Article Third. On Doubt in Faith

33. To what extent it is a sin. 1. Concerning matters of faith, doubt is not impossible, because both the fact of revelation and the very object of faith lack evidence which would compel the intellect to assent and exclude the possibility of doubt.

Wherefore in a faithful man doubts concerning faith and its truths can arise, even against the will; and in this itself the merit of faith consists, that doubts of this kind, sometimes vehement, are excluded through the will and faith is preserved in its firmness.

2. A Catholic faithful person can never licitly change faith or doubt concerning faith.¹

For since he knows that faith is founded on divine authority, to which falsity is absolutely repugnant, he can never have a sufficient cause of changing his faith or of calling it into doubt. Wherefore, when doubts or difficulties against faith arise, he ought to persuade himself that no difficulty occurs which cannot be solved.

a. Therefore the universal doubt of Hermes was rightly condemned, who had taught that a Catholic faithful person must be given license voluntarily to doubt concerning the truth of religion and to remain in doubt until, after an examination has been undertaken concerning the truth of the Catholic religion, he has acquired full persuasion. Yet by these things methodical doubt is not prohibited, which consists in this, that a Catholic faithful person, not suspending but retaining the assent of faith, so acts and inquires into the foundations of faith, especially into the fact of revelation, as if it were not yet established concerning it, so that by an undertaken examination he may be confirmed in faith, which he sees to be a rational service.

b. Therefore with respect to faith the condition of a Catholic and of a heretic is unequal. A Catholic cannot doubt concerning his faith without falling away from his own persuasion: for he knows that his faith cannot be false; but a heretic can doubt concerning faith and inquire further into the truth, nor does this in any way conflict with his principles and therefore with his conscience. For the heretic does not acknowledge in his own sect the infallible foundation of truth; on the contrary, he defends the principle of free inquiry (das Prinzip der freien Forschung). For this reason not only is it permitted to him to doubt, but even we can stir him up to doubt, although we suppose that he is in good faith. The more a Catholic strives to know the Church and its origin and propagation, the more he is confirmed in faith; on the contrary, the more a heretic strives to know his own sect and its origin and propagation, the more clearly and certainly he understands that it is a teacher of error.

3. A Catholic faithful person: a. Who doubts positively, that is, by positive assent judges that truths proposed by the Church to be believed are doubtful and uncertain because of contrary reasons, is a formal heretic: for faith requires of us a certain assent; therefore he who judges the truths of faith to be uncertain sins against the authority of God and the Church equally as he who altogether denies the truths of faith. And in this sense it is rightly said: one doubtful in faith is an unbeliever.

b. He who holds himself negatively, or suspends assent concerning faith or some article of faith, is not a heretic, because he does not err in faith nor admit any pertinacity; but he sins against internal faith.

c. He who in a temptation against faith fluctuates between assent and dissent, and yet does not deliberately suspend assent, does not sin unless perhaps venially, because he resists the temptation negligently and remissly.

When doubts against faith arise, at the same time there arises a struggle between the intellect offering assent and the will commanding assent either of faith universally or of a determinate truth of faith. To avoid sin it is necessary that the will resist the doubts, wish to preserve faith, and continue to command firm assent. The intellect in relation to doubts can hold itself in two ways: either it immediately understands, either directly from the consideration of the doubts or at least indirectly from divine authority, that the doubts are empty and retains firm assent; or it retains the doubt for a time, since it does not see the emptiness of it and therefore cannot remove it. Now an indeliberate doubting of this kind does not harm the firmness of faith, provided the will resists the doubt and by its command excludes fear of erring, or provided the will of submitting itself to the authority of the Church is retained.

4. Indifferentism, which arises from doubt concerning matters of faith, is morally evil and illicit, in whatever way it is taken.

For a. if it affirms that the true religion cannot be known, it is opposed to the arguments by which the Christian religion is shown to be true; b. if it teaches that all religions are equally true or equally false, it contains besides this error, namely that truth and falsity are to be held in the same place; c. if finally it says that man is to be estimated and judged not from that which he believes, but from that which he does, it is opposed to this moral principle, namely that man is held by an absolute obligation to have faith in God speaking.

Note for practice. 1. At the present time there are many who seriously doubt concerning the truth of religion, or cherish and proclaim errors contrary to revealed truths, but nevertheless think themselves to be Catholic faithful and fulfill Christian duties in their own way. Concerning these it is now asked: a. whether they commit the sin of formal heresy or can be in good faith; b. whether in their good faith they can be admitted to the sacraments.

To a. From defect of sufficient instruction it can happen that they do not advert that doubts or errors of this kind are gravely sinful, as being against the infallible authority of the Church and therefore against the authority of God revealing; indeed, it seems possible that they persuade themselves that they have a just cause of withdrawing from faith, so that they entirely fall away from faith without the sin of formal heresy.²

To b. Let the confessor consider what contributes more to the salvation of a penitent of this kind, who in confession says that he doubts concerning faith or that he cannot believe all things: whether he should absolve him or dismiss him without absolution until, doubts and errors having been laid aside, he fully embraces faith. Since absolution can be valid, with the admonition added of believing all things which God has revealed and the Church proposes, and of taking care not to induce others to doubts or errors against faith, he will also be able to be absolved licitly whenever from denied absolution greater spiritual detriment is to be feared.³

2. Lay persons who accuse themselves of doubts in faith or of speeches against faith are to be asked: a. concerning what thing they doubted or spoke: for often they erroneously think that things are truths of faith which are not such, in which case they can sin against faith only from an erroneous conscience.

b. But if the matter is really concerning a truth of faith against which they spoke, they committed heresy if, knowing that the doctrine had been proposed by the Church, they seriously attacked the truth of faith, indeed, supposing knowledge of the penalty, they incurred excommunication. But if they spoke in this way either from human respect or from vanity, they sinned gravely against external faith. But finally, if they spoke in this way to set forth their difficulties and to understand the truths of faith better, they sinned in no way.

¹ Cf. Vatican Council, De fide, c. 3.

² Cf. Pesch, VIII, n. 383 s.

³ Cf. Berardi, Praxis confessariorum, I, n. 87 ff.