damage can arise to him in the matter of morals, is held from justice to repair the damages which proceed therefrom, and therefore with all care to remove him from error. Say the same of speculative error concerning articles of faith.

3rd. He who by force, grave fear, or fraud has impeded someone from entrance into religion, or has induced one already entered to desert religion, is held from justice to remove the fraud and deceit; for each one has a right not to be impeded unjustly from the pursuit or possession of so great a good, or to be drawn away from it. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 662.

4th. He who has deprived another, for example, of the use of memory, etc., by poison, a love-potion, etc., is held from justice to repair all that which is repairable from the damage unjustly inflicted.

5th. He who by fraud has impeded another from learning a science, an art . . . or from teaching others, is held to remove the fraud and to repair the temporal damages which have arisen therefrom.

6th. He who from office ought to teach art or science is held to correct errors, if he has admitted any of some moment. - I said from office, because if gratuitously and without the obligation of some agreement he teaches and procures no or only very little progress in his hearers through negligence or culpable ignorance, excluding the case of fraud or deceit or special damage proceeding from the error which he taught, he is not held to reparation.

*I ASSERT first that one who has driven a man mad by a crime or by a wicked drug is held to make restitution of the damages. This is clear from Valentia disp. 5. quaest. 6. punct 3; Tannerum disp. 4. quaest. 6. dubio 3.

I ASSERT second that one who, without guile, violence, or fraud, merely by persuasion induced another to sin is not held in justice to restore him, as far as in him lies, to his former state, but only out of Charity. Thus Soto lib. 4. de Iust. quaest. 6. art. 3; Nauar. in Manual. cap. 14. num. 45; Bass. 21; Valentia quaest. 6. punct. 5; Tanner. disp. 4. quaest. 6. num. 90; Caspens. disp. 9. sect. 1, against Scotum 4. dist. 15. quaest. 3, Richardum eadem dist. art. 5. quaest. 2, Paludanum ibi, et Adrianum de Restitutione.

The RATIONALE is that no wrong is done to the willing against Justice, and therefore, since he does not offend against Justice, he is not held to restitution, as Valentia notes. Nor let them say that the loss of the grace of God is a greater damage than that of one's whole estate; for since this damage is inflicted upon one who wills it, no wrong against Justice is inflicted.

AND further, I think, this is what the Saintly Doctor in speculo animae, cap. 1 means, where he reckons only the damaging of temporal goods under the heading of restitution, because spiritual goods are not lost except by the will of the one losing them. And of these the old saying is that no one is harmed except by himself. For no force can compel the will to sin; while deceit and guile, which place an obstacle of invincible ignorance, do not induce sin. He indeed who applies force, or brings guile or fraud, will be held to remove them out of justice, and to leave the man constituted in his liberty. Indeed he must exhort him to penance, because he is considered to take away against the man's will. But if the man, now knowingly in his own state, does not repent, he is considered to have condoned the force, as Bass. num. 21 says with Petr. Nauarro.

A difficulty, however, ARISES concerning one who turns someone away from entering Religion by dissuading him. They commonly concede that it is a grave sin to do this without just cause, as may be seen in Fagundez in septimum praeceptum, lib. 7. cap. 31. But whether he is held to restitution.

It is MORE PROBABLE that he is not held to restitution, because he violated no right of religion, since the man is still free; and accordingly he owes nothing to Religion. And for the same reason he is not held to the man dissuaded, both because the man acts freely, and because he has no right to the goods of religion. See Sayrum lib. 11. cap. 1. num. 35; Aragon. 2. 2. quaest. 62. art. 2; Nauar. summa Latina, cap. 22. num. 44 — and this even if it be done by violence or fraud.

Yet the OPPOSITE is asserted by Vasquez de restit. cap. 8. dub. 2. num. 38; Less. lib. 2. cap. 8. dub. 3; Rebell. p. 1. lib. 4. quaest. 15; Turrianus 2. 2. disp. 15. dub. 2; Molina Tom. 4. de Iustitia, tract. 4. disp. 51; Fagundez loc. cit. num. 6; Bannes quaest. 62. art. 2. disp. 3; Aragon. diffic. cit. ad 4; Tanner. disput. 4. quaest. 6. dub. 3, while Bass. num. 22 doubts if it is done by violence, fraud, etc.

WHETHER, then, one who removes a Novice, yet not by force, fear, or fraud, is held to restitution. The Doctors commonly deny it, as in Fagundez num. 15, against Rebellium p. 1. lib. 4. quaest. 15. num. 5. To remove the unfit is not an evil. For thus Christ also in Matth. 8 rejected such a man, as S. Bonau. in cap. 2. Regula Fratrum minorum notes.

But IF he extracts a professed man without force, yet with fraud: first it is certain that he owes nothing to the religious man himself, because no wrong is done to the willing. The question is whether he is held to the religion; and they define that he is held: Molina Tom. 4. tract. 4. disp. 51; Vasquez de restit. cap. 8. dub. 2; Turrianus 2. 2. disp. 15. dub. 2; Azorius Tom. 3. lib. 5. cap. 2; Valentia disp. 5. quaest. 6. punct. 5. §. 1. cap. 2; Reginald. Tom. 1. lib. 10. tract. 4. cap. 21. num. 309; Tanner. num. 99, and others. But they deny it: Sotus lib. 4. de Iust. quaest. 6. art. 3; Sayrus lib. 11. cap. 1; Bassaeus num. 22; Lessius lib. 2. cap. 8. dub. 5; Malder. tract. 8. dub. 3; Filliuc. Tom. 2. tract. 32. cap. 7. quaest. 8, and others among these. Fagundez says both are probable, but inclines to the former. See him.