The Temporal Goods of the Church

64. There are four excommunications carried against those who dispose of ecclesiastical goods unjustly or illicitly: a. against those usurping or sequestrating goods of ecclesiastical persons (I. 11); b. against those invading, etc., the temporal dominion of the Roman Church (I. 12); c. against those usurping goods of any benefice or pious place (II. 19); d. against those alienating ecclesiastical goods without license of the apostolic see (IV. 3).

a. Jurisdiction is understood to be both spiritual and temporal; goods are both movable and immovable, such as beneficial lands; revenues are natural and civil fruits which come from ecclesiastical goods. These constitute the matter of this excommunication insofar as they pertain to ecclesiastical persons, and indeed either by reason of the church over which they preside, or by reason of the benefice which they possess. Therefore here do not belong: a. goods of pious places, because they do not pertain to ecclesiastical persons; b. goods of monasteries, because they do not pertain to regulars by reason of a church; c. goods which by another title, e.g. of stipend, pension, pertain to ecclesiastical persons.

b. Usurpers are called those who occupy by authority, as if by right owed to themselves, a thing still existing in the power of its owner. Therefore they do not incur this censure: a. thieves and robbers;¹ b. those who buy a thing from a usurper or receive it by another title.² Sequestrators are both judges and magistrates who command sequestration, and their ministers who execute the mandate.

Twelfth excommunication. Those invading, destroying, detaining, either by themselves or through others, cities, lands, places, or rights pertaining to the Roman Church, or usurping, disturbing, retaining supreme jurisdiction in them, and also those furnishing help, counsel, favor for each of the aforesaid things.

¹ Holy Office, March 9, 1870.

² Holy Office, July 8, 1874.

65. a. This censure intends to protect the temporal dominion of the apostolic see; wherefore temporal jurisdiction, and indeed supreme temporal jurisdiction, is to be understood.

b. They incur the censure: a. those who occupy or retain some temporal right of the holy see or some place of the temporal dominion; b. those who exercise supreme jurisdiction in occupied lands, of which kind are the kings of Italy, ministers of the kingdom, prefects of provinces, etc.; c. cooperators, who spontaneously, not by compulsion, concur in the aforesaid things.

91. a. This censure protects ecclesiastical goods taken in the broadest sense, namely any temporal goods and rights whatever pertaining to churches, religious places, or pious places; to these also in part article 11 and 12 of the first series refer. Therefore in cases which pertain to both censures, the censure reserved in a special mode is contracted.¹

b. Clerics and laymen contract the censure who usurp the goods of the Church, by authoritatively occupying them as owed to themselves by right, or who impede them from being received by those to whom they pertain by right, by occupying them as if pertaining to themselves and converting them to their own uses. Clerics incur the censure if they even only consent to these actions.

c. In this matter they dispute whether all usurpations are punished by this censure, or only authoritative ones, namely those which are done through public authority. From the declaration of the holy see, thieves and robbers do not incur this censure.²

d. Finally, those also incur this censure who have bought goods of this kind from usurpers or have acquired them under another title (donation, inheritance, legacy, etc.).³

¹ Holy Office, July 8, 1874.

² Holy Office, March 9, 1870.

³ Holy Office, July 8, 1894.

100. What ecclesiastical goods. 1. Ecclesiastical goods are here understood to be the goods of all places which are called sacred or pious, provided they have been erected by ecclesiastical authority, even if their goods are administered by lay persons.

Ecclesiastical goods are not pious legacies or other goods donated to the Church which have not yet been accepted by the Church or duly acquired, nor lay chaplaincies, although not even these can be alienated at will.¹ But goods which pertain to institutes of men and women, whether approved by the holy see or only diocesan, are ecclesiastical, which cannot be alienated without license of the holy see; and those alienating them thus incur excommunication.²

2. Nevertheless, not all ecclesiastical goods indiscriminately, but only immovable goods and precious movable goods (which can be preserved by being kept), are prohibited from being alienated without consulting the holy see.

a. Immovable goods are judged to be not only estates and buildings, but also those things which are held by the land, such as mines, fruit-bearing trees or things necessary for the estate, rights (the right of hunting and fishing) and servitudes, revenues, and money destined by donors for acquiring estates or precious movable goods.

b. Precious movable goods are judged to be gold or silver vessels, abundant libraries, ornaments which excel by antiquity or workmanship, etc., provided they are not of slight value. But goods are judged to be of slight value which do not exceed the sum of 300 florins, or 500 marks, or 600 francs.³

But precious movable goods in order to this law are not judged to be: money, unless it has been given for buying immovable goods or precious movable goods; bonds and shares, which scarcely differ from money; notable relics, which are less properly called precious movable goods; old furnishings, which by custom can be alienated for procuring new ones equally precious; nor fruits and goods which cannot be preserved by being kept: for these are permitted to be alienated by this constitution itself.

¹ S. C. C., February 8, 1871. Cf. Acta s. sedis VI. 476.

² S. C. de Prop. Fide, January 15, 1903.

³ S. C. Epp. et Reg., May 1, 1840. The sum of 25 gold pieces, which in this decree the congregation mentions from older responses (from 1611 and 1698), with the value of money changed, is now rightly judged equivalent to the sum placed above.

101. Actions prohibited under censure are alienation and the corresponding reception or acquisition, presumptuous, of ecclesiastical goods. By the name of alienation is understood any contract by which the right of ownership, or of use, or of usufruct, is transferred to another, or in any way diminished or burdened. Actions of this kind are:

a. Sale, exchange (giving in payment), donation, hereditary transmission (Vererbung), etc., by which ownership is transferred to another;

b. Pledging, hypothecation, imposition of servitude, etc., by which goods of the Church are burdened;

c. Infeudation (Lehensgebung), lease beyond three years, emphyteusis, etc., by which useful ownership is transferred to another;

d. Compromise, settlement, remission of servitude, cession of suit, etc., by which rights are ceded.

a. If an ecclesiastical good (a house or field) had to be leased for a longer time, the administrator, to avoid the censure, would have to reserve to himself the right of rescinding the contract every three years. A promise to renew the contract after three years have passed does not induce the censure.

b. To incur the censure it is required that the alienation be perfected from each side. Therefore if the alienation of an ecclesiastical good is made under reservation of apostolic approval, according to the opinion of many excommunication is not incurred, provided the contract is not put into execution before the apostolic license arrives: for what is still in the dominion of the seller cannot be said to have been alienated. In like manner, where sale is not perfected except by delivery of the thing, the censure is not incurred before the sale has been perfected by delivery of the thing; but where sale is perfected by the consent alone of the parties, the censure is incurred already before delivery of the thing.

c. Whether alienations made between churches or pious places are subject to the censure is disputed. D'Annibale and Ballerini deny this: for the constitution Ambitiosae by this prohibition intends to guard against detriment to divine worship, because ecclesiastical goods pass into the ownership of lay persons; but in an alienation of this kind, which is made between churches, divine worship suffers no detriment. Nevertheless the decree of S. C. C., January 24, 1632, stands against the denying opinion.

1. Ioannes a Deo, a most pious physician, partly from his own patrimony, partly from donations spontaneously made to him, partly from donations made to him at his request, founded an immense hospital, in which a thousand poor persons are admitted and cared for altogether gratis. That the good of souls also might be promoted, Ioannes was accustomed to call the Capuchin Fathers from a neighboring convent, that they might hear the confessions of the sick and have a sermon for them on Sundays and feast days. Then also, from the neighboring house of the Sisters of Charity, he often called Sisters, that they might offer help to the sick women. But behold, Ioannes dies, and his son receives the hospital by inheritance from his father. Since he also is a physician and equally pious as his father, he undertakes to continue the pious work. But the pastor of the place brings suit against him, contending that the hospital is a good ecclesiastical from its institution, and parochial, since it is situated in his parish; and therefore that it pertains to him.

Q. 1. Whether the Church has dominion of goods? 2. What as to the case?

R. To the first. Cf. I. M. 869. - To the second. The pastor in the case seems altogether deceived. For from the fact that this sort of work was instituted from a pious end and with the purpose of charity and mercy, it certainly does not follow that that hospital is an ecclesiastical good. Otherwise, if a layman in his own house received poor boys, that he might teach them the rudiments of the Christian faith, and if he destined the whole house or a part of it to this pious work, by that very fact he would then lose the dominion and ownership of the house, which is absurd. But from the fact that Ioannes called the Capuchin Fathers and the Sisters of Charity, that in the aforesaid hospital they might exercise works of mercy, whether corporal or spiritual, neither does it thence follow that the aforesaid hospital is an ecclesiastical good. Finally, this certainly cannot be drawn from the fact that the aforesaid hospital was founded from the patrimony of Ioannes himself. Perhaps the pastor can affirm that only from the fact that it was founded from offerings and donations of the faithful spontaneously made to Ioannes, or at the instance of Ioannes himself. But even this foundation is altogether weak. For, the offering and donation having been made to Ioannes, the thing offered and donated was now Ioannes's; although the offering and donation was made under a mode, or burden, of founding a hospital, and for the pious purpose of helping the poor. For from this head it follows only that Ioannes could not dispose at will of the accepted offerings and donations; but it does not follow that the founded hospital is not his, but is an ecclesiastical good, proper to the pastor of the place.

A sacred place is indeed distinguished, first, and it is a church, which becomes sacred either by the solemn consecration of the bishop, or even by the simple blessing of a priest. A cemetery is also a sacred place, which becomes sacred by blessing. Second, a religious place, in which, by the authority of the bishop, works of piety and mercy are exercised. Places of this sort are subject to the authority of bishops, and enjoy the immunity of asylum. Hence, for a religious place it is required that in it a work of religion or charity be exercised, and that it be erected by the authority of the Supreme Pontiff or of the bishop, as, for example, a monastery or a confraternity of laymen, which are destined to a work of religion; an orphanage or a hospital, which serve for a work of charity. C. Ad haec 4, de Relig. domib. Wherefore a sacred place, a religious place, is not an orphanage or hospital erected by laymen, with the bishop's authority in no way intervening, nor a private oratory in a private house; and for this reason these are rather accustomed to be called pious places from their destination to a pious work; and consequently they are not subject to the jurisdiction of the Ordinary, nor do they enjoy the immunity of asylum. Schmalz., l. 3, t. 36, n. 24; t. 40, n. 19.

The bishop can visit sacred and religious places, Trent, s. 22, c. 8, de R., s. 25, c. 8, de R., with the exception, however, of the houses of regulars, by privilege of exemption. But truly pious places he cannot visit, except in the cases expressed in law. S. C. C. apud Fagnan., C. Ad haec 4, de Relig. dom., n. 54. Nevertheless, the founder having died, he can inspect whether all things proceed according to the will of the deceased, C. 7, de Testam., and therefore require the accounts of administration yearly, unless either they are under the immediate protection of kings, Trent, s. 22, c. 9, de R., or something else was provided on the threshold of the foundation, from Clem. 2, pr., de Relig. domib., Trent, l. c.; Schmalz., l. 3, t. 40, n. 18.

Therefore the hospital erected by Ioannes, although it can be held as a pious place, is by no means a sacred place, a religious place; and as a private oratory, although it is a pious place, nevertheless does not cease to be private property, so also the hospital of Ioannes is altogether private property, and neither the pastor nor the bishop can claim in it any right of dominion and ownership, apart from the other rights altogether distinct which have already been indicated, by which the bishop, and not the pastor, enjoys. The pastor has only the right and obligation of administering the sacraments there, since it is situated within the boundaries of his own parish, and the place is not exempt. Therefore let him hear the confessions of the sick and of the dying, let him minister viaticum and extreme unction, let him offer assistance to the sick in the last agony of life; and both Ioannes a Deo and afterward his pious son, and also the Capuchin Fathers, and also the Sisters of Charity, will rejoice altogether over this zeal of his, and will congratulate him. - Cf. I. M. 869.

2. Polydorus, a pastor, neglecting the poor, gathered a notable sum of money from stipends of Masses and other honoraria, from a benefice, from a certain pension received from the Government, from the revenues of his patrimony, and from sparingness in food; he distributed it partly among various relatives and friends, and partly reserved it for old age. But seized by sudden death, he was taken from the living without a testament. Wherefore all those things which are left by Polydorus are divided among the heirs.

Q. 1. What sort is the dominion of clerics? 2. Whether and how did Polydorus sin? 3. Whether the heirs are held to restore that reserved money to the poor?

R. To the first. Cf. I. M. 870. To the second. Polydorus did not sin of himself by spending among relatives and friends the money received from stipends of Masses and other honoraria, and likewise from the sparingness employed in his own sustenance; for these goods are his, nor as to their use does he have any special obligation. Likewise he did not sin by distributing the money proceeding from that Government pension. For, since this pension, as appears sufficiently from the case, is not by title of benefice, but by another title, which in the case is not indicated, it also is his, nor of itself does it bring any special obligation. The same must be said a fortiori about the revenues of his patrimony distributed among friends and relatives. But he sinned gravely of himself by spending similarly the revenues of the ecclesiastical benefice while neglecting the poor. For a beneficiary indeed has perfect dominion of these revenues, so that he can use them freely for honorable sustenance; nevertheless he has a grave obligation, but at least probably not from justice, of spending the surplus on the poor, or on pious causes. I. M. 870; Lugo, Resp. Mor., l. 5, d. 11.

To the third. They are not held. For Polydorus at least probably did not sin against justice by not spending on the poor the surplus of the revenues of the benefice, concerning which alone there can be question. Therefore much less can the heirs be held from justice. For the obligation of Polydorus was not real but merely personal; but the heirs do not have this personal obligation. Besides, in the case there is truly the greatest difficulty of knowing whether the money left by Polydorus proceeds from the surplus revenues of the benefice, or from other goods. And although this perhaps can be affirmed of some quantity, it is very difficult that it be established that Polydorus did not also secretly give sufficient alms. I. M. 871; G. 508, 509.

750. Things to be noted. - I. Some goods of the Church were plundered by the Government itself, others by private persons.

II. Pius VII entered into a convention on August 15, 1801, with Napoleon, First Consul, by which he freed the acquirers of ecclesiastical goods from restitution.

III. The Sacred Penitentiary, in a rescript to the Most Illustrious D. Bouvier, March 20, 1818, declared thus: The Sacred Penitentiary, by express apostolic authority, declares to the consulting petitioner that ecclesiastical goods occupied by the Government before the convention entered into in the year 1801 between the Holy See and the Gallican Government are in the full power of the acquirers.

IV. Pius VII directed a Brief to the Bishop of Poitiers on October 20, 1821, in which he declared that the concession of goods previously made by the Supreme Pontiff can be applied to all ecclesiastical goods previously usurped by the Government, whether it had already alienated them before the convention of the year 1801, or had not yet alienated them then.

751. Resolves. - 1. Those who usurped ecclesiastical goods by their own authority sinned gravely, and are still held to restitution; for they are thieves, nor has any condonation been made for them.

2. But those who occupied those goods with the civil law favoring them sinned, and were held to restitution before the convention of the year 1801, but not afterward, by the concession of the Supreme Pontiff.

3. Those who after this pact accepted goods of the Church not yet alienated, sinned against justice, and were obligated to restitution, because by force of the convention the concession had not been made except for goods already alienated ¹.

¹ This resolution seems, from the premises in the preceding number, to be understood of goods which someone acquired from the government after the year 1801 and before the Brief of the year 1821.

172. Second principle: Clerics are bound under grave obligation, at least from ecclesiastical law and charity, to spend the superfluous revenues of ecclesiastical goods on pious uses. It is certain.

It is explained. Here there is question only of revenues, not however of the goods themselves; for since the Church has made these goods her own, clerics cannot alienate ecclesiastical estates without injustice. But from these revenues clerics can turn to their own use whatever is required for honorable support, since benefices were instituted primarily for this end. But what remains is called superfluous; and these things, according to all, must be spent on pious uses from the law of the Church and from charity; whether also from justice or not will be said below.

195. Errors. (A) Certain heretics denied that the right belongs to the Church of acquiring temporal goods, because she is a spiritual society; among whom are: Arnaldus Brixinensis, in the twelfth century; the Waldenses, in the thirteenth century; Marsilius of Padua and Wyclif, in the fourteenth century; and also many Protestants, under Luther as leader, in the sixteenth century. They contended, namely, that "it is against Sacred Scripture that ecclesiastical men have possessions; that Pope Sylvester and Emperor Constantine erred by endowing the Church; that the Pope, with all his clerics having possessions, are heretics, because they have possessions, and besides all consenting to them, namely secular lords and other laymen."²

² In Denzing., nn. 486, 509, 512.

(B) But not a few modern Politicians attack the same right in a twofold way: (a) others, the bolder, hold that the Church has no right of possessing temporal things unless this power has been conceded to her; and that this faculty, once conceded, can be revoked at will, and goods previously acquired can be snatched away. (b) Others, more moderate, indeed confess that there belongs to the Church a certain right of possessing and administering temporal things, but that it must be limited by the State in the manner in which the State itself judges this opportune.

198. Notions. - Here by a moral person is understood an aggregation of several into one moral body, by which it comes about that they are able collectively to possess goods in common, so that they now pertain to the body, not to the individual members.¹ But if it is acknowledged by the authority of the legislator, it civilly obtains juridical existence and diverse rights, and thus becomes a juridical person (rechtspersoon).

¹ The definition is also verified of foundations, as they say, direct foundations, or concerning goods given to a work or destined end: then all in whose favor the foundation is erected possess collectively, for example, all citizens of a city if there is question of a charitable foundation. Nor is it an obstacle that a collegial person can exist without any members, because that is a fiction of law: namely, it is feigned to continue so that it does not need a new erection if members arrive.

By reason of the end toward which they conspire, some moral persons are civil, which immediately pursue a temporal good; others ecclesiastical or religious, which pursue spiritual and eternal goods. Likewise they are public or private, according as the good to which they tend is common and public, or particular and private: thus the State, provinces, and municipalities are public societies; colleges of workers or industrial societies in the actual constitution of civil society are private.

199. Principles. - I. Public civil societies exist by natural right itself and have the right of possessing goods. For men need the assistance of public society, and permanent possession of goods is necessary to society for attaining its end.

The dominion of the republic, by reason of goods, is distinguished as twofold:

a) public dominion, consisting of those things which serve public use and cannot be the object of private dominion, such as public roads, rivers, seashores, fortified citadels, and other things of this kind (C.C., a. 538, 540);

b) private or national dominion of the State, consisting of private goods which the republic possesses and which can be alienated and come to private persons, such as places left by the sea, islands formed in navigable rivers, immovable goods which lack an owner, abandoned inheritances, suppressed roads, or other things which cease to be of public dominion, forests or public buildings which are in the power of the government. This distinction, proportion being observed, is valid concerning the dominion of provinces and municipalities.

II. Private societies can be formed from the free consent of citizens and can possess goods. For men have a natural right of association to a private end which is an honorable good; but if possession of goods is necessary for this end, these also they can possess collegially.

Therefore such societies do not have their being or their right of possessing from the State; nor can they be prohibited or restricted by the State, or subjected to various conditions, except by reason of the common good insofar as is necessary. Although there will more easily be reasons for intervening in these than in the dominions of private persons.

III. The Church, not only by right of nature but from divine right from her founder Christ, independently of the State, has the right of possessing temporal goods, because it is necessary for her end. This is proved in the treatise on the Church,² and is enunciated in can. 1495 and 1499.

² Cf. Wicleff prop. 10, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36 condemned; C. Trid. sess. 22 de ref. c. 11; Pius IX, in the bull Apost. Sedis; Syll. prop. 26 and 27.

But other lesser religious societies can exist dependently upon ecclesiastical power and enjoy the capacity of possessing (ibid.); of these some are collegial societies of persons, others non-collegial, such as benefices. Thus according to the norm of can. 100:

"§ 1. The Catholic Church and the Apostolic See have the character of a moral person from divine ordination itself; the remaining inferior moral persons in the Church obtain it either from the prescription of law itself (as Religious Institutes or religious houses), or from the special concession of a competent ecclesiastical Superior given by formal decree for a religious or charitable end.

§ 2. A collegial moral person cannot be constituted except from at least three physical persons.

§ 3. Moral persons, whether collegial or non-collegial, are equated to minors."

200. Conclusions. - 1. Therefore the Church's full right, independent of the State, of possessing temporal goods is certain. Yet this is not everywhere formally acknowledged by the State, although Catholics can rather often use general legislation concerning societies. In Belgium, the right of dominion is acknowledged to the cathedral church, to the fabrics of parochial churches, and to diocesan seminaries.

2. From moral philosophy it is established that public societies exist by natural right and possess goods; but by civil law that dominion ought to be confirmed, protected, and rightly ordered. Therefore it is no more licit to steal public goods than the goods of private persons; but as to common goods which citizens can enjoy, the conditions established by legitimate authority must be observed, so that in this way the rights of all may remain entire.

3. Private societies also are endowed by nature with the faculty of possessing goods, just as with the right of existing. Therefore the State cannot take away or restrict that right, except insofar as the common good demands it. For the State exists to promote the good of citizens, not to destroy private activity; for which reason by civil law private societies ought rather to be promoted than repressed, provided there is absent from them whatever openly disagrees with morality, with justice, and with the safety of the republic. Thus Leo XIII, enc. Rerum novarum.

In the Netherlands, Austria, Switzerland, England, and the United States of America, the laws are favorable for forming and acknowledging societies; likewise in Germany corporate law is highly evolved, but only the law can confer capacity upon religious societies. In Spain and Portugal, the authority of law must intervene so that a moral person may be constituted. In France, civil law is much more difficult for acknowledging moral persons, especially for religious.

In Belgium, societies instituted for the sake of profit are acknowledged (C.C., a. 1832-1834), especially commercial societies (C. Com. t. IX), professional unions (law of March 31, 1898), indeed from the recent law of June 27, 1921 also societies not instituted for profit.

Titius, the verger of a certain church, lets seats to the faithful for the parish priest. Caia had rented one of the principal seats, but she passed the summer season in distant regions. According to custom, other members of the faithful occupied Caia’s seat in her absence. Julia comes to Titius seeking a seat to be rented during the summer; he denied that any was vacant except Caia’s seat, which she could have, in Caia’s absence, upon payment of a fourth part of the whole annual price and without Julia’s name being put in place of Caia’s. Titius retained for himself the money paid by Julia as the fruit of his industry, as he says. But when the parish priest discovered Titius’s transaction by accident, he proposed the theological question whether he had acted justly. Hence it is asked:

Certain Catholics in a certain town wished a certain religious Order to have a church in their town; indeed, after a large sum of money had been collected, they bought land on which a house and church might be built and handed it over to that Order by a gift between living persons. The diocesan bishop, however, although at first he neither gave nor denied consent, after the land had been handed over and the matter had been discussed with the canons, absolutely refused to give consent, so that there was no hope that the Order would come to the town. When these things became known, the donors expected that the land would be returned to them; the price of it after it had been sold, however, was retained by the Order. Hence it is asked: