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External Profession of the Faith
Each work's treatment of this topic, whole and in its own order, in its own column. Paragraph numbers link to the passage in its place in the manual. Back to the topic page, where the passages of 1917 Code of Canon Law, Spirago on this topic are also listed.
Side by side within this topic The duty of professing the faith · Sharing in non-Catholic worship
Noldin, Summa of Moral Theology
Vol. II, Part First. On the Precept…, Book First. On the Precept…, Question Second. On the Ne…, Article Fourth. On the Precept of External Faith
16. Whether there exists a divine precept and when it obliges. 1. There exists a grave obligation of confessing faith externally, even with danger to life; this is established from Sacred Scripture: Everyone therefore who shall confess Me before men, I also will confess him before My Father who is in heaven; but he who shall deny Me before men, I also will deny him before My Father who is in heaven.1 If you confess with your mouth the Lord Jesus, and believe in your heart, you will be saved: for with the heart belief is unto justice, but with the mouth confession is made unto salvation.2
Since this precept also is affirmative, it is asked when the obligation of confessing faith externally urges. The question, however, is concerning formal confession of faith, which is made with the intention that internal faith be outwardly manifested, not concerning material confession, which is made through the observation of a precept that contains a manifestation of faith.
- The divine precept of formally confessing faith obliges:
a. When the honor of God or of Christ requires external confession, where namely from the omission of confession great detriment of divine honor follows, but from confession great honor accrues to God or to Christ; and this happens especially: a. if someone is asked about his faith by public authority in a cause of faith; b. if the doctrine of faith is mocked or if sacred things are violated.
a. If someone is asked by public authority in a cause of faith about his faith, namely whether he is a Catholic, or what he thinks about some truth of faith, whether this happens publicly or privately, he is bound to confess his faith without ambiguity, even with danger to life,3 because the omission of profession among unbelievers would greatly diminish esteem for God and for the true religion; on the contrary, through public confession the true faith is confirmed and propagated. But if some private unbeliever or heretic asks someone about his faith, of itself he is not bound to confess it, but can be silent or evade the question in another way.
b. If in your presence the doctrine of faith or of the Church is exposed to mockery or blasphemies, you are bound not only to profess the faith, but also, if you judge yourself sufficient for this, to defend it; and if in your presence the Most Holy Eucharist or sacred images or relics are violated, you are bound to manifest yourself as a Catholic and to restrain the injuries, unless you foresee that your efforts will be of no profit.4
b. When the utility of the neighbor requires external confession, where namely from the omission of confession the faithful would fall away from the faith and unbelievers would be confirmed in their error; but, on the contrary, from confession unbelievers would be converted and the faithful confirmed in the true faith.
Whether an adult who receives baptism or returns to the Church ought publicly to profess the faith. Every Christian, by the will of Christ, ought visibly to adhere to the Church; but he adheres visibly to the Church through profession of faith. This obligation of outwardly manifesting the faith endures throughout the course of life; but it is fulfilled by this very fact, that the precepts are observed which contain the external profession of faith, such as hearing Mass, receiving the sacraments, etc.
a. Hence, outside the case of necessity, it is not permitted to baptize an adult or admit him to conversion secretly, with only the priest knowing, but this ought to happen publicly before others, at least two witnesses. Therefore the Church prescribes that the abjuration of heresy which is required of new converts be made before two witnesses, and that the completed conversion be inserted into the parochial books, both so that satisfaction may be made to the obligation of professing the faith, and so that the converted person may be subject to the jurisdiction of the Church in the external forum.
b. Baptism received or conversion completed may indeed be hidden for a time for a grave reason, without being made public, provided the new convert does nothing by which he professes a false sect; thus, as history witnesses, hidden Christians lived in the court of the Roman emperors; but meanwhile he is excused from the positive precepts either of God or of the Church on account of grave inconvenience. Yet concealment for a long time is illicit, both because the obligation of professing the faith urges, and because in practice it cannot happen that circumstances will not soon occur in which the convert must deny the faith and externally profess the sect. Therefore it has been established that a Mohammedan who on account of danger to life wishes to be and remain a hidden Christian cannot be admitted to baptism, but he ought to transfer himself to places where he can publicly profess the Christian religion.5
c. In a case of necessity, where namely one dying, for a grave cause, refuses public conversion to the faith, he can be received into the Church altogether secretly by any priest, so that provision may be made for his salvation, unless the reason of preventing scandal or of promoting the salvation of the neighbor requires otherwise, as in a man of great dignity and authority. But even in this case the conversion can be made before only two witnesses, who, if there is need, can afterwards make the matter public.6
2 Rom. 10:9 ff. Cf. 2 Tim. 2:12.
3 Proposition 18, condemned by Innocent XI: If someone is questioned by public authority, I counsel that he sincerely confess the faith as glorious to God and to the faith; to be silent I do not condemn as sinful of itself.
4 Sporer-Bierbaum, I, tract. 2, n. 43.
5 S. C. de Prop. Fide, 28 May 1635.
6 Cf. Lehmkuhl, Casus conscientiae, I, n. 182 ff.
17. By ecclesiastical law, to certain persons, both ecclesiastical and lay, in certain circumstances profession of faith is prescribed. The cause of this precept is judged to be grave, namely lest spiritual or temporal rule and the office of teaching others be committed to an unbelieving or heretical man. Yet in many regions this precept, at least in part, has been abolished by desuetude.1
1 Concerning who must emit the profession of faith according to the form prescribed by Pius IV, with the addition made by Pius IX, see Lehmkuhl, I, n. 296; Aichner, Compendium iuris ecclesiastici, Brixen: Weger, 1900, §150, 3.
Slater, Manual of Moral Theology
Vol. I, Bk. V, Pt. I, Chapter II. External Profession of the Faith
WE do not fulfil our duty as Christians and Catholics if we keep our religious faith concealed within our own breasts. Our duty to God, to our neighbour, and to ourselves sometimes requires that we should make open profession of the faith which we hold. When our public profession of the faith would render great honour to God, or prevent great dishonour being shown him, or prevent the true religion from being publicly despised and contemned, we must, even at the risk of great temporal loss, boldly come forward and proclaim our religious belief. We must be ready to do the same if our example would gain others to God or prevent them from falling away from him; for charity towards our neighbour sometimes requires that we should sacrifice our temporal interests for the spiritual good of others. Again, if we never made open profession of our faith, there would be grave danger of its becoming weak and altogether dying away; so we must sometimes perform external acts of our religion in order to keep the faith alive within us. The necessity of doing this is shown by the gradual falling away from their religion of Catholics who have no priests, and no churches wherein to practise their religious duties (Can. 1325, sec. 1).
The positive law of the Church requires that a solemn profession of faith be made by those who are about to be baptized, or received into the Church, or at least in their name if they are unable to make it for themselves. The occasions and persons who are bound by canon law to make profession of faith are laid down in Canons 1406-1408.
It is gravely sinful to deny the faith, or to do or say anything which is equivalent to a denial of it, or which shows that we are ashamed of it. ‘‘ For he that shall be ashamed of me and of my words, of him the Son of man shall be ashamed, when he shall come in his majesty, and that of his Father, and of the holy angels.”1 However, the obligation of professing the faith is affirmative, and so always binds but not for always. In other words, we may never deny the faith, but we are only bound to profess it openly when the divine, or natural, or positive law require it. A man might travel for months among heathen or heretics without making his faith known to anyone. As a rule, it is better openly to profess one’s religion, so that all may know that we are Catholics; but under certain circumstances it might be lawful to conceal one’s conversion to the faith for a time.
A Catholic who on being asked denies that he is one does not necessarily deny the faith. Such an answer might merely be a fitting reply to an impertinent question. It will, however, be a denial of the faith when the circumstances require that an open profession of it should be made. A Catholic who flies from persecution, or disguises himself, or eats meat on days of abstinence in order to avoid detection, does not thereby deny the faith. It is better never to enter non-Catholic places of worship, or be present at non-Catholic religious functions, and this is of obligation whenever such acts would be interpreted as countenancing a false religion, or as showing a spirit of indifferentism, or whenever there would be scandal or danger of perversion, or whenever lawful authority forbids them. Otherwise, merely to enter an heretical place of worship, or to be present at a non-Catholic religious function, such as a burial or a marriage, without taking part in the ceremony, is not sinful, and may be permitted for a good cause (Can. 1258).
1 Luke ix 26.
All communication with non-Catholics in their religious rites and ceremonies is as a rule forbidden to Catholics. To take part in such rites and ceremonies is to take part in a form of religious worship which is not approved by God and by the Church; it is a virtual adhesion to a false form of worship, or it shows approbation of it. A Catholic, then, may not act as a sponsor in a non-Catholic baptism, or take an active part in 1a non-Catholic marriage or funeral. On certain rare occasions, as when in danger of death and a Catholic priest cannot be had, a Catholic may accept the ministrations of a schismatic or heretical priest, as was done by some Catholic Japanese officers who were captured by the Russians and shot in the Russo-Japanese War.
Inasmuch as: heretics and schismatics are excommunicated, the Church forbids prayers, suffrages, or Masses to be publicly offered for them (Can. 2262).
Experience shows that very little good and much harm may come from disputes and controversies about religion. Ordinarily such disputes leave the parties concerned more obstinate than ever in their convictions.
Grave scandal, too, and great dishonour to God result from the public and contemptuous denials of sacred truths and the ridicule thrown on them in the heat of controversy. ‘The mind of the Church is that, as far as possible, and except for the necessary defence of the faith, such disputes should be avoided whether they be public or private (Can. 1325, sec. 3).
Wouters, Manual of Moral Theology
Vol. I, Bk. II, Tr. I, Diss. I, Pt. I, Sect. II, Chapter II. On the Precept of the External Act, or Profession of Faith
I. The external act, or profession of faith, is sometimes prescribed. This is clear: 1. From Sacred Scripture. "If thou confess with thy mouth the Lord Jesus, and believe in thy heart that God has raised Him from the dead, thou shalt be saved. For with the heart we believe unto justice, but with the mouth confession is made unto salvation."1 2. From the fact that the Church was instituted by her Author as an external, visible society of believers. But such a society carries with it that believers also profess the faith externally. 3. The majesty of God revealing requires this, for external adherence also is owed to Him. How greatly the obligation of sometimes professing the faith presses is clear, for example, from the fact that the Sacred Congregation de Propaganda Fide, on May 28, 1635, responded that "a Mohammedan who wishes, on account of danger to life, to be a hidden Christian and to remain such cannot be admitted to baptism, but must transfer himself to places where he can publicly profess the Christian religion."2
II. The external act, or profession of faith, generally obliges the faithful "whenever their silence, evasiveness, or manner of acting would carry with it an implicit denial of faith, contempt of religion, injury to God, or scandal of neighbor" (can. 1325, § 1). Specifically, it obliges:
- By reason of the precept of faith itself:
a) When a baptized infant attains the use of reason, or an adult embraces the faith or returns to it after public departure.
b) Several times in life, as is gathered from the arguments adduced under I. Besides, a man who lives Christianly abundantly satisfies this obligation, since hundreds of times he places acts which contain a profession of faith at least in an act exercised.
c) When the honor of God as Author of faith must be defended (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 3, a. 2); this has place: 1. if someone is questioned by public authority. Hence proposition 18 was condemned by Innocent XI: "If someone is questioned by public power, I counsel that he frankly confess the faith as glorious to God and the faith; to be silent I do not condemn as sinful per se."3 But "if a prince by a general law orders the faithful to disclose themselves, by wearing a sign, or presenting themselves, or otherwise, they are not bound, since no one is bound to speak the truth unless he has been specially asked" (St. Alphonsus, II, 14, 50), that is, the obligation of professing the faith presses only when someone is summoned before the law. Make exception if civil authority questions someone about the faith contrary to the prescription of law. Nor is the case present if someone is questioned for a merely political end, for example on the occasion of a census of the people. 2. If the faith is treated contemptuously and someone can conveniently defend it, for example by refuting objections that have been brought forward (St. Alphonsus, II, 11). 3. If, considering the circumstances, omission of profession would be taken for denial of the faith, as if, when several persons have been questioned about the faith and others are professing it, you were silent (St. Alphonsus, II, 14, 40); likewise if, when you were questioned about the faith, another, while you were silent, answered for you that you were not a Catholic. I said considering the circumstances, because per se there is no obligation of professing the faith if someone is questioned by a private person (St. Alphonsus, II, 13, 20).
d) When, unless someone professes the faith, there is grave danger that he will deny the faith.
e) When profession of faith has been prescribed by the Church. Now:
alpha) It must be made by an adult to be baptized4 and, if an infant is to be baptized, by the sponsors;5 likewise by priests in their ordination6 and bishops in their consecration;7 specifically, by a person past puberty who is to be baptized and who is converted from heresy or schism to the faith.8
beta) From can. 1406, those held to the obligation of making profession of faith, according to the formula9 approved by the Apostolic See, are:
Before the president or his delegate, those who are present at an Ecumenical or particular Council or at a diocesan Synod with either consultative or deliberative vote; but the president before the same Council or Synod.
Before the Dean of the Sacred College, the first Cardinals in the order of priests and of deacons, and the Camerlengo of the Holy Roman Church, those promoted to the cardinalitial dignity.
Before a delegate from the Apostolic See, those promoted to an episcopal see, even a nonresidential one, or to the governance of an abbey or prelature nullius, an Apostolic Vicariate, or an Apostolic Prefecture.
Before the cathedral Chapter, the Capitular Vicar.
Before the local Ordinary or his delegate and before the Chapter, those who have been promoted to a dignity or canonry.
Before the local Ordinary or his delegate and before the other consultors, those taken into the office of diocesan consultors.
Before the local Ordinary or his delegate, the Vicar General, parish priests, and those for whom provision has been made concerning any benefices, even manual benefices, having care of souls; the rector and professors of sacred theology, canon law, and philosophy in seminaries, at the beginning of each scholastic year or at least at the beginning of the office undertaken; all who are to be promoted to the order of subdiaconate; censors of books, of whom in can. 1393; priests appointed for hearing confessions and sacred preachers, before they are endowed with the faculty of exercising those offices.
Before the Ordinary or his delegate, the Rector of a University or Faculty; but before the Rector of a University or Faculty, or his delegate, all professors in a canonically erected University or Faculty, at the beginning of each scholastic year or at least at the beginning of the office undertaken; likewise those who, after examination has been made, are endowed with academic degrees.
Before the Chapter or Superior who appointed them, or their delegate, Superiors in clerical religions (can. 1406, § 1).
Those who, after having left the prior office, benefice, or dignity, obtain another office or benefice or dignity, even of the same species, must again make profession of faith according to the norm of this canon (can. 1406, § 2), that is, can. 1406, § 1.
gamma) From the decree of the Holy Office,10 the anti-modernist oath, prescribed by Pius X in the Motu Proprio Sacrorum Antistitum,11 must be made, until the Apostolic See establishes otherwise on this matter, and indeed according to the formula attached to the Motu Proprio, which, with their name signed, they shall give to their Ordinary:
Clerics to be initiated into major orders; to each of them beforehand let there be handed a copy both of the profession of faith and of the formula for taking the oath, so that they may know them accurately in advance, with the sanction, as below, for violation of the oath added.
Priests appointed for hearing confessions and sacred preachers, before they are endowed with the faculty of exercising those offices.12 These, however, are not bound when their faculties are prolonged or when they transfer to another diocese.
Parish priests, Canons, and Beneficiaries before entering into possession of the benefice.
Officials in episcopal curias and ecclesiastical tribunals, not excepting the Vicar General and judges.
Those chosen to deliver sermons during the time of Lent.
All officials in Roman Congregations or tribunals before the Cardinal Prefect or Secretary of the same Congregation or tribunal.
Moderators of religious families and Congregations before they enter office.
Doctors both of seminaries and of religious families, before they enter office.13
It is disputed whether those designated under 8 are bound to make the oath yearly. Now it seems it must be answered affirmatively; for the Holy Office declared14 that the prescriptions regarding the anti-modernist oath must remain in their full force until the Apostolic See establishes otherwise on this matter. But, considering the prescriptions regarding the anti-modernist oath, the said oath was to be made yearly by the aforesaid Doctors.15
Objection 1. The oath is intended as a complement of the profession of faith; and therefore, once the yearly profession of faith has been removed, it should likewise be held as removed. But the profession of faith must be made only at the beginning of the office undertaken (can. 1406, § 1, 7).
Response. The argument adduced seems sufficiently to prove that the reason of complement in the case should not be urged so strongly; in other words, that the anti-modernist oath must be urged even independently of the profession of faith. Besides, there is a special reason for requiring the oath, namely the combating of modernism, and this reason persists and presses, even if the profession of faith is omitted.
Objection 2. The declaration of the Holy Office can regard only the Motu Proprio Sacrorum Antistitum, which does not prescribe a yearly oath; but not the declaration of the Sacred Consistorial Congregation, which extends the sense of the said Motu Proprio to each year.
Response. Apart from the fact that it is in no way clear that the Motu Proprio does not prescribe a yearly oath, the declaration of the Holy Office is considered to regard the Motu Proprio as it had in fact been in force. But in fact it had been in force according to the norm of the declaration of the Sacred Consistorial Congregation, whether that declaration is extensive or comprehensive.
Note 1. One does not satisfy the obligation of making profession of faith, established by can. 1406, if he makes it through a procurator or before a layman (can. 1407).
Note 2. Any custom against the canons just cited is reprobated (can. 1408), that is, canons 1406 and 1407.
Note 3. One who, contrary to the prescription of can. 1406, neglects to make profession of faith without a just impediment is to be warned, with a suitable term also fixed beforehand; when this has elapsed, if he is contumacious, he is to be punished even by deprivation of office, benefice, dignity, or function; nor meanwhile does he make his own the fruits of the benefice, office, dignity, or function (can. 2403).
- By reason of the precept of another virtue, profession of faith obliges:
a) When by professing the faith someone would have hope of converting others to the faith, or by not professing it would be a scandal to others (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 3, a. 2, ad 3; St. Alphonsus, II, 11).
b) When by neglecting profession of faith someone would expose himself to grave danger of committing some sin other than one against faith itself; which will rarely have place.
1 Rom. 10:9 sq.; cf. Matt. 10:32 sq.
2 May 28, 1635 (Collectanea, n. 84); cf. Sacred Congregation de Propaganda Fide, June 26, 1790 (Collectanea, n. 602).
3 Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 1168.
4 Roman Ritual, title II, chapter 2, n. 32.
5 Roman Ritual, title II, chapter 2, n. 17.
6 Roman Pontifical, On the Ordination of a Priest.
7 Roman Pontifical, On the Consecration of a Bishop.
8 Roman Pontifical, Order for Reconciling an Apostate, Schismatic, or Heretic; cf. Instruction of the Holy Office to the Bishop of Philadelphia, July 20, 1859.
9 This formula is found at the beginning of the Code.
10 March 22, 1918 (Acta Apostolicae Sedis 1918, p. 136).
11 September 1, 1910 (Acta Apostolicae Sedis 1910, p. 655).
12 Thus the Sacred Consistorial Congregation, September 25, 1910 (Acta Apostolicae Sedis 1910, p. 740).
13 Motu Proprio Sacrorum Antistitum, September 1, 1910 (Acta Apostolicae Sedis 1910, p. 655); Sacred Consistorial Congregation, September 25, 1910 (Acta Apostolicae Sedis 1910, p. 740).
14 March 22, 1918 (Acta Apostolicae Sedis 1918, p. 136).
15 Sacred Consistorial Congregation, September 25, 1910.
McHugh–Callan, Moral Theology
Vol. I, Pt. II, Q. I, Art. 3. The Commandments o…, The Negative Commandment of External Profession of Faith
The Commandment of External Profession of Faith
The Commandment of External Profession of Faith.—The third commandment of faith given above (see 913) is both negative and affirmative: (a) as negative, it forbids denial of the faith or profession of error opposed to faith; (b) as affirmative, it commands that one make open profession of one’s faith.
The existence of a prohibition against denial of the faith or profession of error is taught in scripture and the sinfulness of such denial is clear from its nature. (a) “He that shall deny Me before men, I will also deny him before My Father who is in Heaven” (Matt., x. 33). Denial of Christ is a grievous sin, for it entails denial by Christ. (b) He who denies the faith is a heretic or infidel, if he means what he says; he lies, if he does not mean what he says, and his lie is a grave injury to God, whose truth is called into question, and against the neighbor, who is scandalized.
With reference to its voluntariness, denial of faith is either direct or indirect. (a) It is direct, when one intends to deny the faith; (b) it is indirect, when one does not intend to deny the faith, but wills to use words, acts, etc., which either from their signification or use, or from the meaning that will or may be given them by others, will in the circumstances express a denial of the faith. Examples: A convert from paganism conceals a crucifix in the idol of a temple and then joins the pagans in their customary bows of reverence, while intending only adoration to Christ crucified and detesting the idol. Titus takes off his hat when passing any church, as a mark of respect for the good they do. Balbus, a convert from Nestorianism, recites the names of Nestorius and Dioscurus at Mass, intending only to honor the patron Saints of those two heresiarchs.
There are three ways of denying the faith: (a) by words, spoken or written, as when one says: “I am not a Catholic,” “I do not believe in miracles”; (b) by acts, as when one dissuades persons of good faith from entering the Church, or moves them to abandon it, or refuses to genuflect before the Blessed Sacrament, or studiously excludes scapulars, pictures and all religious symbols; (c) by omission, as when one fails to answer calumnies against faith, which one could profitably answer, or fails to protest when another speaks of oneself as a non-Catholic.
There are various ways in which error opposed to faith is professed: (a) by words, as when one says that one is a freethinker or Christian Scientist; (b) by acts, as when one offers incense to an idol, or receives the Lord’s Supper in a Lutheran church, or cheers an anti-religious address; (c) by signs, as when one uses the Masonic grip, wears the robes of a Buddhist bonze, takes a Mohammedan or pagan name, etc., in order to pass oneself off as a non-Catholic; (d) by omission, as when one is silent when introduced as a Rationalist, or makes no protest when Indifferentism is being advocated by one’s companions.
The following are not a denial of faith or profession of error:
(a) Words that deny, not one’s allegiance to religion, but one’s acceptance of it as qualified by some calumnious designation. Examples: Titus denies that he is a “Papist,” because he wishes his questioner to use a term that is not intended to be an insult. Balbus, entering a pagan region where the name Christian has the meaning of criminal or enemy on account of crimes committed there by white men in past times, says to the tribesmen that he is not a Christian, but a follower of Jesus and a Catholic.
(b) Words that conceal one’s rank or state in the Church, are not against faith, because one can hold the faith without being in a certain rank or state in the Church, Thus, St. Peter’s denial that he was a follower of Jesus, that he had ever known Him, etc., was, according to some authorities, not a denial of the Divinity of Jesus or of the truth of His teaching. Example: A Catholic who hides or denies his character of priest or religious, his membership in a Catholic family, organization, race, does not thereby necessarily deny his faith.
(c) Deeds that are contrary to practices of religion, but not to the profession of faith, are not denial of belief; for one may be very much attached to one’s religion, even ready to fight for it, but not willing to follow its requirements. Example: Caius is careless about church duties, misses Mass, eats meat on Fridays, and never goes to the Sacraments; but he always calls himself a Catholic and wishes to be considered one.
(d) Signs that have some association with non-Catholic religion, but do not necessarily represent it (since they are indifferent in themselves and have other and legitimate uses), do not deny the faith, when not used as symbols of false religion. Similarly, the omission of signs that are associated with Catholicity, but which are optional, is not a denial of the faith. Examples: Titus, when travelling in the Orient, makes use of the national salutation of the pagan peoples among whom he lives. Balbus builds a church with architectural features borrowed from pagan temples. Caius wears a fez or turban in Mohammedan regions where it is not looked on as a religious headgear. Sempronius practises circumcision as a hygienic measure. Claudius does not say grace at meals when dining in public, and does not wear scapulars when bathing at the seashore.
(e) Omission of profession of faith, when it is not obligatory, is not a denial of faith; for no one is bound to make known his affairs and convictions to every acquaintance. Example: Titus works in an office where most of the clerks are non-Catholics. But no one ever speaks about religion, and hence it is not known that he is a Catholic.
Bucceroni, Moral Enchiridion (4th ed., 1905)
Bucceroni, Moral Enchiridion (4th ed., 1905), On the Theological Virtues
Bucceroni, Cases of Conscience
27. On the External Profession of Faith · 29. On the Trampling of the Cross
27. On the External Profession of Faith
- In places of the missions, a prince, moving persecution against Catholics, made a public edict by which he commanded that all Christians had to present themselves before the judge within the space of fifteen days; otherwise they were judged to have denied the faith. The faithful of several provinces asked the missionaries what was to be done, and almost all answered that they should flee, or, if it could conveniently be done, that they should hide themselves. Yet some reproved this, opposing proposition 18 condemned by Innocent XI, and ordered all the faithful of their mission to present themselves before the judge.
- In a region of heretics, it was prohibited by law for religious to celebrate Mass. Mathurinus, a religious, had celebrated Mass there daily for a year. At last, having been caught, he is asked by the judge whether he knew the prohibition of the law, and whether he himself was a priest and a religious. To all these things Mathurinus responded with subtle evasion.
- Lucianus, a heretical minister, already converted in his heart to the Catholic faith, seized by a lethal illness, calls a Catholic priest so that he may receive from him the sacraments of the Catholic Church. Yet he first asks him that he be willing to come to him clothed in lay garments, lest he introduce any suspicion of himself to others; then, that, if he should die from that illness, he say nothing concerning his conversion, lest perhaps his parents be liable to persecution; but if he should recover, that he himself should await a suitable time for manifesting his conversion, lest his whole fortune be confiscated.
Q. 1. When does the external profession of faith urge? What as to the cases?
To the first, cf. I. M. 364, 365. To the second: the missionaries responded well; nor is the condemned proposition rightly invoked against them. "If only," says Viva on this proposition, n. 13, "in general through an edict it is proposed that, if someone is faithful, he betray himself, when many are hidden, no one, speaking in itself, is held to betray himself." The reason is that, when a tyrant questions concerning the faith, someone is held to respond, not because he legitimately asks, but from this, that through such questioning there arises an article of necessity, for which the precept of confessing the faith obliges. Moreover, in the case, this article of necessity is not had. For flight and hiding, in the case, does not yield to contempt of faith, since on the contrary those who flee and are hidden are rather manifested as Christians and faithful. - "If a prince," says Scavini, 12th ed., Milan, 1874, l. 2, n. 911, "by a general law commands that the faithful betray themselves, by carrying such a sign or otherwise, the faithful are not held to this; since no one is held to tell the truth unless specially asked. Except, unless the circumstances are such that by the very fact that they do not betray themselves they seem to have denied the faith, as, for example, if some were previously known, and then from this they would be thought to have defected from the faith." - Struggl, q. 1, n. 39, 40; Lig. 13, 14; G. 193.
Mathurinus was not held to respond to the judge questioning him, since he had no right, in the case, of juridically questioning a priest. But to dissemble, by mental restriction, knowledge of the aforesaid law, or that he is a priest and religious, is certainly not to dissemble the Catholic faith, and much less to deny it. Wherefore Mathurinus acted rightly. Indeed, without any evasion Mathurinus could have simply denied that he knew anything about the law, understanding namely about a true obliging law; likewise he could deny that he is a priest and religious, understanding namely in order to the illegitimate celebration about which he was being asked, and to the illegitimate questioning of the judge, or that he himself was held to confess. - St. Thomas, Quodl. 12, a. 28; Elbel 62, 63; G. 192, 193.
The Catholic priest could indeed approach Lucianus clothed in lay garments. For this contains nothing against faith; and not rarely Catholic priests, from a reasonable cause, walk as laymen lest they be recognized, for example, in time of persecutions, etc. - But he could not permit Lucianus to dissemble the faith by dying. For there urges, especially in the article of death, for a heretic who is then converted to the faith, the positive obligation of the Church of external profession of faith, which obligation Lucianus was not ignorant of, as appears from the case. Furthermore, it was altogether necessary by that profession of faith to remove scandal and retract the errors which he had taught; otherwise others, either seduced by Lucianus or certainly confirmed in their errors, without doubt would have persevered further in these errors, not without most evident loss of salvation and detriment to divine honor. Wherefore Lucianus ought altogether, at least before two witnesses before he died, to profess the Catholic faith. But if Lucianus had been altogether in good faith concerning this obligation of the Church, which he had entirely been ignorant of, and had not been a heretical minister, but a man from the common people, who had never confirmed anyone in his false sect; since in such a man then neither the honor of God nor the salvation of souls would be endangered, and therefore the natural and divine precept would not then urge concerning externally professing the Catholic faith for removing scandal, then, on account of a truly reasonable and grave cause, the external profession of faith could more easily be dissembled. Nor does it matter that he would be believed by others to have died in heresy; for scandal having been removed and a grave cause standing, that false opinion can be permitted. The other thing could be permitted to Lucianus, namely that, health having been recovered, for some time he dissemble the external profession of the Catholic faith, until he could suitably provide for himself and his affairs. For to dissemble the faith on account of a reasonable cause is not to deny it. Yet he ought altogether to abstain from acts protestative of false religion, as for example, to go on in the exercise of a heretical ministry: for this is to deny the faith. Elbel 67-70; G. 195-198; Collectan. S. C. de P. F., n. 1639, 1642, 1643, 1647, 1650-1653, 1686.
- "How ought a confessor to conduct himself toward apostate penitents placed in the article of death, when he is summoned secretly by them, so that he may absolve secretly? The reason of the difficulty is that in that article they are accustomed to be induced by an infidel family or false priests to acts of false religion, nor can they refuse without danger of death.
R. The Most Holy One judged that the confessor ought to absolve the apostate penitent placed in the article of death, the apostasy having first been abjured in the forum of conscience; and if he should survive for some space of time, and if he can, let him abjure in public before the faithful; but if he cannot, let him leave a written document of his abjuration, signed at least with the sign of the cross; but if he cannot do this either, let him commit to the confessor that he manifest his abjuration to the faithful.
Yet the apostate penitent then placed in danger of life is not held, even with Turks persuading him with danger of life, to confess the Catholic faith which he then embraced after abjuring infidelity, but to elude their persuasions, either by not responding, or by using equivocal words." Holy Office, 25 July 1630. A. S. S., v. 26, p. 642.
29. On the Trampling of the Cross
Pagans, driven into rage against Christians, engraved the sign of the Cross in public roads, on bridges, and on the threshold of city gates, to be trampled by the feet of those going to and fro; and this with such frequency and continuity that it is impossible for travelers to abstain from that injury. Furthermore some of the pagans placed themselves on watch, so that they might silently observe the manner of acting of Christians. The Christians, the matter having been known, threw themselves into anguish: for on one side they cannot abstain from access to the city unless they wish to renounce their commerce and the procuring of things necessary for life; on the other, it seems to them that by trampling those crosses they give an indication of religion forsworn.
Q. What is to be done in these straits of affairs?
R. The preceding case was proposed by the Apostolic Vicar of Hu-nan. The S. C. de P. F., 26 June 1863, responded: "... 1. If Christians are admonished by no one concerning some sign of the cross which perhaps they have before their feet, the Sacred Congregation judged that they should walk freely, examining nothing. For when those things are established which have been set forth by Your Apostolic Lordship, and those two especially are evident and publicly known, namely the necessity of making the journey for conducting one's own business and sustaining life itself, and the firm will of Christians to be retained in their religion and to exclude all those things which are contrary to it, anyone easily sees that such a manner of acting cannot be refuted either from the end, or from the object, or from the circumstances, which are the three elements by which the morality of an action is constituted. For the end, which is not directed to contempt of Religion, but to consulting one's own necessities, is manifestly honorable.
"But with an end of this sort proposed, the material act also of walking over crosses, in which act the object of the action here is, if it is considered in itself and receives nothing of depravity from the circumstances, must without doubt be free from all fault. For since to walk and to place footsteps is an act indifferent by its nature, it necessarily follows that, if a dishonorable end is excluded, but an honorable end and one conformable to reason is proposed, the act itself also must be held as honorable and conformable to reason. Therefore you know that not only is it counted among scruples if someone turns it into religion for himself that while walking he trampled straws joined in the form of a cross, but also that everywhere and freely in churches the faithful walk over the stones of sepulchers, where the most holy name of Jesus, and its monogram and crosses, are very often engraved.
"It remains, therefore, that from the circumstances nothing of depravity accede; of these, one proposition occurs which seems to stretch forth some appearance of difficulty, that in describing the aforesaid crosses the pagans proposed to set a snare for Christians, namely so that, if compelled by necessity they should trample them, they might seem to have forsworn religion; to which Your Apostolic Lordship adds another by which he seems not a little moved, namely that in the first days pagans were also seen on watch, so that they might observe the Christians' manner of acting; yet you will easily perceive that this circumstance brings no moment. For since you say that the same persons stood by altogether silent and daring nothing at all, you plainly understand that they are to be held just as those who by chance saw Christians passing by. Wherefore this one thing is to be asked here, both as regards them, and as regards others who by chance are present, and also as regards the rest who, absent, know the deed, whether, because the pagans engraved crosses with that evil mind, scandal would rightly arise among them if Christians walked over them, as if namely they seemed to have given a judgment of religion forsworn. Since those two things which we have mentioned leap into the eyes of all, and are publicly known, namely the will of Christians, which openly and firmly adheres to its religion, and by equal reason abhors those things which are contrary, and the true reason which drives the same to frequent the roads of the city, which is the necessity of conducting their affairs and sustaining their life, this indeed follows: that if someone, blinded by his voluntary malice, is unwilling to see these things which all see, so that by calumny he attributes apostasy to Christians, he certainly suffers not the scandal of the little ones, nor one born from infirmity, but that of the Pharisees and one produced from malice. But you know that the scandal of the Pharisees is to be spurned.
"2. If Christians are admonished by someone concerning some cross which they have near their feet, the same Sacred Congregation responded that they ought diligently to take care lest they press the cross; since, if, admonished, they should freely trample the same, when nevertheless they could avoid it, they would rightly seem to the little and weak to have violated the sanctity of religion....
"3. But if the way is so blocked that it is licit to pass only over the described crosses, in that case, since it is manifest that one walks over them not from some irreverence but from mere necessity, the Sacred Congregation indeed responded that this can be done, but that for removing every account of scandal a twofold condition must be observed. The first is that before the one admonishing, and those hearing, Christians expressly profess that the will of inflicting injury on the cross is altogether absent from them. The other is that, in the very fact of passing, they hold a manner, as far as can be done, becoming, so that some sign of reverence may appear from it.... But if someone should wish to take scandal from this, he would plainly follow the ways of the Pharisees, and therefore his calumny would have to be despised, especially since, if Christians allow themselves to be terrified more than is fitting by these injuries of pagans, an occasion would be furnished to them for making the condition of the Christian Religion more difficult day by day, and easily extinguishing it by these acts...." Collect. S. C. de P. F., n. 1662.
Bucceroni, Moral Enchiridion
Bucceroni, Moral Enchiridion, On the Theological Virtues
On Schismatics to Be Admitted at the Funerals of Catholics
"Insofar as schismatics accompanying the funerals of Catholics exhibit a merely material presence, for the sake of civil honor toward the deceased, not mixing themselves with the Catholic prayers or rites by which it is customary to carry out funerals and lead the dead to burial, it can be tolerated; but insofar as in that function they employ their own rites, or mix themselves with ours, it is not lawful and is not to be permitted." S. I. C. 10 May 1753.
Tanquerey
Vol. II, On the Theological Virtues…, On the Virtue of Faith
- Existence: There exists a divine precept of externally professing faith at times.
This Christ indeed taught:7 "Everyone therefore who shall confess Me before men, I also will confess him before My Father who is in heaven. But he who shall deny Me before men, I also will deny him before My Father who is in heaven." Paul inculcates the same:8 "For with the heart we believe unto justice, but with the mouth confession is made unto salvation."
7 Matt. 10:32-33; cf. Luke 9:26; 12:8-9.
8 Rom. 10:10.
And rightly; for he who, believing in his heart, fears externally to profess faith: (a) is exposed to the danger of losing faith: for by this voluntary omission the firm assent to revealed things is diminished, and little by little doubts arise; on the other hand, by open confession internal faith is strengthened not a little. (b) He commits irreverence toward God, since, on account of vain fear, he refuses to offer the reasonable service owed to the supreme Lord: for by that very fact he seems to prefer human judgments to divine wisdom. (c) Moreover he is guilty of cowardice; for he who is not ashamed to act against his own persuasion of soul by that very fact shows that he is not a man, but a weak immature person, who is deterred by vain fears from fulfilling his duty. (d) Finally he shows himself an unworthy citizen of the Church; for since the Church is a visible society, which demands the visible union of her members, he who does not externally profess faith weakens this external unity, - and is compared to a soldier who is ashamed to defend the banner of his fatherland.
- Extension. That precept, insofar as it is affirmative, demands confession of faith at times; and insofar as it is negative, forbids that faith ever be denied.
(A) The affirmative precept of professing faith obliges, according to St. Thomas,1 when "by the omission of this confession the honor due to God would be withdrawn, and also the utility to be bestowed upon neighbors":
1 St. Thomas, II-II, q. 3, a. 2.
(a) When the honor due to God demands it, namely if, from the omission of this profession, God is dishonored or deprived of the honor due to Him. Thus if someone is questioned publicly or privately by public authority, in a cause of faith, for example, whether he is Catholic, or what he thinks concerning such and such an article of faith, he must confess his faith without hesitation and ambiguity, even with danger to life: this indeed the honor of God demands, and in these circumstances silence would be equivalent to denial of faith. Therefore this proposition 18 was condemned by Innocent XI: "If someone is questioned by public power, I counsel him to confess the faith frankly, as glorious to God and faith; to be silent, I do not condemn as sinful in itself."2 For although public power has no right to question concerning faith, but only concerning things pertaining to the temporal good of society, yet the faithful person is bound to respond, on account of the honor of God, and in order to avoid scandal, lest from silence it be inferred that the true faith has been denied. Yet make exception if silence, from the circumstances, indicates constancy in faith clearly enough. - The same must be said if someone is questioned, in hatred of the faith, even by a private person, at least in those circumstances in which silence would be equivalent to denial of faith.
2 Denzing., n. 1035; Viva, on this proposition.
But if only by a general edict it is commanded that the faithful present themselves before the magistrates, or betray themselves as Catholics by a certain sign, they are not bound to obey; for their silence cannot be held as a denial of faith, when they are not questioned in particular.
- (b) When the spiritual utility of neighbor demands it: for from charity we are bound to prevent, insofar as this can be done, lest the neighbor incur great spiritual harm. Therefore a profession of faith is necessary whenever, from its omission, someone is turned away from faith or delayed, or is deprived of some great spiritual advantage, provided that the good of neighbor cannot otherwise be provided for; for example, if from such omission the newly converted or the weak in faith would be scandalized.
(c) At times in life: for since we are bound to adhere visibly to the Church, we must at times manifest this adhesion by external profession of faith. But for this it is sufficient to fulfill Christian duties which imply this profession, such as the reception of the sacraments, attendance at Mass, etc.
- N.B. Besides the divine precept, there is present an ecclesiastical precept imposed upon certain persons, in determined circumstances, of making a profession of faith according to the formula which is called Piana.3 In a general way those are bound to make this who are promoted to some dignity or ecclesiastical office or to the subdiaconate, as is explained in the Code, c. 1324, cited at the end of the work.
3 Which profession of faith, together with the oath prescribed by Pius X to drive away the danger of modernism, must be made by: (a) professors of universities and seminaries, every year; (b) clerics to be initiated into major orders; (c) priests destined for hearing confessions and sacred preachers; (d) pastors, canons, beneficiaries before entering possession of the benefice; (e) diocesan officials and judges; (f) superiors and teachers of religious families. Cf. A.A.S., Sept. 9, 1910.
- (B) The precept of confessing faith, insofar as it is negative, forbids that faith ever be denied, even externally. For he inflicts injury upon God not only who interiorly embraces heresy, but also who externally denies faith, and by deed or word simulates himself to be a follower of a false religion: for although he believes internally, he commits a grave lie, and for the most part gives scandal to others. - Yet there is a difference between denying and concealing faith: the former is never permitted, the latter for a grave cause is permitted in certain circumstances.
- (a) Whoever by words or deeds denies faith universally, or some article of faith, is guilty of grave sin. 1) By words, for example, he who denies that he is Catholic, or that he believes in the supreme authority of the Roman Pontiff; or affirms that he is a rationalist, positivist, Protestant, Mohammedan. 2) By deeds, by exercising actions which of themselves or from circumstances imply denial of faith, for example, to kneel before idols or to burn incense, to communicate in the supper of heretics, to use circumcision as a religious rite (but not as a means of preventing certain diseases); or by using garments or other signs which, from usage and custom, indicate adhesion to some sect,4 for example, if someone were to wear the insignia of Freemasons, so that he would seem to have given his name to this sect. But it is not prohibited to use garments, for example, the Turkish cap, which are distinctive of a people rather than of a religious sect. - Likewise to enter the temples of heretics from curiosity, or in order to fulfill a civil office, is by no means considered an external denial of faith; otherwise, if such entrance bears before it the appearance of cooperation in divine rites, and seems to signify denial of faith.5 - Therefore in one word, all things must be avoided which, from all the circumstances, seem to imply denial of faith.
4 Thus, in the decree of the S. C. of Prop. Fide, Feb. 19, 1774 (Collectanea, n. 1653), it is declared: "Therefore in the first place, the deceitful manner of acting of those cannot be excused from the mark of simulated infidelity, who, while on more solemn days they are present at the sacrifice of the Mass, fearing the presence of Turks standing by out of curiosity, never at all uncover the head, nor sign themselves with the sign of the cross, and abstain from the other acts of the Catholic religion, which are wont to be openly exercised by others who are reckoned by the Christian name; and those acting thus obtain this, that they are regarded as followers of Mohammedan superstition." - Thus also in the first centuries, the Church regarded as guilty of very grave fault the libellatici, who, although they had not sacrificed to idols, obtained with money certificates from magistrates by which it was declared that they had fulfilled the commands of the emperor.
5 Thus it once happened in England, when Catholics by royal edict were compelled, under very grave penalties, to be present at the prayers and sermons of Protestants. Then Paul V wrote to them, Sept. 22, 1606: "We are compelled to admonish you and call upon you, that in no way should you approach the temples of heretics, or hear their sermons, or communicate with them in rites, lest you incur the wrath of God."
- (b) But it is permitted to conceal or dissimulate faith, when the precept of confessing faith does not urge, and moreover there is a grave reason: for this is not evil of itself, and therefore is permitted for a grave cause.
Thus if some Catholic passes through places of infidels or heretics, he can eat meats on prohibited days, if he seriously fears (which today rarely occurs) lest, having been recognized as a Catholic, he should undergo some grave harm; for this eating of itself does not signify denial of faith; otherwise, however, if someone were urged to eat meats in contempt of faith or of the Church: for in these circumstances, it would seem to be a denial of faith.6 - Likewise he can use those garments which are distinctive of a people rather than of religion, as was said above.
6 "Besides, it is not without grave fault that the same secretly believing persons, when on days consecrated to ecclesiastical fast or abstinence they recline at the tables of the Turks, eat foods forbidden on those days by the Church, or pretend to eat them; for this simulation cannot be presumed to have been done with any other intention than that they may be seen as in no way bound by the laws of Christians, but may be thought plainly Mohammedans among Mohammedans." (S. C. de Prop. F., Feb. 19, 1774, Collectanea, n. 1653.)
All the more is it permitted to flee persecution, unless there is question of pastors of souls whose presence is necessary for the salvation of their subjects: for these, when the parish cannot otherwise be provided for, must lay down their life for their sheep.
Vermeersch, Theologia Moralis
Vol. II, First Book: On the Theolog…, Tr. I, Title III: On the Duty of Professing the Faith
— 1. By leading a Christian life, the faithful person in reality sufficiently signifies his faith and makes that profession of it which is called material.
- From c. 1325 § 1: "The faithful of Christ are bound openly to profess the faith, whenever their silence, evasiveness, or manner of acting would carry with it an implicit denial of faith, contempt of religion, injury to God, or scandal of neighbor."
Therefore: formal profession, by the law of nature, is to be made when, unless it were made, great honor due to God or great utility to be procured for the neighbor would be withdrawn, privatively or contrarily. - Privatively, I say, if for that reason great honor of God, or great utility of the neighbor, would cease; which case will be rare. Contrarily, if, because of the omitted profession of faith, God would be affected by injury, the neighbor would suffer grave detriment: for example, religion would be contemned, the neighbor would thereby be turned away from conversion. Charity then commands the profession; indeed faith itself does so, if the detriment would be to faith itself.
Therefore, as often as silence or evasiveness would be equivalent to denial, or would denote fear or inconstancy or shame, faith is to be professed by us, lest we fall into that saying: "He who shall be ashamed of me and of my words, of him the Son of man shall be ashamed when he shall come in his majesty" (Luke 9, 26. From the parallel place itself, Matt. 10, 33, it appears that there is question of shame which is morally equivalent to denial). Wherefore, to signify that necessity of fortitude, the Christian to be confirmed is anointed with sacred chrism on the raised forehead. Cf. Lugo, De fide, d. 14, n. 377. To manifest mere fear is not of itself grave, contrary to giving an indication of denial or inconstancy.
Wherefore they regularly judge that an answer is to be given with open profession of faith to a public authority questioning concerning religion, at least if the legal order is observed by the one questioning. Cf. proposition 18a condemned by Innocent XI: "If anyone is questioned by public authority, I counsel that he ingenuously confess the faith as glorious to God and to faith; to be silent I do not condemn as sinful per se" (Denz., n. 1168). For if the law itself has forbidden inquiries into matters of conscience, it will be enough to decline an answer for this reason. And a private man who asks about religion can also be repelled.
This doctrine is confirmed by the cited c. 1325 § 1.
— By ecclesiastical law (cc. 1106-1408), a contrary custom being reprobated, the following must personally and according to the formula approved by the Apostolic See (such as is exhibited at the beginning of the Code) profess the faith:
Before the presiding officer, or his delegate: all who are present at a council or synod, even with merely consultative vote; but the presiding officer before the same council or synod;
Before the Dean of the Sacred College, the first Cardinals in the order of priests and of deacons, and the Camerlengo of the Holy Roman Church: those promoted to the cardinalitial dignity;
Before one delegated by the Apostolic See: those promoted to an episcopal See, even non-residential, or to the government of an abbacy or prelature nullius, of an Apostolic vicariate, or of an Apostolic prefecture;
Before the cathedral chapter: the capitular Vicar;
Before the Ordinary of the place, or his delegate, and before the chapter: those who have been promoted to a dignity or canonry;
Before the Ordinary of the place, or his delegate, and before the other consultors: those assumed to the office of diocesan consultors;
Before the Ordinary of the place, or his delegate: the Vicar general, pastors, and those for whom provision has been made concerning any benefices, even manual benefices, having the care of souls; the rector, professors of sacred theology, canon law, and philosophy in a seminary, at the beginning of each scholastic year, or at least at the beginning of the office undertaken; all who are to be promoted to the order of subdiaconate; censors of books ex officio in diocesan curias (c. 1393); priests destined for receiving confessions and sacred preachers, before they are endowed with the faculty of exercising those offices;
Before the Ordinary or his delegate: the rector of a University or Faculty; but before the rector of the University or Faculty, or his delegate: all professors in a University or Faculty canonically erected, at the beginning of each scholastic year, or at least at the beginning of the office undertaken; likewise those who, after examination, are endowed with academic degrees;
Before the chapter or the Superior who nominated them, or their delegate: Superiors in clerical religious institutes.
N. B. "Those who, after relinquishing the former office, obtain another office or benefice or dignity, even of the same species, must again emit the profession of faith" (c. 1406 § 2).
Although c. 1406 now imposes the direct obligation of professing the faith, nevertheless from the old law it can still be said that the Superiors before whom the profession is to be emitted are primarily held by the obligation of seeing to it that the promise of faith be made (Genicot, 197; Arregui, n. 121). Indeed if they themselves refuse to receive the profession of faith, the subjects will be excused by impossibility.
— From the response of the Holy Office, 22 March 1918, the abjurations of modernism prescribed by the decrees of Pius X continue in force until the Holy See shall determine otherwise. Wherefore, the profession of faith having been premised, the following must abjure modernism and hand over the signed formula of the oath:
To the ordaining Bishop: those to be ordained in sacred orders, at least before the subdiaconate; - to the approving Ordinary: future confessors and sacred preachers, before they are endowed with the faculty of exercising those offices (but not when the faculty is prolonged for them); - to the nominating Ordinary: pastors, canons, beneficiaries before entering upon possession of the benefice, and consequently as often as they accede to a new benefice; Lenten preachers; - to the Ordinary of the place or to the Cardinal Prefect or Secretary: officials of the episcopal curia, not excepting the Vicar general; of ecclesiastical tribunals, not excepting the judges; of the Roman Congregations; - to the nominating Superior or chapter: moderators of religious Families and Congregations, before they enter upon the office, and consequently as often as they undertake a new office; - to their own superior: doctors, or lectors, in seminaries and religious institutes, each year, before beginning the lectures. - This obligation primarily affects Superiors: they ought to call those bound to fulfill the obligation. Those who are unwilling to swear are to be reported to the Holy Office at once.
(These things are gathered both from the Motu Proprio, 1 September 1910, and from various declarations of the Sacred Consistorial Congregation, 25 September, 25 October, 17 December 1910. - All are proposed in our Periodica, t. 5 and 6).
You ask whether the profession of faith through the formula of Pius IV, with the definitions of the Vatican Council added, must necessarily be premised to the abjuration of modernism.
There is no doubt that this is laudably done. Yet since in the Motu Proprio itself of 1 September 1910 the profession of faith is distinguished from the formula of the oath, and the Code c. 1406 defines by whom and when the profession of faith is to be made, this profession does not seem strictly to be appended to the abjuration, except when the profession of faith itself is prescribed by the Code. Besides, only the oath is mentioned in the declarations of 25 September 1910, by which annual abjuration is prescribed for Doctors who, from the earlier Motu Proprio Sacrorum Antistitum, had to swear only at the beginning of their office (Cf. Per., V, 200 and 229).
— In no case, whether by voice or by nod, is it lawful exteriorly to deny the faith.
But when profession is not prescribed, it is per se lawful, and sometimes expedient, to conceal the faith, and consequently to do so honestly and without a lie: as if, hidden among heretics or unbelievers, you could accomplish more good, or if more evil is to be feared from confession: disturbances, killings, the exasperation of a tyrant, danger of defection under tortures. Hence voluntarily to offer oneself to the persecutor is for the most part rash. - Nor must one per se obey a general edict by which the faithful are commanded to betray themselves, except, as has just been said, if he who does not appear is commonly regarded as an apostate. Nor is anyone forbidden to obtain by money that no inquiry be made concerning his faith. Much less does he deny the faith, but rather confesses it, who flees persecution. But the pastor must examine what is more advisable for the good of souls: either by the example of fearless confession, or at least by his presence, to confirm the others; or, on the contrary, to withdraw himself for a time so that from a safe place he may administer the territory and reserve himself for the good of more persons.
— It is no more permitted by clothing than by words or by another sign to profess superstition, or adherence to a condemned sect. Wherefore it is not lawful to use clothing which, neither of itself nor from the circumstances, has another immediate signification. But if the immediate signification is diverse, or this is ambiguous or twofold, there will be place for the prudent use of the principle concerning double effect.
Hence they distinguish sacred clothing from profane; among profane clothing, some garments which, as Lehmkuhl says, I, 405, by showing the inhabitants of an unbelieving region, materially distinguish unbelievers from the faithful; others which bear signs for recognizing unbelievers, and by which therefore unbelievers are formally distinguished from the faithful: as the distinctive garments of the Jews were in the City and in Poland. A graver cause indeed is required for using these latter than for the former profane garments. Yet the wearing of such clothing carries another explanation than apostasy. Wherefore only the garments which are used in superstitious functions fall under a sufficiently absolute prohibition, unless a different explanation is positively present.
Lehmkuhl, l. c., and also Genicot, I, 197, assimilate Masonic insignia to garments of sacred use. But we would wish this also to be understood prudently, when they certainly show adherence to a condemned sect. For garments, since in themselves they are indifferent things, easily have an uncertain signification. What, for example, if, to deceive Freemasons, many others momentarily adopt those signs so that true sectarians are not distinguished from false ones; what if, in a city where he is unknown, some traveler, without any scandal, wears the insignia so that he may observe the sectarians; what if, in a dangerous hour, when life is to be feared for, an unknown Catholic, not specially asked to manifest adherence by this sign, protects himself with those insignia in order to flee persecution? Does not the signification become ambiguous from the circumstances themselves, and consequently will it not be able to be tolerated for a proportionate cause?
This is the rule. The less the signification is definite of itself, the more easily, from the circumstances themselves, it is rendered uncertain. Genicot himself, I, 197, whom others follow, allows that whether to deceive them, or to obtain their benevolence, you may use gestures by which sectarians recognize one another, "because it does not seem equivalent to a profession of the sect."
— Since the eating of meats of itself says no profession of religion, and for various causes meats are eaten even by Catholics on a day of abstinence, it is altogether lawful, for declining grave danger - not however for fleeing mockery 1 - to dissemble the faith by eating meats. Indeed, to avoid rashness, this per se is to be done. Except if that eating is demanded in hatred of the faith. Then, without protestation, they cannot be eaten. Suppose it to be established by the guests that he who is an enemy of Catholicism should eat meats: it would not be lawful to eat them unless by protesting the faith.
Nor otherwise, if in conversation someone presents you as an adversary of the faith, could you be silent, unless your whole bearing betrayed a different cause of silence.
1 According to the cause or form of mockery, that shame could be opposed to faith or to religion.
Illicit Concealment. — Because faith must sometimes be professed, every concealment of faith which betrays the shame concerning which the Lord says in the Gospel is to be condemned: "He who shall be ashamed of me and of my words: of him the Son of man shall be ashamed, when he shall come in his majesty and that of the Father and of the holy angels" (Luke 9, 26). Nor is it lawful to receive into the Church someone who would wish to be merely a hidden Christian through his whole life. But the circumstances can be such that even a merely individual exterior profession would give occasion to excessive evil; indeed, that the public good would command silence. As long as such circumstances remain, it will be lawful to be a hidden Christian and to satisfy the debt of Christian profession through a posthumous revelation, committed to a trustworthy man, as soon as this can be done without common or prevailing harm.
Summary
— I. Besides the material profession of faith which a Christian life led entails, formal profession is to be made: 1. by the law of nature, when it is required lest God be deprived of great honor or the neighbor of great utility; much more lest God be affected by injury, or the neighbor by grave harm. The obligation is of charity, indeed of faith, if the detriment to be avoided would be of faith. Therefore as often as silence or evasiveness would be an indication of denial or inconstancy, faith is to be professed: this regularly happens when public authority, the legal order being observed, asks about religion (cf. c. 1325, § 1); - 2. by ecclesiastical law, a contrary custom being reprobated, those indicated in c. 1406 must personally profess the faith. Moreover, from the response of the Holy Office, 22 March 1918, the abjurations of modernism prescribed by Pius X continue in force until the Holy See shall determine otherwise. The profession of faith must be placed before these abjurations, whenever c. 1406 commands it to be made.
II. It is never lawful exteriorly to deny the faith; to conceal it is per se lawful and sometimes expedient. Wherefore it would be wrong to use garments which neither of themselves nor from the circumstances had another immediate signification than that of superstition. If the signification were ambiguous, the principles concerning double effect will have to be applied prudently. Nearly the same is to be said concerning Masonic insignia. Unless the eating of meats is demanded in hatred of the faith, to dissemble the faith by eating meats is not forbidden. - But, on the other hand, it is not lawful for one converted to the faith to conceal his conversion perpetually, at least from a private cause: he would sin against the obligation of professing the faith.
Prümmer, Manuale Theologiae Moralis
Vol. I, Pt. I, Tract VII. On theological …, Ch. II, Art. II, § 2. On the external profession of faith prescribed
504. Existence of the precept. The profession of faith is its external manifestation made before other men, and it can be made either by words or by deeds; but it is prescribed 1. by divine law; 2. by ecclesiastical law.
- That there exists a divine precept of confessing faith outwardly is drawn from Sacred Scripture. For St. Paul says: "If you confess the Lord Jesus with your mouth, and have believed in your heart, ... you shall be saved; for with the heart one believes unto justice, but with the mouth confession is made unto salvation."42 But Christ says: "Everyone therefore who shall confess me before men, I also will confess him before my Father who is in heaven. But he who shall deny me before men, I also will deny him before my Father who is in heaven."43
The intrinsic reasons why God prescribed the exterior profession of faith are chiefly: a) Christ founded a visible Church with worship also visible; and therefore the members of that Church must manifest themselves outwardly as such, and especially in external worship. But this happens through the profession of faith. b) Besides, he commits great irreverence toward God and shameful cowardice who, on account of vain human fear, omits to show himself a faithful servant and worshiper of God. c) There is added that the exterior profession of faith greatly serves for confirming interior faith and for converting other men tepid in faith, or even altogether unbelieving, to fervid faith.
Extension of this precept. The divine precept of professing faith is rather affirmative44 than negative. But insofar as it is negative, it forbids faith ever to be denied outwardly; this indeed can happen either directly or indirectly. Faith is denied directly by formal infidelity or heresy, i.e. by him who knowingly and voluntarily denies the true faith outwardly and inwardly. Faith is denied indirectly when someone places an external act which, all the circumstances having been seen, must be regarded by other men as a denial of faith, although he himself inwardly did not wish to deny the faith; e.g. when someone takes a Protestant supper, although inwardly he in no way believed that Christ is present in such a supper.
Principle. It is never licit to deny faith, neither directly nor indirectly.45 For every denial of faith inflicts grave dishonor on God, because it refuses God's authority and reverence. In addition, it causes grave scandal to one's neighbor. Christ threatens those denying faith: "He who shall deny me before men, I also will deny him before my Father who is in heaven." But it must be noted that denying faith is one thing, concealing or dissembling faith another. For sometimes it is licit to dissemble or conceal faith, as will be said below, n. 507. Direct denial of faith will be treated in the following chapter (n. 512 sqq.).
The affirmative precept of professing faith is twofold, one divine, the other ecclesiastical. The following things are to be observed:
42 Rom. 10, 9 sq.
43 Matt. 10, 32 sq.
44 S. theol. 2, 2, q. 3, a. 2.
45 Some authors, such as Noldin, De praec. n. 24; Gopfert, I, n. 274, permit indirect denial of faith, provided sufficient reasons are present. This manner of speaking, although it can be rightly understood, is better avoided, since it sounds badly and gives occasion for erring.
505. The divine precept of professing faith obliges: 1. when from the omission of this confession the honor due to God is withdrawn; 2. when the utility of one's neighbor demands it. Thus the Angelic Doctor46 establishes rules which are admitted by all theologians.
- The honor of God to be preserved demands the profession of faith: a) when someone is questioned about his faith by public authority; b) when someone is moved in hatred of religion to deny faith by word or deed.
To a) Theologians commonly teach that a Catholic man is bound (even with danger of life) candidly to confess his faith if he is questioned by public authority in a cause of faith, because otherwise great scandal and grave irreverence against God are committed. And therefore on March 2, 1679, Innocent XI condemned the following proposition (18): "If someone is questioned by public power, I advise ingenuously confessing faith as glorious to God and faith; I do not condemn silence as sinful per se."47 But if someone were questioned not about faith, but about his state, e.g. whether he is a priest, monk, etc., and concealed the truth, he would not sin against faith, but perhaps against truth, or also against charity, if his neighbor were to suffer scandal from it. But if public authority, by persecuting religion, commands by general edict that the faithful present themselves or betray themselves by a certain sign, no one is bound to obey, because such a law is altogether unjust and therefore does not bind in conscience. Wherefore, in persecutions of Christians, the faithful and priests can conceal themselves, indeed also flee, as is clear both from the words of Christ: "If they persecute you in this city, flee into another,"48 and from his own example and that of the Apostles.49
505. But pastors of souls then would have to remain even with danger of life, if their flight would expose the people committed to them to grave danger of apostasy. For "the good shepherd gives his life for his sheep; but the hireling ... sees the wolf coming and leaves the sheep and flees, and the wolf catches and scatters the sheep."50
If someone is questioned about faith by a private person, he is not bound (at least per se) to confess the truth, but can be silent or give an evasive response. The reason is that in this case silence or an evasive response is not irreverence toward God, but rather slighting of the questioner, who has no right of putting questions of this kind. But by accident, even in this case of a private question, the one questioned would have to confess the truth, if namely "from this it would be believed either that he did not have faith, or that faith was not true, or that others through his silence would be turned away from faith."51
To b) If someone, in hatred of religion or faith, is moved by public or even private authority to act by word or deed against faith, certainly he cannot obey, but must profess the true faith. Thus, e.g., if a master out of hatred of the Catholic religion wished to compel servants to eat meat on prohibited days, then they could not silently obey, but would have to either refuse obedience absolutely, or say openly to the master: We venerate our Church and obey her; but, placed in great necessity, we eat meat, because in these circumstances the Church herself dispenses us from her law.52
46 S. theol. l. c. This precept is expressed in the Code of Canon Law, c. 1325, § 1, in these words: "The faithful of Christ are bound openly to profess faith whenever their silence, evasion, or manner of acting would carry with it an implicit denial of faith, contempt of religion, injury to God, or scandal of neighbor."
47 Denz. n. 1168.
48 Matt. 10, 23.
49 John 8, 59; 10, 39; 2 Cor. 11, 33; Acts 12, 8 sqq.
50 John 10, 11 sqq.
51 S. theol. 2, 2, q. 3, a. 2.
52 Cf. St. Alph., Theol. mor. l. 2, 15 at the end; Konings, Theol. mor. n. 137; Aertnys, Theol. mor. l. 2, n. 8, q. 6.
506. 2. The spiritual utility of one's neighbor demands confession of our faith whenever otherwise grave scandal would arise for one's neighbor. Thus, e.g., in the ancient persecutions of Christians, those who were called "libellatici" because they had bought from the prefect a certificate as though they had sacrificed to idols, sinned gravely. Yet they were punished more mildly than the so-called "sacrificati" or "thurificati," who namely from fear of death had truly sacrificed to idols. In our times all those sin against the divine precept of confessing faith in this way who publicly furnish favor to heresy, even if inwardly they do not wish to deny faith.
II. The ecclesiastical law establishes that the following persons make a profession of faith:
Those to be baptized; if they are infants, in their place the sponsors make the profession of faith through the recitation of the Apostles' Symbol.53
All who return from heresy or schism into the bosom of the Catholic Church.54
All who are present with either deliberative or consultative or decisive vote at an ecumenical or particular Council or diocesan synod. They must make the profession before the president of such an assembly or before the delegate of the president.55
Those promoted to the cardinalitial dignity.56
Those promoted to the episcopate (even titular), to the government of an Abbey or Prelature nullius, of an Apostolic Vicariate, of an Apostolic Prefecture, and indeed before the Delegate from the Apostolic See.57
The capitular vicar before the cathedral Chapter.58
Those promoted to a canonry or to a dignity in a Chapter. They must make the profession before the local Ordinary or his delegate and before the assembled Chapter.59
Diocesan consultors before the local Ordinary or his delegate and before the other assembled consultors.60
The vicar general, pastor, beneficed cleric having care of souls, rector of a Seminary, professors of theology, philosophy, and canon law, all who are to be promoted to the subdiaconate, censors of books in episcopal curias, those receiving the faculty of hearing confessions or preaching.61
The rector of a University or canonically erected Faculty before the Ordinary, i.e. before the bishop or his religious superior or their delegate; but all professors of such institutions before the Rector or his delegate. Likewise those who after examination are given academic degrees.62
The religious superior in clerical religious institutes before the Chapter or the superior who appointed him.63
Note. 1. He who, having left the former one, obtains another office or benefice or dignity, even of the same species, must again make the profession of faith.64 Therefore, e.g., a pastor who is transferred from one parish to another must again make the profession of faith.
- He does not satisfy the obligation of making the profession of faith who makes it through a procurator or before a layman.65
The penalties laid down against those who without a just impediment neglect to make the due profession of faith, after a fitting admonition has been disregarded, are a) loss of the fruits of the benefice, office, dignity, or function. This loss of fruits obtains at once, and therefore, e.g., a pastor who, having been admonished, did not make the profession of faith must restore the fruits received in the same way as if he had omitted the recitation of the Breviary. b) deprivation of the office itself, benefice, dignity, or function.66
It is very fitting that the profession of faith be made either before an altar, or at least before a Crucifix and two lighted candles.
53 Rit. Rom. de baptismo, tit. 3.
54 Holy Office, July 20, 1859 (Collect. de Prop. Fide n. 1178).
55 Cod. iur. can. c. 1406, § 1, n. 1.
56 Ib. n. 2.
57 Ib. n. 3.
58 Ib. n. 4.
59 Ib. n. 5.
60 Ib. n. 6.
61 Ib. n. 7. He who made the profession before receiving the subdiaconate is not bound to repeat the same before the diaconate or presbyterate, unless the Ordinary has judged otherwise. Likewise a confessor who made the profession before beginning the office is not bound to repeat it if in another diocese he receives the faculty of hearing confessions. S. C. Consist., March 24, 1911, and June 20, 1913 (Act. Ap. Sed. III, 182; V, 273).
62 Cod. iur. can. c. and § cited, n. 8.
63 Ib. n. 9.
64 Ib. § 2.
65 Cod. c. 1407.
66 Ib. c. 2403.
507. On the concealment or dissimulation of faith. It is never licit to deny faith either directly or indirectly, as has already been said above; but sometimes to conceal the true faith is not only licit, but even necessary. For the divine precept of professing faith is an affirmative precept, and therefore does not always oblige. Wherefore St. Thomas writes:67 "If disturbance of unbelievers arises from a manifest confession of faith, without any utility of faith or of the faithful, in such a case it is not praiseworthy to confess faith publicly; hence the Lord says: 'Do not give what is holy to dogs, nor cast pearls before swine, lest turning they tear you.'"68 But if some utility of faith is hoped for or necessity is present,
507. once the disturbance of unbelievers has been contemned, man must publicly confess faith; hence it is said69 that when the disciples had said to the Lord that the Pharisees, having heard his word, were scandalized, the Lord responded: "Let them alone" (namely, be disturbed), "they are blind and leaders of the blind." From these things the following practical conclusions are deduced:
Resolutions: 1. Some heretic or pagan who wishes to embrace the true faith, but cannot do this publicly without great temporal inconveniences, can be received secretly into the bosom of the Church before two discreet witnesses.70 But after conversion, although he is dispensed from positive divine and ecclesiastical precepts which cannot be fulfilled without grave inconvenience, nevertheless he can no longer perform acts which are a profession of heresy or paganism, such as, e.g., to receive a Protestant supper, to contract marriage before a non-Catholic minister, to exercise the office of a non-Catholic minister, to wear signs signifying idolatry,71 etc. But he could perform other things which are not a direct profession of heterodox faith, such as, e.g., to visit temples of heretics, to attend a non-Catholic funeral, indeed once or twice to attend a non-Catholic sermon, provided, however, that danger of perversion or scandal is absent.
A Catholic man can wear the garments which the inhabitants of some region of unbelievers are accustomed to wear, e.g. the cap of the Turks; but by no means is it licit to wear garments or signs which have been instituted solely for professing a false faith, as are the priestly garments of idolaters. Hence the Sacred Congregation of Propaganda Fide on March 23, 1844, forbade Missionaries, in order more easily to introduce the Catholic faith among the Tartars, to put on garments used by Lama priests, or to shear their head after their manner.72 The reason for each solution is that to wear the garments of some non-Catholic region is indeed a dissimulation of the true faith, but not a simulation of false faith, since not all inhabitants of that region are non-Catholics; on the contrary, to wear garments or signs of some sect is to simulate false faith; this certainly is not licit.
A priest or Religious can, for a reasonable cause, lay aside the clerical or religious habit. He can also eat meat on days prohibited by ecclesiastical law, if, living in the land of heretics, he otherwise would have to suffer great distresses. The reason is that positive ecclesiastical laws do not oblige with grave inconvenience.73
A Catholic man cannot licitly make nods, movements, pressure of fingers, etc., which by convention serve solely for the profession of a false religion or of some non-Catholic sect. Hence it is not licit to wear the distinctive signs of Freemasons; it is not licit to make signs of reverence before an idol, etc.
507. 5. A Catholic eating together with non-Catholics is not bound to say the customary prayers before and after the meal and thus betray himself as a Catholic, if grave inconveniences would arise for him from this. The reason is obvious; for by no strict precept is a Catholic man obliged to these prayers, nor does this omission of prayers include denial of faith.
Note. For the rest, in practice it cannot always easily be distinguished whether concealment of faith is licit or not. Speaking generally, it is much better candidly to profess faith, because the harms arising from profession are not accustomed to be so great as they appear when considered at first glance. On the contrary, from an ingenuous profession of faith the greatest goods are accustomed to be produced, both for the one professing himself and for others admiring his good example.
67 S. theol. 2, 2, q. 3, a. 2 ad 3.
68 Matt. 7, 6.
69 Matt. 15, 14.
70 Thus also the Holy Office established on March 28, 1900 (Collect. de Prop. Fide n. 2079).
71 Very long and very sharp controversies arose among the Missionaries of the Indies and of other adjacent regions concerning the so-called Malabar rites, e.g. whether converted women to be joined in marriage could wear on the neck a certain token called Tauly, representing some idol. Several Supreme Pontiffs, and especially Benedict XIV, Const. "Omnium sollicitudinum," September 12, 1744, condemned this use. But the Holy Office on February 3, 1892, permitted the use of the Taly, after it had been cleansed of all superstition.
72 Collect. de Prop. Fide n. 948.
73 Cf. Noldin, De praecept. n. 21.
508. Scholion. On the means of advancing in faith. Since faith is of such great necessity and utility, it is excellent to use efficacious means for procuring its increase. Faith, as being an infused virtue, cannot indeed directly be increased by our acts, as was already said above, n. 493, but is increased in the measure in which sanctifying grace is increased in us. Nevertheless by our acts we acquire a very precious facility for eliciting meritorious acts of faith and thus for growing in grace and in faith itself. Such acts are:
Fervent and frequent prayer. Hence even the Apostles themselves asked the Lord: "Increase faith in us."74 For prayer, as being the elevation of the mind to God, intimately unites the mind with God, the father of light, and the spirit inflaming our hearts; and therefore it is exceedingly useful for advancing in faith.
Reading of Sacred Scripture, which contains divine revelation and vehemently incites us to believing. Also very useful is the reading of books treating of the distinguished acts of faith performed by holy men.
Pious hearing of sermons, in which the truths of faith are well set forth and inculcated. These sermons indeed are very useful not only to simple faithful, but also to clerics and religious.
The exercise of faith a) by thought; b) by word; c) by deed. We must direct all thoughts and judgments neither according to the prudence of the flesh, which is an enemy to God,75 nor according to the prudence of this age, which is foolishness before God.76 Therefore nothing is to be greatly esteemed except those things which are great before God. - Our words must be conformed to our thoughts, and therefore in conversations we must estimate the value of things according to the Gospel. - All our works must be performed from a supernatural motive, and not from empty glory, desire, or another merely egoistic motive.
Propagation of faith among others. For by laboring for the propagation of faith, both our faith is stirred up and our meritorious works are increased.
74 Luke 17, 5.
75 Rom. 8, 7.
76 1 Cor. 3, 19.
Marc, Institutiones Morales
Vol. I, Pt. II, Sect. I, Tr. I, Ch. III, Article III: On the Dangers of Faith · Vol. I, Pt. II, Sect. I, Tr. I, Ch. III, Art. III, § 1. On Liberty of Worships · Vol. I, Pt. II, Sect. I, Tr. I, Ch. III, Art. III, § 2. On Communication With Heretics and Unbelievers · Vol. I, Pt. II, Sect. I, Tr. I, Ch. III, Art. III, § 3. On the Reading of Depraved Books
Vol. I, Pt. II, Sect. I, Tr. I, Ch. III, Article III: On the Dangers of Faith
There are especially three things which bring danger to faith, namely: 1. liberty of worships conceded by a prince; 2. communication with heretics or unbelievers; 3. reading of depraved books.
In voluntarily incurring these dangers there is given a fault of imprudence, which nevertheless is not always mortal, nor opposed to faith; and therefore it does not necessarily expel the habit of faith (Tanquerey, I, 655-659). If the imprudence is against faith, from the fact that someone proximately exposes himself to danger, there will be present a grave sin of infidelity.
Vol. I, Pt. II, Sect. I, Tr. I, Ch. III, Art. III, § 1. On Liberty of Worships
- Note beforehand. That liberty or equality of worships lies greatly in ambush against the Catholic faith, nothing is more evident than this. For through it there is brought into Catholic kingdoms that horrible system, most repugnant even to the natural light of reason itself, "of the indifference of any religion whatsoever, which, after every distinction of truth and error has been taken away, boldly asserts that men can attain eternal salvation in the worship of any religion whatsoever," and thus it casts peoples down into the abyss of incredulity (Pius IX, Enc., November 9, 1846).
- PRINCIPLES. I. Liberty of worships, considered as doctrine, is a false principle of liberalism, which a Catholic legislator ought to impede by all the ways in which he can. Reason: he who cannot favor lesser vices, how much more ought he to resist those things which tear out the foundations of the commonwealth (St. Alph., de Prohib. lib., c. 1, n. 4; opusc. Fedelta dei vassalli).
Liberalism is a politico-religious system which professes an independence of the State from the Church so complete that the State rules itself, no respect being had to Religion, as if this did not exist, and all religions were in reality equal in themselves.
Moreover, the Supreme Pontiffs have always reprobated this liberty and equality of worships: "What more insane can be devised?" exclaims Pius VI in the Letter to Cardinal La Rochefoucauld (on March 10, 1791). Gregory XVI, in the Encyclical Mirari vos; Pius IX, in the Encyclical Quanta cura (December 8, 1864) and in the Syllabus (propositions 77, 78, and 79); Leo XIII, in the Encyclical Libertas (June 20, 1888), condemned this system by their supreme authority. The same Pontiff spoke thus concerning this doctrine in the Encyclical Immortale Dei: "If it differs from Atheism in name, in reality it differs not at all."
Note. But what kind of sin against faith he commits who professes liberalism was said above at n. 441.
II. Liberty of worships and of conscience can sometimes be tolerated where the prince cannot impede it without graver detriment to the true religion and commonwealth. Thus the Angelic Doctor teaches (2.2, q. 10, a. 11): Human rule is derived from divine rule, and ought to imitate it. But God, although he is omnipotent and supremely good, nevertheless permits some evils to be done in the universe which he could prohibit, lest, by their being removed, greater goods be taken away, or even worse evils follow. St. Alphonsus is plainly consonant with the Angelic Doctor (II, 18). Cf. Zigliara, Summa Phil., p. 247.
III. Liberty of worships, existing in fact, creates a twofold danger for the faithful, both of embracing the theoretical error concerning the equal value of religions, and of confusing political tolerance with dogmatic tolerance (Villada, Casus Consc., I, p. 59).
The matter is clear. From this twofold danger it must always be discerned whether someone in reality has fallen into a sin opposed to faith, or has only undergone the danger of falling into it, and whether the matter is one of doctrinal liberalism, or only of political parties.
- From these things you will resolve: A. As regards liberalism, as it is doctrine:
In order to determine what sin against faith he commits who professes this liberalism, one must carefully inspect (as Genicot says) what he understands by the sentence to which he gives assent, since among those who have not completely turned aside to atheism or rationalism and who wish to remain Catholics, this word liberalism is taken with manifold variety; then one must see how far, by reason of ignorance and good faith, each one is excused from formal sin.
Hence: 1. He is a heretic who: a) fully embraces the doctrine of liberalism, that is, the full independence of the State from the Church, or (what is worse) the subjection of the Church to the authority of the State. For some subordination of the State to the Church is manifestly contained in the full power with which Christ furnished Peter and his successors; b) the same must be said of those liberals who pertinaciously hold certain particular doctrines which are also adverse to divine faith, for example, that by force of a merely civil contract there is given among Christians a true marriage. Cf. Sarda y Salvani, Le liberalisme est un peche.
- They are excused from heresy, but expose themselves to danger, who defend these errors on account of ignorance for the most part culpable, and yet do not bear the mind of retaining them when they shall have known them to be reprobated by the Church. Likewise, by defect of religious assent, they sin gravely against prudence or reverence owed to the Church who hold only some secondary error, but one by no means contrary to divine faith, for example the 76th proposition of the Syllabus, concerning progress going to follow for the Church from the abrogation of the civil empire. But here some good faith can easily be admitted.
B. As regards liberalism, as it denotes political parties.
Before all things one must examine whether those who adhere to such parties nevertheless otherwise seem to fulfill the offices of good Catholics. Then it must prudently be explored whether they themselves admit something evil in doctrine or manner of acting, or without sufficient reason cooperate in the evil counsels of others; and according to these things let them be judged.
Concerning cooperation of this kind a question often occurs when there is question of schools, assemblies, and other social works.
Vol. I, Pt. II, Sect. I, Tr. I, Ch. III, Art. III, § 2. On Communication With Heretics and Unbelievers
- Communication is either RELIGIOUS or in sacred rites, or CIVIL or political. The former is prohibited by reason of itself, by divine and ecclesiastical right, on account of scandal and cooperation in sin; namely insofar as it is simulation of false faith, or approbation of false religion (see n. 432). - The latter is prohibited chiefly by reason of the danger of perversion which it induces.
PRINCIPLES. I. Civil communication with unbelievers, heretics, and apostates is forbidden by the natural and divine law, if it is dangerous to those communicating. This is established from the things said at n. 374, and from several places of Sacred Scripture, for example the Epistle to Titus (3:10): Avoid a heretical man, and Romans (16:17, 18): Decline from them. For men of this kind do not serve Christ our Lord, but their own belly: and by sweet speeches and blessings they seduce the hearts of the innocent (cf. de Prohib. lib., c. 1).
Note. 1. From civil communication a threefold danger arises: a) lest the Catholic religion suffer detriment; b) lest someone make shipwreck of his own faith; c) lest others take scandal.
Apostates, free-thinkers, and heretics entice more to their errors than unbelievers do; because their speech creeps like a cancer (2 Tim. 2:17), and because Satan, so that he may more easily deceive the simple and unwary, with their help and work, is transfigured into an angel of light. The danger grows in places of heretics or unbelievers where there does not exist some church with a Catholic priest to whom it is free to exercise our rites publicly.
Formerly a more severe prohibition, even general, was had against civilly communicating, without just cause, with heretics and others denounced by name (cf. n. 1295). It was forbidden to Christians (cf. title de Judaeis in Canon Law) to dwell with Jews in the same house, to be present at banquets, to use a common bath, to employ them as physicians ... or to serve Jews. But these things, says Tanquerey, have passed more or less into desuetude, and today attention must rather be given to the danger of perversion (II, n. 677, note). Cf. Gury-Ferreres, I, n. 210; D'Annibale, I, n. 110.
For ITALIANS Clement VIII, Const. Cum sicut, established: a) That under whatever title they dare not dwell in places of heretics where there does not exist a church with a Catholic priest. b) That they not depart to dwell in the aforesaid places except after opportune admonitions have been received from the Ordinaries or inquisitors for guarding against the danger of subversion. c) That they not use heretical physicians if a suitable Catholic is present (Scavini, II, n. 820).
- II. Religious communication with unbelievers, heretics, and apostates is of itself illicit and prohibited by the Church. It is established from reason and from the decisions cited above.
Note. 1. The prohibition is absolute in those things which contain heresy, as happens in active, public, and formal communication; it is only conditioned in those things which are administered in the Catholic rite, for example in mixed marriages, provided the dangers of religion are absent and ecclesiastical prohibition does not urge (cf. D'Annibale, l. c.; Gury-Ferreres, I, n. 209). The reason is clear, for the first is the same as truly to deny the true faith, to profess and simulate a false one (cf. n. 429), which is never licit; the other contains only the appearance of adhesion to a condemned sect, although it brings danger; yet all these things can and ought sometimes to be removed.
It can more easily be admitted that heretics communicate with us in our rites; for this has less danger than if we communicate with them.
It is more strictly prohibited to communicate in sacred rites with unbelievers, because besides other inconveniences there is almost always present participation in superstitious worship (cf. D'Annibale, l. c., and above n. 432).
- IT IS ASKED. Whether DISPUTATION with heretics is prohibited?
It must be noted beforehand. A twofold disputation is given: public, which, with day and hour fixed, has place before a multitude and judges appointed; private, which is made before a few hearers.
Resp. 1. For laymen, Alexander IV (c. 2, § 1, de Haeret., in Sexto) established thus: "We prohibit that it be licit for any lay person to dispute publicly or privately concerning the Catholic faith. But he who shall do contrary, let him be bound by the snare of excommunication" (excommunication ferendae sententiae). The law is founded on the presumption that laymen are not sufficiently taught. Therefore exception must be made if the controversy is made by learned men with the Bishop's permission, or in a case of great usefulness, or of introduced custom, as in Germany.
- "Disputation is prohibited to clerics by no right, provided that they are suitable, and from the circumstances a happy outcome can be hoped; but public disputation with heretics cannot be made without permission" (namely, of the Supreme Pontiff). Thus the Sacred Congregation of the Council, March 6, 1625, and several times the S. C. Prop. Fide. Yet in a case of necessity, if there is danger in delay, the Ordinary of the place can grant this license (Konings, n. 255).
Disputations with socialists are subject to the same rules, the Sacred Congregation for extraordinary affairs declared, January 27, 1902 (A. S. S., 38, p. 107. Cf. Canon. Cont., XXV, p. 335; Etudes, August 20, 1905, p. 480; Ami du Clerge, 1905, p. 354).
- From these things you will resolve: 1. Marriages with heretics and unbelievers, as being generally dangerous for the Catholic party and offspring, are, regularly speaking, gravely illicit. Yet sometimes, for a grave cause, and every danger being removed, the Church permits marriages of this kind to avoid a greater evil (II, 19). See the treatise on Matrimony (n. 1986).
It is not licit to serve heretics when there is danger of perversion. The same must be said if the servant is for the most part impeded from fulfillment of the precepts of the Church; but otherwise if he is only rarely impeded.
To send little children, young men, or girls into schools of heretics or of impious men is a great sin and a very great evil, ordinarily never repairable (cf. n. 713 seqq.). See the Instruction of the Eminent Cardinal Vicar to the pastors of the Fair City, July 12, 1878 (A. S. S., vol. 11, p. 176). Likewise, parents sin gravely who for the sake of gain send their still tender children, or allow them to go, to places of heretics, without any necessity and due cautions.
Also with the greatest caution must young people be permitted to frequent associations called scholastic or postscholastic, or associations of Popular Universities, because often faith runs into danger there. See the things said at n. 432.
Vol. I, Pt. II, Sect. I, Tr. I, Ch. III, Art. III, § 3. On the Reading of Depraved Books
Through the publication of books opposed to faith (or to good morals), especially in this our age, an immense slaughter of souls is made (de Prohib. lib.; ed. G., I, p. 253).
- PRINCIPLES. I. By force of the natural law, there is given a most grave obligation of avoiding the danger of perversion which arises from the publication, retention, and reading of depraved books. For: 1. "If a pernicious word, which immediately flies away, creeps like a cancer and wounds unto death: what evil does an improper book not bring, which can become a perpetual font of subversion?" (l. c., n. 2). 2. If a continual occasion of lust must altogether be removed, so that the penitent may deserve to be absolved, how much more a pernicious book inducing danger of losing faith?
Hence it is inferred: 1. Bishops, pastors, fathers of families, princes, magistrates, teachers, etc., ought to use the greatest vigilance in this matter.
Although someone has been furnished with the faculty of reading prohibited books, nevertheless he cannot read them if he knows or experiences that reading of this kind is harmful to him, or proximately dangerous, for example if he does not know how to distinguish truth from error (ibid., n. 12).
"In this matter, it is ordinarily expedient to follow the stricter opinions" (ibid., c. V, n. 8).
- II. By force of positive law, books prohibited by the Church, whether with censure or without censure, without legitimate license, can neither be read nor retained. The Church has received jurisdiction from the Lord himself for prohibiting to the faithful the reading of books which contain something against religion, good morals, or the discipline of the Church. If this faculty were not with the Church, and the faithful were not bound to obey it in this, neither could faith be preserved unharmed, nor would Christ have sufficiently provided for his Church. Hence the Doctors rightly teach that the judgment of the Church concerning books is altogether infallible (ibid., c. 2, n. 1).
It was said: 1. Books prohibited by the Church. Under the name book is understood a writing which consists in some bulk and unity of object, which must be judged from the judgment of prudent persons. Therefore positive prohibition is not extended to newspapers, letters, flying sheets, unless special mention is made of these. But periodical booklets, whose several fascicles are joined into one, are to be counted among books properly so called (S. Off., January 15, 1892). 2. Whether with censure, such as by the Constitution Officiorum are both books of heretics or apostates defending heresy and books of any author whatsoever prohibited by name through apostolic letters. 3. Or without censure, that is, all books which are contained in the Index of prohibited books or comprehended by the general rules. 4. Can neither be read nor retained; but it is required and suffices that you destroy books of this kind in whatever way, or hand them over to one having the faculty of retaining them, because even by acting thus you do not retain them. 5. Without legitimate license: which license is to be obtained from the Roman Pontiff, for example through the S. Congregation of the Index; for the faculty of permitting belongs to him whose office it is to prohibit. The Congregations of the Holy Office and de Propaganda Fide enjoy the same power; likewise the Master of the Sacred Palace for the City. Sometimes, however, Bishops, by force of special faculties, are able to grant this license to priests (A. S. S., 7, p. 302). Cf. Const. Officiorum, which we shall explain more fully in the Appendix.
- III. All Bishops by divine right, for their dioceses, have the power of proscribing and prohibiting, even under censure, either books, or even daily papers, of harmful reading. This belongs essentially to their office. Indeed, because knowledge of all harmful books cannot so easily and immediately come to Rome, it is often preferable that they be proscribed by their own authority without any delay interposed (VII, 290).
"Ordinaries, even as delegates of the Apostolic See, should strive to proscribe books and other harmful writings published or spread in their diocese, and to remove them from the hands of the faithful. Let them refer to Apostolic judgment works or writings which require more subtle examination, or in which, for obtaining a salutary effect, the sentence of supreme authority may seem to be required." Const. Officiorum, n. 29.
- IT IS ASKED. Whether necessity can sometimes excuse from the law of the Index?
Resp. "That which several Doctors teach does not seem improbable, ... namely that by just epikeia a truthful, pious, and learned man reading a heretical book is excused, if he necessarily needs such reading for convincing some heretic from his own, for instance by finding contradictions, concessions, fallacies, and similar things; provided necessity urges, and besides recourse to Rome or to one's own Bishop is not open." Thus St. Alphonsus (de Prohib. lib., c. 5, n. 2). Cf. Const. Officiorum, n. 25.
Outside these cases, to the question: "Whether one who is morally certain that the reading will not harm him can read a prohibited book without license?" St. Alphonsus responds (VII, 291): "Whatever others may say, it must altogether be denied." Cf. n. 451, 452.
- Note. The INDEX OF PROHIBITED BOOKS was first made by order of Paul IV. Pius IV and Clement VIII perfected it. - It prohibited books partly through general decrees, which are called Rules of the Index, partly by indicating in alphabetical order either the titles of books or the names of authors. But lastly Leo XIII, by the Constitution Officiorum ac munerum (January 25, 1897), after abrogating the general decrees hitherto in force, instituted new ones and approved and confirmed a new Index, through the Brief Romani Pontifices (September 17, 1900).
Merkelbach, Summa Theologiae Moralis
Vol. I, Special Moral Theology, Treatise: On Divine Faith, Second Part: On the Act of…, Chapter II: On the External Act of Faith or on Its Confession
St. Thomas, II-II, q. 3.
711. Confession of faith is its external manifestation through some sign suitable for this. It is an external act of the virtue of faith, because it is produced immediately by faith, with no other habit mediating; whence confession of faith according to object and species is directly ordered to faith as to an end.
From natural-divine law there is given a precept, obliging under grave obligation, of confessing faith outwardly; this precept is at once affirmative and negative (can. 1325, § 1).
712. Insofar as it is negative, the precept of confessing faith prohibits, in any case or danger whatever, even of death, expressly or tacitly, by word or sign or deed (by silence, for example), outwardly to deny the faith or to profess or simulate a false faith. For he who acted thus would at least implicitly say either that God reveals false things or that He did not reveal the dogmas of the Christian faith, each of which is most injurious to God. Hence Christ: "But he who shall deny me before men, I also will deny him before my Father who is in heaven" (Matt. X, 32, 33; cf. Luke IX, 26; XII, 8-9; II Tim. II, 12).
This can happen in two ways: a) directly and explicitly, when someone knowingly denies the faith or professes a false one; b) indirectly and implicitly, if without the intention of denying he places an action which is held by others as a denial of faith, such as assisting at or participating in heretical rites can be (for example, receiving the Calvinist supper).
Therefore they sin against faith:
- by words, who openly, seriously or fictitiously, deny even one article of faith, or deny that they are Christians or Catholics, or say that they are disciples of another sect (Old Catholics, rationalists, positivists, Mohammedans), or deny that they are papists, ultramontanes, clericals, ... in regions in which those words signify nothing except a Catholic by religion;
- by deeds: those who for concealing faith employ the rites or ceremonies of false worship, such as burning incense, genuflecting or sacrificing before an idol (S. C. de Prop. F., September 12, 1645), receiving the Calvinist supper, using circumcision as a religious rite, etc.;
- likewise those who with money buy a certificate that they have professed a false religion (libellatici);
- likewise those who place an action which from itself or from circumstances signifies the profession of a false religion, for example, to drink to the death of Papists or to the health of the enemies of the Church, to pray, sing, etc., together with them, to give one's name to a heretical, schismatic, Masonic sect, to an anti-Catholic or biblical society, for whatever cause;
- generally those who use garments, gestures of the hands, or signs specially professive of a false religion, such as sacred garments which display honor to the Prophet, to an idol, etc. (S. C. P. F., March 23, 1844), and insignia or signs professive of Freemasons;
- generally those who, when questioned concerning the faith by name and personally by public power, are silent or use ambiguous words (which, for example, are taken by the questioner as a denial): for this, on account of the circumstances, according to common estimation, is considered as denial or shame of faith, or fear of imminent punishment (prop. 18 condemned by Innocent XI).
I said generally, because, if on account of certain altogether peculiar circumstances it were manifest to all that those things are not a denial of religion or shame concerning it, for example, if silence were held by those present rather as a confession of faith, or if the law openly established that no public power is permitted to insert itself into the conscience of citizens, it would not be illicit. But when this happens is left to be determined by prudent estimation.
713. Insofar as it is affirmative, the precept of confessing faith commands, even sometimes with danger of life, the external confession of faith, and indeed in a twofold case: 1. when by the omission of this confession, privatively a great honor due to God would be subtracted, or positively or contrarily God would be affected by a great injury; hence not only one questioned concerning faith, who by silence is held as an infidel, must confess and procure great honor for God, but also he who sees sacred things trampled upon by infidels or heretics is bound to prevent it if he can, and he who hears the faith attacked must contradict if he can or impose silence on those attacking, or profess the faith, if these are judged useful or likely to profit; 2. when, by not confessing faith, grave spiritual harm would arise for one's neighbor, such as contempt of religion, the perversion of the faithful, scandal, for example, if, with someone being silent, others would believe that the faith was not true and would be turned away from the faith, or would be delayed for a long time, or would not be converted to the faith. Hence Rom. X, 9, 10: "If you confess with your mouth the Lord Jesus and believe in your heart..., you will be saved: for with the heart one believes unto justice, but with the mouth confession is made unto salvation."
For faith itself obliges us to confess it when, by omitting confession, injury is done to God in faith or one's neighbor suffers detriment.
714. Applications. - Since an affirmative precept does not oblige for always, hence per se and generally they do not sin, at least against faith, by words, signs, or acts:
- who conceal or dissemble faith but for a grave cause;
- who, when questioned by a private man, out of contempt either are silent or use equivocal words;
- who deny or are silent that they are priests, religious, etc.;
- a fortiori who, lest they be recognized as Catholics, eat meats, or do not assist at Mass, do not pray before or after lunch, unless this were expressly demanded in hatred of religion, disobedience to the Church, profession of a false sect;
- indeed who for a graver cause use garments or signs distinctive of a nation, and also probably of a false religion only;
- likewise those who flee in time of persecution (Matt. X, 23); pastors of souls are excepted, who would flee with the spiritual harm of these souls (John X, 11);
- who pay money so that others may not harm them or inquire concerning their faith;
- who, when the prince commands that Catholics betray themselves or appear, are unwilling to appear or betray themselves.
I say generally, for if the aforesaid actions from special circumstances were held by others as denial or shame of faith, or if great honor would be subtracted from God, or grave scandal would arise, they would be sinful against faith and must be abandoned. But when this happens is left to be determined by prudent estimation.
715. Observations. - 1. From other precepts or virtues we are also sometimes obliged to external confession of faith, for example, in the reception of Baptism (cf. ritual) or of another sacrament, by reason of external worship and adherence to the Church, from the precept of the Church (Holy Office, July 20, 1859; can. 1406-1408), etc. But in those cases it is not the precept itself of faith which obliges us.
- Sometimes it is necessary to conceal faith, whenever, the precept of confessing faith not urging, from its confession religion would be more blasphemed, or disturbances would arise, or danger of death would have to be undergone, or other grave harms would follow (St. Thomas, a. 2, ad 3).
- Concerning communication with infidels and heretics, it will be said in the fourth part.
- Noldin notes: "If somewhere political power prohibits conversion to the true faith before a certain year of age (16 or 18), the law is impious, nor is it lawful for him who is persuaded concerning the truth of the Catholic religion to defer the profession of faith longer on account of civil law. Pastors of souls are bound to admit to the profession of faith those who ask to be enrolled in the bosom of the Church, notwithstanding whatever temporal evil, proper or alien. But to avoid the evils which from civil law would threaten both the parish priest and the one to be converted, it can be permitted that by mutual consent conversion be deferred to lawful age, or that a conversion already made be concealed until that age, if it is already close at hand," Theologia Moralis, II, n. 14. But internal adherence must immediately be given to faith, nor can it be deferred.
- Yet union with the Church and profession of faith per se must be made publicly, nor must they be concealed at least perpetually, as the constant praxis of the Church bears. Whence:
a) "Outside the case of necessity it is not lawful to baptize an adult or admit him to conversion secretly, with only the priest knowing, but this must be done publicly before others, at least two witnesses. Therefore the Church prescribes that the abjuration of heresy, which is required from neoconverts, be made before two witnesses and that the conversion made be inserted into the parish books, both so that satisfaction may be made to the obligation of professing faith, and so that the convert may be subject to the jurisdiction of the Church in the external forum...
b) Therefore it was established that a Mohammedan cannot be admitted to Baptism who, on account of danger of life, wishes to be and remain a hidden Christian, but that he must transfer himself to places where he can publicly profess the Christian religion (S. C. de Prop. F., May 28, 1635).
c) In the case of necessity, where namely a dying person from a reasonable grave cause refuses public conversion to the faith, he can be received into the Church altogether secretly by any priest, so that his salvation may be provided for, unless the reason of preventing scandal or promoting the salvation of one's neighbor demands otherwise, as in a man of great dignity and authority. But even in this case conversion can be made before two witnesses only, who can afterwards divulge the matter, if there is need" (ibid., n. 16, 2; cf. Holy Office, July 25, 1630).
d) Likewise "some heretic or pagan, who wishes to embrace the true faith but cannot accomplish this without great temporal inconveniences, can secretly before two discreet witnesses be received into the bosom of the Church (and conceal this for a time). But after conversion he can no longer perform acts which are a profession of heresy or paganism, for example, receive the Protestant supper, contract marriage before a non-Catholic minister, wear signs signifying idolatry, etc. But he could perform other things which are not a direct profession of heterodox faith, as, for example, visit the temples of heretics, assist (merely) at a non-Catholic funeral, indeed once or twice assist at a non-Catholic sermon, provided nevertheless that danger of perversion or scandal is absent," Prummer, Theologia Moralis I, n. 507, resol. 1.
- Prummer notes, ibid., n. 507, 5: "In practice it cannot always easily be distinguished whether concealment of faith is lawful or not. Generally speaking, it is much better to profess faith candidly, because the harms arising from profession are not wont to be so great as they appear at first sight. On the contrary, from an honest profession of faith the greatest goods are wont to be produced both for the one professing himself, and for others admiring his good example."
Billuart, Summa Summae
Billuart, Summa Summae, Tomus III. On the Secunda …, On Faith, On the Internal and Extern…, On the external act of faith
Twofold is the precept concerning the external act of faith, as we said concerning hell: one negative, not to deny the faith externally; the other affirmative, to confess the faith externally.
I say 1°: In no case whatsoever, even to avoid death, is it licit to deny by word or deed the faith retained in the heart, or to profess or simulate it false externally.
It is clear 1° from the words of Christ, Matt., X, 33, and Luc., XII, 9, where he says: He that shall deny me before men, I will deny him before my Father. And Apost., 2 Tim., II, 12: If we deny him, he also will deny us. It is therefore a divine negative precept not to deny the faith. Such however is the nature of a negative precept that it binds always and forever.
2° To deny the faith is to say that God revealed what is false, or did not reveal a dogma of faith. But either is a lie injurious to God. Therefore it is never licit.
I said 1°: « By word or deed; » because in both there is a lie 21, with this sole difference, that a lie by deed is called simulation. 21 This q. II, a. 1, o.
I said 2°: « Or profess or simulate it false externally; » because to simulate and outwardly profess a false faith or religion is just as much as to deny the true one; for he who says in word, or exhibits in deed, that he is a Calvinist denies himself to be a Catholic.
You will ask when in practice someone is judged by deed to simulate or outwardly profess a false religion.
I answer. And let it be a general rule. To make use of signs, rites, ceremonies, vestments, actions which are primarily distinctive of sect from sect, or which either of themselves, or by institution, or from circumstances are primarily significant of the profession of a false faith, is to profess that false faith externally; and therefore never licit. Those things however which distinguish not primarily sect from sect but nation from nation, or which only per accidens, indirectly and secondarily, are significant of the profession of a false faith, although they are to be avoided lest we give some occasion for believing that we denied the faith — provided nevertheless there subsist a just cause of necessity preponderating over this deception — may be used licitly; because this is not absolutely to profess a false faith. From this rule rightly understood and applied you will resolve many cases. I shall relate some.
Hence therefore you will infer 1° that it has never been licit to bend the knee before an idol, to offer incense to it, even if the intention be directed to a hidden crucifix, to wear the image of Mohammed hung about the neck, to take the supper of the Calvinists, to sing psalms in their temples, to play the organs, to contract marriage before a minister blessing the nuptials according to the rite of his sect; because these are primarily distinctive of sect from sect, and per se primarily significant of a false religion.
[By the constitution Ex quo singulari, given 11 July 1742, Benedict XIV, confirming the constitution of Clement XI Ex illa die, declared that Chinese Christians might not exhibit external signs of adoration to an idol, although the intention were directed to a cross hidden under their garments. He permitted them to keep only those usages which could be held as civil only, such as those which had been instituted in honor of Confucius, provided all rites in which religious worship was included were done away with.
You will infer 2° that it is regularly not licit for Catholics to be present at the sermons, baptisms and marriages of heretics or schismatics, as was declared by the Congregation of the Holy Office on 10 May 1770. Whence conclude that undertaking the office of godfather at the baptism of heretics, and of witness at their marriages, is forbidden a fortiori by the same decree. This is elicited from the Instruction of Pius VI of 26 September 1791, and from his replies to the clergy of France of 28 May 1793. — As to mere assistance, it was said that it is regularly not licit, because if the presence be merely material, as can sometimes happen, and it be sufficiently gathered from the circumstances that it contains or supposes no communication in divine things with heretics, and moreover offers no occasion of scandal, it can be excused from sin. — But truly, as evidently appears, if any Catholic, despising the laws of the Church, contracts marriage before a minister of a dissenting cult, it is licit to no Catholic to assist at such a marriage, even though he do not inwardly assent to it. Nay, parents and those more closely joined by blood are bound positively to disapprove it. — To the question: « Is it licit for Catholics to enter the temples of heretics? » the Congregation of the Holy Office replied on 14 January 1718: « It is licit, if they enter out of mere curiosity, without any communication in sacred things. » — If funerals of heretics be in question, a distinction must be made. Things pertaining to a merely civil office, such as accompanying the body to the door of the temple or cemetery, can be permitted. Other things which have the nature or species of communion with heretics are to be prohibited. Moreover several things which could be admitted in one place cannot be tolerated in another, because from circumstances or from the customs of the region they receive a different signification. Whence one must attend to local custom, and in doubt superiors must be consulted. So Gury-Dumas, num. 192, 5°.
You will infer 3° that those gravely sin who are present at the merely civil funerals of those who abjured the Catholic faith; because funerals of this kind, from which all signs of religion are deliberately excluded, are nothing but an open profession of impiety, which not even the relatives of the deceased may cooperate in.]
You will infer 4° that on the contrary it is licit, for a just cause, to wear long Turkish dress, or even what they call a turban, to conceal the faith. For although it has never been licit to deny the faith, it is nevertheless licit sometimes to hide and dissemble it; nor is that garment primarily for the distinction of religion but of nation, nor does the Catholic assume it so that he be believed to profess the Turkish religion, but that the occasion of attending to and inquiring about his religion be taken away. Say the same of the vestments of other idolatrous nations which are not destined precisely for the uses of their religion. Say the same of their standards in war, that thus they may be deceived and conquered.
I say 2°: By the precept of Christ the faithful is bound sometimes to confess his faith externally 22. 22 This q. 3, a. 2, o.
It is proved. Christ, Matt., X, 32, says: Every one that shall confess me before men, I will also confess him before my Father. Luc., IX, 26: He that shall be ashamed of me and of my words, him will the Son of man be ashamed of. And the Apostle, Rom., X, 10: With the heart we believe unto justice; but with the mouth confession is made unto salvation. Therefore confession is sometimes necessary to salvation.
The Author here 23 assigns two cases in which this affirmative precept of confessing the faith binds, namely: « When through omission of this confession honor due to God would be withheld, and also utility to be bestowed on neighbors: suppose that anyone questioned about the faith kept silence, and from this it were believed either that he had no faith, or that the faith was not true, or that others were turned away from the faith by his silence. » All theologians follow the Saintly Doctor. And deservedly, for the precept of confessing the faith binding sometimes being supposed, cases cannot be assigned in which its observance presses more than these two which St. Thomas assigns. 23 Ibid.
[Whence the following proposition was condemned by Innocent XI, on 2 March 1679, which is the 18th: « If anyone be questioned by the public authority, I counsel him sincerely to confess the faith, as glorious to God and the faith; I do not condemn silence as sinful. »
It must be noted however that this proposition was condemned as too general, because namely it includes also the cases in which silence would be equivalent to denial of the faith. For it is commonly admitted, with St. Liguori, lib. III, n. 13, that for a just cause it is licit to conceal the faith, or to cover truth with words or other ambiguous and indifferent signs, whenever the precept of professing the faith does not press, which, insofar as it is affirmative, binds indeed always but not forever. Hence one questioned about the faith not in juridical form may keep silence or answer obscurely. For it is not generally true that one questioned by those who exercise public authority is bound to profess the faith, unless this profession be made necessary by the circumstances, lest he seem to deny the faith before bystanders. Much more will it be lawful for anyone to refuse to satisfy the curiosity of private persons: unless questioned about the faith out of hatred of religion he would seem, by acting thus, to deny the truth; which is to be judged from the circumstances.]
I say 3°: By ecclesiastical law, under mortal sin, the following are bound to external profession of faith, from the Council of Trent, session XXIV, cap. 12 de reform.: « Those provided with benefices of whatever kind having care of souls shall be bound, from the day of acquired possession, within at least two months, in the hands of the bishop himself, or, he being hindered, before his general vicar or official, to make public profession of the orthodox faith, and to promise and swear that they will persevere in obedience to the Roman Church. Those provided moreover with canonries and dignities in cathedral churches are bound to do the same not only before the bishop or his official, but also in chapter. Otherwise let all the aforesaid provisors, as above, not receive their fruits, nor let possession avail them. » — From the tenor of this decree, those provided with canonries in merely collegiate churches, or with simple benefices, are not bound to the said profession. — The most sacred council commands moreover, session XXV, cap. 2 de reform., that patriarchs, primates, archbishops and bishops emit the same profession of faith in the first provincial synod in which they themselves take part; likewise that the same be done in the first diocesan synod in which all the rest who are to hold ecclesiastical benefices ought to assemble. Pius IV extends this law to all prelates of religions, even military, and Pius VI to all who are to be promoted to doctors, masters, regents and professors. De Angelis warns, Praelect. iuris canon., lib. I, tit. 1, n. 2, « that the constitution of Pius IV is not received in usage as regards those prelates who are placed over the government of religious not by the Holy See but by their superiors or by the chapter. » Sanchez truly, c. 3, n. 4, says the decree of Pius V does not bind where it was not received in usage. As regards the penalty of not receiving his fruits imposed by Trent upon those omitting the profession of faith, St. Liguori judges, lib. III, n. 11, that these are not bound to it before sentence.
It must be noted that this profession of faith is to be made according to the formula prescribed by Pius IV, into which, by order of Pius IX, express mention is to be inserted of those things « which have been handed down, defined and declared by the ecumenical Vatican Council, especially concerning the primacy and infallible magisterium of the Roman Pontiff. »
Although it is probable that this profession can be made through a procurator, it is nevertheless more probable that the promoted person is bound personally. The reason is that otherwise it does not seem that satisfaction is sufficiently made by oath, which must be made personally. St. Lig., lib. I, n. 11.
Sabetti-Barrett, Compendium of Moral Theology
Vol. I, Tr. V, Ch. I, Art. III, § I. On Infidelity in General
Infidelity, taken generally, is lack of faith, and a threefold kind is distinguished, namely: 1st. positive or formal, which is lack of faith in him to whom faith itself has been sufficiently proposed, and who positively rejects it; 2nd. negative or material, which is lack of faith in him who has never heard anything concerning the true religion, or indeed has heard, yet not sufficiently; 3rd. privative, which is lack of faith in him who, when the occasion has been given, neglects to obtain for himself knowledge of faith.
I Say. As infidelity both positive and privative is a most grave sin, so negative infidelity is no sin, but only the penalty of sin. The reason for the first is that in positive infidelity there is had explicitly, and in privative infidelity virtually, contempt of the first truth and of the authority of God revealing. But the reason for the second is both because no sin can exist where invincible ignorance is had, and because the following proposition, which is the 68th of Baius, "Purely negative infidelity in those among whom Christ has not been preached is a sin," was condemned by St. Pius V and Gregory XIII.
Concina, Compendium
Bk. III, Diss. I, Chapter VI — On the divine and ecclesiastical precept of confessing the Christian doctrine, both of faith and of morals
I. Question I. Is there a precept of confessing the Christian faith outwardly? Answer. All affirm it. This divine precept is twofold, affirmative and negative. The discourse is now of the first. The exterior manifestation of the faith can be made by words, signs, nods, gestures, and actions which express the faith either by peculiar institution or by common acceptation.
II. The divine precept of confessing the faith outwardly Christ frequently inculcates, saying in Matthew chapter 10: Every one therefore that shall confess me before men, I will also confess him before my Father. The precept presses: 1. When the honor of God, and the good of Religion, demand it. 2. When our Neighbor needs to be confirmed in the faith. 3. When we are constrained to teach others the catholic Religion. 4. When from our silence a suspicion arises, or can arise, that we have withdrawn from the faith. In these and similar cases the precept of exterior confession presses.
III. Question II. Does he sin who, being interrogated about the catholic faith, keeps silence? Answer. The Theologians are wont to distinguish an interrogation made by the public Power from an interrogation made by a private person. It is agreed among all that those Christians sin against the precept of confessing the faith who, interrogated about matters of faith by the public Power sitting in tribunal, keep silence and omit to profess the faith openly. Wherefore the following thesis was justly condemned: If one be interrogated by the public Power, I counsel him to confess the faith openly, as glorious to God and to the faith; to keep silence I do not condemn as of itself sinful. If the interrogation be made by a private person, then the circumstances of persons, of time, and of place must be regarded. For if the bystanders would incur danger from the silence, if the honor of God would suffer detriment, then the precept of confession would press, even though the interrogation were made by a private person. The Faithful are also bound to answer a catholic Superior interrogating them about the faith. And this holds true even if the Prince be a layman: for although it does not belong to such to interrogate about matters of faith, it can nevertheless happen that it is theirs to know whether their own subjects are catholics. When a Catholic sees the sacred images trampled upon, he is bound to profess his faith, that, so far as can be done, he may repel the injury inflicted upon God and upon the sacred images.
IV. Question III. Is it sometimes licit to flee from a tyrant, that compulsion to confess the faith may be avoided? Answer. Tertullian denied it in his book On flight in persecution; and his error the Montanists embraced. The error of Tertullian the Fathers confuted by manifest testimonies of the Gospel. St. Matthew, chapter 10, says: And when they shall persecute you in this city, flee into another; and again, chapter 24: Then they that are in Judea, let them flee to the mountains.
V. Bishops, Parish priests, and other Pastors can licitly flee, and sometimes ought, when tyrants rage against them personally, and other ministers are present who can administer spiritual assistance to the flock — as is evident from the example of the most invincible Athanasius, and as the Angelic Doctor teaches, lecture 3 on John. On the contrary, when no ministers are present, and the sheep are pressed by grave necessity and are in grave danger of losing the faith, then the Pastors cannot flee, but must expose their life for the salvation of the flock, as John says in chapter 10: For the good shepherd giveth his life for his sheep. But the hireling ... leaveth the sheep, and flieth. Those who are not Pastors are bound, by the title of charity, not of justice, to succor their brethren when the gravest necessity presses.
VI. Question IV. Are those who have the care of souls bound to make public profession of the faith? Answer. All affirm it; and this the Council of Trent decreed, session 24, chapter 12. The Tridentine decree Pius IV confirmed and amplified in his motu proprio whose beginning is Injunctum nobis. And again St. Pius V, in his constitution which begins In sacrosancta, etc., commands that all Doctors, Masters, Regents, Lecturers, Preachers, etc., make the profession of faith. And these decrees oblige under grave fault, as the common opinion teaches. Beneficiaries having the care of souls are bound, within two months from the day of peaceful possession, to make the profession of faith in the hands of the Bishop or his Vicar; otherwise they do not make the fruits their own, and are bound to restitution, as the more common and more probable opinion teaches. See Tome I on the Decalogue, book 1, dissertation I, chapter 13. To the aforesaid constitutions are subject also Patriarchs, Primates, Archbishops, and Bishops.
VII. Question V. Would he deny the faith who denied that he is a Christian? Answer. St. Augustine affirms it, tractate 103 on John. For he who denies that he is a Christian, denies Christ himself. The same must be said of him who should deny that he is a Papist, a Pontifical, a Romanist, when the interrogation were made by Heretics for the sake of religion. Similarly he would deny the faith who, interrogated whether he is a Turk or a Lutheran, should affirm it — provided the end of the interrogator was to ascertain the religion of the one answering; otherwise, if the interrogation looked to something else. He who should deny that he is a Cleric, a Priest, a Religious, would not deny the faith, yet he would be guilty of a lie — whatever certain Probabilists assert to the contrary. It is not licit, for the sake of avoiding death, to burn incense to an Idol, or to bend the knee to it, or to exhibit other signs of religion, even though interiorly the faith be kept inviolate. For when external actions of their own nature savor of religion, they can never be licitly exercised for the purpose of testifying veneration toward an Idol. The example of Naaman the Syrian, which is wont to be objected, is vain, as will be made plain in its place. The use is not licit of ceremonies which are, as it were, the tokens of a false religion, and which savor of superstition.
VIII. It is not lawful for Christians to use the garments of Infidels instituted of themselves for the protestation of a false Sect — whatever Azor, with certain others, asserts to the contrary. For although garments, absolutely speaking, have been instituted for the adornment of the body, and under this aspect their use is licit, yet when they have been determined to the professing of a false Sect, then they can in no way be licitly employed. See Tome I on the Decalogue, book 1, dissertation I, chapter 14. Entrance into the temples of Heretics, into the synagogues of Jews and of Infidels, is licit for just causes: since such an entrance, in the common estimation of men, is not reputed an office or protestation of religion. If, however, a heretical Prince should command that the Catholics subject to his dominion enter the temples of the Heretics for the sake of religion, the Catholics ought rather to meet death than obey such a decree. Under pressing extreme necessity it is licit to go to the temples of Heretics for the receiving of baptism.
IX. It is also licit to eat idol-offerings, that is, foods consecrated to Idols, provided suspicion of superstition, scandal, and the worship of the false Sect be absent, as is gathered from St. Paul, 1 Corinthians 10: Whatsoever is sold in the shambles, eat; asking no question for conscience' sake. Catholics passing through the regions of Heretics cannot eat flesh on forbidden days, necessity being absent. For the precepts of the Church are to be observed everywhere. Yet to avoid death, or another grave inconvenience, the eating of flesh is licit. If, however, the eating of flesh were commanded in contempt of Religion, death would rather have to be undergone than to eat forbidden foods in contempt of one's own true Religion.
X. Question VI. Do they sin against the precept of confessing the faith who blush at the public confession of the doctrine which rules morals? Answer. The Christian religion, as I have said elsewhere, turns upon what is to be believed and what is to be done, as upon two inseparable hinges. Each part, then — both of the things to be believed and of the things to be done — must be publicly confessed. In the first centuries of the Church the heathen tyrants persecuted the things to be believed, but venerated the things to be done. On the contrary, in these last times of the Church, the things to be done are assailed by not a few professors of the Christian Religion itself. For he that shall be ashamed of me (says Christ, Luke 9) and of my words, of him the Son of man shall be ashamed, etc. Christ does not say: he that shall be ashamed to confess the Divinity, the Trinity, God the Creator, and the other splendid mysteries, which illuminate the mind only; but he says: he that shall be ashamed of me — that is, of me, a man humble, assailed with reproaches, contumelies, and derisions, crucified and dead. He adds: he that shall be ashamed of my words. What are the words of Christ? They are the precepts of morals, which crucify the flesh, restrain the appetites, humble the puffed-up soul, command penance, and prohibit allurements, dancings, the pomps of the world, luxury, lust, and the love of riches. He that shall be ashamed of me before men. It does not suffice to confess all these things in the heart; they must be manifested and defended before men. It is not enough to profess the things to be believed in any fashion whatever; they must be championed pure and inviolate, as Christ revealed them. By the same reason it does not suffice to profess any Moral doctrine whatsoever; but there is necessary the public confession of the Christian Moral, which leads through the strait and narrow way, which separates men from the pomps of the world, from spectacles, comedies, and the other allurements. Necessary is the profession of a Moral pure and immaculate, which is simple and ingenuous, and which detests cavillations and double-tongued distinctions.
XI. Question VII. Is it ever lawful to simulate a false Religion by words or deeds? Answer. From what has been said it is plain that this is never lawful. Against all simulations whatsoever Benedict XIV published a constitution, inserted in Tome 1 of his Bullarium, number 89, whose beginning is Inter omnigenas. From it I excerpt a few things, and subjoin them below.1
1 I. "Beginning, therefore, from the business of the faith, without which it is impossible to please God, we strictly command and enjoin upon all and each of the Faithful of that Kingdom [Serbia] who desire to retain the communion of the catholic Church, that they take care not to do or admit anything against the evangelical precepts and institutes in order to conceal — when it is sometimes licit and necessary to do so — the profession of the Christian Religion; and above all, things which include a protestation of the Mahometan Sect. Therefore, if they receive circumcision, let them know that Christ, as the Apostle testifies, shall profit them nothing. Let them altogether avoid taking upon their lips Turkish names, of which they ought not even to be mindful; frequenting the abominable temples of the Infidels, which they call Mosques; profaning the days of ecclesiastical fasts by the eating of flesh — and this to the end that they may be believed Mahometans. For all these things, even if the faith of Christ be held in the heart, cannot be done without a simulation of the errors of Mahomet, contrary to Christian sincerity, which contains a lie in a most grave matter, and includes a virtual denial of the faith, with the greatest injury to God and scandal to one's Neighbor. — II. But much more, when they are interrogated by the public Power, let them know that it is illicit for them to profess themselves adherents of the Mahometan Sect; but let them know that that is the time at which it behooves them, taking the shield of faith, not only to believe with the heart unto justice, but also with the mouth to confess Christ unto salvation: otherwise, if they dare to deny him before men, he also will deny them before his Father. — III. Equally impious and illicit is the abuse of those Christians of Serbia who, being about to depart from this life, permit or command that their corpses be committed to the burial-places of the Turks, with the assistance of the latter and with Mahometan rites employed. For if they ought by no means to be ashamed of Christ in life, how much less when they are to be presented at his tremendous judgment — lest he too be ashamed of them before his eternal Father. — IV. It shall therefore be the office of Bishops, Parish priests, and Missionaries seriously to teach and admonish those Christians who nefariously presume the above-said things, with immense injury to the faith, that in vain do they flatter themselves on their custody of the Christian law and their zeal, and on the education of their children in the same: since, failing even in one of these things, they are become guilty of all. Let them therefore openly declare to them that whoever, through fear of any Power whatever, or through dread of losing temporal goods, betrays his faith, provokes the wrath of God upon himself, and, unless he repent, renders himself a stranger to all hope of salvation: since he fears man more than God, and prefers to retain momentary things rather than to acquire eternal. And if any, obstinate, will to go on in this way of the ungodly, they shall be incapable of the Sacraments in life, and, if they die impenitent, of suffrages after death — to which let no minister of the Church presume to admit them; otherwise he shall be punished by his own Bishop with canonical penalties, according also to the prescript of the above-said Council of Albania. — V. Equally to be kept from the Sacraments of the Church are those women who, admitted under the name of marriage into the cohabitation of Turks, concealing the profession of the Christian Religion, there lead a life removed from every exercise of Religion; and it must be declared to them by their Pastors that they should not place the confidence of eternal salvation in that faith which, dead without works, they persuade themselves they can profitably preserve in the heart alone."
Bontempi, Palladium Theologicum V
Tr. I, Disputation I: On Faith, Question XVI: Whether we are bound to confess faith, and when · Tr. I, Disputation II: On Unbelief, Question VI: Whether the rites of unbelievers are to be permitted · Tr. I, Disputation III: On Heresy, Question IX: Whether we are bound to avoid the conversation of heretics
Tr. I, Disputation I: On Faith, Question XVI: Whether we are bound to confess faith, and when
Faith exacts from us the duty of the heart and of the tongue, as D. August. says lib. de fide, et Symb. cap. 1. I have already treated of the Acts of the heart; now of the Confession of faith.
But it is certain concerning the faith that there exists a divine precept against denying the faith. So D. Bonaventure ad 9. Lucae, which he proves from there: Whoever shall be ashamed of me and of my words: of him the Son of man shall be ashamed, when he shall come in his Majesty. There follow D. Thom. quaest. 3. art. 1., Valencia quaest. 3. p. 2., Fagundez lib. 1. cap. 3. So the Councils teach: Nicaenum can. 11. et 12., Ancyr. almost entirely, and Elibert. can. 1. et 2., where they testify that innumerable Martyrs underwent torments and deaths on account of the confession of the faith, which we are bound rather to undergo than to deny the faith. Therefore it is said Matth. 10. Whoever shall deny me before men, I will also deny him before my Father. Fear not those who kill the body, as the Holy Doctor notes in 3. dist. 39. art. 3. quaest. 2. et sermone 18. de pluribus Martyribus. See Valencia quaest. 3. p. 1., Fagundez cap. 3., Tanner disp. 1. quaest. 7. dub. 5., Fuliensis lib. 3. cap. 5.
Observe that some acts of a virtue are produced by the habit itself, and are physical, and in this way only the internal acts are acts of FAITH; for they are produced by the same habit, of which this is the sign, that they reside in the same potency in which the habit is. Secondly, some are acts of the virtue only morally, because they have praise on account of the formal object of the Virtue, and are ordered to it as to their end; and in this way even the external confession of faith is an act of the virtue of faith. It is proved: for it is ordered to the same end and the same object, as is had in 2. Corinth. 4. Having the same spirit of faith, we believe, for which cause we also speak. Hence it can be said that the Confession of faith pertains to various virtues; for instance to Religion, insofar as it begets honor for God: and to fortitude, insofar as on account of imminent peril it can be arduous, as the Holy Doctor teaches de Dono fortitudinis.
The Confession of FAITH therefore binds in two cases. First, when the worship due to God would otherwise be withheld. Secondly, if a grave spiritual benefit would be withheld from the people.
It is proved by D. Thom. ad primum. The act of some Virtue is necessary then, when it is necessary for the end of charity toward God or neighbor. But in those two cases the confession of faith is necessary for the end of charity. Therefore. The major is proved, for the end of every virtue is ordered to charity. The minor is proved; for, when one can attend to the honor of God or the salvation of his neighbor, and does not wish to, he is not judged to provide for charity. Add the times assigned by the Council of Trent for the profession of faith. See Fagundez lib. 1. cap. 4., Bassaeum verb. fides 2. num. 5.
The first question therefore is: Whether in some case one can deny that he is a believer. But this can be denied in two ways. First, lest it be believed that he is a Christian or Catholic by those who understand by that name some wicked and odious nation; and in this sense it is not a sin to deny that one is a Catholic or Christian, by which someone of such a wicked nation is understood. Valencia brings examples: see him. But in the second way, to deny oneself a Christian to one who understands rightly, is not licit. So commonly all the Doctors with D. Bonaventure 3. dist. 25. et p. 6., Breuil. cap. 8., D. Thom. 2. 2. quaest. 3. art. 2., where Cajetanus, Aragon. and other Thomists; Azor lib. 8. cap. 27., Suarez disp. 4. sect. 1., Sanchez lib. 2. cap. 5., Becanus p. 2. cap. 9. n. 30. and others, cited by Fagundez lib. 1. cap. 3., Tanner. loc. cit.
It is proved from the Holy Doctor in the places cited, and ad 22. Lucae, et 19. Ioannis from the fault of Peter, who denied Christ out of fear of death, and sinned gravely, as the Fathers confess, especially those cited by him, Chrysost. homil. 82., August. tract. 113., Gregory homil. 21. in Evangelia.
Next it is doubted: Whether one who is questioned about the faith by a Tyrant out of hatred for it can keep silence or change the subject.
D. Thom. quaest. 2. art. 2. denies it, as often as by that silence or answer he could be judged not to have the faith. Others follow him. The foundation is taken from the chapter Nolite timere 11. quaest. 3. It seems D. Bonaventure holds it ad 12. Lucae on those words: Be not terrified by those who kill the body. And he brings 1. Machab. 2. for it: Fear not the words of a sinful man. Take courage, and act manfully in the Law.
Others say he can keep silence or change the subject. So Aragon. quaest. 3. art. 2., Roder. cap. 119. Summae.
Others bring forward that one is bound to confess clearly, if he be a grave person, such as a Bishop or Doctor. So Valencia disp. 1. quaest. 3., Sanchez lib. 2. cap. 4.
Others say one is bound, if he is questioned publicly by a Tyrant. So Valencia loc. cit., Azor. cap. 27. quaestio 1., Tanner. num. 120., Aragon. quaest. 3. art. 2., Bannes q. 3. art. 2. et others cited by Fagundez cap. 5. The reason is; because then honor is detracted from God, if you do not confess. This the Holy Doctor seems to hint serm. 18. Martyrum. Accinit Fuliens.
It is asked thirdly. Whether through feigned external acts of a false religion it is licit to conceal the true faith, for instance by bending the knee to an Idol.
ADRIANUS in 4. Tract. de Baptismo, quaest. 1. art. 1. ad 5. says it is licit when a most grave cause urges. He brings D. Hieronymum 2. ad Galat. et epist. 89. ad August., where he teaches that the Apostles by cautious simulation exercised the ceremonies of the Law, now deadly.
It is PROVED first from 1. Reg. 5., where Naaman petitioned Eliseus: But this only is that for which you shall beseech the Lord for your servant, when my master goes into the temple of Remmon to adore, and he leans upon my hand: if I adore in the temple of Remmon, when he adores in the same place, that the Lord may forgive your servant for this thing, to which Eliseus answered: Go in peace, signifying that it was licit.
SECONDLY from 4. Reg. 10. the example of Jehu, who feigned that he wished to sacrifice to Baal, that he might draw the priests of Baal into the snare, and he seems to be praised by God: Diligently you did what was right, and pleased in my eyes. This example D. Bonaventure brought 3. dist. 38. quaest. 1. ad 3., where he says that the simulation of Jehu, feigning that he wished to adore Baal, is not a lie, but a simulation of prudence. On account of these words some draw the Seraphic Doctor to the opinion of Adrian. But the Holy Doctor does not exempt Jehu from sin against faith.
The true opinion therefore is, that it is not licit: So it seems to D. Bonaventure 4. dist. 33. dub. 8. litt. et loc. cit. Brevil. and D. Thom. quaest. 3. art. 2., where Cajetanus, Valencia quaest. 3. p. 2. dub. 4. and other Interpreters, Ales. 3. p. quaest. 183. membr. 2., D. Antonin. 2. p. tit. 22. cap. 6., Sylvest. verb. fides, quaest. 5., Armil. ibi num. 9., Ang. verbo Infidelitas, num. 8, Nauar. cap. 11. num. 23., Toletus lib. 4. summae, cap. 2., Vasquez disp. 182. cap. 5., Suarez de fide disp 14. sect. 4. et lib. 9. de leg. cap. 17. et in defensione fidei, lib. 6. cap. 9., Becanus 2. p. summae, cap. 9. quaest. 5., and others commonly, Fagundez lib. 1. cap. 6., Caspens. disp. 3. sect. 7. num. 61., Tanner. quaest. 7. disp. 5., Morand. quest. 11., Sanchez lib. 2. cap. 4. num. 14., who condemn the opposing opinion as error. And because they involve the Seraphic Doctor in it, I shall bring other passages in which he holds this second opinion absolutely. The first is prima parte Centil. sect. 26., where he wills that idolatry is committed absolutely by genuflecting, or evaporating incense to an Idol. The same he teaches ad caput 15. Sap. on these words: They are worthy of death who hope in such things.
It is proved first from that 1. Cor. 10. I would not have you become partakers of demons: you cannot drink the chalice of the Lord and the chalice of demons. The same is gathered from chapter 10.
It is proved by the reasoning of D. Bonaventure, because external worship contains superstitious worship intrinsically, because it was instituted for religious use.
To D. Hieronymus it is answered, that those ceremonies were for the worship of the true God, and were not yet declared harmful. See Tract. de Legibus, disput. penultima.
To the example of Jehu it is answered with D. Bonaventure loc. cit., D. August. lib. cont. Mendacium, and D. Thomas 2. 2. quaest. 3. art. 1., that Jehu is not excused from lying, or from the simulation of religion. Therefore he is not praised thus: Diligently you spoke. But: you did it, by killing the sons of Achab. See Vasquez num. 70., Tanner. 104, Fulsensem loc. cit.
Therefore he is excused only with respect to the prudence directed to the worship and obedience of God, not with respect to the sheer falsehood and simulation.
As to Naaman it is answered, that he asked only that he might show political deference to his lord, as Abul. quaest. 20. explains it, Cajetanus, Lyra, and Burgen. ibi. Then, even supposing he had asked to worship the Idol with external worship. Valencia and Fagundez answered: Eliseus did not consent, but only said: Go in peace, which could also have the sense of one reproving.
I answer more easily, that he asked that Eliseus should pray for him on account of the sin of entering the temple of Remmon, for which he ought to have been rebuked by Eliseus, and he did not improve. Therefore he says: Go in peace, as if to say: Since there is no hope of amendment, I shall pray for you: Go. Certainly Eliseus had admonished him as an idolater about this superstitious worship; for why else would his stricken conscience say to him that he should pray for him on account of this sin? Therefore the prophet does not retract, but only dismisses him; just as a poor man is dismissed to whom you do not wish to give alms: Go in peace: For prayer is a spiritual alms.
From what has been said it is gathered that neither can garments expressing superstitious worship be used, which are the sign of a Sect (although Fulsens. hints otherwise). As to garments signifying only politically a false sect, such as the yellow cap of the Hebrews, there are various opinions: some affirm; others deny. See Fagundez cap. 7., where he cites ten authors for the affirmative, namely that it is licit; and the same number for the negative. But garments which signify only the usage of a people are not forbidden. It is licit even to go to the temples of heretics, to confute their sermons. See Valencia quaest. 3. p. 2., Azor. cap. 27. quaestio 5., Tanner. num. 123. Not, however, where worship is presumed, as in England, by the Decree of Paul V.
Tr. I, Disputation II: On Unbelief, Question VI: Whether the rites of unbelievers are to be permitted
The certain rule is that these rites are not to be permitted by Christians to subject infidels without a most grave cause.
The most grave causes, however, are twofold: to avoid greater evils, or lest a greater good be impeded. So the Theologians commonly with St. Thom. 2. 2. quaest. 10. art. 11. et St. Bonau. locis allegandis. So Tanner. disp. 1. quaest. 9. dub. 2.; Card. Lugo disp. 19. sect. 2. §. 4.; Bassaeus v. Fides, 2. num. 9.
I assert first, that for the causes adduced, subject infidels can be tolerated by Christian Princes.
It is proved from the Saintly Doctor, opusc. de sex alis Seraphim, cap. 7., from that word of Matth. 13., where the Father of the family, expostulated with about eradicating the Zizanias, answered: Non: ne forte eradicetis et triticum. Sinite utraque crescere, etc. — No: lest perhaps you root up the wheat also. Suffer both to grow, etc. For this is the general rule, observed at that time by Pontiffs and Kings, lest seditions and confusions boil up in the Church. For thus God also tolerates certain evils for these causes, as Tanner. notes after St. Bonau. in 1. dist. 47. quaest. 3., where he infers our conclusion, certainly for this reason, because our goods ought to have their exemplars in God.
I assert second, that for this cause also the Jews are tolerated, both because as it were shadows they confirm the truth of our faith, and they exhibit the sacred Books to us for convincing the Pagans. So it is had in can. Qui sincera, dist. 45. et St. August. l 8. de ciuit. cap. 46. The legitimate Books of the old testament are indeed to be received from them, but the truly Talmudic, Cabalistic, and similar ones, vomiting forth insults against Christ, are to be given to the flames, as was long ago decreed by Gregory IX, Innocent IV, Julius III, Paul IV, and recently by Clement VIII.
I assert third, that outside these cases subject infidels are not to be tolerated. So it is defined in the Fourth Council of Carthage, can. 15. Elibertino; cap. 44. et Clem. un. de Iudaeis, et Saracenis, et leg. Nemo, C. de Paganis.
It is proved from Suarez disp. 18 sect. 4.; Tannero disp. 1. quaest. 9. dub. 2.; Lugo disp. 19 sect. 2. §. 4.; by the argument of St. Bonau ad Psal. 118. cap. 2. vers. 11., expounding that word of Matthaei 20: Principes gentium dominantur eorum — The princes of the nations lord it over them; because they are bound to remove their subjects from the perdition of souls, from scandals, and to promote them to good. For this reason Constantine burned the Temples of the Pagans and forbade the sacrifices; and he is praised by the Saints, Ambr. epist. 30. August. epist. 48. 50. et 104., and Nicephorus lib. 8. cap. 33. et de Iouiniano lib. 10. cap. 39. et Theodosio lib. 12. c. 25. relates it; thus Josias, Ezechias, Iosaphat are praised, who took away the high places, 3. et 4. Reg., and others are blamed who did not take them away, as St. August. epist. 50. notes.
Here they ask: whether a Prince can grant a safe-conduct to infidels without a faculty of the Pontiff.
Hurtadus answers, disp. 79. sect. 5., that it can be granted to unbaptized infidels; not to heretics, who are subjects of the Church.
Therefore, notwithstanding any safe-conduct of the Kings, the Church can punish heretics, as the Council of Constance defines, sess. 19.; yet if she herself has given the safe-conduct, she is bound to keep it: as the Master Joannes Marq., the Augustinian, teaches, lib. 2. de gubernatore Christiano. cap. 24., who on pagina 301. says that faith is to be kept with them, especially when confirmed by oath.
Tr. I, Disputation III: On Heresy, Question IX: Whether we are bound to avoid the conversation of heretics
Soto ASSERTS it, 4. dist. 25. quaest. 1. art. 1. et 3. and dist. 20. quaest. 1. art. 5.
The COMMON opinion, however, denies it, as long as the heretic has not been juridically declared and denounced, because the Council of Constance indulged communication with all excommunicates, except those denounced by name and public strikers of clerics. So the authors in Sanchez Lib. 2. decal. cap. 9. So Henriquez with others, Lib. 13. cap. 5. Suarez 3. p. Tract. 5. disp. 9. sect. 2. Toletus Lib. 1. summae, cap. 9. Tannerus disp. 1. quaest. 9. dub. 5.
Whence it is to be noted that the Seraphic Doctor, in 4. dist. 18. p. 2. q. 1. asserts the opinion of Soto, but before the Council of Constance: at that time, however, it was the common opinion.
The DIFFICULTY, however, is: whether it is sufficient for someone to be declared a heretic; or whether it is also required that he be declared excommunicate.
TO ME it seems sufficient that he be declared a heretic; for excommunication is infallibly linked to heresy. So both Soto, Medina, Henriquez, and others, whom Sanchez reports, Lib. 2. cap. 9. who however holds the opposite with others; and Suarez, de censuris, disput. 9. thinks it probable with Card. Lugo disp. 22. sect. 1.
…and 12 more passages — all of them are listed on the topic page.
Slater, Cases I
Slater, Cases I, Faith, Case 3. External Profession of the Faith
Caius, an Anglican minister who was dying, summoned Titius, a Catholic priest, and asked to be received into the Catholic Church, which he firmly believed to be the one Church of Christ. As to other matters, Titius found him excellently disposed; nevertheless, he wished absolutely that his reception into the Church be kept secret, lest his wife and children be deprived of the pension to which widows of Anglican ministers have a right. Titius, however, doubted whether he could receive him under this condition or not. Hence it is asked:
- Is it ever lawful to deny the faith?
- Must the faith be professed externally, and when?
- What must be done in the reception of converts?
- What is to be said concerning the case?
No, it is never lawful to deny the Faith: “He that shall deny Me before men, I will also deny him before my Father who is in heaven.”1
1 Matt. x. 33.
- Must the Faith be openly professed, and when?
Yes, it is at times necessary to profess the Faith openly; it is not sufficient to believe merely internally. This is required by the natural and divine law, as well as by positive law. A solemn profession of faith must, by positive law, be made by converts on their reception into the Church, by bishops at their consecration, by priests at their ordination, and by certain ecclesiastical functionaries on their assumption of office. We are chiefly concerned in this case with profession of faith which is required by natural and divine law. Like all positive precepts it always obliges, but not for always; in other words, there are certain occasions when the precept must be fulfilled; it does not oblige on all occasions whatever. The general rule is that the Faith must be openly professed whenever the honor of God, the spiritual good of one’s neighbor, or one’s own good requires it.
- What is to be done in the reception of converts?
Inquiry must first of all be made about the baptism of the convert, he must be instructed, and where the bishop requires it, the leave to receive him must be obtained from the bishop. If the convert has not been validly baptized, he is only required to make a profession of faith, and he is baptized according to the Ritual with the longer form, unless an indult has been obtained to use the shorter form prescribed for infants. If he was baptized before, but the validity of the baptism is doubtful, he must make a profession of faith, and then conditional baptism is conferred (in England privately with holy water and without the ceremonies); then he is conditionally absolved from censures, and after making a general confession of his whole life he receives sacramental absolution conditionally. If he was validly baptized, he makes profession of his faith, is absolved from censures, and then makes his confession and is absolved. Youths before puberty are not absolved from censures.
- The case. Caius, an Anglican minister, called Titius, a Catholic priest, and asked to be received into the Church. Caius was dying. Titius found him well disposed in other respects, but he desired that his conversion should be kept secret for fear lest his wife and children should be deprived of a pension to which they would have a right as the widow and children of an Anglican minister. Titius doubted whether this could be allowed.
No; Caius could not be received on that condition. The conversion of one in his position is likely to give great honor to God and to the true religion, and to be a cause of conversion to others.1 In all probability the society which granted such pensions as are mentioned in the case would never dream of depriving Caius’ widow and children of theirs because of his conversion on his death-bed. Perhaps, through some friendly source, assurance on this point could be obtained and communicated to Caius, who might then be received unconditionally.
1 Cf. Collectanea S. C. de P. F., nn. 44, 84. 2d ed.
The Casuist
Vol. IV, Case XXV: A Case of Conscience Regarding External Profession of Faith · Vol. IV, Case LXXX: Conversion from the Eastern Schism to the Catholic Church
Vol. IV, Case XXV: A Case of Conscience Regarding External Profession of Faith
A young man, brought up as a Protestant, has for some time been convinced that the Catholic is the only true Church. He resolves accordingly to enter it, but there are serious difficulties in his way. He lives with his parents, who are strict Protestants, and the least hint of his intention would at once arouse their anger; it would be impossible for him to continue to live peaceably in his parents' house; he would have to hear all manner of bitter remarks and finally would be compelled to quit his home. He will not be in a position to support himself for about three years; after that time he will be free from his parents' authority and able to take the important step openly. Being perplexed as to how to act, he succeeds in having a private conversation with the local Catholic priest, to whom he reveals his difficulties. The priest, as is his duty, has recourse to the Bishop. How will the latter decide the case?
The question is this: Is the young man bound to confess his faith in spite of all obstacles, and publicly to be received into the Catholic Church, or may the Bishop allow him to be received secretly, and to keep the fact of his conversion concealed until he can leave his father's house?
Against an affirmative answer may be quoted our Lord's words: " Qui confitebitur me coram hominibus, confitebor et ego eum coram Patre meo " (Matth. x, 32); and also the threat: " Qui me erubuerit et meos sermones, hunc Filius hominis erubescet, cum venerit in majestate sua " (Luke ix, 26). To obtain a just appreciation of these severe words, we must notice the contrasting clause, added by our Lord Himself. To the words, " Qui 'confitebitur me," etc., the contrasting clause is not: " Qui me confessus non fuerit," etc., as it is with reference to faith: " Qui non crediderit, condemnabitur," but it is: " Qui negaverit me," " Qui me erubuerit." Christ shows us plainly in this way that it is not permissible positively to deny His name and doctrine, and that false shame is no sufficient reason for a man's concealing his faith.
After setting aside this objection, we may adduce the following principle in support of an affirmative answer: Praecepta affirmativa obligant semper, sed non pro semper, or Praecepta affirmativa non obligant ad semper, sed certis duntaxat temporibus agendum. The Confessio exterma fidei is precisely a praeceptum affirmativum. It is, moreover, a generally accepted doctrine that weighty reasons, such as the certainty of incurring serious injury, relieve us from the duty of obeying laws that are not absolutely necessary to our salvation. The Confessio externa fidei is a law of this kind. It is permissible to conceal our religious convictions, where neither the honor of God, nor our own salvation, nor our neighbor's welfare, require us to reveal them, provided that we have good reasons for keeping them secret.
In the case under consideration a Confessio externa does not affect the honor of God nor the welfare of a neighbor. The young man's own salvation might be imperiled in his present circumstances, as, should it be made his duty to proclaim his faith, he might put off his conversion, and possibly never be converted.
My conclusion is, therefore, that the Bishop can give the young man permission to be received into the Catholic Church secretly, and can at the same time dispense him from observing the commandments of the Church, although he ought to hear Mass occasionally, when he is able to do so. He can easily receive the Sacraments secretly, in some other town for instance.
Another question arises in connection with this subject: What is the young man to do if his parents wish him to accompany them to a Protestant church? How is he to behave? If he cannot avoid yielding to their wishes or commands, he may go with them, but he must not take part in the singing or prayers of the service.
In support of the opinions expressed above, we may quote the following passage from St. Thomas Aquinas: “If a disturbance among unbelievers arises from an open profession of faith without any benefit to the faith or to the faithful, it is not praiseworthy in such a case to profess the faith publicly; hence the Lord says in Matthew 7: ‘Do not give what is holy to dogs, nor scatter your pearls before swine, lest they turn and tear you to pieces.’ But if some benefit to the faith is hoped for or necessity is present, a man must profess the faith publicly, disregarding the disturbance among unbelievers; hence it is said in Matthew 15 that, when the disciples told the Lord that the Pharisees had been scandalized on hearing His word, the Lord answered: let them alone—that is, let them be disturbed—they are blind and leaders of the blind” (II.—II. qu. 3, a. 2, ad 3).—Professor Josef Aertnys, C.SS.R.
Vol. IV, Case LXXX: Conversion from the Eastern Schism to the Catholic Church
Jovan, after being baptized and brought up in the Greek Church, now desires to be received into the Catholic Church. Is his baptism to be regarded as valid?
The Church strictly orders a priest who obtains faculties to admit to the Catholic Church a person belonging to some other Christian denomination to make sure that the convert has been validly baptized. If post investigationem peractam it appear certain that he has not been thus baptized, the priest must baptize him absolute. Should there be a probabile rationabile dubium with regard to his baptism, the Sacrament must be administered again conditionally.
Have the Eastern schismatics valid baptism?
Baptism is undoubtedly administered validly in all the so-called Churches (the name is used incorrectly, as there is but one Church, viz., the Catholic) which have come into existence in consequence of the Oriental or Greek schism since 1054. We may regard as validly baptized all the members of the schismatical Greek Church in the patriarchates of Constantinople, Alexandria, Antioch and Jerusalem, also all who belong to the Orthodox Church in Russia, to the Greek Church in Greece, to the Orthodox Churches in Bulgaria, Servia and Montenegro (Cernagora), as well as the Serbs, Bulgarians and Roumanians in the Turkish territory near the Balkans. The same is true of the Serbs, or Greeks, or Orthodox in Bosnia and Herzegovina, of the Dalmatians, Croatians and Slavonians, both in Hungary and in Austria. It is true also of all adherents of the schismatical Greek Church in Roumania, as well as of the members of the Graeco-Roumanian Church in Hungary and Siebenbürgen, as well as in Bukovina. We may safely assume that the members of any one of these Churches have been validly baptized. Some doubt may arise in the case of Russian sectarians, who have cut themselves off from the Orthodox state Church and can hardly be said to retain the principles of Christianity. There seem to be several millions who belong to various sects of this kind, and many may not have been baptized at all if they have succeeded in evading the compulsory baptism required by the state.
There are good reasons for regarding as valid the baptism of members of the Eastern Churches. They have preserved the hierarchy instituted by Christ with the potestas ordinis, and their priests have valid orders. They retained the Sacrament of Holy Order and great care has always been taken to preserve the validity of their orders. In the Churches enumerated above there are priests (popes) who administer the Sacrament of baptism, in fact, in some of these Churches, baptism could at one time not be administered by laymen, but only by a properly ordained priest. A Catholic synod in 1703 complained: "For it is a pernicious law of the schismatics that infants, even when necessity is urgent, are to be baptized only by a priest" (Collect. Lacensis, I. p. 298).
Although this may not have been a universal practise among the Eastern schismatics, it shows what scrupulous care was taken to secure valid baptism, as laymen were not permitted to administer it lest they should not do so validly. This fear seems justifiable, as the people in general are not well instructed in religious matters.
The members of the Eastern Churches, like ourselves, regard baptism as the first and most indispensable Sacrament, by means of which original sin and all actual sins committed before baptism are forgiven, and sanctifying grace is imparted to the soul. The idea, common among Protestants, that baptism is only a signum mere externae aggregationis ad ecclesiam, is quite foreign to the Eastern Churches. They are far from regarding it as a matter of indifference how baptism is administered, and their priests are most careful in seeing that this most important Sacrament is administered validly in accordance with their ritual. The Church is forced, however, to emphasize the fact that the laity may now validly baptize in casu necessitatis if the correct matter, form and intention are present.
Pope Eugenius IV., when he issued the decree Pro Armenis at the Council of Florence in 1439, felt it necessary to decide: "The minister of this Sacrament, Baptism, is the priest, to whom it belongs by office to baptize. But in a case of necessity not only a priest or deacon, but also a layman or woman, indeed a pagan or heretic, can baptize, provided the person observes the form of the Church and intends to do what the Church does."
The East is strictly, almost rigidly, conservative, and the Eastern Churches display, with reference to all their ecclesiastical customs, the greatest aversion to departing from the traditional consuetudo. This is particularly the case with regard to baptism and the ceremonies connected with it. They adhere most exactly to their traditional ceremonies. Their Forma baptismi is very simple; the Latin translation of it is: " Baptizatur {baptizetur is also valid) servus (a) Dei N. in nomine Patris et Filii et Spiritus Sancti." The priest baptizing utters these words in either the liturgical language or in the vernacular, and this amount of familiarity with the Euchologium (Ritual) may be assumed in the least educated priests of the Eastern Churches, who all know and use this formula. It is certain too that they use natural water as the matter of baptism and not an artificially produced fluid of any kind. As many believed the water ought to be cold, Pope Eugenius IV. stated in the decree " Pro Armenis," already quoted: "The matter of this Sacrament is true and natural water; it does not matter whether it is cold or warm." In cold countries considerations of health induced people to use warm water; in fact some maintained that it ought to be warm.
What must we say of the Materia proxima, or of the union of matter and form in the Eastern Churches? In this respect there can be no question that baptism, as they administer it, is valid, for they still retain the ancient trina immersio, or (according to Denzinger, Ritus Orient., § 2) they use immersionem aspersione mixtam above the infant's head, so that it is impossible to doubt that a sufficient lotio realis et symbolica takes place in connection with the utterance of the short form of words.
It may be asked whether this Forma baptismi of the Eastern Church is sufficient.
At the reunion council of Florence in 1439 no objection was raised to the method of baptism used in the East from remote times, and in the decree Pro Armenis, Eugenius IV., after giving the Latin forma baptismi, goes on to say: "The form, however, is: Ego te baptizo, etc. Yet we do not deny that true Baptism is also effected by these words: Baptizatur talis servus Christi in nomine Patris et Filii et Spiritus Sancti; or: Baptizatur manibus meis talis in nomine Patris et Filii et Spiritus Sancti. For since the principal cause from which Baptism has its power is the Holy Trinity, while the minister who outwardly confers the Sacrament is instrumental, if the act exercised through the minister is expressed together with the invocation of the Holy Trinity, the Sacrament is effected." (Denzinger-Bannwart, 696.)
It is a matter of history that Novatian caused a schism in Rome about the middle of the Third Century; he found many followers in the East, who maintained: The faith of the minister is necessary for the validity of Baptism. In order to check the evil resulting from this doctrine, the Eastern Church prudenti oeconomia introduced a change in the form of baptism, so that baptizatur (βαπτίζεται) was used instead of ego te baptizo. This is the account given by the learned Peter Arcudius (Concord. Eccl. occid. et orient., 1. 1, c. 3, 8). The Latins derived their form of baptism from our Lord's word " Baptizate" (Matth. xxviii, 19); the Greeks from " Baptizamini" (Acts i, 5).
What has been said of the Churches that owe their origin to the schism of Constantinople, according to the Conc. Florentinum, applies, of course, equally to the schismatical Armenians, in case any of them wish to return to the Catholic Church; their baptism is valid.
All the Eastern Churches have a form for blessing water to be used at baptism: All Eastern Christians devoutly retain the blessing of baptismal water from the ancient and universal discipline of the Church. (Denzinger, Rit. Orient., § 1.)
The Roman Church has always respected the old ceremonies used as sacramentals that occur in the Eastern ritual of baptism; they take the place of those of the Latin Rituale. Hence no supplementary baptismal ceremonies are performed in the case of converts from any of the Churches that we have mentioned, although it seems desirable to perform them in that of converts from Protestantism, that they may receive these sacramentals, even if otherwise their Protestant baptism has proved to be valid, investigatione peracta.
The Catholic Church therefore has nothing to do with our convert Jovan in respect of his baptism, for all is in order.
Should a member of one of these schismatical bodies and a Catholic intend to enter into matrimony, there need be no doubt as to the valid baptism of the former. But in mixed marriages between Catholics and Protestants, the invalidity of the Protestant baptism frequently gives rise to a suspicion of impedimentum disparitatis cultus.—J. Danner, S.J.
Vermeersch, Tolerance
Vermeersch, Tolerance, Third Part: Corollaries an…, First Section: Doctrinal Questions
IV. The Scientific or the Religious Ideal. Scientific and Religious Liberty : Their
Alleged Antagonism.
Summary : Is the scientific ideal opposed to the religious ? —Error of M. Bouché-Leclercq.—Exact notion of scientific theories : their object and their ambition.— The complete work of the scientist. — Though not disregarded by religion, scientific theories can neither confirm nor contradict it.—Impossibility of conflict between religion and natural sciences.—Objection founded on the alleged conflict with history and philosophy. — Incomplete answer. — Science is not the supreme good.—Sacrifices often asked of it.—Insignificance of those which religion asks of it accidentally.—Abundant compensation. — Parallel functions of science and religion. — The habit of faith not inconsistent with the scientific spirit.—Humanity needs both science and religion.—The problem of their reconciliation difficult, but important.
The copious literature of Tolerance has been recently enriched by a book written in France by a professor of the Sorbonne, entitled L’Intolérance Religieuse et la Politique. We have already quoted it. Its author, M. Bouché-Leclercq, is one of the survivors of rationalistic Liberalism. Though he repudiates religion, he does not approve of the open war between the Church and the State ; and he even proposes a modus vivendi, pressing rather heavily, it is true, on Catholics. However, he augurs very ill for the future of the faith and positive religions. No reconciliation between science and revelation appears to him possible, for he declares that there is “ an essential contradiction between the scientific ideal, which is the unremitting pursuit of truth through a succession of temporary or provisional theories, and the ideal of positive religions, which is the preservation of truth already acquired, and henceforth unassailable.”1
1 Op. cit., p. 354. 2 Quoted above, p. 232.
If the conflict between science and positive religions were as implacable as he declares, the modern world, which is entirely on the side of science, and the State which represents it, instead of begging concessions of tolerance from religion, would set to work to persecute it; or at most they would grant a temporary and, so to speak, compassionate tolerance to the Church and to Catholics, as to a set of old-fashioned persons, clinging to a transitory expression of religious sentiment: their good-nature would go no farther.
Happily this is not the case—the essentiality of the contradiction is imaginary ; so, indeed, is the contradiction itself, as we shall endeavour to prove. M. Bouché-Leclercq is mistaken, both as to religion and as to science.
What does he mean by his provisional theories ? Is he using unsuitable and inexact language ? Does he wish, in the interests of science, to associate himself with M. Payot2 in proclaiming the necessity of the relativist principle ? He cannot do it without falling into that absolutism of statement which he so unreasonably condemns. Relativism is no more a postulate of science than stagnation is a postulate of religion.
Does M. Bouché-Leclercq speak of the provisional theories of the natural sciences in the proper sense of the word ? The ideal of these sciences does not by any means consist in the pursuit of a truth which is continually escaping from our grasp ; and, on the other hand, the religious ideal is not the mere preservation of acquired truths. The acquired truth of religion is composed of a limited number of dogmas, derived from Divine revelation; but their clear understanding has sometimes taken centuries of work and preparation. Similarly, every science has its acquired truths1 and its provisional theories. But these do not imply any attitude with regard to truth, different from the attitude of revealed religion, for the good and sufficient reason that, being entirely directed to the exact representation of external phenomena, they do not aim at the acquisition of absolute truth.
1 Such are the results derived from experiments ; and such, also, is a part, very difficult to define, of physical theories, of which M. Duhem says : “ By a continuous tradition, every theory of physical science transmits to that which follows it that part of natural classification which it has been able to construct ” (La Théorie Physique, son Objet et sa Structure, p. 48. See also Physique de Croyant, p. 41).
Poincaré similarly says : “ At first sight it seems as if theories lasted only for a day ; but there is something in them which survives. If one of them has enabled us to discover a real relation between two things, that relation is finally acquired, and we shall find it again in a new form in the later theories which follow to take the place of the former ” (La Valeur de la Science; Paris, 1905).
Formerly, no doubt, and even fifty years ago, scientists put forward their theories as explanations, some certain and others conjectural, of the real truths concealed beneath the phenomena whose laws they recorded. Acoustics asserted and demonstrated the undulations which produce sound ; with reference to the propagation of light, various hypotheses were made, the most important of which were the emission or corpuscular theory and the undulatory theory. According to the latter, all bodies were supposed to be filled by an extremely subtle elastic medium called ether, through which waves of light were constantly throbbing ; but since then modern scientists, tired of fruitless strife and defeat, have ceased to look to their methods of observation for what those methods cannot teach them. Their theories are constructed, not to explain phenomena, but to represent and classify and generalize them, and to foresee the conditions of their recurrence, and thus to group them into rational systems, by which much mental labour is saved and the investigators are put on the track of new discoveries. They do not go deep enough to discover real causes, but in their places put symbols between which the same relations exist as would exist between the realities which are represented by those symbols in their statements and calculations.
For example, the theory of luminous vibrations does not assert any real motion, but it provides an excellent basis to express in figures the experimental laws of light. Its value consists in the precision with which it represents a great number of laws. It establishes between luminous phenomena a logical connection which gives it its beauty, and it exhibits its fecundity in the various deductions which are drawn from it. Though superior to other theories less simple, less complete, or less exact, it does not profess to exclude them as false, so long as they remain in sufficient correlation with the phenomena of which they are the signs and symbols ; for the vibratory theory, like the electro-magnetic theory, which tends to replace it, not pretending to tell us anything of the real causes of the luminous phenomena, does not present itself as objectively true or objectively false. “ The object of Fresnel was not to know whether there is such a medium as ether, whether it is formed of atoms or not, or whether these atoms move in this or that direction: it was to foresee the optical phenomena.”1 This conception of scientific theories attracts scientific men of the sceptical school like H. Poincaré,2 and of the Christian school like M. Duhem.3 The scientific ideal ceases, then, to be the pursuit of ontological truth, and becomes the reduction of all partial theories to unity ; and these succeed one another provisionally, because they are symbolical, and they must necessarily be continually modified and completed to fit in with new discoveries.
1 H. Poincaré, La Science et l’Hypothèse, pp. 189, 190. Before this he had said : “ We are not concerned whether ether really exists ; that is the business of metaphysicians ” (Leçons sur les Théories Mathématiques de la Lumière, Preface ; Paris, 1889).
2 See Sur la Valeur Objective des Théories Physiques (Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale, 1902, p. 263). “ The scientific fact,” says Poincaré, “ is nothing but the bare fact translated into appropriate language.” And again : “ Science is principally a classification, a way of connecting facts ... a system of relations ” (La Valeur de la Science, pp. 231, 265, 266).
3 See the work, La Théorie Physique, son Objet et sa Structure ; and the pamphlet, Physique de Croyant, written in answer to the article of M. Rey, quoted below, p. 288.
With these remarks, we may take leave of M. Bouché-Leclercq. His assertion holds good only as long as he4 clings to an antiquated scientific ideal, now almost abandoned. But modern conceptions furnish us with new material, which may be utilized to put an end to the old quarrel between science and religion.
4 In company with M. Le Dantec, who, with thorough Breton tenacity, seeks to know from biology what life is, and so puts forward his Biologie destructive in opposition to religion. See his Conference, Biologie Constructive et Biologie Destructive, given at the jubilee of the University of Brussels (Revue de l’Université de Bruxelles, 1909-10, pp. 308-318). “ When a scientific theory professes to tell us what heat is, or what electricity is, or what life is, it is condemned beforehand ” (Poincaré, La Valeur de la Science, p. 267).
Science is one thing, the scientist another. In practice the latter oversteps the limits of the former ; for who is there who does not yield to what M. Rey1 calls the common temptation to do a little metaphysics ? And so we may say that the scientist proceeds by three stages, which we may compare to the three stories of a building. In the first we have the exact observation of facts and experimental laws—facts and laws which have their phenomenal reality, and communicate their objective value to the statements in which they are expressed ; in the second, we come to the rational classification of these facts and laws— the theoretical interpretation. Without expressing any opinion on the real facts, this interpretation supplies a logical, convenient, and suggestive representation by symbols. This is the work which properly belongs to science, and secures all its benefits. Lastly, these same theories, and sometimes also extra-scientific prejudices, lead scientists to set up a second series of hypotheses concerning the reality underlying the phenomena, so much the more clearly cherished because they seem as if arising spontaneously from the representative theories founded on experience. The scientist will thus become an atomist or a dynamist in cosmology ; a materialist or a determinist in natural history ; a transformist in biology. But we must remark that not one of these hypotheses is strictly contained in the physical theories or their manifold applications. They are formulated only by the aid of metaphysical principles or postulates, and the philosophic scepticism of many scientists leads them to neglect the prudent counsels of this other branch of human knowledge. They hope to deduce everything from experience, but unconsciously they overstep its teaching, and for want of philosophic discernment they proceed by guesswork to fill up the gap, which is sometimes very wide, between the theories and their hypothetical conclusions on man and the universe.
1 La Philosophie Scientifique de M. Duhem (Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale, 1904, p. 699).
Take, for example, the naturalist, and watch him at his work. He will apply himself in the first place to the careful consideration of actual organisms and reproductions. Comparative studies of living beings will lead him to a theoretical systematization, in which all the species observed by him will occupy their logical place, in which compartments will be reserved even for intermediaries not yet discovered, but which the series of beings seems to demand, as the calculations of Leverrier postulated a new planet. That is strictly scientific work—the only work indispensable to progress in scientific discovery. The naturalist, however, following his natural inclination to announce as an established fact what is really only a hypothesis, will easily discover ontological relations between species which seem logically to be connected, and will proclaim that one is derived from the other. He will declare himself a transformist, but he will make this declaration, not as a scientist, but in the name of a parasitic philosophy which he has grafted on his science.1
1 It is much less as a scientist that M. Le Dantec declares that he “ abandons the language of humanity in the strictest sense ” and reduces man, soul included, to a mere piece of automatic machinery. He boasts of his destructive biology, which, as he says, does not teach him to live well, but only to live without the fear of death (Biologie destructive, Biologie constructive, Conference quoted above). There is neither science nor philosophy here. The two preceding speakers, Poincaré and M. Lanson, had used much more reserved and more scientific language.
These preliminary explanations suggest a very important question : At what stage are those contacts produced which are so incorrectly called the conflicts between science and religion ?
On the first story of our scientific building peace and good understanding prevail. Nothing appears possible beyond a little friction, a slight temporary and accidental irritation. In fact, no philosophical or religious doctrine could for long deny or contradict observations founded on palpable evidence. Poincaré wittily observes that Galileo and the Grand Inquisitor were not at issue on a question of fact;2 but the same scientist is wrong in saying that a man, when he puts on his working clothes and enters his laboratory, must leave his faith behind him.3 It will be a delicate task to discover the points of intersection between observation and the scientific theory which accompanies it, for the proposition which formulates a scientific fact or law “ is generally a mixture of experimental discovery, possessing objective importance, and of theoretical explanation, simply symbolical, without any objective significance.”1 M. Duhem adds that if a natural philosopher desires to speak of an optical phenomenon, he will speak of the vibrations of ether ; in other words, he will express the phenomenon in the language of his favourite theory.
2 La Valeur de la Science, p. 231.
3 Le Libre Examen en Matière Scientifique, Conference at the Jubilee of the University of Brussels (Revue de l’Université de Bruxelles, 1909-10, pp. 285-295). The reference is specially to p. 288.
1 Duhem, Physique de Croyant, p. 27. 2 Ibid., p. 19.
On the second story — that is, in the stage of theories—science and faith cannot come into conflict, because the scientific theory affirms nothing concerning objective reality. “ By its own nature and essence every principle of theoretical physics is useless in metaphysical or theological discussions.”2 And in this sense we may assent to the statement of M. Lanson : “ If there is not a German science, or a French science, or a Belgian science, but one science common to all nations, still less is there a science of a party, a monarchist or Republican science, a Catholic or Socialist science.”3
3 L’Esprit Scientifique et la Méthode de l’Histoire littéraire. Conference at the Jubilee of the University of Brussels (Revue de l’Université de Bruxelles, 1909-10, pp. 296-307 ; see p. 306).
Does this mean that the philosopher or the theologian can despise scientific theories ? Poincaré would perhaps condemn the pretensions of metaphysical research, for, according to him nothing can enable us to know the nature of things.4 As for ourselves, who give its due place to philo-sophy, we believe also in a harmonious correspondence of the classifying genius with the Spirit which has created that genius and all other things. We admit instinctively and, as it were, necessarily between the reality of things and their ideal classification certain analogies, closer and more probable according as the classification is more comprehensive and perfect. The plan which is formed as the result of scientific observations tends to reproduce the original plan on which all things were created. “ Every branch of learning appears to me a praiseworthy effort directed towards knowledge of the order which presides over a determinate category of phenomena.”1 Thus the scientific theory creates a prejudice favourable or unfavourable to a philosophical or religious doctrine, but nothing more. We remember that in these scientific theories the scientist treads ground on which he is independent, in which he need not hope for or fear any clashing with religion.
4 La Valeur de la Science, p. 266.
1 A. de Lapparent, La Recherche Scientifique, et la Foi. Letter to the Revue Pratique d’Apologétique, t. 2, p. 267.
The highest story only is the stage on which science and religion are brought into contact and relation, and sometimes into conflict.
This is enough to reassure mere unscientific mortals. This upper story, as we have seen, is not one of discoveries or inventions ; the scientist has not constructed it as a scientist. Even if the atmosphere there is troubled, and a wind of discord blows through, there is no reason to tremble for that earthly happiness or progress about which human nature shows such eagerness and anxiety. It is never with science properly so called that religion can find itself in conflict, but with something that we may call meta-science. The pretended conflicts of science and religion have never existed, except between religion and a certain philosophy that calls itself scientific.
This is enough to show that impiety has only misused the popularity of science in order to attack the faith or to make unlimited tolerance an essential condition of progress. Neither the act of faith nor submission to doctrinal authority need disturb the scientist in his truly scientific work.
There remains, it is true, his metaphysical work. For those branches of natural science which are devoted to the exploration of the material world with such valuable results, this is negligible, or of only secondary importance. It engages the attention principally of conceited inquirers, who hope to bring out of the facts of science either speculative answers on the nature and origin of life, ideas, and morals, or practical rules for the direction of our individual and social energy, the formulae of our duties, the key to our happiness.1 Certainly, in all departments of knowledge strictly scientific inquiries and objective perceptions remain independent of metaphysical or religious doctrines. This remark applies also to psychology, and even to mysticism, in so far as they are experimental.2 Nevertheless, hitherto the interest of observations of the psychical order has been identified with that of spiritualist or determinist teachings, and of supernatural or naturalistic explanations which inquirers rightly or wrongly professed to deduce from them. Few biologists or psychologists, and perhaps no sociologist, have confined themselves within the special limits of science.
1 To this class belong those attempts to form a so-called “ scientific ” code of morality, which professes to do without the help even of philosophy. But these are no longer in fashion, and at present M. Durkheim is almost the only person to plead the cause of a moral code founded exclusively on science.
2 “ The object of experimental psychology,” Father Maréchal forcibly remarks, “ is to deduce the laws of the relations of mental phenomena, but not to discover the ontological causes of the phenomena themselves ” (Le Sentiment de Présence, chez les Profanes et les Mystiques). Speaking of mystical phenomena, the Abbé Pacheu adds : “ The observation and description of facts, if men are well informed, cannot but be the same for all ” (L’Expérience Mystique et l’Activité Sub-consciente, p. 301). M. Delacroix, the secular writer who has the reputation of being the best informed on these sacred matters, writes to the author : “ As you say, it is not the part of psychology either to acknowledge or to deny the supernatural ” (ibid., p. 305).
There remain also history and historical criticism, in reference to which Renan says : “ Religions present themselves as facts, and must be discussed as facts.”1 How can we gainsay this ? The speculative, moral, or social conclusions of certain writers who have a great reputation as philosophers or scientists, and also their historical conclusions, frequently come into contact with religious dogmas or assertions which necessarily depend on those dogmas, or at least with theories, beliefs, and opinions which are accredited and in favour in the Church, and these contacts are by no means always friendly.
1 Discourse in answer to Pasteur’s discourse on admission to the French Academy. M. Bouché-Leclercq similarly says : “ However high they soar, revealed religions take their standing-ground on the earth, and they are bound to show the time and place at which the revelation they assert was made. And it is on this point that they have to justify themselves before historical criticism.”
Full liberty of expression and diffusion is claimed for every formal declaration put forth in the name of science, and the intolerance of the Church refuses it to science. Every scientist is called upon to give up preconceived ideas. The Catholic has his freedom of thought limited by his faith. Here is intolerance, here is slavery, which furnish the modern world with weapons against all authoritative religion.
Is it sufficient, in order to dispose of the first objection, to answer that a true dogma cannot contradict a truth of reason, and that therefore the religious barrier forbids nothing to scientists but error ? There is a double reply at once. Man can only make progress by groping his way. He fails before he succeeds ; he passes through error to arrive at the truth ; he must be allowed freedom to make unsuccessful attempts, or even wrongly to contradict articles of the Creeds. And, on the other hand, religious authority does not impose dogmas alone. It blocks the way by propositions not yet defined, but which it considers important to its cause ; it makes us subject not only to an infallible Pope, but also to Commissions and Congregations which are liable to error ; and in this connection men will triumphantly point to a small number of censures passed upon propositions which are nowadays universally accepted.
The page which bears the names of Catholic men of science is very glorious to the Church, and very useful for our argument ; but it is going a little too far to profess that it supplies a complete refutation of the objection. Certainly, we thoroughly appreciate the warning which Poincaré gave to an assembly of freethinkers : “ Do not imagine that I wish to deny science to men of faith, and especially to Catholics. God forbid ! I should not be such a fool as to deprive humanity of the services of a Pasteur.” And we are glad to hear him admit that “ believers have as much of the critical spirit as any other men.” “ I know many,” he added, “ and Pasteur is only the most illustrious among them.”1
1 Conference quoted, p. 288.
Again, it may be asked whether these Christians were not scientists in spite of their religion ; whether they have not had to overcome difficulties and obstacles in order to gain their reputation ; whether they do not owe their distinction to the emancipating influence of their environment. Perhaps, also, they are famous in those branches of science which have nothing to do—at least, at the present day—with religious questions, such as pure mathematics and astronomy. In such matters there would be no possibility of conflict with religion.
For this reason these answers appear to us incomplete, though we do not say that they are entirely devoid of truth. Some concession seems to be required, and our mind cannot be satisfied except by rising to a plane higher than that in which the difficulty lies.
It may be that in some departments of science in which the interests of religion are directly involved religion requires from scientists precautions which may entail sacrifices. It may call upon them to move slowly and carefully, and not to throw things into complete disorder ; and thus it to some extent hampers their investigations, and puts some restriction on their movements. Will it never go farther than is required ? Will the judgment of those who speak in the name of religion be so sound, so comprehensive, and at the same time so promptly given, as to place no unnecessary restriction on liberty ? Will their intention even be always so pure and honest as to take no counsel but from the light of reason ? We cannot expect such perfection of judgment and intention in every case without looking for a miracle which is nowhere promised, and forgetting the traditional symbol of the Church—a boat tossed on the waves of a stormy sea. The qualified representatives of the Church, and still more its self-constituted defenders, are but men. Their knowledge may be small, their prudence may be outwitted, even their virtue may fail. Their interference will sometimes be awkward, inopportune, or exaggerated. Excessive zeal, after all, should surprise us less and distress us less than the moral scandals from the pain of which God has not spared His Church.
This we grant freely and sincerely, but in making this admission we feel that we are the more justified in protesting against the absurd pretension implied in the complaint against religion and the Church. Science and all its branches and all its advances are represented as blessings so precious that they are worth purchasing at the price of any loss or sacrifice, while religion is a useless thing that is not deserving of the least attention. Unless they maintain some such proposition, our readers will admit that the famous objection as to the conflict between religion and science cannot be sustained, and that it leaves untouched our principles and our conclusions on the subject of tolerance and religion.
To explain. On a concrete question, let us reason without passion or prejudice—in other words, let us adopt what is called a scientific attitude.
If Science impersonate could appear before us, Religion and Science might well join hands, for what would religion have to fear ? Science, in the full light and in peaceful possession of truth, would not sin by impatience, or be in too great a hurry to reveal her secrets; but instead of a personification, we have only the disciples of Science, the best of whom call themselves eternal beginners, always labouring at the construction of a monument which is never completed, and in which every successive course of stones is only laid finally after many fresh beginnings.
If scientists themselves (all dogma set aside) had that interior liberty of which Poincaré makes a duty ; if they possessed those qualities which M. Lanson eloquently describes—“ disinterested desire for information, sincere probity, laborious patience, submission to facts ; if they were not too ready to believe either in themselves or in others ; and if they had a continual desire for criticism, control, and verification,”1 we should be almost ready to vote with the famous philosopher for the suppression of all barriers. Not a single barrier is raised without cost, and all are irksome. Men of the character we have just described would give to religion and to society itself guarantees of perfect security. But, unfortunately, Poincaré dare not promise us or even expect complete freedom from prejudice among scientists. He recognizes the frauds which have given Haeckel such an unfortunate notoriety ;1 while Madame Curie has shown us that scientists, in their pursuit of truth, do not necessarily forget all other desires; and the orator who followed Poincaré at Brussels condescended to go into details : “ Scientists and ourselves have in common all the same human weakness, the same short sight, the wavering attention, the blind passions, the same inability to put ourselves in another person’s place, the perpetual risk of deceiving ourselves and of being deceived.”2
1 Lanson, Conference quoted, p. 299.
1 Conference quoted, p. 290. 2 Ibid., p. 298.
There is no close corporation of scientists : the first comer is permitted to usurp the title ; and these are the men who claim entire freedom to write or say anything they please.
It must be admitted that entire freedom is no longer insisted upon with the same distinctness, and when to the question whether there are doctrines which are socially dangerous, and of which society can get rid as it gets rid of criminals, Poincaré replies, “ No lie can be ultimately advantageous,”3 he practically assumes without any justification that all doctrines are so many truths.
3 Ibid., p. 290.
We also think that no lie can be ultimately advantageous, and precisely for that reason we would not refuse to the civil power the right to protect itself against the propagation of falsehood and error.
Is not the remark which M. Lanson makes as a literary critic equally applicable in other matters ? He says : “ We have been too much inclined to believe that it was sufficient to have ideas, and have not fully realized that literature, like everything else, requires ideas that have been proved to be true.”1
1 L’Esprit Scientifique et la Méthode d’Histoire Littéraire, p. 304.
But if this is the fact, and if it is really impossible to identify scientists with science and ideas with truth, then all the liberty which Poincaré claims for science and all the good that he says of harmless truth unfortunately does not apply, even from the scientific point of view, to those who call themselves scientists or to what they call their ideas.
It is perfectly natural and intelligible that a Government anxious for the public welfare should be disturbed by the social repercussions of so many fanciful theories, that are labelled “ scientific ” just as easily as London merchants used to label their English goods “ made in Germany,” because German goods were in fashion. And how much more is the prudent and even protective action of the Church justified ! Charged with the spiritual interests of a multitude easily scandalized and easily led away, is she wrong in taking care that scientific novelties shall not be introduced without any control or examination ? Is she wrong in refusing to risk the higher life of souls for an advantage which is always less important, and sometimes problematical ? The personal dignity of every man forbids that dangerous experiments shall be made even on the vilest bodies in the interests of medicine or surgery. Is it not the part of a wise democracy to forbid the dangerous experiments in social or educational matters which modern sociologists or educators would like to try, as it were in anima vili, on the people or their children ?
This argument is not weakened by the optimistic view which prophesies a final victory for truth, for, while we are waiting for that victory to be won, error will have disturbed many souls, driven many more to utter ruin, and produced irreparable disasters.
But do not the restrictions of liberty tend to embarrass and retard the progress of science ? Granted ; but even then they are not necessarily condemned, unless we regard the least important scientific discovery as the supreme good of humanity.
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