The duties of the wife

BESIDES the obligations which are treated of under Marriage, and the rights and obligations arising out of property belonging to married people, which are discussed under the Seventh Commandment, there are certain obligations arising from marriage inasmuch as it places the husband in a position of authority and the wife in one of subjection. A word must here be said concerning their mutual obligations in this respect.

The wife becomes by marriage subject to her husband, and owes him love, reverence, and obedience, as to a superior. ““ Let women be subject to their husbands as to the Lord,” says St Paul. ‘‘ Because the husband is the head of the wife: as Christ is the head of the Church. ... Therefore as the Church is subject to Christ, so also let wives be to their husbands in all things.”¹ However, a wife is not the slave or servant of her husband, but rather his companion, and so, though subject and bound to obey in all that relates to family life and conduct, yet she should be treated with love, consideration, and deference, and consulted in what concerns the family affairs.

¹ Eph. v 22-24.

The wife will commit grave sin if she shows great contempt for her husband, habitually neglects his commands, and arrogates his authority to herself without just cause.

II. Duties of spouses. 1. Spouses owe one another love, affective and effective,¹ conjugal fidelity,² and living together.³

2. The husband is bound: 1. diligently to administer family affairs; 2. rightly to govern the wife and the whole family. Yet let the husband be mindful of the condition of the wife, who is a companion, not a handmaid. Hence let him treat her honorably; if there is need, let him correct her, but it scarcely happens that it is lawful to strike her (St. Alphonsus, III, 351).

3. The wife is bound: 1. to reverence her husband;⁴ 2. to obey her husband;⁵ 3. together with the husband to govern the family; 4. to perform domestic duties. As to obedience, however, note that of herself she is not held to those things which the husband would irrationally impose, for example if he required from a woman of more honorable condition that she sweep the house, unless poverty excused it (St. Alphonsus, III, 351, 352, question 2). Besides, disobedience as such is not easily gravely evil, because she ought to obey as a companion, not as a handmaid.

Spouses sin gravely by provoking one another with hatreds, grave curses, or quarrels.

The husband sins gravely: 1. "if he hinders [his wife] concerning the precepts of God or of the Church... but if he hinders her, even without cause, concerning those good things which are only of counsel, as confession, communion, etc., he commonly sins only venially; 2. if he beats her gravely; yet sometimes he can moderately chastise by words, or even from a grave cause by moderate blows, with account taken of condition and state;... 3. if he neglects the governance of the house and the family property; 4. if he does not cohabit with his wife or is absent for a long time without just cause; 5. if, when he can, he does not procure food, unless however the wife has departed from the company of the husband by her own fault, or unless she has committed adultery" (St. Alphonsus, III, 356).

The wife sins gravely: 1. "if she provokes her husband by quarrels or otherwise by words to grave anger or blasphemy;... 2. if, despising her husband, she claims authority for herself; 3.... if she inserts herself into the administration of the house without just cause; such as if, for example, the husband, being prodigal, squanders the goods of the family" (St. Alphonsus, III, 351).

¹ Cf. Eph. 5:25, 28, 29; Titus 2:4.

² Cf. our little work De virtute castitatis, n. 34.

³ Cf. cited work, n. 103.

⁴ Eph. 5:33.

⁵ Eph. 5:22, 23.

The goods of spouses are distinguished into common and proper, according as they belong to both or to either one. It depends on the law what kind the goods of spouses are: whether common, or proper, or partly common and partly proper. In many kingdoms legal community is in force; in other words, the goods of spouses are common unless before marriage something else is agreed. Now:

I. As regards common goods, ownership of them belongs to both; the right of administration is in the husband's hands; the right of the fruits falls to both. It is said:

1. Ownership of them belongs to both; this is the same as asserting co-ownership, as it is called.

A twofold co-ownership of spouses can be distinguished: one by which spouses are not distinct subjects of right but one owner; according to many, though undeservedly as it seems, co-ownership of this kind is constituted by Dutch law. The other co-ownership is that by which the spouses are two distinct subjects of rights. And this co-ownership is again twofold, Roman and Germanic. Moreover, the chief difference between them consists in this, that the Romans divided common goods mentally, and then considered the undivided part of the thing as a separated whole, which any co-owner could alienate or burden. But the Germans did not divide common goods mentally, but continued to consider them as one whole, and therefore left to all co-owners the right of disposing of the common goods.

2. The right of administration is in the husband's hands; the right of the fruits falls to both.

Corollary I. Spouses who seize common goods for themselves alone or squander them sin against commutative justice if, with the law considered, the co-ownership is Roman or Germanic. The reason is that they violate the strict right of the other spouse. The contrary is to be said with sufficient probability if the co-ownership is of the former kind explained above, because deservedly it is doubted whether the alterity required for commutative justice is present if one person, although one is not the same as two, with another becomes one subject of rights or one owner. In a word: the matter depends on whether the two are to be regarded as a moral person or not; if the former, the required alterity is certainly had. For the rest, not only the husband, but also the wife, can subtract those things which otherwise will be squandered by the husband. This is clear if Roman or Germanic co-ownership is had, because squandering is opposed to strict justice, as we have said; and the wife can certainly forestall that injustice. If co-ownership is of the former kind explained above, the squandering to be feared is a sufficient reason for withdrawing common goods from the husband's disposition and acquiring for herself the administration of those goods (St. Alphonsus, III, 541).

Corollary II. If the husband refuses necessities or grants them with great difficulty, the wife can, even if Roman or Germanic co-ownership is had, from the common goods:

1. Give out what is necessary for suitable support of herself and the offspring, for decent adornment and suitable recreation, for alms to be given according to condition; likewise for guarding herself in the future and procuring a suitable state for the offspring, or for averting grave spiritual or temporal damage from the family. The reason is that the intimate conjunction between wife and husband, between children and parents, brings it about that common goods, if the proper good or the good of the offspring demands it, can be treated as proper goods (St. Alphonsus, III, 540, 541).

2. Spend those things by which she may consult the necessary support of her parents or of offspring received from another marriage; for what is lawful for her in order to her own advantage also seems lawful in order to the good of those who are in some way one with her; all the more because in the case the husband is also bound from piety to consult the parents and offspring of his wife (St. Alphonsus, III, 542).

II. As regards proper goods, each spouse has direct and useful ownership of them, that is, of proper goods; but to whom administration belongs is to be drawn from the law.

Corollary I. Those about to marry sin against justice, and in themselves are bound to restitution, by deceiving the other party, for example by exaggerating goods, lessening debts, and thus bringing it about that a nuptial agreement is omitted by which community of goods would be excluded wholly or in part.

Corollary II. A wife can freely dispose of those things which she has gathered by extraordinary labor or parsimony, or has saved from what was granted for food or pleasure (St. Alphonsus, III, 541).

Corollary III. If the husband refuses, or grants with great difficulty, the things which are necessary for suitable support of the wife or offspring, for decent adornment and suitable recreation, for alms to be given according to condition, for guarding the wife in the future and procuring a suitable state for the offspring, or for averting grave damage from the family, if, I say, the husband refuses these things or grants them with great difficulty, the wife, in defect of proper and common goods, can also use the husband's proper goods, because the intimate conjunction between wife and husband, between children and parents, brings it about that the proper goods of one are in some way also those of the other, so that things owed to the other spouse or to the children, if they are denied, can be seized (St. Alphonsus, III, 540-541).

In general, however, the confessor should not easily indulge the complaints of wives, lest the reins be loosened too much.

Note: If someone married sins with a married woman, or one having a vow of chastity sins with one also having a vow of chastity, he admits a double sin, by reason of marriage and vow. "For the prior malice is against the fidelity which he owes to his wife.... But the latter is insofar as he is the cause, by his cooperation, that his accomplice violates the laws of marriage." Likewise "one species of malice is contracted from the violation of one's own vow; but another from cooperation in the violation of the vow of someone to whose observance I am not held by vow, as is established." Lugo, l. c., n. 140, 141; L. l. 2, n. 46; l. 3, n. 456.

What is alms? Alms, generally, is an act of charity and mercy by which the necessity of neighbor is relieved. One kind is spiritual, another corporal, according as that necessity is spiritual or corporal. We treat here only of corporal alms. The principal question is concerning its precept, which is explained in the following paragraphs. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 32. Alms strictly taken, about which the speech is properly here, is the largess of those things which are necessary for the sustenance of life. But taken more broadly, it embraces any help whatever for freeing neighbor from bodily evil. Seven works of corporal mercy are listed: to give food to the hungry, drink to the thirsty, to clothe the naked, to lodge travelers, to visit the sick, to visit those detained in prison, to bury the dead.

Can a mother or grandmother also annul the vows of children? - A mother can annul the vows of children, the father being lacking, if she has been designated tutor or curator, and she can do what tutors and curators can do. But if she was not designated as tutor or curator, and the son lacks father and paternal grandfather, Sanchez, Suarez, etc., think that then the son is his own master. But the opposite, namely that in that case it falls to the mother, or even grandmother, to be tutor or curator, is held more probably by the Salmanticenses, Tamburini, etc., because it is reasonable that a mother or grandmother provide for a minor, and therefore she can well annul his vows as tutor or curator.

But Sanchez, Suarez, etc., deny that a mother can annul the vows of children when the father or tutor is present, and they say that the mother, and in the absence of the mother, the grandfather or grandmother on the mother's side, can annul only the vows of those below puberty when the father or tutor is lacking. But not less probably, the Salmanticenses, Roncaglia, etc., assert that the mother, even when the father is present and not contradicting, or the tutor, can annul all the vows of those below puberty, even vows of chastity and religion, and also the personal vows of pubescents which prejudice the governance of the house; but not real vows, whose administration pertains to the father or curator. The reason is that such power, although not civilly (by common law namely it belongs only to the father of the family), nevertheless naturally is also in the mother, to whom children are bound to obey, although with subordination to the father; so that the father can annul the vows of children when the mother contradicts, but not thus the mother when the father contradicts. By more recent laws, indeed, paternal power is in the father and mother, although it is exercised by the father alone. Inst. 1, l. 1, t. 9; C. I. 220; C. G. 371-373; C. H. 154; C. A. 143, 144, 147; C. B. 1627, 1634; L. 230; C. He. 273, 274; S. Th. 2. 2, q. 88, aa. 8, 9; Struggl 39, 40.

Note: It is owed to positive law, namely Canon Law and Common Law, that religious are most fully subject to their superiors, C. Monacho 2, c. 20, q. 4, and that parents can directly annul only the vows of children below puberty, but indirectly the vows of pubescent children. C. Puella 2, c. 20, q. 2. For by natural law no one is so subject to another that he depends upon him in all his actions; and that distinction between those below puberty and pubescents, as to children of a family, comes only from the aforesaid Law. This distinction between those below puberty and pubescents is passed over in more recent laws. Hence not improbably parents can directly annul all vows of children as long as they remain under paternal power. C. I. 120; C. G. 372;

C. A. 174; C. H. 154; C. B. 1626; C. L. 311; C. He. 14. L. 227, 232; S. Th. 2. 2, q. 88, a. 8; D'Annib., ed. 4, p. 3, n. 206.

What is paternal power? - Paternal power is the complex of rights of parents over children, and it arises from a twofold cause: 1. because children have had life from them; 2. because parents must educate them fittingly. C. A. 147; C. L. 137. It is from Natural and Positive Law at the same time, positive law defining and determining natural right. For the rights of parents over children flow from natural and civil law. By Natural Law, piety is owed to parents, whether legitimate or illegitimate, namely to father and mother, and it belongs to them equally and perpetually as to love and honor, but not however as to obedience after the son has become major, or has been emancipated. C. I. 220. Besides this, power belongs to parents as to those things which pertain to the spiritual salvation of children. And this also belongs equally to each, indeed also to grandfather and grandmother. But if they disagree among themselves, he prevails who consults the salvation of the child. And, when the father has died, if the mother as tutor and the paternal grandmother disagree, the latter will be stronger. Benedict XIV, Ep. Probe te, §§ 20, 21, 23; Ep. Postremo mense, §§ 16, 17; C. Ex litteris 2, de Conv. infid. - The natural power of parents in those things which pertain to the salvation of the soul ends when infancy has passed; in those things which pertain to the choice of state it ends at puberty, C. Cum virum 12, de Regul.; C. A. 148; in those things which pertain to domestic care and discipline it ends by emancipation. But in those things which regard the sustenance of the body and generation of offspring, children are their own masters. And as to entering marriage, they commonly are bound only to seek the counsel of parents. L. 335.

But emancipation is naturally had when the son of the family has already grown sufficiently by age, so that he himself can now be father of a family, and by himself duly consider and oblige himself concerning those things which pertain to his own person and to his exterior goods. C. 11, 12, de Regul.; S. Th. 4 D. 27, q. 2, a. 2; D. 38, q. 1, a. 1, q. ult., sol. 3; 2. 2, q. 104, a. 5; S., q. 43, a. 2; q. 58, a. 5; St. Basil the Great, Epist. 276, Migne, vol. 32, col. 1011.

By Common Law paternal power belongs only to the father of the family, and it was per se perpetual. Inst. 1, l. 1, t. 9, §§ 2, 3; t. 12; lib. 1, tit. 6, ff., §§ 3-5, de Patr. pot.; l. 8, t. 46, C.; C. 2, de Convers. infid. But from the More Recent Laws it belongs also to the mother of the family. C. I. 220; C. G. 372; C. B. 1634, 1684, 1685; C. L. 138; C. He. 274. But the mother does not use it as long as the father uses it, to whom it principally belongs. C. I. 46, 220, 230, 331; C. G. 141, 373, 507; C. A. 144, 147; C. H. 154; C. B. 1634; C. L. 139, 155. Moreover it belongs over legitimate and natural children, over natural children acknowledged, over natural children acknowledged and legitimated, and at least in some way also over adoptive children. C. I. 66, 184, 194, 210, 211, 220; C. H. 154; C. A. 183; C. B. 1306, 1757, 1765; C. L. 166. Cf. here n. 663.

Paternal power is exercised by the father, and when he has died or is absent, by the mother with equal right. C. I. 46, 220, 231; C. H. 154; C. G. 141, 390; C. A. 144, 147; C. B. 1627, 1684; C. He. 274. Yet a father dying has the right to prescribe to the surviving mother the manner he wishes to be observed in the education of the children and the administration of goods. C. I. 235, 1059. Cf. C. G. 391; C. B. 1852 seqq. If the mother enters second nuptials, it will be in the power of the family Council or pupilary Judge to permit or remove guardianship from her. C. I. 237; C. G. 395; C. A. 255. When parents are lacking, and a tutor has not been named, guardianship by law belongs to the paternal grandfather; and, he being lacking, to the maternal grandfather. C. I. 244; C. B. 1776.

Moreover paternal power is exercised partly over the persons, partly over the things of children. C. B. 1627.

Paternal Power is exercised, 1. over persons by the faculty which the father has of retaining the son at home, C. He. 273, unless the son wishes voluntarily to give his name to military service. C. I. 221; C. G. 374; by the faculty which the father has of moderately correcting and punishing a disorderly son, C. He. 275; also of barring him from his own house, and even having recourse, where there is need, to the tribunal, and of placing him in another house of education or correction. C. I. 222; C. H. 155, 156; C. G. 375 seqq.; C. A. 145; C. B. 1631, 1632; C. L. 143; L. 3, de Patr. pot., C. Moreover the son is prohibited without the consent of parents from giving himself into adoption, C. I. 208; C. G. 346; C. A. 181; C. B. 1747, and from entering marriage. C. I. 63; C. G. 148; C. A. 49, 153; C. H. 1305; C. L. 1058, 1061; C. He. 98. But when the mother dissents, the consent of the father suffices. C. I.; C. G., ll. cc.; C. He. 274. Finally the right of appointing a tutor belongs to the last surviving parent. C. I. 242; C. G. 397; C. B. 1777; C. He. 274.

Excepting marriage, which before puberty is null from canon law, as to other acts and contracts sons of a family who are minors are only naturally obligated; and if in due time they do not seek restitution in full, they can also be civilly obligated, and those who contract with them are naturally and civilly obligated. Therefore, if they have entered betrothals, if they have emitted a vow, they are bound by the betrothals and by the vow. If they have donated anything, they transfer dominion to the recipient; and if they themselves receive something as a gift, they licitly acquire and retain dominion. C. I., de Desp. impub.; C. I. 1304; C. G. 1314; C. H. 160, 161; C. A. 244, 246; C. B. 106; C. L. 98, 99; Inst. 1, l. 3, t. 19, § 6; S. Th. 2. 2, q. 88, a. 8; 4 D. 27, q. 2, a. 2; L. l. 3, n. 918; Lugo, de Iust., d. 22, nn. 228, 295, 300.

But although a minor validly contracts, from the More Recent Laws he does not contract firmly if various prescriptions of those laws are not observed, and then restitution in full is conceded to them, which also holds in the forum of conscience, since a law of this sort is definitive of right and just; since it is for protecting good morals, for the peace and good of families, and for the common good. C. G. 2012; C. I. 317, 319, 1899.

From C. I. a minor is restored because he is a minor, and an action of nullity is admitted: 1. If a non-emancipated minor performed an act by himself without the intervention of the father or his legitimate representative. 2. If an emancipated minor performed by himself an act for which the law requires the assistance of a curator. 3. When the formalities constituted for certain acts by special dispositions of law are not observed. But an action of nullity is not admitted: 1. If the minor by evil art and deceit concealed his condition as a minor. 2. If the matter concerns an obligation arising from delict or quasi-delict. 3. If it is proved that what was paid was turned to the convenience and utility of the minor. C. I. 1300, 1303, 1305, 1306, 1307, 1899.

From C. G. a minor is restored because he was harmed, and an action of nullity is admitted if the prescriptions of the law in contracts of minors were not observed. Rescission is not admitted: 1. If the harm happened from a chance event. 2. If a minor exercises commerce or some art, as to contracts entered by reason of his commerce or art. 3. If the matter concerns an obligation flowing from delict or quasi-delict. 4. If it is proved that what was paid went to their convenience and utility. C. G. 1304, 1305, 1306, 1308, 1310, 1312, 2012; L. l. 3, nn. 514, 918. Cf. Troplong, della Vendita, cap. 2, art. 1594, num. 166 seqq.

From C. H., the formalities of law not having been observed, the contract of a minor becomes liable to rescission. But he is not bound to restitution except insofar as he became richer by the thing received. C. H. 317, 420, 1163, 1304, 1764, 1765. From C. A., in general a minor indeed cannot be validly obligated without the consent of the father and the other prescriptions of the law. Yet he can freely dispose of things acquired by his own industry, and of others given to him for his own use after puberty has been attained. C. A. 151, 152, 244, 246, 248. From C. B., a minor needs the consent of his representative for any declaration of will whatever, unless this procures a juridical advantage for him, or unless the matter concerns things left to his free disposition. Without the aforesaid consent of the representative, the act can be rescinded. C. B. 108 seqq. From C. L. 297 seqq., the acts of a minor are null if they are made without due authority. But they themselves cannot use this nullity as to obligations upon things of their own art or profession, or if they use deceit so that they may be held as majors.

The power of the father is exercised, 2. over the things of children. From common Law the son was at first a thing of the father of the family; whatever he acquired belonged to the father. Afterwards peculium was recognized. Peculium is any good whatever proper to the son, separated from paternal goods. It is fourfold: 1. Castrense, acquired by military service or on the occasion of military service; and this whole thing, in perfect dominion, belongs to the son. Yet one below puberty does not have its administration.

2. Quasi-castrense, acquired by the profession of sciences or liberal arts, or by some civil office, for example, of judge, advocate, physician, teacher, from an ecclesiastical office or benefice; and the perfect dominion of this also belongs to the son. Yet administration belongs to the father if he himself is below puberty.

3. Adventitious, which comes to the son from elsewhere than from paternal goods, and not by regard for the father, for example, what comes to the same son from the mother, from the maternal line, or by regard for the mother, or what is acquired by his own industry and labor, by the liberality of others, by chance and fortune. The dominion of ownership belongs to the son; the usufruct and administration of this peculium belongs to the father as long as he lives. Therefore by Roman Law the father has the usufruct of all these goods of the son; and this usufruct ends only by the death of the father, otherwise than is had by More Recent Law.

4. Profectitious, which either is acquired from paternal goods, or has been donated to the son by regard for the father. And this whole thing belongs to the father, in ownership, usufruct, and administration. Inst. 1, l. 2, t. 9, §§ 1, 2; l. 3, t. 29; Lugo, d. 5, n. 23 seqq. The father can dispose of adventitious goods if they are consumable, with the burden however of restitution. If the son trades outside the father's house from goods other than paternal goods, the gain is adventitious. If he labors in the paternal house and is fed by the father, or trades from the father's goods, it is profectitious. "If a son trades with the money of the father, either received as a loan or secretly stolen, at his own risk, so that he seriously determines to preserve the father unharmed in any event whatever, it is certain from the common opinion of all cited by Laymann, l. 3, tr. 4, c. 8, n. 12, that the whole gain pertains to the ownership of the son as adventitious peculium. Why is this? Because although he obtains the whole gain by the money of the father, he obtains it in such a way that the whole gain is derived not from the money of the father, sterile of its own nature, but from the industry of the son, which renders the money fruitful." Ithur., Cas. 3, n. 6; L. 488.

The father of the family and the son of the family are held as one person. Since therefore no one can contract with himself, if they contract, the pact is civilly void. Civilly, for naturally they are mutually obligated and obligate. Inst. 1, l. 3, t. 19, § 6. A son of the family, not even with the father consenting, can make a testament concerning adventitious or profectitious peculium; but he can, even against the father's will, concerning castrense or quasi-castrense peculium. Inst. 1, l. 2, t. 12.

From More Recent Laws, minors are held by law incapable of protecting themselves and their own goods. Hence as to each, he with whom paternal power is represents them. C. B. 1630; C. L. 98, 100; C. He. 279.

The administration of all goods of minor children is in the hands of the father or mother, or tutor, who must supply the incapacity or lack of skill of the children until they become majors or obtain emancipation. Exceptions must be made, from C. B. 1638; C. L. 147; C. He. 294; C. I. 224, of goods given to the son with exclusion from this administration of the father. Cf. C. L. 146, 147. Majors are altogether free in managing their own affairs, unless in some case the law specially forbids this to them, and therefore they have full administration of their own goods; but emancipated persons have it only limited. C. I. 323, 310 seqq.; C. G. 488, 476 seqq.; C. A. 149, 187, 251. Cf. C. L. 305 seqq., 311.

Hence he who exercises paternal power manages the affairs of the son. C. I. 224, 242; C. G. 389; C. A. 149, 152. He, not the son, acts in judgment, enters upon inheritances coming to the son after an inventory has been made, accepts donations, C. I. 226, 1059; C. A. 205, 222 seqq., 243, and administers his goods, C. I. 224; C. G. 389; C. H. 159; C. A. 149. But goods, whether immovable or movable, excepting those which cannot be preserved by being preserved or become worse, he cannot alienate, bind by mortgage or pledge, nor likewise receive a loan in the name of the son, nor exercise other acts which exceed acts of simple administration, except from a cause of necessity or evident utility and by decree of the civil tribunal. C. I. 224, 225; C. H. 164; C. G. 389; C. B. 1640 seqq.; C. L. 150; C. He. 290, 299, 300.

The father, or mother exercising paternal power, has the usufruct of those things which come to the son by succession, donation, or another lucrative title. C. I. 228, 229, 231; C. G. 384, 386; C. H. 160; C. B. 1640, 1685; C. He. 294, unless the goods were left to the son by testament, or given by donation, on this condition, that the usufruct not pertain to the parents, C. I. 229; C. G. 387; C. B. 1651; or were left to the son by testament, or given by donation for undertaking some course of life, art, or profession, C. I. 229; or for his education and instruction, C. H. 162; or unless, against the will of the parents, the son accepted the donation or legacy, or entered upon the inheritance, C. I. 229. Likewise excluded from that usufruct are those things which the son acquired for himself by labor, profession, or separate industry, C. I. 229; C. G. 387; C. B. 1650, 1651, and the goods of the succession of a son as to which parents have been declared unworthy. C. I. 728; C. G. 730.

To this usufruct there inheres the obligation of feeding, sustaining, educating, and instructing the children. C. I. 230; C. G. 385; C. B. 1602, 1603, 1606, 1656; C. L. 148; C. He. 293. Neither father nor mother has the usufruct of the goods of natural children. They can only administer their goods, but with the burden of rendering an account also concerning the fruits. Gousset on a. 384, C. G.; C. I. 184. Cf. C. L. 166, 167.

From C. A. 149, 150, 151, 154, all goods, administration excepted, simply pertain to the son; yet the father can deduct the expenses of education from the revenues. From C. H. 161, goods acquired by children from the goods of the same parents simply pertain to the parents. From the same C. H. 160, the usufruct even of those goods which the son acquired by his own labor and industry pertains to the parent exercising paternal power. From C. L. 145, 146, 147, the usufruct of goods which a son of the family acquires by his labor, his industry, his means, or by any other gratuitous title whatever, pertains to the parents, unless they were given with exclusion of this usufruct, or the children acquire by arms, letters, liberal arts, or acquire by their own labor and industry, but live from themselves with the father's permission.

Usufruct of this sort ends by the emancipation of the son, or by death, or when minority or legitimate age has been completed; by the widowed father or mother passing to other nuptials; if the father abuses paternal power, either by not caring for the obligations imposed or by administering goods badly, with a sentence of the tribunal added; and likewise it ceases with respect to the spouse by whose fault divorce has legally been pronounced. C. I. 156, 228, 232, 233; C. G. 384, 386; C. H. 167, 172; C. B. 1666, 1673, 1679, 1680; C. He. 297 seqq. From C. B. 1661, 1662, usufruct also has an end by the marriage of the son, and by renunciation of the father. From C. G. 384, 386, usufruct is conceded to the father, and after he has died to the mother remaining unmarried, up to the eighteenth year of the children, or their emancipation. Cf. C. L. 149; C. He. 274, 292.

But when the son has become a major, those things which have been done by the parents, if they were done according to law, remain ratified; but otherwise they can be made void by him. And if meanwhile a conflict arises as to goods between father and son under paternal power, the latter will be able to have recourse to the tribunal. C. I. 224, 227, 1304; C. G. 1314; C. H. 165; C. A. 271; C. B. 1667, 1668; C. L. 153; L. 488, 543, 544; Gousset 682; C. He. 283, 284, 297 seqq.

Paternal power is dissolved by the death of the father or son, C. H. 167; C. L. 170; C. He. 274; by adoption of the son, C. H. 167; C. B. 1757, 1765; C. A. 183; by emancipation of the son, C. I. 220, 311; C. G. 372, 476-479; C. L. 170; C. H. 167; C. A. 172, 252. But a son is emancipated by the law itself through marriage, C. I. 310; C. G. 476; C. L. 304; C. He. 14, otherwise from C. A. 175. Emancipation is a legitimate act by which a father dismisses his minor son from his power, so that he is made his own master. Emancipation cannot be made before the completed eighteenth year, C. I. 311; C. He. 15. It is dissolved besides by majority of age, C. I. 220;

C. G. 372; C. A. 172; C. L. 170. Cf. here 664. From C. B. 386, which does not admit emancipation, declaration of majority can be had in the eighteenth year of age. It is likewise dissolved if the father abuses paternal power, with a sentence for the crime added. C. I. Poen. 392; C. H. 171; C. B. 1666, 1680; C. A. 177, 178. Paternal power ought to consist in piety, not in atrocity. If the mother survives, she does not simply lose it, although she passes to other nuptials. Yet in this case, from C. I. 237, she can be removed from the administration of the son's goods. From C. B. 1697, a mother passing to other nuptials loses paternal power in part. Cf. C. L. 155 seqq.; C. He. 286. When parents are interdicted, insane, or mad, their paternal power remains suspended. C. I. 220, 229 seqq.; C. A. 179; C. B. 1676 seqq.

When paternal power has been dissolved, the son of the family becomes his own master. But whether he is his own master or is still subject to paternal power, the father of the family can usefully contract with him, and from the eighteenth year of age he can make a testament. C. I. 763, 1107; C. A. 271, 596; at the sixteenth year, but in a limited way, from C. G. 903, 904. Inst. 1, l. 1, t. 12.

How many kinds of rights and obligations are there between spouses? - Marriage is the union of man and woman, containing an undivided sharing of life. Inst. 1, l. 1, t. 9, § 1; C. B. 1353; C. A. 44. Hence from marriage there flows a threefold kind of rights and obligations: as to persons, as to goods, as to the body. The rights and obligations of each spouse as to the body will have to be discussed in the treatise on Marriage. Therefore here we shall speak only of the others. C. A. 89.

Obligations as to persons: some are mutual, others of only one or the other. The mutual ones are mutual love, mutual help as to the body, as to the soul, as to the conjugal debt, and common habitation, common table and bed. To the husband belongs marital power over the wife, and the principal paternal power over the children. But he is bound to feed the wife according to her proper condition. To the wife as mother belongs the education of the offspring, although dependently upon the husband, and to have care of the family estate, likewise dependently upon the husband. C. He. 163; C. H. 62.

What are the rights and obligations of spouses concerning goods? - If Natural Law is considered, marital society does not prevent both husband and wife from retaining ownership, usufruct, and administration even of goods which they had before marriage, and which they acquire during marriage. Yet they must concur for expenses necessarily to be sustained on account of common burdens. Moreover, it is fitting that the husband either have the whole administration of goods, or certainly assist the wife as much as is necessary for supplying her weakness.

But if positive Law is considered, the husband's power in this matter is broader. Hence by positive Law various goods of the wife are distinguished. S. Th. 2. 2, q. 57, a. 4.

Some goods of the wife are dotal, whose fruits the husband enjoys for sustaining the burdens of marriage; others are paraphernal, namely beyond the dowry, which the wife has beyond the dowry, and which she specially reserves to herself; others are common, which by pacts of the spouses or by determination of law are brought into a certain society. Before entering marriage, spouses can determine under what conditions their goods are to be subjected, with certain statutes of the law observed. If they have omitted to do this, the law will supply.

From Roman Law: The wife has direct dominion of her dowry, but the husband has usufruct and administration. When the husband has died, she is preferred to all personal creditors of the husband, and even during life she can juridically seek the dowry again if she fears lest the husband become unable to restore it. If the dowry consists in money, or in other things consumable by use, or in appraised things handed over, full dominion of the dowry is indeed attributed to the husband, but with the obligation of restoring the value, dominion being transferred for the wife into all goods of the husband according to the rate or quota of her dowry. The wife has full dominion and administration of paraphernal goods, so that concerning these the husband, with her unwilling, can dispose of nothing. Hence as to these she in no way depends upon the husband.

The ownership and utility of common goods pertain to each spouse; but administration of the same pertains to the husband alone. But this community of goods can admit various conditions or restrictions, and therefore attention must be given to the various dispositions of places. Gury 549; Elbel 69; L. 489; Troplong, della Prescrizione, c. 3, n. 483 seqq.

From More Recent Law: In the first place we can distinguish goods of the wife, goods of the husband, and common goods. As to goods of the wife, these likewise are either dotal or extradotal, or paraphernal. Dowry is goods brought to the husband for sustaining the burdens of marriage. But any goods whatever of the wife not constituted as dowry are held as paraphernal. C. I. 1388, 1425; C. G. 1540, 1575; C. A. 1218.

That there be dowry it is necessary: 1. that it was expressly constituted by this name, C. I. 1388; C. H. 1336. Therefore those things which are donated to the woman by contract of marriage are not dotal, unless something else has expressly been provided. But it is otherwise from C. G. 1541. Moreover, dowry can comprehend all goods, even future goods. C. I. 1389; C. G. 1542; C. A. 1218, 1227; C. H. 1336, 1337. 2. That an instrument be drawn up by a notary, and, if the dowry is constituted by the spouses themselves, before marriage. C. I. 1382, 1391; C. G. 1394. For after marriage dowry can neither be constituted nor increased by them. C. I. 1341; C. H. 1338; and from C. G. 1543, not by others either. Cf. C. A. 1225; C. H. 1344. 3. That nuptials have been entered from Civil Law. L. 3, de Iure dot.; C. I. 93; C. G. 165; C. A. 44; C. H. 42.

He who constitutes a dowry must furnish it from his own goods, even if the woman does not lack her own goods. C. I. 1392, 1393, 1394, 1395; C. G. 1544, 1545, 1546; C. A. 1224. Cf. C. H. 1340, 1341; and he furnishes security against eviction. C. I. 1396; C. G. 1547. But the husband is not bound to surety for the dowry unless he is obligated to it by agreement made, or is driven to it by sentence of the judge, if the dowry is exposed to danger, and the dowry was constituted by him who, if it were lacking, would be compelled to furnish support to the dowered woman. C. I. 1400; C. G. 1550, 1563; C. A. 1245. Cf. C. H. 1345, 1349, 1358.

Of those things which are given by reason of dowry, some pass into the full dominion of the husband, others do not, and constitute a permanent dowry. Things which are consumed by use pass into the full dominion of the husband, C. A. 1227; things, whether movable or immovable, which are given to him in payment, C. I. 1403; C. G. 1553; movable things, if they were given appraised, C. I. 1401; C. G. 1551; not likewise immovable things, unless this was openly expressed. C. I. 1402; C. G. 1551; C. A. 1228. From C. H. 1346, if nothing is determined in the marriage contract, the wife preserves dominion of all her dotal goods. Cf. C. B. 1227, 1228.

Of those goods which constitute a permanent dowry, natural and direct dominion remains with the wife; civil and useful dominion passes to the husband. C. A. 1227, 1228, 1230. Therefore, by force of the natural and direct dominion of the wife, the increase or damage of the dowry will belong to the wife. By force of the civil and useful dominion of the husband, the husband has administration and usufruct of dotal goods; whence he administers dotal goods as his own, acts in judgment for them, C. I. 1339; C. G. 1549; C. H. 1357, 1360, and all things which are contained under the name of fruits are his from the marriage entered, C. I. 1399; C. G. 1549; C. A. 1227; and if counted money was promised, interest by the law itself is owed to him, although delay for payment had been stipulated. C. I. 1397; C. G. 1548. But the husband must furnish that diligence in administering dotal things which he furnishes in his own things, and he must fulfill all obligations of a usufructuary, C. I. 1408; C. G. 1562. But he is bound to use the fruits for feeding the family, for this is why the fruits are assigned to him, namely for bearing matrimonial burdens.

A woman can obtain separation of dotal goods by the office of the judge if the dowry is in danger, or the affairs of the husband are turning to evil, or she has been judicially separated from him. C. I. 1418; C. G. 1563. When this has been obtained, she herself, in place of the husband, administers the dotal goods, C. I. 1424; C. G. 1449; C. H. 225, 1365; but together with the husband she must provide for domestic necessities and for the instruction of the children. C. I. 1423; C. G. 1448. Cf. C. A. 1241, 1263. It can be established in the marriage contract: 1. that the wife receive each year a part of the fruits for small expenses, C. I. 1399; C. G. 1549; 2. that the surviving spouse receive some gain beyond the dowry, with the legitimate portion of the children preserved. C. I. 1398; L. l. 3, n. 539.

Dotal goods regularly, while marriage remains, cannot be alienated, and an alienation made can be revoked even by the husband himself who consented to the alienation. C. I. 1407; C. G. 1560. Dotal goods, namely all from C. I. 1405, but only immovables from C. G. 1554. Regularly; for they can be alienated from a grave cause of necessity or utility, by decree of the tribunal and consent of each spouse, C. I. 1405; C. G. 1558; C. H. 1358 seqq.; or if alienation was permitted in the marriage contract itself. C. I. 1404; C. G. 1557. They cannot be alienated for any cause whatever from C. I. 1405, which distinguishes nothing, except the cause of placing some child from C. G. 1556. Alienation, moreover, also comprehends exchanges, servitudes, and mortgages. C. I. 1404, 1405; cf. C. G. 1554, 1559. While marriage remains; therefore also after separation from C. I. 1405; cf. C. G. 1449. But if, while marriage remains, a woman has legitimately contracted debt, or any obligation whatever, after the marriage has been dissolved even dotal goods are bound to creditors from C. I. 1407; but otherwise from C. G. 1558, 1560. Cf. C. A. 1260.

When the marriage has been dissolved, the dowry ceases and must be restored. The dowry must be restored to the wife, or to her heirs. C. A. 1229; C. H. 1365. Things whose civil and useful dominion only was in the hands of the husband must be restored immediately in their own species, as they then are. C. I. 1409, 1411, 1412; C. G. 1564, 1566, 1567; C. H. 1367; and if by the fault of the husband they have become worse, the loss is charged to him. C. I. 1408; C. G. 1562; C. H. 1360, 1375. But of things of which the husband had full dominion, only the price must be restored within a year. C. I. 1401, 1410; C. G. 1551, 1565; C. H. 1347, 1366, 1370. From these the woman can retain for herself linens and those things necessary for her ordinary use, with their actual price deducted, if, after an appraisal of the same had been made, they were first given. C. I. 1411; C. G. 1566. Cf. C. H. 1384.

Besides this, the fruits of the last year of marriage are to be restored, according to the proportion of time. The year is computed from the anniversary day of the marriage celebrated. But the widow can according to her judgment either demand these fruits, or support for the whole year of mourning. Besides, during this year housing and mourning clothes are owed to her. C. I. 1415, 1416; C. G. 1570, 1571; only mourning clothes, C. H. 1879. Cf. C. A. 1242, 1243. Finally, when the marriage has been dissolved, gains also or dotal increases are owed to the surviving spouse from the goods of the deceased, if a pact concerning them was present in the marriage contract. C. I. 1398.

Paraphernal or extradotal goods are those which the wife reserves to herself outside the dowry. C. H. 1381. These are the wife's by full right, and therefore she administers them and enjoys their usufruct. C. I. 1427; C. G. 1576; C. H. 1382. Yet she cannot alienate immovables, nor stand in judgment for them without the express consent of the husband, or, with the husband resisting, without sentence of the tribunal. C. I. 134, 136; C. G. 215, 217, 1576, 1538; C. H. 1387; cf. C. A. 91. The same must be said from C. G. 1536, if the wife is altogether separated in goods. But if the husband administers them from the express or tacit mandate of the wife and receives the fruits, he must restore only the fruits which then exist when the woman asks, or dies; but he must restore all the fruits which he received if the condition was added to the mandate that he render accounts of the fruits, or if the woman opposed herself at least by an extrajudicial act. C. I. 1427 seqq.; C. G. 1576 seqq. But from C. H. 1384, 1389 seqq., if paraphernal goods are handed over by the wife to the husband to be administered, they are then equated with dotal goods, whose dominion remains in the hands of the wife. From C. A. 1238, 1239, unless the wife opposes herself, by presumption of law the administration of the wife's free patrimony is judged to have been entrusted to the husband as legitimate procurator. But he is responsible only for the substance of the thing, or for the capital; he is not bound to give an account of the fruits received, unless this was expressly agreed.

To paraphernal goods belong, and they are the wife's, those goods which, during marriage, she acquires from her own goods, or from singular industry, or from her own extraordinary labor, especially if she exercises commerce in her own name, or also by subtracting something from what has been conceded to her for food, clothing, recreation, etc.; and also those things which were given to her with the express condition that they not fall to the husband. C. A. 1237; L. l. 3, n. 541.

As to the goods of the husband. The wife has no dominion over the goods of the husband. But since the wife is the companion of the husband, and the husband must feed the wife according to her condition, the wife can by her own right take for herself those things which are necessary to her for this reason. Lugo, de Iust. et Iur., d. 16, n. 72; Lessius, de Iust. et Iur., l. 2, c. 12, n. 85. And if by received custom of the region it is accepted that the wife spend something from the goods of the husband, she can also do this. Lugo, l. c. Therefore the wife can take not only those things which are necessary for the body, but also those things which pertain to relieving the mind and to the decency of her state. Lugo, l. c., nn. 68, 70. Nor indeed can she do this for herself only, but also for the children received from that marriage, for the utility of the family, or for removing some harm to it, and this even against the will of the husband. Therefore she can withdraw things from a prodigal husband in order to reserve them for the family in the future, or from an avaricious husband for making moderate alms. Lugo, l. c., n. 65; Lessius, l. c., n. 85. From the very nature of conjugal society the wife has administration of domestic things, the pantry, furniture, etc. C. He. 163; Lugo, l. c., n. 65; Lessius, l. c., n. 85. From C. I. 1432, if the wife administered the goods of the husband, she is subject to the same law to which he himself is subject in the administration of the wife's paraphernal goods.

But when the husband is absent or insane, the wife administers his goods, and she can spend them, according to the strength of the patrimony, for the sustenance and preservation of the dignity of the family, although perhaps the husband, if he were present or in control of himself, would not have spent them. From C. H. 1442, 1444, the wife administering all the goods of the marriage has the same faculties and obligations as when the husband administers them. Yet she cannot alienate or burden immovables. Lugo, l. c., nn. 16, 70; Lessius, nn. 12, 86; L. 541.

As to common goods. From C. I. 1433, 1435, 1436, 1438, 1439, 1441, in the marriage contract itself, although a dowry has been constituted, the spouses can enter together into a universal society, not indeed of goods, but of fruits coming from the goods themselves, whether movable or immovable, whether present or future. Yet this society cannot comprehend debts and credits existing before marriage, nor those which are later deferred by title of succession or donation while the communion itself lasts. The effect of this communion is to render common and divisible those things which are acquired by the spouses together or separately during the communion, whether by common industry, or by thrift made upon the fruits or incomes of the spouses, the debts of the communion itself always being deducted. Goods placed in common are administered by the husband, who cannot alienate them or subject them to mortgage except by onerous title, and if he leases them, he must observe the laws established for leasing which is done by a usufructuary. But the society ceases by the death of either spouse, by the declared absence of one, by definitive separation of persons, and by judicial separation of goods.

From C. H., when a contract concerning goods is lacking, by which they can also establish separation of goods between themselves, the marriage is judged to have been entered under the regime of legal society of gains, 1315, 1432. But if this society is excluded, without the rules by which the goods are governed being expressed, then the dotal regime is observed, and nevertheless the husband receives all the fruits of the society of gains just as if it existed, 1364.

Now by society of gains husband and wife make their own, by half, when the marriage has been dissolved, the gains and benefits indistinctly obtained by either spouse during marriage, 1392. By the law itself the proper goods of each spouse and the common gains are determined, 1396 seqq., 1401 seqq., and also the burdens and obligations of this society, 1408 seqq. The husband administers the society according to the established laws, 1412 seqq.; he can make moderate donations for the sake of piety and beneficence, but cannot reserve usufruct for himself, 1415.

The society is dissolved by dissolution of marriage, by the absence of either spouse, by separation of persons or goods, 1417, 1433. When the society has been dissolved, after an inventory has been made, and dotal and paraphernal goods have been restored, and the other burdens of the society have been satisfied, what remains is divided equally between husband and wife, or their respective heirs, 1418 seqq. Cf. ibid. 1435, 1436.

From C. G. 1393, even if spouses do not establish that certain goods will be common, nevertheless if any other pact is lacking, legal Community has place by force of law. For the pacts which can be entered by spouses before marriage constitute three classes, or a threefold regime, namely the dotal regime, concerning which we have already spoken, the regime of community, and the regime excluding community. Moreover, Community is either legal or conventional, according as it is constituted by law or by a special pact of the contracting parties. 1391, 1400 seqq., 1497 seqq., 1540 seqq. Legal Community coalesces: 1. from all movable goods which the spouses possessed on the very day of the marriage entered, or which afterwards come to them by title of succession or donation; 2. from all fruits and any revenues whatever of immovable goods possessed by the spouses before marriage, or coming to them during marriage; 3. from all immovable goods which were acquired from common goods during the time of marriage. Conventional Community consists in other pacts of the spouses, by which legal statutes can be restricted or relaxed. When these are lacking, the community is governed by the disposition of the law alone.

Under the regime of community the husband alone has administration of common goods. Indeed he can sell them, exchange them, and hand them over into mortgage, even without the consent of the wife. Yet he cannot donate immovables by gratuitous title, nor movables by universal title, or as to their universality or quota, that is, a half, third, or fourth part. He can dispose of some movable thing by gratuitous title, provided he does not reserve usufruct for himself. But when the community has been dissolved, goods and burdens are divided into two parts, unless the wife or her heirs prefer to renounce the goods, and thus to exempt themselves from the burdens. Debts are to be paid by each spouse, or by their heirs. The husband also has administration of the proper or personal goods of the wife. 1400, 1401, 1409, 1422, 1428, 1441, 1453, 1467 seqq., 1497 seqq.

A regime excluding community can be constituted by the spouses in two ways, namely: 1. by declaring that they enter marriage without community; 2. by establishing that each will be altogether separate as to goods. In the former case the man receives all revenues of the wife's goods and alone administers all things. But if they are consumed by use, he is bound to return their value. But in the latter case the woman has administration and usufruct of all her own goods. Each spouse concurs for the burdens of marriage by special pact; but if no agreement exists, the wife must concur up to a third part of her revenues. Therefore in this third regime, as also in the second, some dowry must be contributed by the wife, by which she may in part aid the burdens of marriage; but a dowry of this sort can be alienated by the husband. 1530 seqq., 1536 seqq. Cf. here 868, 1237.

From C. A. 1233, 1234. For communion of goods between spouses a special contract is required. But it is understood only for the case of death, and gives to the spouse a right to the half part of the goods constituted in communion which remain after the death of the other spouse. Cf. art. 1262, 1266.

From C. B. the regime of goods is twofold, legal and conventional. Legal matrimonial regime of goods. By the marriage contract the goods of the wife, even those which she herself acquires during marriage, are administered by the husband, who has their usufruct, but must sustain the expenses of marriage. The goods reserved to the wife are excepted, whether by law, namely clothes, precious gems, and instruments of labor, and goods acquired by labor or the personal exercise of a gainful profession; or by contract, namely those which were declared such by the marriage contract; by succession, legacy, or donation made with that reservation. The wife has administration and usufruct of these reserved goods. When administration and usufruct of the husband have ceased, the husband is bound to restore the goods to the wife and also to render an account of administration. But the wife can demand this cessation if her goods are placed in danger. C. B. 1363 seqq.

Conventional regime of matrimonial goods. Spouses can establish an agreement concerning goods both before marriage and after marriage has been contracted, and they can dissolve or modify the regime of goods. If by the marriage contract the administration and usufruct of the husband is excluded, or if the community of goods is dissolved, then separation of goods is had. But community can be either universal of goods, or particular, or particular of acquisitions, or particular of movables and acquisitions. The husband administers the community and sustains the burdens of marriage from the goods of the community. When the community has been dissolved, the debts having first been paid, those things which remain are divided into two equal parts between the two spouses, or the descendants of either and the widowed spouse. C. B. 1432 seqq.

Besides these things, which are constituted by various laws, all those pacts must be observed both by the husband and by the wife which in the marriage contract either were tacitly entered, according to the proper laws of the region, or expressly constituted by private will, provided however that these agreed pacts do not oppose good morals or the laws. C. I. 1378; C. A. 1217; C. G. 1387; C. H. 1315.

From C. L. It is licit for spouses before marriage to make a contract concerning goods, within the limits of the law, 1096. Agreements of this sort will not be valid unless they have been made by public writing, 1097. If no agreement is made, the marriage is judged to have been contracted according to the custom of the kingdom, 1098. A woman can reserve to herself the right of receiving part of the fruits of her goods, provided it does not exceed a third part, 1104. An agreement can be made of marriage according to the custom of the kingdom, of community of acquisitions, of separation of goods, of the dotal regime, 1099 seqq. Agreement according to the custom of the kingdom imports community of all present and future goods not excepted by law, 1108 seqq. Dominion and possession of these goods is with each spouse; administration is in the hands of the husband, 1117 seqq. When the Community has ended, its goods are divided between the spouses and their heirs, due equality being observed. But satisfaction must be made first to the woman, then to the man, 1123, 1124. Agreement of community of acquisitions does not comprehend goods which are had at the time of marriage, or which afterwards are had by succession or another gratuitous title, 1130 seqq. Agreement of separation of goods does not exclude from community goods acquired without express declaration, 1125. Each spouse preserves dominion of his or her own goods, and their free disposition, with however that restriction for the woman which is made by law, 1127, 1128. Under the dotal regime the husband can alienate movable goods, but is bound concerning their value, 1148. Immovable goods are inalienable except for cases permitted by law, 1149 seqq., nor can they be prescribed during marriage, 1152. When the marriage has been dissolved, dotal goods must be restored to the woman and her heirs, 1156 seqq.

C. He. has the regime of union of goods, communion of goods, and separation of goods. Unless otherwise disposed, spouses are subject to the regime of union, 178. By union of goods all goods which the spouses possess at the moment of the celebration of marriage, or acquire during marriage, are joined into one sole conjugal substance, 194. The part of this conjugal substance brought by the wife remains her property. The husband is owner of the goods which he himself brought, and of any conjugal substance which was not brought by the wife. The wife's revenues and natural fruits of goods brought by her are the property of the husband from the moment when they are owed or separated, 195. The husband administers the conjugal substance, uses and enjoys it as a usufructuary, 200, 201. When the wife has died, the goods brought by her pass to her heirs. When the husband has died, the wife recovers the goods brought by her. If, after separation has been made, an increase is had, two thirds of this pertain to the wife and her descendants, the third part to the husband and his heirs. If on the contrary diminution is had, it is to be sustained by the husband and his heirs unless it is proved to have been caused by the wife. And, if on account of debts made by the husband the wife would obtain less than half of the goods brought by her, her credit for completing this half part is privileged. The cession of this privilege in favor of individual creditors is null, 211 seqq.

By communion of goods all goods and revenues of husband and wife are joined into one undivided substance, which pertains to each. The husband administers it. By the death of either spouse, half part of the common substance pertains to the surviving spouse, the other half part to the heirs of the deceased. Increase is divided into two equal parts between the spouses or their heirs. Diminution must be sustained by the husband or by his heirs, unless it is proved to have been caused by the wife. 215, 216, 225, 240.

Separation of goods regards the whole substance of each spouse. Each preserves ownership, administration, and usufruct of his or her own substance. But the wife is bound to contribute, in an equitable portion, to the burdens of marriage, even with reserved goods. 192, 241, 242, 246. Goods are reserved either by matrimonial contract, or by the liberality of third parties, or by law. Reserved by law are those things which personally and exclusively pertain to either spouse; goods of the wife which serve her for the exercise of her profession or art; and the gain which the wife receives by laboring in her own name. Reserved goods of the wife are not comprehended in the union of goods. 190, 191, 194.

What can a wife do as to entering various contracts? - The wife cannot, without the consent and authority of the husband, donate, alienate, or subject to mortgage her immovable things, contract a loan, cede or demand capitals, stand surety, make a settlement, or act in judgment concerning these acts. C. I. 134; cf. C. G. 215, 217; C. A. 91. Nor can she undertake to manage another's affairs without authorization of the husband. C. I. 1743; cf. C. G. 1990. But a woman needs no consent or authority of the husband or of another when the husband is a minor, interdicted, absent, or expiating a penalty longer than a year, or absent, or when she is juridically separated by the fault of the husband, or when she exercises commerce. C. I. 135; C. G. 220. From C. He. 161, 163, the wife is the one who directs domestic economy and represents it. And from art. 167, the wife has the faculty of exercising a certain profession or art with the express or tacit consent of the husband.

He who contracts with a wife, without the consent and authority of the husband, when this is needed, is obligated to the wife both civilly and naturally; and the wife is likewise obligated to him. But restitution in full is given to the wife and her heirs, and also to the husband while marriage remains, and to those having cause, unless it is proved that what was paid to the wife went to her convenience and utility. C. I. 134, 137, 1157, 1300; C. G. 217, 225, 1304, 1312. From C. H. 1304, the wife is not bound to restore a thing received by contract, when it has been rescinded, unless she became richer by it. Cf. also art. 1163. From C. B. 1365-1371, 1395-1400, 1405-1407, the wife can freely dispose of goods reserved to her; but as to goods subject to the administration and usufruct of the husband, she needs the approval of the husband.

Can a wife sometimes stand surety for the husband? - R. Affirmatively, namely so that she may provide for domestic necessities. But otherwise negatively. Thus commonly. The reason is that the former is sometimes required by the good itself of the family, but the latter is excluded by this same good. Hence it follows that a wife is bound to pay debts legitimately contracted by the husband in the name of the wife, with her knowing and consenting, for the good and convenience of the family itself. L. 454. From C. I. 1405; C. G. 1558, the authority of the judge is required, or from C. He. 177, the consent of tutelary authority.

What about repairing harms? - The question is generally raised: Is a superior bound to repair harm inflicted by his subjects?

R. Affirmatively in the external forum, according to the various laws in force in various regions. Generally this obligation of repairing harm on account of the deed of another is either from negligence in custody and vigilance to be used, or from the choice of persons whom we deputize to do something. Cf. C. I. 1153; C. G. 1384; C. H. 1903, in which express mention is made: 1. Of the father, and, when he has died, from C. G., or is lacking from C. I., of the mother in relation to minor children dwelling with them; and in C. I. and in C. H. of tutors in relation to those whose administrators they are, likewise dwelling with them. 2. Of the master and of the one commanding in relation to servants and mandatary persons in the exercise of functions to which they themselves destined them. 3. Of the teacher and craftsman in relation to students during the time in which they are under their vigilance. But nothing is established about the husband in relation to the wife.

Moreover, an obligation of this sort, whether in parents or in tutors, whether in masters and those commanding, whether in teachers and craftsmen, ceases, from each Law, Italian and French, whenever they prove that they could not have impeded the deed concerning which otherwise they would have to respond; or, from C. H., that they used due diligence. C. G. 1424. From C. B. 828 seqq., children before the completed seventh year by no means answer for harm inflicted. After the seventh year and before the eighteenth year, they answer for it if necessary discretion was not lacking. But those who ought to watch over them must repair the harm if they omitted to use due diligence. The same is established about one commanding another some business, if this other inflicts harm on another in the execution of that business, unless the one commanding used ordinary diligence. From C. He. 333, the head of the family, or of domestic communion, answers for harm inflicted by a member of it who is a minor, interdicted, or of infirm mind, unless he demonstrates that ordinary diligence required by the circumstances was used.

R. Negatively, speaking generally, in the internal forum. The reason is that the quality of superior brings only the burden of governing subjects rightly, but by no means the obligation from a debt of justice of impeding harms of his own subjects, and much less of others who are not subjects, unless he ought to impede them either from a special contract or from a special office. Hence a private schoolmaster who does not correct students stealing or detracting from others, although he ought to imbue them with good morals and receives payment for this, nevertheless is by no means bound to restitution to those from whom the students steal or whom they detract, since nothing was done with them.

Speaking generally; for they who preside over others are bound concerning harm if they do not prohibit it in that thing or office in which they ought to be over them, for example, if the apprentice of a pharmacist gave poison instead of medicine, provided they do not lack grave fault. The same altogether holds if from your animal, or from your thing, with your fault harm happened to another, if, for example, your dog, untied, bit one entering, or your house, collapsed from age, killed several. Inst. 1, l. 1, t. 7; l. 4, tt. 5, 8; Dig. 1. 47, t. 5; C. A. 1308, 1309, 1314-1316; C. L. 2394 seqq.; Gousset 963 seqq.

What about the contracts of wives, minors, and interdicted persons in more recent law? - A wife generally cannot contract firmly without the special consent of the husband, or, in his absence, without the authority of the judge. C. I. 135, 136; C. G. 217, 219; C. H. 61, 62, 65. Nevertheless she can buy necessaries for the family. In C. H. 62, a wife can contract without the special consent of the man when she makes ordinary expenses of the family. Likewise in C. He. 163, the wife represents the conjugal union for occurring necessities of domestic economy, and obliges also the husband, unless her acts have been excessive. From C. I. Comm. 14 § 2, a wife engaged in commerce is permitted even the alienation of her own immovable goods (not dotal goods). From C. B. 1365-1371, 1395-1400, 1405-1407, a wife can freely dispose of goods reserved to herself; but as to goods subject to the husband's administration and usufruct, she needs the husband's approval. Cf. C. A. 1237 ff. - Non-emancipated minors cannot contract firmly without the assistance of a tutor. C. I. 277; C. G. 450; C. H. 262, 1263; C. A. 152; C. B. 106 ff. But emancipated minors are capable of making acts of administration and contracts determined by law. But for the rest the assistance of a curator is required. C. I. 317-319; C. G. 480, 484, 487; C. H. 317. But in a matter of greater moment, the tutor and curator depend on the authority of the family council. C. I. 277, 301, 314 ff.; C. G. 450, 468, 483; C. H. 269. From C. I. Comm. 9 ff., emancipated minors, whether males or females, legitimately exercising commerce, are considered majors and can alienate their own goods, even immovable goods. Interdicted persons, namely those who by sentence of a judge are declared incapable of exercising civil acts because of a state of weakness, or dementia, or fury, as also prodigals juridically declared, cannot contract firmly without the assistance of a tutor or curator, or of a juridically constituted counselor. C. I. 329, 335, 339, 340; C. G. 502, 509, 513; C. H. 200; C. B. 114 ff. If the prescriptions of law are not observed, the contracts of these, namely of wives, minors, and interdicted persons:

1. Are valid, unless they are invalidated by the sentence of a judge. C. I. 1300, 1899; C. G. 1304, 2012; C. H. 1302; C. B. 106-113. - 2. Are rescindable at their discretion, but by no means at the discretion of the fellow contracting party. C. I. 341, 1107, 1300; C. G. 1125, 1304; C. H. 1302; C. B. 108, 111, 135, 144; except interdicted persons by way of penalty, against whom incapacity can be opposed by anyone having an interest. C. I. 1107. But where there is question of wives, the husband or their heirs also can oppose the nullity of the contract. C. I. 137; C. G. 225; C. H. 65.

3. Minors can invoke rescission because they are minors from C. I. 1300, 1303; C. H. 1300; because they are harmed from C. G. 1305, 1306. But wives and interdicted persons can invoke rescission even if they were not harmed. C. G. 1305, Rogron in this article; with the case excepted, however, for a minor, if, exercising commerce or an art, he contracted for matters of commerce or art, C. G. 1308; but for a wife, when she is occupied with public and separate commerce, C. G. 220, Rogron in this article; C. I. 135; or buys those things which are necessary for the support of the family, C. H. 62.

4. But they could not invoke this rescission in conscience whenever they acted by fraud and deceived the fellow party, and when the obligation arose from delict or quasi-delict. For no one ought to receive advantage from fraud; nor does the legislator intend to favor fraud and delicts, but the weakness of these persons. C. I. 1305, 1306; C. G. 1307, 1310; C. A. 865, 866; C. B. 109, 828.

5. Once rescission of the contract has been made, they must restore what they received, if they received advantage from the contract. C. I. 1307; C. G. 1312; C. H. 1303, 1304. If no utility came to them, they can use in conscience the benefit of the law, so that they not pay what they received, since such a law is just on account of the common good, for defending persons of this kind against the frauds of the wicked. C. I. 1307; C. G. 1312; C. H. 1163, 1304; Gousset 744-749; L. 918. Cf. here 667, 678, 1085. L. ult. C. de Temp. in integr. restit. grants four years for seeking restitution in full; C. I. 1300, five years. Cf. here 950.

How much determinately is required in grave thefts of wives? For grave theft by wives, several theologians also require a greater quantity, and indeed twice as much as for theft by sons. The reason is that between husband and wife there is a greater conjunction and moral identity, especially in order to common goods, than between father and son; therefore against the theft of a wife the husband is ordinarily judged to be less unwilling. Nor are several and grave theologians lacking who extend this quantity of matter even more broadly, and assert that the wife does not sin mortally, even if annually she secretly takes a twentieth part of the revenues for honest uses; which sum St. Alphonsus, 540, H. A. tr. 10, n. 33, judges excessive, at least speaking universally. Therefore, since here also a universal and absolute rule cannot be established concerning the gravity or lightness of similar thefts, this must be taken 1. from the state, wealth, liberality, and greater or lesser affection of the husband toward the wife; 2. from the greater or lesser dowry, from the wife in order to household economy, and from other circumstances. The reason is that from these heads it is ordinarily accustomed to happen that the husband is more or less, or at least can be, unwilling against the theft of the wife. L. 539, 542.

98. The wife has the administration of the goods of the house; but she must furnish reverence, service, and obedience to the husband in those things which regard the governance of the house and good morals. Nevertheless she is his associate, not his maidservant. Wherefore, if she herself is rich or noble, she is not forced to furnish to the husband those things which are not of her dignity, for example to cook food, sweep the house, etc. Yet if she does not obey the husband in a grave matter, she sins gravely, and a certain moderate coercion is permitted to the husband. 1 Peter 3:5 seqq.; L. 351, 352, 356, l. 6, n. 972; Sanchez, de Matr. l. 6, d. 6, n. 14; C. I. 131; C. G. 313; C. H. 57; C. B. 1354, 1356, 1357; C. L. 1185, 1189; Leo XIII, Enc. Arcanum, Feb. 10, 1886.

548. • The goods of a wife are of three kinds, namely:

1. Dotal goods, whose fruits the husband enjoys for sustaining the burdens of marriage.

2. Paraphernal goods (παρὰ φερνὴν, besides the dowry), which the wife has besides the dowry, and which she specially reserves to herself.

3. Common goods, which by the pacts of the spouses or by determination of law are brought into a certain partnership.

Spouses can, before entering marriage, determine the conditions to which their goods are to be subjected, with certain statutes of law being preserved; if they have omitted to do these things, the law will supply.

549. • I. The wife has direct dominion of her dowry, but the husband has usufruct and administration. When the husband has died, she is preferred to all the personal creditors of the husband, and even during life she can juridically reclaim the dowry if she fears that the husband will become unable to restore it. If the dowry consists in money or in other things consumptible by use, full dominion of the dowry is indeed attributed to the husband, but with the obligation of restoring the value, dominion having been transferred for the wife into all the goods of the husband according to the rate or quota of her dowry ¹. - St. Lig., n. 489.

¹ This is valid if the dowry consists in things which are counted by weight, number, or measure, or certainly in appraised things handed over; for then the husband becomes by full right the owner of those things. But if non-appraised species are given as dowry, then the wife alone is mistress of the dowry; but to the husband only two things pertain from the right of dominion, namely vindication of the thing given, and the right of using and enjoying.

II. The wife holds full dominion and administration of paraphernal goods, so that concerning these the husband is able to dispose of nothing against her will. Hence as to these she depends in no way on her husband. - St. Lig., ibid.

III. The property and utility of common goods belong to each spouse; but the administration of the same belongs to the husband alone. But this community of goods can admit various conditions or restrictions, and therefore attention must be paid to the various dispositions of places. - Elbel, n. 69.

Pacts which can be entered into by spouses before marriage constitute three classes, or a threefold regime, namely: 1. the dotal regime; 2. the regime of community; 3. the regime excluding community.

550. • I. Dotal regime. Dotal goods are those which constitute the wife's dowry: the husband has full administration of these and receives the usufruct. But the wife preserves direct dominion alone (art. 1549).

If the dotal goods consist in movable goods, either partly or totally, the husband has perfect dominion of them, and is bound only concerning their value consigned in the contract preceding the marriage (art. 1554).

Dotal goods can in no way be alienated, even with the wife consenting, except certain particular cases excepted by law (art. 1551 and following).

But all goods whatever of the wife, not constituted in the dowry, remain altogether her own, or are held as paraphernal; and the woman also has the administration of them and receives the usufruct (1574, 1576). Yet she cannot alienate immovable goods, nor appear in court for them, without the express consent of the husband, or, if the husband resists, without a sentence of the tribunal of first instance (art. 1576); the same must be said if the wife is entirely separate in goods (art. 1536).

To paraphernal goods also belong those which the wife procures for herself by singular industry or extraordinary labor, with sufficient care of the family estate having been applied, or those which she accumulates by subtracting something from what is granted to her for food, clothing, recreations, etc.; and also those things which have been given to her with the express condition that they not yield to the husband.

551. • II. Regime of community. It has place when spouses establish in the matrimonial contract that certain goods will be common between them ². But community is either legal or conventional, according as it is constituted by law or by the special pact of the contracting parties.

² This perhaps is said less exactly. For even if the spouses do not establish that certain goods will be common, nevertheless, if any other pact is lacking, legal community has place by force of law. See art. 1393 and 1400.

Legal community is formed: 1. from all movable goods which the spouses possessed on the very day the marriage was begun, or which afterward come to them by title of succession or donation; 2. from all fruits and any revenues whatever of immovable goods possessed by the spouses before marriage, or coming to them during marriage; 3. from all immovable goods which have been acquired during the time of marriage from common goods (art. 1401-1402).

Conventional community consists in other pacts of the spouses, by which the legal statutes can be restricted or relaxed. When these are lacking, the community is governed by the disposition of the law alone.

552. • Under the regime of community, the husband alone has the administration and usufruct of the common goods. Indeed he can sell them, exchange them, hand them over in mortgage, even without the wife's consent. Yet he cannot donate immovable goods by gratuitous title, nor movable goods by universal title, or as to their universality, or quota, namely a half, third, or fourth part. But when the community has been dissolved, the goods and burdens are divided into two parts, unless the wife or her heirs prefer to renounce the goods and so exempt themselves from the burdens. Debts are to be paid by each spouse, or by their heirs (art. 1482).

553. • III. Regime excluding community. Spouses constitute this in a twofold way, namely: 1. by declaring that they enter marriage without community; 2. by establishing that, as to goods, each will be entirely separate as to his own. In the former case, the husband receives all revenues of the wife's goods and alone administers all things. But if they are consumed by use, he is bound to return their value. In the latter case, however, the woman has the administration and usufruct of all her goods. But each spouse contributes to the burdens of marriage by special pact; but if no convention exists, the wife must contribute up to a third part of her revenues. Wherefore in this third regime, just as also in the second, some dowry is to be furnished by the wife, by which she may in part assist with the burdens of marriage; but such a dowry can be alienated by the husband.

554. • Resolutions. 1. A wife has a strict right to support from the common goods; therefore she can procure it for herself if the husband refuses, or consents only with very great difficulty.

2. The wife does not sin by subtracting some things for food, clothing, and the other necessities of the family, which husbands often do not take care of, and which would be sought from them in vain. - St. Lig., n. 541.

3. If the husband squanders or wastes goods to the detriment of the family, the wife can hide them and reserve them for the good of the family.

4. The wife does not act unjustly if, without the husband's knowledge, she takes some things for herself which the husband would easily and certainly grant if he were asked; for presumed permission is present, and sometimes a just cause of not asking, lest she be forced to show herself as a maidservant. - Reuter, n. 47.

5. In default of the husband, the wife can spend from the common goods what is necessary for preventing grave damage threatening the family. - Lugo, disp. 16, n. 67.

Yet in these and similar things one must act cautiously, lest the reins be loosened for wives, since they are inclined to extend their rights beyond what is equitable.

555. • Questions. Q. 1. Whether a wife can make alms from common goods or from the fruits of her dowry?

Resp. Affirmatively, even if otherwise she has goods of her own, provided this is done according to the custom of other women of the same condition. The reason is that a wife is not a slave, but a companion; therefore she ought to have a certain administration in the house of the husband. Then the husband is deservedly presumed to consent to those things which are done by the wife according to the honorable custom of the region and condition; and if he shows himself unwilling, such dissent is judged irrational, because the husband cannot deprive the wife of a right granted to her by legitimate custom. - Thus commonly with Lugo, St. Lig., n. 340.

556. • Q. 2. Whether a husband is bound to restitution who prodigally or badly spends a notable part of the common goods?

Resp. It is disputed. The first probable opinion affirms. The reason is that although the husband has the administration of the goods, nevertheless the wife has dominion of half of them, and therefore that right is violated if, while she is reasonably unwilling, that part is dissipated by the husband. - Thus Antoine, p. 3, c. 5. - Collet, De Iust., p. 3, c. 4. - Pontas, see Communauté. - Conference of Angers, De Matr. ut contr. civili, q. 2. - Gousset. The second opinion, also probable, denies generally, that is, unless the husband exceeds the limits of the right granted to him by law. The reason is that the wife, from law, has a strict right only to half of the goods which will exist when the community has been dissolved ³; nor is the husband bound to render an account of his administration. Hence although he sins gravely against piety toward his wife and children, nevertheless he does not sin against justice properly so called, which induces the obligation of restitution. But the wife can forestall the dissipation of the goods through the faculty which is granted to her by law, of juridically seeking the separation of goods. - Thus Lacroix, n. 1020, De furto. - Carrière, n. 276.

³ It can indeed seem obscure what this opinion means, and even that it involves contradictory things. For it is supposed that the wife, by force of the community, has a right in half of the things existing; then this right is restricted to half of the things existing when the community is dissolved; and meanwhile a full faculty of disposing of all things is given to the husband, so that he is bound neither to render an account nor to restitution. But to what, then, does that right of the wife finally come, when the husband can so dissipate all things that nothing remains to be divided when the community is dissolved? Besides, speech about a violated office of piety toward the wife and children is introduced wrongly. For the condition of the wife and children is unlike in the case. For while the father is living, there is no strict right for the children in paternal goods; but something else is here supposed concerning the wife as to common goods.

Nevertheless this opinion will not seem so absurd if account is had, which the Author did not declare sufficiently, of the French Code, which certainly the authors of this opinion had before their eyes. Namely, there by the laws sufficient provision is made for the wife, so that of those things which she brings into community she can recover either whatever still exists, or the equivalent, and exact the indemnities decreed by the judge, and this in such a way that she is preferred both to the husband and to the creditors as regards the community itself. But if any restitution is denied in this opinion, this pertains to those things which could remain from the good administration of the revenues. Wherefore the indemnity of the wife is no less consulted here than in that mode of the dotal regime which transfers full dominion of the dotal goods to the husband.

Moreover Croix is alleged here to no purpose (lib. 3, p. 1, n. 1020): for the Authors whom he alleges as absolving the husband from the burden of restitution judge that the goods concerning which there is a question are proper to the husband alone; but those who judge the goods to be common, Croix alleges as imposing the burden of restitution. Therefore Croix would rather fight for the first opinion, not for the second.

But under French Law the husband would exceed the limits of his right, and would certainly be bound to restitution, if he gave some immovable goods by gratuitous title, or the totality or a quota of the movable goods, or if he took the goods of the community for himself.

557. • Q. 3. Whether a wife sins by accepting something from common goods or from the fruits of the dowry for relieving the necessity of parents or children who were received from a first marriage?

Resp. Negatively, if she does not have paraphernal goods, nor the husband wishes to give what is necessary, because by the law of nature the wife is bound to support the aforesaid blood relatives, and the husband ought to consent to this. - Thus St. Lig., n. 542, with others.

Q. 4. Whether the wife is bound to restore goods accepted in this way, when she has come into the husband's inheritance, or when she has recovered her dowry?

Resp. 1. Negatively, if these goods are of small importance, because then they are held as common alms, which, if made moderately, do not carry with them the burden of restitution. - Thus all.

Resp. 2. Several likewise deny, even if the goods subtracted are of greater importance, because they judge all burdens which come to one spouse while the marriage stands to be common to the other ⁴. But the affirmative opinion seems to be held with St. Lig., n. 543; Hom. apost., n. 33. - See Casus, n. 505.

⁴ Lugo reports this opinion thus (De Iust., disp. 16, n. 71): "Nevertheless Lessius thinks it probable, with Molina, that those things which are spent for supporting parents so needing, namely extremely or gravely, and the same must be conceded concerning supporting children, are to be paid from the common goods of each spouse, if the marriage was celebrated by a contract of halves of goods; but if by a contract of earnest-money and dowry, they are to be paid from superadded gains, if there are any; but if there are none, they ought to be taken by the wife in part of those things which she should have had when the marriage was dissolved."

Yet this last little clause does not seem to have pleased Lugo. For after he said (ibid., n. 72) that when the wife does not have other free goods, but nevertheless has half of the goods with the husband, or brought a good dowry, or other goods which the husband administers, or there are gains common with the husband, she can assist needy parents or children, and perhaps also brothers; and he added that he did not see why, if those expenses are moderate, she ought, when the marriage is dissolved, to count them into her own part; he soon adds: "Indeed this also seems probable, even if she married without a dowry, with the husband consenting, and does not have half of the goods or common gains. The reason is that the husband could also assist from common goods his own parents, or children of a prior marriage who are in need: why therefore will the wife not be able to do the same, since the burdens of each ought to be common? For although under the name of support, if they are taken precisely, those things do not come which the wife would give to her parents, nevertheless the wife does not seem only to have a right to bare support; because she seems to be a participant in the goods and family estate in some way; nor is she like one of the family, so that she ought only to be fed, but she has a part in the government of the family: and although she is under the power of the man, nevertheless she is a companion and participant of dignity; wherefore just as the man is called lord of such a city or town, so the wife is called lady of the same place. Hence although as to administration the wife is subordinated to the man, nevertheless it is equitable that he permit his spouse, with due moderation, the use of goods for relieving the grave necessities of her own people: for the use of goods is more necessary to the wife for this than for other things for which the man could not justly deny necessities to his wife."

593. 3. The obligations and rights of the wife. The wife must revere the husband and render him due obedience.

Therefore the Apostle admonishes: "Wives, be subject to your husbands, as it behoveth in the Lord."¹⁰²⁷ The reason for this subjection is drawn from the condition of the family itself, whose head and ruler is the husband. The wife must furthermore exercise diligent care in the education of the little children and in domestic affairs, as her condition requires. Hence a wife sins if she neglects domestic affairs by indulging too much in idleness and amusements; likewise she sins if she indulges too much in luxury and thus exasperates her husband. The rights of the wife are drawn from the obligations of the husband just explained; but especially the wife can demand that she be treated by her husband in all things as his companion.

¹⁰²⁷ Col. 3:18.

830. Mutual offices of spouses. - Besides the offices of justice, which regard either the administration of goods, concerning which it was already spoken in n. 181-182, or the conjugal debt itself of intercourse to be rendered (I Cor. VII, 3) and conjugal fidelity to be preserved, concerning which it must be spoken in the treatise on matrimony, there are three things which spouses owe each other by natural and divine law from piety: mutual love, mutual help and consolation, and cohabitation.

1. Sincere and intense mutual love. For since they are as one flesh (Mt. XIX, 5), they ought also to be as one heart; for this reason St. Paul commands husbands to love their wives as Christ loved the Church (Eph. V, 25), and wives to love their husbands (Tit. II, 4; Col. III, 18; I Tim. II, 15). This love must be not only affective but also effective, so that spouses furnish help to each other, especially in necessities, and, says Prummer, Th. M. II, n. 590, "avoid disordered egoism, contumelious words, harshness, and especially jealousy, which is wont to be the sepulcher of conjugal love."

2. Mutual help and consolation: for in this they complete each other, because the gifts of one are the complement of the other. Whence God says: It is not good for man to be alone; let us make him a help like unto himself (Gen. II, 18). Hence matrimony is not only a union of bodies but also a union of souls, and a special friendly society by which spouses promise service and assistance to each other.

3. Cohabitation at one table and bed (can. 1128; C. C., a. 214); this is a corollary of the others, altogether required for attaining the ends of matrimony: the education of offspring and mutual help. Whence it is said: For this cause a man shall leave father and mother, and shall cleave to his wife, and they shall be two in one flesh (Gen. II, 24; Mt. XIX, 5).

831. Special offices of the husband. - The husband is the head of the wife and family; and therefore there belongs to him the power of governing not only the children and the family property, but also the wife, who nevertheless is not his handmaid but a worthy partner. Hence he is bound:

1. to furnish to the wife suitable sustenance according to his state, and support and protection;

2. to take care that the wife faithfully fulfill her duties;

3. also to correct her when delinquent; but correction ordinarily ought to consist in words brought forth without anger and hatred: for graver correction consisting in deeds or in moderate blows is rarely opportune or even legitimate.

Hence per se he sins gravely a) if he denies food to the wife, or, although he can, does not procure it, unless she has departed by her own fault;

b) if he treats his wife very harshly and roughly, or compels her to labors which altogether disgrace her condition;

c) if he affects his wife with contumelious or defamatory words;

d) if without cause he impedes her as to the practice of religion;

e) if he gravely beats her;

f) if he greatly afflicts her by his drunken excesses and other disordered passions;

g) if he is very negligent in the governance of family property.

832. Special offices of the wife. - The wife ought to reverence her husband as head and ruler, and furnish him due obedience; whence the Apostle warns: Women, be subject to husbands, as it behooves in the Lord (Col. III, 18; Eph. V, 33). For this reason she ought to expend diligent care in domestic affairs, as her condition demands; and to obey the husband in the governance of the house and in good morals.

Hence per se the wife sins gravely: a) if by quarrels or words she provokes her husband to grave anger or blasphemy;

b) if, despising her husband, she herself wishes to govern, or is notably disobedient, unless the husband commands irrationally;

c) if she gravely neglects domestic affairs, indulging idleness or amusements; or if, given to luxury, she exasperates her husband;

d) if she habitually injects herself into the administration of the house, not in the manner of one helping but of one dominating; unless there is a just cause, such as if the husband, as a spendthrift, squanders the goods of the family or is unfit for management: yet let her not think this last too easily.

971. Mutual love and help is a necessary condition and foundation of conjugal life. So intimate and individual a custom of life, which is perfected in rendering the conjugal debt to one another and is completed by the partnership of roof and bed, so that spouses adhere to each other to the exclusion of another person, is not understood, we said, nor can it firmly stand, without an intimate union of souls strengthened by constant love, and without mutual help to be furnished to each other in the various necessities of domestic life. And indeed:

1° Nature inclines to this love, which moves to matrimony and to mutual love of man and woman, so that under its influence they may be a support and help to each other; marital copula fosters and nourishes this love, and common offspring promotes and strengthens it.

2° Christian doctrine commands love: "Husbands," says the Apostle, Eph. V, 25, 28, "love your wives, as Christ also loved the Church, and delivered himself up for her... So also husbands ought to love their wives as their own bodies. He who loves his own wife loves himself"; and similarly he wills that women "love their husbands, love their children; be prudent, chaste, sober, having care of the house, kind, subject to their husbands," Tit. II, 4-5.

3° Reason also confirms it: for where there is a special conjunction, there ought to be a special love. Between husband and wife there is an altogether special and most intimate conjunction in conjugal life, so that they are even one flesh. Therefore between them there ought to be an altogether special and intimate love; from which mutual support and help is naturally born to follow, because true love is naturally operative.

To true and intimate conjugal love there is opposed:

a) love, as it is called, platonic, nourished toward an unmarried person of the different sex; by which the spouse withdraws his heart from the other spouse so as to give it to an outside person, while nevertheless leaving the body to the spouse for conjugal acts;

b) a fortiori adulterous friendship, which would admit a lustful affection or act with outside persons; to which they say indulgence must be given in our days, since they judge affection restricted to the spouse to be "a certain obsolete weakness of mind and soul, or an abject and vile jealousy," and "this the more because not a few have an innate sexual disposition to which they cannot give satisfaction within the narrow limits of monogamous marriage," as Pius XI denounces;

c) likewise blind agreement of character and mere sympathy of disposition, which certain moderns intend to substitute as the foundation of marriage for genuine conjugal love, or for the deliberate and constant conjunction of souls and mutual charity, and "when this ceases, they teach that the bond by which alone souls are united is relaxed and fully dissolved";

d) finally conjugal jealousy, which can arise not only from the imprudence or fault of the other spouse, but also from the mere suspicion of the jealous one, and consists in this, that everywhere and in all actions of the other party he perceives signs of diminished love toward himself and undue love toward another person. For this defect the best remedy, says Prummer, Th. M. III, n. 688, "is the candid and open manner of speaking and acting always employed between spouses, without all ambiguities and secrets. As a rule to be recommended: Each spouse in his private life should hide nothing from the other party." This indeed, the praised author warns, is not to be extended to one's professional life and to secrets committed to one.

972. Respective offices of husband and wife. - Every love ought to be ordered; but in conjugal love there ought to be an order of subordination, because the husband is loved by the woman as her head, and the woman by the husband not as a slave or handmaid but as a companion and friend. Hence the Apostle says, Eph. V, 22-23: Let women be subject to their husbands as to the Lord; because the husband is the head of the woman, as Christ is the head of the Church (likewise I Pet. III, 1; I Cor. XI; Col. III, 18; I Tim. II, 12; Tit. II, 5); as he also adds: Husbands, love your wives as Christ also loved the Church, which he chose for himself, namely as a companion. Hence, although husband and wife are equal in right as to those things which are proper to the human person in order, namely, to his ultimate end, and as to the primary object itself of the matrimonial contract, or the conjugal debt, nevertheless they are by no means equal, but unequal, as to those things which concern domestic life.

And therefore the offices of the husband are one thing, those of the woman another.

A. The husband is the head of the woman and of the family, and therefore he ought

1° to protect the woman,

2° to provide suitable support to her according to his state,

3° to direct and govern her, not however as a slave, but as a companion and friend, and therefore to see to it that she fulfills her duties and to correct her when she fails, moderately, however, and according to her dignity,

4° diligently to administer the temporal goods of the family.

B. The woman is the companion of the husband, but subject to him as to the head, and therefore she ought

1° to show reverence to him as to head and ruler,

2° to furnish obedience in the governance of the house and in good morals,

3° diligently to care for the domestic matter.