III. On the Numerical Distinction of Sins

Whence is the numerical distinction of sins to be taken? It is to be taken: 1. from the diversity of total objects; 2. from the multiplicity of acts morally interrupted. Here that is called a total object which, either from its intrinsic nature or from the extrinsic intention of the agent, is completed in itself, and is not referred to another as a part. Thus in homicide there is had one total object, although the homicide has placed beforehand various previous acts, e.g., by seeking weapons, laying ambushes, and striking several times; because all those previous acts are to be held as parts of the principal act, and are ordered to it.

But if the homicide first intended only a striking, and afterward, with the will changed, killed, there will be a double total object; because from the intention of the agent one is not ordered to the other, but is intended separately in itself. - Morally interrupted; because, although any interruption physically suffices for the numerical distinction of acts, nevertheless in order to confession they are not multiplied unless they are morally many; because, just as a moral act is to be attended to in confession, so also moral multiplication and distinction must be attended to. Proof of the first part. Because the object, as St. Thomas teaches, 2. 2. q. 18, a. 2, is in a certain way the form of the act.

Therefore the act is such as the object is. Therefore where there are several objects in number in the genus of morals, there are several acts in number in the same genus; where there is one object, there is reputed to be one act. Therefore there are as many sins as there are total objects. - Proof of the second part. For when acts of the will are morally interrupted, they become complete in number, and each is constituted in its own malice; since the following act cannot be called the continuation of the preceding one. Therefore those acts by moral interruption become diverse; therefore by repetition they are multiplied. Thus he who, on several occasions morally interrupted, strikes another or steals, commits as many sins as there are those strikes or those thefts, because these constitute so many diverse acts. L. 35, 36; Lugo, d. 16, s. 14.

Is there one sin or several when there are several objects materially and physically total, but they are referred together to one act of the will? - It is disputed. There are two opinions, and for each many and grave theologians stand. The first opinion, which St. Alphonsus follows, 45, teaches that diversity of objects materially and physically total constitutes in one and the same act different sins in number. The reason is that sin is the motion of the will into its term, or object. Therefore, just as by specific diversity of objects it is distinguished in species, so by their numerical distinction it is distinguished in number. Ioann. De Dicastillo, De Poenit., d. 9, dub. 4, n. 216 ff.; La-Croix 150. "Hence it is inferred that the following commit sins diverse in number: 1. He who by one blow kills several men, or detracts from several... And the same must be said if someone intends to kill or defame a whole family.... But otherwise, if someone were to injure goods which some city, monastery, or chapter possesses in common; for then the right does not belong to individuals in particular, but only to the whole community, whence one right is injured. 2. He who by one act desires to approach several women, or several times the same woman; much more, he who in the same night several times knows the same woman... for each fornication has its own completed term. 3. He who steals from several. 4. He who on one occasion gives scandal to several. 5. He who by one act wills through several days to omit the canonical hours or fast. 6. He who by one act desires evil to three persons." L. 46.

The second opinion holds that diversity of objects materially and physically total, in one and the same act, constitutes only one sin in number. The reason is that those objects, materially and physically several, are attained by one act after the manner of one adequate object, and therefore constitute one total formal and moral object. In one and the same act, namely one and the same interior act of the will; and if there is question of an efficacious act of the will, also one and the same exterior act. For if the exterior act is not one and the same, but there are several, since each is terminated and completed at an object total in itself, it can no longer be united with another. - Lugo, de Poenit., d. 16, n. 126 ff.; Suarez, de Poenit., d. 22, s. 5, n. 34. Hence resolves: He commits one sin who by one blow kills several men. But he would not sufficiently explain his sin by saying, "I committed homicide," which signifies the killing of one man; but it ought at least to be explained under some confused generality signifying plurality, e.g., by one blow I killed several, or many. Lugo, l. c., n. 141. The same must be said of him "who by one act of the will wills to approach, for example, ten women of the same condition, or wills to approach the same woman several times. For it is enough if he says: I willed to approach several times an unmarried woman, or unmarried women, or married women, without necessity of expressing the number of objects of such a single volition." Tambur., Meth. Conf., l. 2, c. 1, § 9, n. 59; Dicastillus, de Poenit., d. 9, dub. 4, n. 256, 257. "He who by one act of detraction has injured many at the same time, for the same reason, need not open the number of persons injured.... If someone detracts from a family or house or religion, whether it is numerous or small, it is enough if he says: I detracted from a certain family, etc." Tambur., l. c., n. 63; Lugo, l. c., n. 135. It is also one sin if someone detracts from another before many, since the right to reputation is not multiple, but one among all. Likewise it is one sin if someone by one act gives scandal to several. Lugo, l. c., n. 112, 164; L. 49. Likewise it is one sin if someone by the same act denies several articles of faith, because the formal object of faith is not multiple, but one, namely the authority of God revealing. L. 50; Lugo, l. c., n. 288 ff. He who by the same impulse of passion wishes several diverse evils to an enemy, for instance infamy, death, poverty, commits one sin in number and species, namely if all are sought under the generic aspect of evil. Lugo, l. c., n. 260; L. 50. Besides, it is one sin if someone steals a purse belonging to several, or a thing which exceeds grave matter several times. Lugo, l. c., n. 137; Diana, tom. 1, tr. 7, r. 18, n. 8. "I infer that one willing not to recite the office through the whole year, and afterward executing this, commits several sins.... Similarly, he who wills to practice robberies and slaughters on the road through his whole life, does not afterward commit one sin, but several." Lugo, l. c., 546; L. l. 4, n. 149. The same must be said of sin committed with three women: it is triple, not one, etc.

Does he commit diverse sins who detracts from someone in several matters, or affects him with diverse insults? St. Alphonsus, 48, more probably affirms. But the common opinion of grave doctors denies it. For reputation and honor are always of the same species, whatever the matter concerned may be. Whence this is not necessarily to be explained in confession. Lugo, de Poenit., d. 16, n. 265; Diana, tom. 1, tr. 7, r. 14, n. 2, 3; Elbel 552.

Note: If someone married sins with a married woman, or one having a vow of chastity sins with one also having a vow of chastity, he admits a double sin, by reason of marriage and vow. "For the prior malice is against the fidelity which he owes to his wife.... But the latter is insofar as he is the cause, by his cooperation, that his accomplice violates the laws of marriage." Likewise "one species of malice is contracted from the violation of one's own vow; but another from cooperation in the violation of the vow of someone to whose observance I am not held by vow, as is established." Lugo, l. c., n. 140, 141; L. l. 2, n. 46; l. 3, n. 456.

When is there had a moral interruption of acts? - An act of the will is interrupted in three ways, namely: 1. By retraction or express revocation of the will, because this prevents the later act from being joined with the prior one, e.g., if someone retracts a depraved will of acting evilly, and afterward resumes it, unless a very brief delay intervened. 2. By voluntary cessation from the act, or by application of the mind to diverse objects, e.g., if someone freely ceases from an evil purpose, and then returns to it; unless there is present the purpose immediately of continuing the same sins, as if someone conversing shamefully with a woman, when another arrives, ceases meanwhile, but with the intention of continuing when he departs. 3. By involuntary cessation sufficiently notable, account being taken of the nature of the act, according to the judgment of prudent persons, e.g., by sleep, distraction, etc. Sufficiently notable; for if a sufficiently brief time intervenes, the acts, morally speaking, are not discontinued. These three things can easily be applied to a threefold class of acts, namely merely internal acts, internal acts with the purpose of placing an external action, and external acts, or acts externally consummated. L. 35, 38; Lugo, de Poenit., d. 16, n. 551; Struggl, q. 1, 41.

Merely internal acts, which are altogether perfected inwardly, e.g., hatreds, heresies, morose delectations, shameful inefficacious desires, rash judgments, etc., speaking in themselves, are multiplied as soon as they are retracted or abandoned by free will, or involuntarily deserted. The reason is that such acts, since they have an object complete in itself and are ordered to no external effect by reason of which they could be continued with one another, are acts altogether complete in themselves. And therefore the penitent must explain, if he can, how many times he consented by internal will to a depraved thing; but if he cannot, because, e.g., the depraved mind was long-lasting, then it suffices to say approximately, or at least to confess the time in which he persevered with such a mind, and whether very frequently or rarely. For thus the confessor will sufficiently understand that ordinary interruptions intervened, or, on the contrary, more rare ones. Speaking in themselves, for if several acts of this sort proceed from the same impulse of passion, they constitute one mortal sin, even if some brief interval intervenes between the acts. Likewise one mortal sin is had if the depraved wills have order among themselves, so that one depends on another. For then the later wills, without new deliberation or consultation, are placed by force of the first will. Lugo, de Poenit., d. 16, n. 562 ff.; Suarez, de Poenit., d. 22, s. 5, n. 11; Struggl, q. 1, n. 36; Tambur., Meth. Confess., l. 2, c. 1, § 5, n. 30 ff.; L. 35, 37.

Internal acts with the purpose of placing an external action are likewise multiplied: 1. By retraction of the will. For then, if someone returns to an evil will, there will be a new sin, since the later act does not proceed from the first. 2. By voluntary cessation, namely if someone voluntarily and freely ceases from a depraved purpose, with a notable delay interposed; for then also it is verified that the later act is a new sin, since it does not proceed from the first. 3. By involuntary cessation, if a long time intervenes; for if a brief time intervenes, the acts are not morally discontinued. - L. 35, 38, 39. Difficulty is present here as regards defining the aforesaid notable delay and long time. Now a double hypothesis can be made: the first, that the internal acts are ordered immediately to several external acts, directed and subordinated to some one and common end; the second, that the internal acts are ordered to one external act. In the first hypothesis the first thing which St. Alphonsus has, 40, holds: "Acts of the will, if they proceed from the first will, and morally remain in some effect, through whatever time the depraved will lasts, constitute only one sin. Hence it is inferred that if someone proposes to kill a man, and for this reason prepares weapons, takes the road, and kills the enemy, he commits one sin, although through many days he has sought him, and several times repeated the will." But in the first and the other hypothesis, if no exterior effect is yet had, what is to be judged a brief time or a long one, so that the aforesaid acts are judged to be continued or discontinued, no certain rule can be assigned. That brief or long interval can be defined in particular cases by the judgment of prudent persons alone. For the same purpose endures for a greater or lesser time according to its varying intensity, and also according to the varying circumstances of persons, age, sex, character, etc. A purpose of committing theft can be continued for several days; a purpose of reading a prohibited book ordinarily scarcely endures for one or two hours. Generally speaking, however, the aforesaid acts are not discontinued by brief and common, or ordinary, interruptions, which occur through sleep, a meal, conversation with a friend, etc. Therefore, suppose that after these you again repeat the depraved purpose of killing an enemy, fornicating, etc.; you commit one sin, because, since the first will remains virtually, it is united and continued with the second. Salmant., tr. 20, c. 12, n. 38. But something else must be said concerning an extraordinary interruption, which indeed removes the moral unity of the human action. For then the prior will no longer persists. If someone, for example, wills to kill an enemy, so that for a month he continues this will, notwithstanding brief and ordinary interruptions, but afterward for a year, for several months, or for a month he is ill, and by this change of circumstances he no longer thinks about killing the enemy, that prior will growing cold, indeed entirely vanishing, if after he has recovered he again resumes that prior will, this later will can no longer make one with that prior one, since wills so distant cannot any longer be joined among themselves even by moral estimation. Tambur., Meth. Confess., l. 2, c. 1, § 5, n. 34; Lugo, de Poenit., d. 16, n. 545.

External acts, or acts externally consummated, are multiplied as often as the object is disparate, or terminated in itself; but they are not multiplied, even with a notable interval of time interposed, when they are like parts of a more principal act, or tend to one end, because they effect something morally one, which is not completed except when the principally intended act has been consummated; or when, although those partial acts are not ordered to the principal act, they nevertheless proceed from the same impulse of passion. Understand that all preceding acts effect something morally one with the more principal and intended consummated act, unless by themselves they introduce a new species, which of itself does not tend to the completion of the sin. Let the example be one who, wishing to kill a man, burns his house so that he may perish by the fire. For since these things are disparate, they cannot effect one thing. Therefore he commits one sin who, intending fornication, shamefully touches a woman, kisses her, entices her by shameful conversations, and finally fornicates; because all the preceding acts by their nature are ordered to the consummated act. But if from the beginning he had wished only to touch the woman, and afterward, induced by lust, completed copulation, there will be a double sin, and therefore it will not be enough if he confesses the copulation.

A priest commits one sin who wills to omit the whole office on one day, because the individual hours are ordered to completing one office. But he would commit two sins who had wished only to omit Matins, and afterward did not wish to recite the remaining hours, because there would be a twofold distinct act of evil will, having an object terminated in itself. He perpetrates one sin who from the same impulse of passion repeats an evil act many times, e.g., one who several times shamefully touches himself or another, even with some interruption; one who several times strikes an enemy, or imprecates very many evils upon him, etc.; because there is one depraved affection of the will, and those various actions are morally united. Likewise he probably commits one sin who blasphemes against God in several matters, as, for instance, if he said that God is false, unjust, cruel; and he who by the same continued act blasphemes against several Saints, e.g., against the twelve Apostles, since all blasphemies against the Saints derive their malice from one relation to God.

He commits one sin who, intending to steal some definite sum of money, takes it away at several times, morally not interrupted, lest he be discovered, because there is one depraved act of the will, which is consummated in the last theft. On the contrary, he commits several sins who at several times steals something from the same money without having decided from the beginning to carry off the whole, because the individual thefts effect a total object in themselves. He commits several sins who fornicates successively several times with the same woman, although on the same night. Likewise he commits several sins who omits a prescribed fast through several days, although those fornications and omissions arise from one and the same will; for any fornication and omission successively made is terminated in itself, and constitutes a total object. Nevertheless, if someone in mortal sin hears several confessions successively but continuously, one after another, there are theologians who affirm that one sin is present because of moral union. Lugo, de Poenit., d. 16, nn. 135, 546, 556, 557, 561; Tambur., Meth. Confess., l. 2, c. 1, n. 52; Struggl, q. 1, n. 43; L. 41, 42, 43, 44, 46, 47, 50; l. 3, n. 538.

Resolves: If someone consents in mind to heresy, and then, while reading a book about religion, or hearing a sermon about religion, positively does not wish to amend the sin, he sins as often as he again positively does not will it; since individual acts of this sort of the will are independent among themselves, and stand perfectly by themselves. If someone, on the contrary, decides not to restore another's thing, and always remains in the same will, even for a year, he commits one sin, although he also often renews this purpose of his. The reason is that in that retention, never retracted, the first will virtually remains, and the later wills are morally united. Elbel 551; L. 40, l. 3, n. 683; Diana, tom. 1, tr. 7, r. 158, nn. 3, 4. Moreover, as D'Annibale well observes, p. 1, n. 288, ed. 4, in practice the conscience alone of those sinning numbers sins; for such persons commonly do not know these subtle and refined distinctions. This also must be attended to in practice concerning the various species of sins. Indeed, as the praised author notes, ibid., n. 290, note 14, many things are most certainly lethal for theologians which to rude or unlearned persons seem scarcely reprehensible.

Are touches which immediately follow fornicatory copulation a new sin? All these acts, as also complacency concerning the copulation had, are not a new sin if they are had immediately after copulation, and are in no way directed to a new copulation, because they are very probably employed as the complement of the copulation obtained. L. 41; Tamb., l. c., 72.

Must the means used for sinning be explained in confession, if the sin afterward was not consummated? - R. It seems that it must be denied altogether, if those means are not evil in themselves, for then they constitute no special sin; but it suffices to say generally, in order to explain the external action of the sin: I tried, for example, to kill an enemy; I prepared the means for killing him, etc. - But it must be affirmed if those means are evil in themselves; and then they must be indicated, and indeed all of them according to species, if they are diverse in species, such as touches had with oneself, or obscene words used for soliciting. And the reason is that, the sin not having been consummated, those various means, evil in themselves, can no longer be referred to the end and constitute something one in the consummation of the sin, whence they would take their ultimate species.

Therefore those individual acts are to be considered with their own proper malice. Therefore they are to be accused separately in confession. - But if those means, evil in themselves, repeated several times in the same way, or diverse among themselves, are of the same species, all must also be explained according to number, if they have not coalesced morally into one act; for the sin not having been consummated, from which they receive moral unity, they remain acts distinct and many in themselves. Otherwise, however, if they constituted morally one act, for instance because they proceeded from the same impulse of passion, or because one was ordered to another and was continued by it. - Lugo, de Poenit., d. 16, n. 240; Tambur. 66 seqq.; L. 42.