Doubt in Faith

33. To what extent it is a sin. 1. Concerning matters of faith, doubt is not impossible, because both the fact of revelation and the very object of faith lack evidence which would compel the intellect to assent and exclude the possibility of doubt.

Wherefore in a faithful man doubts concerning faith and its truths can arise, even against the will; and in this itself the merit of faith consists, that doubts of this kind, sometimes vehement, are excluded through the will and faith is preserved in its firmness.

2. A Catholic faithful person can never licitly change faith or doubt concerning faith.¹

For since he knows that faith is founded on divine authority, to which falsity is absolutely repugnant, he can never have a sufficient cause of changing his faith or of calling it into doubt. Wherefore, when doubts or difficulties against faith arise, he ought to persuade himself that no difficulty occurs which cannot be solved.

a. Therefore the universal doubt of Hermes was rightly condemned, who had taught that a Catholic faithful person must be given license voluntarily to doubt concerning the truth of religion and to remain in doubt until, after an examination has been undertaken concerning the truth of the Catholic religion, he has acquired full persuasion. Yet by these things methodical doubt is not prohibited, which consists in this, that a Catholic faithful person, not suspending but retaining the assent of faith, so acts and inquires into the foundations of faith, especially into the fact of revelation, as if it were not yet established concerning it, so that by an undertaken examination he may be confirmed in faith, which he sees to be a rational service.

b. Therefore with respect to faith the condition of a Catholic and of a heretic is unequal. A Catholic cannot doubt concerning his faith without falling away from his own persuasion: for he knows that his faith cannot be false; but a heretic can doubt concerning faith and inquire further into the truth, nor does this in any way conflict with his principles and therefore with his conscience. For the heretic does not acknowledge in his own sect the infallible foundation of truth; on the contrary, he defends the principle of free inquiry (das Prinzip der freien Forschung). For this reason not only is it permitted to him to doubt, but even we can stir him up to doubt, although we suppose that he is in good faith. The more a Catholic strives to know the Church and its origin and propagation, the more he is confirmed in faith; on the contrary, the more a heretic strives to know his own sect and its origin and propagation, the more clearly and certainly he understands that it is a teacher of error.

3. A Catholic faithful person: a. Who doubts positively, that is, by positive assent judges that truths proposed by the Church to be believed are doubtful and uncertain because of contrary reasons, is a formal heretic: for faith requires of us a certain assent; therefore he who judges the truths of faith to be uncertain sins against the authority of God and the Church equally as he who altogether denies the truths of faith. And in this sense it is rightly said: one doubtful in faith is an unbeliever.

b. He who holds himself negatively, or suspends assent concerning faith or some article of faith, is not a heretic, because he does not err in faith nor admit any pertinacity; but he sins against internal faith.

c. He who in a temptation against faith fluctuates between assent and dissent, and yet does not deliberately suspend assent, does not sin unless perhaps venially, because he resists the temptation negligently and remissly.

When doubts against faith arise, at the same time there arises a struggle between the intellect offering assent and the will commanding assent either of faith universally or of a determinate truth of faith. To avoid sin it is necessary that the will resist the doubts, wish to preserve faith, and continue to command firm assent. The intellect in relation to doubts can hold itself in two ways: either it immediately understands, either directly from the consideration of the doubts or at least indirectly from divine authority, that the doubts are empty and retains firm assent; or it retains the doubt for a time, since it does not see the emptiness of it and therefore cannot remove it. Now an indeliberate doubting of this kind does not harm the firmness of faith, provided the will resists the doubt and by its command excludes fear of erring, or provided the will of submitting itself to the authority of the Church is retained.

4. Indifferentism, which arises from doubt concerning matters of faith, is morally evil and illicit, in whatever way it is taken.

For a. if it affirms that the true religion cannot be known, it is opposed to the arguments by which the Christian religion is shown to be true; b. if it teaches that all religions are equally true or equally false, it contains besides this error, namely that truth and falsity are to be held in the same place; c. if finally it says that man is to be estimated and judged not from that which he believes, but from that which he does, it is opposed to this moral principle, namely that man is held by an absolute obligation to have faith in God speaking.

Note for practice. 1. At the present time there are many who seriously doubt concerning the truth of religion, or cherish and proclaim errors contrary to revealed truths, but nevertheless think themselves to be Catholic faithful and fulfill Christian duties in their own way. Concerning these it is now asked: a. whether they commit the sin of formal heresy or can be in good faith; b. whether in their good faith they can be admitted to the sacraments.

To a. From defect of sufficient instruction it can happen that they do not advert that doubts or errors of this kind are gravely sinful, as being against the infallible authority of the Church and therefore against the authority of God revealing; indeed, it seems possible that they persuade themselves that they have a just cause of withdrawing from faith, so that they entirely fall away from faith without the sin of formal heresy.²

To b. Let the confessor consider what contributes more to the salvation of a penitent of this kind, who in confession says that he doubts concerning faith or that he cannot believe all things: whether he should absolve him or dismiss him without absolution until, doubts and errors having been laid aside, he fully embraces faith. Since absolution can be valid, with the admonition added of believing all things which God has revealed and the Church proposes, and of taking care not to induce others to doubts or errors against faith, he will also be able to be absolved licitly whenever from denied absolution greater spiritual detriment is to be feared.³

2. Lay persons who accuse themselves of doubts in faith or of speeches against faith are to be asked: a. concerning what thing they doubted or spoke: for often they erroneously think that things are truths of faith which are not such, in which case they can sin against faith only from an erroneous conscience.

b. But if the matter is really concerning a truth of faith against which they spoke, they committed heresy if, knowing that the doctrine had been proposed by the Church, they seriously attacked the truth of faith, indeed, supposing knowledge of the penalty, they incurred excommunication. But if they spoke in this way either from human respect or from vanity, they sinned gravely against external faith. But finally, if they spoke in this way to set forth their difficulties and to understand the truths of faith better, they sinned in no way.

¹ Cf. Vatican Council, De fide, c. 3.

² Cf. Pesch, VIII, n. 383 s.

³ Cf. Berardi, Praxis confessariorum, I, n. 87 ff.

II. Those wavering in Faith. - "As if for our time St. Hilary already long ago wrote: 'For there are many who, simulating faith, are not subject to faith, and rather constitute faith for themselves than receive it, being puffed up by the sense of human vanity, while they understand what they will, and are unwilling to understand what is true.' How many laymen cultivated in doctrine are found today who seem to be Catholics, but in reality do not have faith! Therefore it ought not seem wonderful if some among them are found who, from a human motive, do not fear to receive Easter Communion without faith in the presence of Christ.

"Since faith is the root of justification, it is manifest that those who are unbelieving concerning the truths of the Catholic faith or call them into doubt are not only unworthy of sacramental absolution but also incapable of it, unless they wish to come to their senses and elicit a true act of faith. But even then, if they have externally uttered heresy and have not been ignorant of the censure, they first need absolution from the excommunication contracted and specially reserved to the Pope.

"Moreover, concerning those fluctuating in faith or unbelieving in this way, attention must carefully be given to the sources of unbelief. The principal are: 1. defect of solid instruction in Religion; which defect in our age is for the most part to be imputed to parents, because they have committed their children to neutral schools, and have neglected Christian education, indeed have sown religious indifferentism in them by word and example. Due instruction must be procured for the ignorant of this kind by the living voice, books, etc. If they desire to be taught, perhaps they fluctuated inculpably; but if they refuse instruction, they are by no means immune from grave fault. - 2. Sensualism or materialism, by which worldly men gape only after pleasures of the senses, riches, and honors; whence there arises a hidden hatred of truth, which, as contrary to their depraved affections, is rendered hateful to them. Therefore, to lull the anxieties of conscience, they follow doubts against the faith, take complacence in the same, gladly hear and read whatever is opposed against the truths of faith, and although truth is solidly proposed to them, nevertheless suspend assent. - 3. Swollen pride, which they decorate with the specious title of emancipation of the human race or independence of human reason. Such persons, boasting themselves enlightened, wish to rise above the common people, and contemn whatever exceeds their grasp. Both these sources are accustomed to help each other. Not a few are also found who, from ostentation, from desire of persuading themselves of errors, utter unbelief, yet believe in heart.

"As regards remedies, the principal, lest I say the only one, is prayer. Then they are to be dissuaded from conversation with men who scatter doubts and errors, and from reading liberal books and periodicals. Disputation with them concerning the truths of faith is everywhere to be avoided, unless they sincerely desire to be taught; nor are books of controversies to be persuaded to them; for otherwise they continue to reason concerning faith, are strengthened in the opinion that one must arrive at faith by reasoning, and, what is worse, their vanity is nourished."²

² For their instruction and confirmation in Faith, among other works the following deserve to be commended, for cultivated persons: Van Gestel, Het geloof van den christen; Famulus, Heeft God werkelijk tot de menschen gesproken?; Dekkers, Roomsch-Katholieke Godsdienstleer (Dogmatics - Morals - Doctrine of Grace); Apologie; Laforet, Les dogmes catholiques; Aug. Nicolas, Etudes philosophiques sur le christianisme; Deschamps, Demonstration catholique; De Segur, Opuscules; Hugueny, Critique et catholique; Verelst, Apologetique (Dutch translation), Dogmatique, Morale; Hettinger, Apologetik (French translation); Wilmers, Lehrbuch der Religion (Dutch and French translation); Mausbach, Religion, Christenthum und Kirche; Die Katholische Moral und ihre Gegner.

XVI. Concerning those doubting and wavering in faith.¹¹ - At the present time there are many who seriously doubt concerning the truth of religion or foster and preach errors contrary to revealed truths, but nevertheless think themselves to be faithful Catholics and fulfill Christian offices in their own way. Concerning these three things are asked: 1) whether and concerning what they are to be questioned; 2) whether they always commit the sin of formal heresy; 3) whether in their good faith they can be admitted to the sacraments.

¹¹ Cf. Noldin, Th. M., II, n. 33; Berardi, Praxis Conf., ed. 3, n. 87 sq.; Aertnijs, Th. P., n. 166.

1. Are those confessing such things to be questioned, and concerning what? Resp. Those who accuse themselves of doubts in faith or of speech against faith: a) are to be questioned concerning what matter they doubted or spoke about; for often they erroneously think that things are truths of faith which are not such, in which case they can sin against faith only from an erroneous conscience. b) When in fact the matter is of faith, against which they spoke, they committed heresy if, knowing that the doctrine had been proposed by the Church as to be believed of faith, they seriously attacked truths of faith (indeed, supposing knowledge, they contracted excommunication); but if they were ignorant, they did not commit the sin of heresy, although nevertheless they could have sinned, and gravely, insofar as their ignorance was voluntary from preceding negligence.

But if they spoke thus either from human respect or from vanity, they sinned gravely against external faith. If finally they spoke thus in order to explain their difficulties and better understand truths of faith, they sinned in no way.

2. Whether those seriously doubting or certainly erring in faith always commit the sin of formal heresy, or on the contrary can be in good faith? Resp. From defect of sufficient instruction it can happen that they do not advert that doubts or errors of this kind are gravely sinful, as being against the infallible authority of the Church and therefore against the authority of God revealing. This is possible, for example, if a pastor has set forth the truths to be believed merely materially, without the reason for believing.

Indeed, according to some authors, it seems able to happen that certain persons persuade themselves that they have a just cause for departing from faith, so that without the sin of formal heresy they fail entirely from adherence to faith. Given that the case is possible, nevertheless it will be most rare; hence in practice, not good faith but bad faith is to be presumed in those saying farewell to faith.¹²

¹² Entirely diverse under this respect is the condition of a Catholic and of a non-Catholic. In the faithful person the light of faith effects that he firmly believes with tranquil conscience; nor has it been heard that anyone, whether in life or in death, or in the sight of eternity, was agitated by remorse because he is a Catholic. On the contrary he will feel remorse if he thinks of deserting the Catholic faith. For the non-Catholic there are reasons for changing religion; the Catholic cannot truly need a change, neither on the part of the thing, nor on the part of the conscience urging him. A non-Catholic, as long as he is merely doubting, ought to remain in his religion, since he is in a state of perplexity; if the Catholic religion already seems more probable, he is bound to inquire more, even to certainty, at which, with divine help confidently and perseveringly implored, he will arrive.

3. Whether those erring who seem to be in good faith can be admitted to the sacraments? Resp. Let the confessor judge what would more contribute to the salvation of a penitent of this kind, who in confession says that he doubts concerning faith or that he cannot believe all things; whether he should absolve him, or send him away without absolution until, having put aside doubts and errors, he embraces the faith fully. In this last case, works elucidating true doctrine are to be indicated to him, or oral instruction is to be provided.

Since absolution can be valid, with an admonition added to believe all things which God has revealed and the Church proposes, and to beware lest he lead others into doubts or errors against faith, he will also licitly be able to be absolved as often as a greater spiritual detriment is to be feared from absolution being denied.

XVII. Admonitions for confessors. - 1. The preceding things are to be understood concerning a true positive or grave doubt, but not concerning a negative doubt which is founded on no or a slight reason, and therefore is in no way to be attended to but is to be contemned as empty.

2. But those who labor under a serious or grave doubt against faith are to be treated with great charity.

3. Yet the confessor should not easily say to them that such deliberate doubting concerning faith is a grave sin, unless he is specially asked about this.

4. Nor should he say that grave doubts or temptations against faith are easily comprehensible, or almost natural, nor that he himself or others have suffered the same; but let him counsel the reading of books defending or well setting forth faith.

5. Let him also insist upon the solidity of faith which rests upon the word of God Himself.

6. Nevertheless confessors should know that the faithful more rarely accuse themselves of doubts against faith.

7. But when a penitent occurs who opens doubts or temptations against faith:

a) Before all things it must be examined whether he gave perfect consent, which can be clear from the confession itself and the responses of the penitent; but if this is not sufficiently established from them, the presumption will be taken from the penitent's usual life, so that a man of languid faith, leading a life little Christian, not avoiding occasions dangerous for faith, in doubt is rather to be judged to have consented; on the contrary, one who leads a truly Christian or devout life, or labors under scruples or neurasthenia or a similar pathological state, is to be judged not to have given perfect consent.

b) In the case in which the penitent, by deliberately doubting, has committed a grave sin against faith, he cannot be absolved unless he has put aside the doubt and has a firm purpose of avoiding all proximate occasions of sins against faith. To this let the confessor help and dispose him, by correcting errors, by instructing him concerning the particular point from which the doubt arose, by proposing solid motives of faith according to the capacity of his understanding, by indicating suitable remedies against future temptations, such as prayer and humility, by recommending the reading of a good book concerning religious truths; in this, nevertheless, discretion is needed, so that account be taken of the condition and character of the penitent, and the book not put forward weak arguments, but truly solid ones, and aptly respond to objections.

c) But when a truly pious person is troubled by various but troublesome temptations against faith: if he indulges in some measure the vanities of the age and of a life too worldly, let him be admonished to hand himself over more diligently to God alone; meanwhile let him not cast down his soul, since temptations are not a sign of weak faith, but God permits them for our progress in humility, as is also established from the life of the saints; but let him learn to repel them. For this end let the confessor suggest that one must not struggle with them, or dispute against them, or have recourse against them to motives of credibility to the contrary; but that they are merely to be fled and contemned without positive effort, simply by turning away to other honest occupations, even merely profane ones.

But if after temptation the penitent wishes to elicit an act of faith, let there be one merely general act concerning the whole revealed doctrine, for example: I firmly believe whatever God has revealed and Mother Church proposes as to be believed; nor afterward let new acts of faith be formed, lest agitation grow and thence the temptation rather be fostered, or at least lest a scrupulous estimation gradually arise that consent had been given unless contrary acts were continually repeated.¹³

¹³ Thus Leroux, in Rev. Eccl. de Liege, Jan. 1927.

751. Warning. - He who has embraced faith, if a serious doubt³ arises against it, is bound under grave obligation to inquire concerning faith and to ask light from God; but if he neglects this, he sins by a sin of ignorance in faith, which is grave if the negligence is grave. But he cannot practically admit the doubt and dismiss faith, even if, after inquiry has been made, the contrary of faith appears probable, but he is bound to inquire until he arrives at certitude proportioned to his capacity. The reason is because in matters of salvation the safer course must be taken. Similarly the law of nature demands that we always have religion toward God. Whence, once admitted from authority, we must retain it until by proper reason we can sufficiently form a conviction, such as mere probability is not.

³ He who believes and does not have serious doubt, cannot, in order to arrive at truth, inquire as one doubting; but empty doubt is to be neglected.

The same must be said of a heretic and infidel who doubt concerning their own religion.

The FIRST opinion is negative. Cited by Cano lib. 12. de locis cap. 9. Tannerus disp. 1. quaest. 8. dub. 5. num. 83. Diana follows it primo Tom. 2. p. tract. 2. miscell. resol. 53. Many say the same with these, concerning one suspending the act of judgment. Sanch. consents T. 1. lib. 2. cap. 7. Portel addit. ad dub. Reg. v. Haeresis, Puteanus 2. 2. quaest. 21. art. 2. disp. 2. Ballaeus num. 3.

BUT the common opinion proclaims as a heretic him who voluntarily and pertinaciously doubts concerning the faith, judging that thing to be doubtful, or that it can be otherwise, (which judgment Sanchez, Vasquez 1. 2. disp. 65. and Tannerus loc. cit. with Maldeno call wrongly reflexum; for an actus reflexus has another act for its object, as Coninch. notes disp. 18. dub. 7. num. 86. and Card. Lugo disp. 17. sect. 5. num. 85. but these judgments have the thing itself for their object, saying that that matter of faith is uncertain. Villalob. consents tom. 2. tract. 1. disp. 10. Sylu. 2. 2. quaest. 1. Faber de Sacr. ord. disp. 3. cap. 4. num. 112. Homob. de exam. Eccl. p. 2. tract. 12. cap. 16. Molf. 1. 1. tract. 8. cap. 8. Lara 2. 2. quaest. 11. art. 3. disp. 42. and sixteen others cited by Sanch. Therefore D. Thom. and others proclaim this voluntary judgment pertinacious [to be] heresy, whom Suarez follows disp. 19. sect. 3. Hurtad. disp. 80. sect. 4. §. 21. Coninch. dub. cit. num. 102. Lorca disp. 42. Castro Palao Tom. 1. tract. 4. disp. 3. p. 2. num. 9. and others besides these, with whom Card. Lugo subscribes disp. 20. sect. 1. num. 17. Fulienfis lib. 3. de fide, cap. 7.

I suppose from D. Bonau. in 3. dist. 17. dub. 3. that doubt is properly called the indifference of the judgment of reason, with respect to either part of the contradiction, so that it prefers neither to the other.

I SUPPOSE secondly, from the same D. Bonau. in 4. dist. 13. dub. 4. that Heresy, so called from eligere, is that in which a false opinion is deliberately elected. From which he deduces that to opine is not heresy; just as neither is to doubt. And so he seems [to side] with the former opinion.

S. Doct. also TEACHES in opusc. de profectu religios. cap. 3. that certain doubts about the faith are often assailed by the devil, which are rather to be despised; because, the more we are indignant with ourselves, and dispute with them, the more their rage is kindled. Gerson attends to this admonition tract. de foeda tentatione, alph. 62. lit. O. usque ad T. Sanchez lib. 2. decal. cap. 7. num. 13. and all the others also of the second opinion.

I ASSERT first, with D. Bonau., that one doubting concerning matters of faith is not properly a heretic.

It is PROVED first by the authors of the prior opinion, by the argument of D. Bonau. loc. cit. in 4. taken from D. August. lib. de utilitate credendi, cap. 1. and it is cited cap. Haereticus, 24. quaest. 3. and by D. Hieronymo cap. 5. ad Galat. et ad Tit. 3. and it is cited cap. Haeresis, 24. quaest. 3. and D. Thom. also uses it 1. Corinth. 11. lect. 4. et 2. 2. quaest. 11. art. 2. ad 3. Of the nature of heresy is the pertinacious election of doctrine contrary to the faith: but one doubting precisely does not elect, etc. but is suspended: Therefore.

It is CONFIRMED; for heresy is an error contrary to the faith; but error implies assent, or dissent. It is confirmed, because heresy is opposed to faith; but doubt is a mean.

I ASSERT secondly, that one doubting is an infidel privatively, because he is deprived of the certainty of assent, necessary for retaining the habit of faith.

It is PROVED; for in this sense cap. 1. de haereticis it is said, that one doubting in the faith is an infidel, not contrarily, as if he had an assent contrary to the faith, but privatively, because he lacks the necessary assent. Thus doubt of the faith can be condemned, just as those are condemned who deny that the soul is the form of the body, or doubt about it, as is found Clem. 1. §. Porro; and those who doubt of the immortality of the soul are condemned by Leo X. in Conc. Later. In the same sense the Fathers spoke, whom Franciscus Suarez adduces num. 12. Lorca num. 5. From which the text cap. 1. de haeret. remains exposed [to objection], which is of Pope Stephen, to whom others answer, that one doubting in the faith is called an infidel with respect to the external forum.

A third opinion of OTHERS says, that it is true when he reflects upon his own doubtful thought, and in fact elicits an erroneous judgment concerning matters of faith, so that he may judge them only probable. But these men confound the questions.