Article VI: On the Dominion of Moral Persons

198. Notions. - Here by a moral person is understood an aggregation of several into one moral body, by which it comes about that they are able collectively to possess goods in common, so that they now pertain to the body, not to the individual members.¹ But if it is acknowledged by the authority of the legislator, it civilly obtains juridical existence and diverse rights, and thus becomes a juridical person (rechtspersoon).

¹ The definition is also verified of foundations, as they say, direct foundations, or concerning goods given to a work or destined end: then all in whose favor the foundation is erected possess collectively, for example, all citizens of a city if there is question of a charitable foundation. Nor is it an obstacle that a collegial person can exist without any members, because that is a fiction of law: namely, it is feigned to continue so that it does not need a new erection if members arrive.

By reason of the end toward which they conspire, some moral persons are civil, which immediately pursue a temporal good; others ecclesiastical or religious, which pursue spiritual and eternal goods. Likewise they are public or private, according as the good to which they tend is common and public, or particular and private: thus the State, provinces, and municipalities are public societies; colleges of workers or industrial societies in the actual constitution of civil society are private.

199. Principles. - I. Public civil societies exist by natural right itself and have the right of possessing goods. For men need the assistance of public society, and permanent possession of goods is necessary to society for attaining its end.

The dominion of the republic, by reason of goods, is distinguished as twofold:

a) public dominion, consisting of those things which serve public use and cannot be the object of private dominion, such as public roads, rivers, seashores, fortified citadels, and other things of this kind (C.C., a. 538, 540);

b) private or national dominion of the State, consisting of private goods which the republic possesses and which can be alienated and come to private persons, such as places left by the sea, islands formed in navigable rivers, immovable goods which lack an owner, abandoned inheritances, suppressed roads, or other things which cease to be of public dominion, forests or public buildings which are in the power of the government. This distinction, proportion being observed, is valid concerning the dominion of provinces and municipalities.

II. Private societies can be formed from the free consent of citizens and can possess goods. For men have a natural right of association to a private end which is an honorable good; but if possession of goods is necessary for this end, these also they can possess collegially.

Therefore such societies do not have their being or their right of possessing from the State; nor can they be prohibited or restricted by the State, or subjected to various conditions, except by reason of the common good insofar as is necessary. Although there will more easily be reasons for intervening in these than in the dominions of private persons.

III. The Church, not only by right of nature but from divine right from her founder Christ, independently of the State, has the right of possessing temporal goods, because it is necessary for her end. This is proved in the treatise on the Church,² and is enunciated in can. 1495 and 1499.

² Cf. Wicleff prop. 10, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36 condemned; C. Trid. sess. 22 de ref. c. 11; Pius IX, in the bull Apost. Sedis; Syll. prop. 26 and 27.

But other lesser religious societies can exist dependently upon ecclesiastical power and enjoy the capacity of possessing (ibid.); of these some are collegial societies of persons, others non-collegial, such as benefices. Thus according to the norm of can. 100:

"§ 1. The Catholic Church and the Apostolic See have the character of a moral person from divine ordination itself; the remaining inferior moral persons in the Church obtain it either from the prescription of law itself (as Religious Institutes or religious houses), or from the special concession of a competent ecclesiastical Superior given by formal decree for a religious or charitable end.

§ 2. A collegial moral person cannot be constituted except from at least three physical persons.

§ 3. Moral persons, whether collegial or non-collegial, are equated to minors."

200. Conclusions. - 1. Therefore the Church's full right, independent of the State, of possessing temporal goods is certain. Yet this is not everywhere formally acknowledged by the State, although Catholics can rather often use general legislation concerning societies. In Belgium, the right of dominion is acknowledged to the cathedral church, to the fabrics of parochial churches, and to diocesan seminaries.

2. From moral philosophy it is established that public societies exist by natural right and possess goods; but by civil law that dominion ought to be confirmed, protected, and rightly ordered. Therefore it is no more licit to steal public goods than the goods of private persons; but as to common goods which citizens can enjoy, the conditions established by legitimate authority must be observed, so that in this way the rights of all may remain entire.

3. Private societies also are endowed by nature with the faculty of possessing goods, just as with the right of existing. Therefore the State cannot take away or restrict that right, except insofar as the common good demands it. For the State exists to promote the good of citizens, not to destroy private activity; for which reason by civil law private societies ought rather to be promoted than repressed, provided there is absent from them whatever openly disagrees with morality, with justice, and with the safety of the republic. Thus Leo XIII, enc. Rerum novarum.

In the Netherlands, Austria, Switzerland, England, and the United States of America, the laws are favorable for forming and acknowledging societies; likewise in Germany corporate law is highly evolved, but only the law can confer capacity upon religious societies. In Spain and Portugal, the authority of law must intervene so that a moral person may be constituted. In France, civil law is much more difficult for acknowledging moral persons, especially for religious.

In Belgium, societies instituted for the sake of profit are acknowledged (C.C., a. 1832-1834), especially commercial societies (C. Com. t. IX), professional unions (law of March 31, 1898), indeed from the recent law of June 27, 1921 also societies not instituted for profit.