Formal and material co-operation

CLOSELY connected with scandal is the subject of co-operation or participation in the sin of another; indeed, they are often treated of together, but on account of the importance of the latter it seems desirable to devote a special chapter to it.

Co-operation, then, may be formal or material. Formal co-operation is concurrence in the bad action of another and in the bad intention with which it is performed. Material co-operation is the concurrence in the external action of another but not in the evil intention with which it is done.

Co-operation is proximate or remote according as the action of the secondary agent is more closely connected with the action of the principal agent or less so.

One is said to co-operate positively when he does something which influences the action of the principal agent; one is said to co-operate negatively when he does not hinder a bad action which he is bound to prevent.

It is never lawful to co-operate formally with another’s sin, for it is obviously to wish evil, which is always sinful. Nor is it lawful to co-operate materially with the sin of another when the action of the secondary agent is itself wrong, as is also clear. But provided the action of the secondary agent is not itself wrong, but right, or at least indifferent, and he has no evil intention, and furthermore there is a just cause for permitting the sin of the principal agent, material co-operation in the sin of another is not wrong. In such circumstances, the secondary agent does nothing that is wrong in itself; he foresees, it is true, that another will take advantage of his action in order to commit sin, but the secondary agent is only bound to prevent this out of charity, which does not bind with relatively serious inconvenience, and this is present whenever there is a just cause for permitting the sin of the principal agent. This is merely the application of the principle of a double effect which was laid down in the Book on Human Acts.¹

The cases to which this doctrine may be applied are very 732) numerous, but the safe application is difficult and attended with risk. The chief difficulty lies in determining the gravity of the cause which will justify one in co-operating materially in another’s sin. No general rule can be laid down on the point beyond saying that a graver cause is required when there is question of a graver sin, when the co-operation is more proximate, and when it is more probable that the sin would not be committed at all if the co-operation were denied. The following examples taken from approved authors are given as illustrating the application of the doctrine, and they may be used to show what may be done in similar cases.

(a) I may lawfully ask for the sacraments from a bad priest, though he commits sin in administering them, for he need not sin thereby unless he likes, and his malice should not deprive me of the benefit of the sacraments to which I have a right.

(b) A dealer may sell to all buyers things which are in themselves indifferent, though they can be put to a bad use, as firearms, unless he is certain that they are required for a bad purpose. Even in the latter case a correspondingly serious inconvenience or loss will excuse his selling, especially if his refusal will not hinder the sin on account of the buyer being easily able to procure what he wants elsewhere.

(c) Intoxicating drink may not be sold to one who has already had too much. Many authors, however, allow this to be done when it cannot be refused without provoking to violence and quarrelling. This excuse would rarely avail in England at present, because the law forbids such sale, the strong arm of the law thus being on the side of morality.

(d) It is not lawful to sell things of which the use is ordinarily sinful, except when their lawful use is guaranteed. And so booksellers are not allowed to sell infidel or immoral books except to such as require them for good reasons and with the requisite permission. The same doctrine applies to drugs and instruments used for immoral purposes, as well as to poisons. Publishers, too, sin by publishing books which are dangerous to faith or morals. Compositors and others employed in printing should not work for firms which are known to publish bad books; as they are usually ignorant of the nature of the work which they help to bring out, their ignorance, the remoteness of their co-operation, and the ease with which other workmen can be found to supply their place, will ordinarily excuse them from sin if an odd bad book or two are published by an otherwise respectable firm.

(e) Dancing may be a perfectly innocent amusement and it may be a dangerous occasion of sin. No general rule, therefore, can be given as to when dancing must be avoided. Much depends upon the company who join in the dance, upon the way of dancing, and upon the subjective disposition of the dancers. If there be nothing objectionable in any of these respects, there is no reason why a young man or a young woman should not be allowed to dance with due caution. If there be ground for objection, and especially if sin has already been frequently committed in similar circumstances, there is an obligation to abstain, unless the occasion of sin is necessary and can be made remote by taking proper precautions. If sin only follows occasionally, there will be no strict obligation to abstain from dancing, provided due precautions be taken in future.

(f) The question of theatre-going is settled on similar grounds. There are all sorts of theatres and all sorts of plays represented in them, and.all sorts of actors and actresses. To go and listen to a bad and suggestive play arouses the passions, leads to sin, and encourages evil in many ways. It will, then, as a rule, be grievously sinful to go to the theatre to see such a play. The confessor will usually be able to judge best whether in any particular case it is lawful to go to the theatre by asking whether in the past it has frequently led to sin. If it has done so, it is a proximate occasion of sin, and must be avoided as far as possible. In other cases, unless the play or the theatre is known to be bad, there will be no strict obligation to refrain from going.

¹ St Alphonsus, lib. 2, tract. 3, n. 63.

Lawfulness of Material Cooperation.—The conditions necessary in order that material cooperation be lawful are the same as for any other act that has a double result (see 104); for from the cooperation follow two results, one that is bad (viz., the sin of the other person) and one that is good (viz., the avoidance of loss or the retention of good). Two of the conditions required in the principle of double result need not be considered, however, since their presence is manifestly assured by the very fact that the cooperation is merely material. (a) Thus, the condition that the good effect must not be secured through the evil effect is verified; for, if one intends the sin of the other party as a means to the good end, cooperation is formal. Hence, if Balbus helps Claudius to get sinfully drunk, so that Claudius may go to confession the sooner, the cooperation of Balbus in the drunkenness of Claudius is formal. (b) The condition that the evil effect is not intended is also verified; for the very definition of material cooperation excludes the intention of the sin committed by the other party.

Hence, we may confine our attention to the two remaining conditions stated in the principle of double effect, and conclude that material cooperation is lawful when and if the act of the cooperator is itself good or indifferent, and he has a reason sufficiently weighty for permitting the sin of the other party.

The first condition of material cooperation is that the act of the cooperator must be good or at least indifferent; for, if it is evil, the cooperation becomes implicitly formal. But, since it is often difficult to determine in particular instances whether cooperation is intrinsically evil or merely indifferent, one must examine the nature and circumstances of the act.

(a) Thus, according to its nature, an act of cooperation is intrinsically evil, if it has no uses except such as are evil; it is indifferent, if, according to the intention of those who use it, it is now good, now evil. Hence, it is intrinsically wrong to assist in the manufacture or distribution of obscene books or pictures, or of drugs or instruments used exclusively for immoral purposes, since the only use to which such things can be put is sinful. It is also intrinsically wrong to take part even remotely in pagan superstitions, or to give any immediate assistance to an act which from its nature is opposed to the Sixth Commandment. But it is not intrinsically wrong to assist in the manufacture of firearms or poisons, which have many good uses, or to act as bodyguard to a person who fears harm from others.

(b) According to its circumstances, an act of cooperation is evil, if by reason of adjuncts it is wrong, as when it signifies approval of evil, gives scandal to others, endangers the faith or virtue of the cooperator, or violates a law of the Church. Thus, it is not from the nature of the act wrong to invite a pedestrian to ride in one’s car; but it is wrong from the circumstances when the pedestrian asks to be taken to a spot where he intends to commit robbery. It is not wrong intrinsically to work at building a temple; but it is wrong from the circumstances, when this act is regarded by the public as a sign of adherence to a false religion, or when the act causes scandal (see 983). The laws of the Church on mixed marriage or neutral schools afford other examples of cooperation lawful in one set of circumstances, but unlawful in another on account of significance, scandal, danger, etc.

But the circumstance that the cooperator knows for certain that the principal agent will use the cooperation for sinful purposes, or will take scandal to the extent of being strengthened in his evil designs by reason of the assistance given, does not necessarily make cooperation evil.

(a) Thus, the cooperator may know from the declaration of the principal agent just what is to be done, and yet have no will whatever to concur in the evil. Hence, if a person is forced at the point of a revolver to help in robbing his own guests, he knows very well what is being done, but he certainly does not approve of it.

(b) The cooperator may know that scandal will be occasioned by the cooperation, either to the principal agent or to others, but he may have sufficient reasons for permitting it (see 1478, 1482). Thus, if the employee of an undertaking establishment has orders to assist at the funeral of an anarchist, and will lose his means of livelihood if he does not comply, he is not obliged to suffer this great detriment to avoid Pharisaic scandal or even scandal of the weak. But he should, if possible, declare his want of sympathy with anarchy, if he knows of some anarchist present who regards his cooperation as a mark of sympathy for the principles of the deceased.

The second condition for lawful material cooperation is that the cooperator should have a reason sufficiently weighty for permitting the evil connected with his cooperation. The standards for judging whether a reason is sufficiently weighty, are the rules given above on permission of an evil effect (see 105).

(a) Hence, the graver the sin that will be committed, the graver the reason required for cooperation. Thus, a greater reason is required for cooperation in assault than for cooperation in theft.

(b) The nearer the cooperation is to the act of sin, the greater the reason required for cooperation. Thus, he who sells paper to the publisher of obscene books cooperates remotely; he who sets the type or reads the proofs of such books cooperates proximately. A greater reason is necessary for the latter than for the former cooperation.

(c) The greater the dependence of the evil act on one’s cooperation, the greater the reason required for cooperation. Thus, a more serious reason is needed to justify giving intoxicants to a person who abuses liquors, if he is unable to procure them elsewhere, than if he can easily get them from others. But the fact that, if you deny intoxicants or other cooperation, another person will grant what you deny, is not of itself a sufficient reason for cooperation.

(d) The more certain the evil act, the greater the reason required for cooperation. Example: Titus gets drunk frequently, Balbus at intervals. Hence, a greater reason is needed for providing liquor to Titus than to Balbus.

(e) The more obligation one is under to avoid the act of cooperation or to prevent the act of sin, the greater the reason must be for cooperation. Hence, a much greater reason is necessary for lawful cooperation by those who are bound ex officio, from piety or justice, to prevent a sin (such as parents, spiritual directors, and policemen) than on the part of those who are not so bound.

Reasons for cooperation correspond in gravity with the importance of the goods or evils involved (see 1163 sqq.).

(a) Hence, a grave reason for cooperation exists when, if one refuses it, a great good will be lost or a great evil incurred. A day’s wages or income is generally a great good; a severe or long-continued pain, great anger of an employer or other superior, things that bring on notable annoyance, shame, repugnance, etc., are examples of great evils.

(b) A very grave reason for cooperation is the gain or retention of a very great good or the avoidance of a very great evil. A notable percentage of the goods of one’s station in life should be considered as a very great good. A severe and long-continued illness, unemployment on the part of the breadearner of a needy family, serious detriment to one’s honor, reputation or peace of mind, etc., are examples of very great evils.

(c) Graver reasons for cooperation are those that surpass the very grave without being supreme, such as the loss of one’s station in life, incurable disease, loss of an eye or other principal member, severe or perpetual imprisonment.

(d) Most grave reasons for cooperation are the public safety of Church or State, loss of all one’s property, death, extreme disgrace, and the like.

When the sin committed by the principal agent is grave, but contains no injustice to a third party, the reasons for cooperation need not be so serious as when the sin is grave and unjust.

(a) Thus, immediate and indispensable cooperation is justified in order to avoid grave loss to self; for example, one may ask absolution from an unworthy minister, in order to recover the state of grace more quickly.

(b) Immediate and not indispensable cooperation, or mediate and indispensable cooperation, is lawful when it is necessary in order to avoid a moderate loss. Examples: One may receive Communion from an unworthy minister in order to make the Easter duty more conveniently. One may supply intoxicants to a drunkard in order to avoid a brawl, if there is no time to call in the strong arm of the law to subdue the drunkard.

(c) Mediate and not indispensable cooperation is justified even by avoidance of a slight loss. Example: A butcher may sell meat on Friday to a cook who will serve it to some persons bound by abstinence, if the cook can easily get the meat from others and the profit will go elsewhere, unless the butcher sells her the meat.

When the sin committed by the principal agent is a grave injustice to a private party, the reasons for cooperation need not be so serious as when the sin is against the public good.

(a) Thus, immediate and indispensable cooperation is permissible, if without it one cannot avoid a loss to self that is both certain and of a higher kind, or at least a greater one of the same kind than that which will be suffered by the injured party; for this latter would be unreasonable, if he expected one to suffer a greater loss in order to spare him. Example: Mercurius, a servant, is threatened with instant death if he does not open a safe of his employer, take from it certain papers, and deliver them to a burglar.

(b) Immediate and not indispensable cooperation, or mediate and indispensable cooperation, is allowed if necessary for the avoidance of an equal loss to self. Examples: The burglar mentioned above can blow open the safe if Mercurius refuses to open it, but, if he is put to this trouble, he will steal from Mercurius valuables comparable to the papers in the safe. Claudius, a servant, opens a backdoor, the only way through which a burglar can enter secretly, because he is taken by surprise, and refusal on his part will inevitably cost him the loss of papers equally as valuable as those the burglar wishes to secure. Sempronius wishes to rob a house, but he cannot get there without the assistance of Caius, a chauffeur. Caius understands the purpose of Sempronius, but, if he refuses to take him to the house, Sempronius will give out information that will do almost as much harm to Caius as the robbery would do to the owner of the house.

(c) Mediate and not indispensable cooperation is justified by the avoidance of a loss to self less than the loss of the injured party, but in proportion to it, Example: Balbus is usually honest, but today he is going out to “fleece” a number of unsuspecting victims, and he gives orders to his servant Titus to get his coat and hat and open the door, and to his chauffeur Caius to drive him to the gambling place. Titus and Caius have an inkling of Balbus’ plans, but no proofs. If they disobey his orders, other servants will do what Balbus asks, the swindling will not be stopped, but Titus will be demoted, and Caius thrown out of the position necessary for his livelihood.

When the sin committed by the principal agent is against some good of a public character, though not against the common safety, still greater reasons are necessary for cooperation than those given above. (a) Thus, immediate and indispensable cooperation is allowed to avoid a greater public evil, or an equal public evil joined with grave loss to self; for it is lawful to permit a lesser in order to escape a greater evil. Thus, the law may tolerate certain evils for the sake of public tranquillity, if the attempt to suppress them would lead to serious disturbances. One may delay to denounce a practice that is doing harm to a family, if an immediate complaint would cause an equal harm to the family and bring on the maker of the complaint a serious evil.

(b) Immediate and not indispensable cooperation, or mediate and indispensable cooperation, is permitted when it is necessary to avoid an equal public evil, or a very serious personal evil proportionate according to prudent judgment to the public harm done. Thus, an actor who has a harmless part in a somewhat evil play may act it for a time, if the company can easily obtain substitutes but he cannot easily obtain other employment and needs his wages. Similarly, the owner of the only theatre in town may rent it to that company in order to be able to refuse it to another company that is worse.

(c) Mediate and not indispensable cooperation may be allowed when there is need of avoiding a grave loss to self which cannot be prevented except by cooperation. Thus, the ushers in the theatre who have no present way of supporting dependents except by the wages they are earning, may help patrons to seats, even when the play that is being shown is not morally unobjectionable.

When the sin committed by another is directed against the necessary public welfare (i.e., against the common safety of Church or State), one may not cooperate, but should resist. In this case: (a) cooperation is unlawful, for there is no greater public good to justify it, and much less can it be justified by private good; (b) resistance should be made, if possible; for the individual should be willing to suffer loss, spoliation, and death itself to conserve the safety of the Church or of the State.

In giving reasons sufficient for cooperation with sins injurious to the sinner alone or to some third party, we considered only the harm or loss to oneself that would result from a refusal to cooperate. But the good of others may also suffice for cooperation.

(a) Thus, the good of the sinner may justify one in cooperating, as when one assists in order to prevent the commission of a greater evil. It would not be wrong to give whisky to one who wished to make himself drunk, if otherwise he would take poisoned alcohol.

(b) The good of a third party may justify cooperation, as when one assists in perpetrating a minor injury against him in order to stop a major injury. It would not be wrong to bind and gag a man who was being robbed, if otherwise a burglar would murder him.

(c) The common good will often be a justifying reason. Thus, in political affairs it is at times necessary in indifferent matters to compromise with opponents, whose general policies one does not approve, in order to secure the election of good citizens or the passing of good laws, when these ends are very important for the general welfare. It is lawful to administer a Sacrament to one who is unworthy in order to avoid a public evil, such as disturbance or scandal among the people.

"In relation to cooperation with superstitious rites, this rule is to be held. If the cooperation has been part of the superstitious rite, then it will be judged formal, intrinsically evil, and can never lawfully be done. On the contrary it will be judged material if it was not part of the superstitious rite. Some grave harm which would arise to the cooperator, if he wished to abstain from this material cooperation, will make it lawful, even if scandal is present, that which is called scandal of the little ones by Theologians, because by the law of charity no one is bound to remove that scandal with grave harm to himself." S. C. de P. F. 2 July 1827.

“In relation to cooperation with superstitious rites, this rule is to be held. If the cooperation has been part of the superstitious rite, then it is to be judged formal, intrinsically evil, and can never be done licitly. On the contrary, it is to be judged material if it was not part of the superstitious rite. Some grave harm which would arise to the cooperator if he wished to abstain from this material cooperation will make it lawful, even if scandal is present—what is called scandal of the little ones by theologians—because by the law of charity no one is bound to remove that scandal with grave harm to himself.” S. C. de P. F., 2 July 1827.

“All direct cooperation of Christians with superstitious things is forbidden, and those acts are furthermore prohibited which, according to the common estimation of the people, are referred to worship being exhibited to idols. Nor can acts of this kind be excused because of the intention of the one acting or ministering, on the ground that they direct their mind not toward the superstitious worship of idols but toward some other indifferent service; for the private intention of the one acting does not avail to cleanse from guilt an act which among unbelievers is regarded as directed toward superstitious worship. Likewise, the fact that Christians concur in superstitious things only by slight labor and by remote ministry cannot furnish a sufficiently suitable excuse. For whatever the labor may be that is expended directly for superstitious things, and whatever ministry, however remote, is furnished for worship being exhibited to idols, if in the common estimation it cannot be referred to an indifferent cause, is always illicit and vicious.” S. C. de P. F., 5 April 1785; C. 1713.

1. Franciscus, destitute of all work and not having from which he might live and honorably sustain his numerous family, after he had tried other means, with an ample wage offered to him, accepts the office of typographer, of compositor of type, in a Protestant workshop, in which Bibles and other books of Protestants treating of Religion are continually published, to be disseminated here in Rome among the people even gratuitously. At Easter time Franciscus approaches confession, and the confessor commands him that, notwithstanding whatever grave inconvenience, he depart from that workshop. Franciscus obeys, and since he does not find work in a Catholic workshop, he sells newspapers through the public streets, La Tribuna, il Messaggero, L'Osservatore Romano, La Voce della Verità, and others, good and bad mixed together.

Q. 1. Could Franciscus licitly remain in that workshop? - 2. Can he now licitly sell good and bad newspapers indiscriminately?

R. To the first, negatively. The reason is, 1. because his cooperation in disseminating those depraved books against the Catholic religion is proximate, and in fact a sufficient cause to excuse him is lacking. For when that workshop has been left, it is very difficult that he not find another, at least not so bad and perverse; or at least that he exercise another office from which he can live honorably and sustain his family, although perhaps not without some inconvenience to him, which is proved by daily fact here in Rome and in almost all great cities. Nevertheless, in the case of true most grave detriment, he could remain for the briefest time, until he should find another workshop, or find another office to be exercised, if scandal and contempt of religion are absent. Since to set a heretical writing in type, just as also to transcribe it, is not evil in itself from its intrinsic nature, since it can be done both for an evil end and for a good end, for example to refute that writing, and then it is evidently not prohibited. Aptly Laymann, l. 2, t. 3, c. 13, n. 5: "In a very grave necessity, however, if other scandals also and contempt of the Catholic religion are absent, such a thing could be furnished for a brief time, for example, if the son of a heretical typographer should be converted to the Catholic faith, who could not so quickly desert his father without very grave detriment to himself. Since to set in type a writing of heretics, just as also to transcribe it, is not evil per se, if it is not done for an evil end; nor does an ecclesiastical law prohibiting this oblige in so grave a necessity." The same is taught by Gury, Comp., v. 1, n. 253, q. 5; Frassinetti, Comp., 6th ed., Genoa, 1875, v. 1, tract. 4, dissert. 5, n. 21; D'Annib., ed. 3, p. 3, n. 142; and other more recent authors commonly.

The second reason is drawn from the Instruction of the Eminent Cardinal Vicar for parish priests of Rome: "they sin gravely..... and typographers, even secondary ministers, who, lest they be cast out by superiors, collect letters for printing the books of heretics; nay indeed, if there is question of books of heretics by which heresy is taught and upheld, even secondary ministers of the typographer incur the major excommunication reserved in a special way to the Pontiff." Enchir. Moral., n. 367.

To the second, negatively again. The reason is that still sufficiently proximate cooperation is had in spreading among the people those depraved and prohibited newspapers. Nor in fact is there a sufficient reason to excuse Franciscus. For just as, when the Protestant printing workshop had been left, he found this new office, so assuredly there is not lacking another office which he can exercise in a Christian manner, as we have already observed; especially since he himself is endowed with so good a will that, to avoid sin, he is prepared, in place of the nobler office of typographer-compositor, to exercise even the lowest office of public crier through the streets. Besides, there is no necessity of selling good and depraved newspapers; indeed let him sell only good ones, and he will conciliate to himself the favor of the good, who without doubt will be at hand for him and his family in necessity. Nevertheless, since also in this case the cooperation is material and less proximate, especially since there are many others who do this, he will be able meanwhile to exercise that office for some very brief time, until he finds another office, to avoid most grave harm; for example, if he should be compelled to beg and scarcely have from which he himself might live and sustain his family, yet scandal and contempt of religion always being excluded. Frassinetti, l. c.

2. "... In the city M. there exists a hospital... in which nuns take care of the sick.... But since in this hospital followers of a non-Catholic religion are sometimes received, and they from time to time ask for a heretical minister, from whom they may receive the aids and consolations of religion, it is asked whether it is licit for the aforesaid nuns to call a minister of false religion? It is asked besides whether the same solution is to be given where a heretical sick person dwells in the private home of a certain Catholic; namely, whether then the Catholic can licitly call a heretical minister?

The Fathers responded: According to the things set forth, it is not licit; and they added: Let them behave passively." Holy Office, 15 Mar. 1848. - G. 202; Collectan. S. C. de P. F., n. 1845, to 7.

3. "1. Whether it is licit to minister the sacraments of the dying to the faithful who indeed do not adhere to the Masonic sect, nor are led by its principles, but, moved by other reasons, have ordered their bodies to be cremated after death, if they are unwilling to retract this command?

2. Whether it is licit for the faithful whose bodies have been cremated, not without their own fault, publicly to offer the sacrifice of the Mass or even privately to apply it, and likewise to accept foundations for this end?

3. Whether it is licit to cooperate in the cremation of corpses, either by command and counsel, or by furnished work, as for physicians, officials, and workers serving in the crematory? And whether this is licit at least if it is done in some necessity or to avoid great harm?

4. Whether it is licit to minister the sacraments to those cooperating in such a way, if they are unwilling to desist from this cooperation, or affirm that they cannot desist?

R. To the first. If, admonished, they refuse, negatively. But that admonition may be made or omitted, let the rules handed down by approved authors be observed, having regard especially to avoiding scandal.

To the second. Concerning the public application of Holy Mass, negatively; concerning private application, affirmatively.

To the third. Never is it licit to cooperate formally by command or counsel. But material cooperation can sometimes be tolerated, provided that 1. cremation is not held as a protestative sign of the Masonic sect; 2. nothing is contained in it which of itself, directly, and solely expresses the reprobation of Catholic doctrine and approbation of the sect; 3. nor is it established that Catholic officials and workers are constrained or called to the work in contempt of the Catholic religion. For the rest, although in these cases they are to be left in good faith, nevertheless they are always to be admonished not to intend to cooperate in cremation.

To the fourth. Provision was made in the preceding. And let the Decree of f. IV, 15 Dec. 1886, be given. This Decree indeed has itself thus:

Whenever there is question of those whose bodies are subjected to cremation not by their own will, but by another's will, the rites and suffrages of the Church can be applied both at home and in church, but not as far as the place of cremation, scandal having been removed. But scandal can also be removed if it becomes known that cremation was not chosen by the will of the deceased himself. But where there is question of those who chose cremation by their own will, and in this will certainly and notoriously persevered until death, attention being given to the Decree of f. IV, 19 May 1886, one must deal with them according to the norms of the Roman Ritual title, Those to whom it is not licit to give ecclesiastical burial. But in particular cases in which doubt or difficulty arises, the Ordinary will have to be consulted, who, having accurately weighed all the circumstances, will decree that which he judges more expedient in the Lord." Holy Office, 27 July 1892. M. E., v. 9, p. 1, p. 31.

4. Can Catholic wives place meat before husbands asking for it on prohibited days, while they themselves do not eat?

R. Affirmatively, if the women would suffer grave harm by not complying with their husbands, and contempt of religion being excluded." S. C. de P. F., 26 June 1820, Collectan., n. 2064.

"Very many of ours are held to buy or cook or set meat at the table of Protestants every day. If they are compelled to leave the office, they know no other art by which they can provide for themselves for sustaining life; they are reduced to extreme want. Can it be permitted or tolerated that they act thus, when there is so great an inconvenience, and on the part of the Protestants this is not done in contempt of the Church, about which they seem to care little, or perhaps even do not think?

R. Affirmatively, on account of the grave detriment which could arise thence for Catholics." S. C. de P. F., 26 June 1820, Collectan., n. 1658.

5. "There is a Christian official whose office is to preside when goods are sold under the spear. Sometimes, however, books of heretics or others containing obscene things are found; is the aforesaid official held to investigate whether they are such books or not?

R. The official of whom there is question in the case is not held to investigate whether, among the goods which are sold under the spear, books of heretics or others containing obscene things are found. But if by chance he has recognized this, and can prevent the depraved books from coming to bidders who will abuse them, let him indeed furnish this, since each one ought to impede the sin of neighbor when he can do this conveniently, or without his own grave inconvenience." S. C. de P. F., 26 June 1820, Collectan., n. 1874.

When there is question of co-operating in the sins of others, we must distinguish (α) between formal and material and (β) between immediate and mediate co-operation. α) Formal co-operation (cooperatio formalis) is that in which the sin itself is willed. It is always illicit, because it involves sharing the sinful intention of the other (cooperatio in malam voluntatem).

Material co-operation (cooperatio materialis) takes place when a man participates in a wicked deed without sharing the evil intention (cooperatio ad malam actionem) of the principal. Such co-operation is permitted if the act co-operated in is in itself good, or at least objectively indifferent, or when it is dictated by a just cause, e. g., necessity, great utility, avoidance of a serious inconvenience, etc.

β) Immediate co-operation (cooperatio immediata) is a participation in the evil deed itself, not merely in some act preparatory to its commission, which latter would be merely cooperatio mediata.

Immediate co-operation in sin is illicit because it involves conscious assent to the sin itself and therefore is equivalent to formal co-operation. Mediate co-operation may be perfectly licit.

I. Cooperation is called every concurrence afforded to the action of another; in the present case, concurrence afforded to a sterilization to be decreed or performed by another.

It can be given in diverse ways. One kind is cooperation in the broad sense, which occurs through a moral influence upon the will of another, whether directly and positively, as by commanding, counseling, requesting, seducing, consenting, and so forth; or indirectly and negatively, by not admonishing or not impeding, when someone can and ought to admonish or impede. Another is cooperation in the strict sense, which occurs through a real or physical influence, as by assisting, partially causing, supplying means, and so forth. This is immediate or mediate, according as the cooperator executes the work itself with the principal agent, as if he takes away another's property by carrying it together with a thief; or only supplies means by which the other can perform the work, or can perform it more easily. In the latter case the cooperation can be more proximate or more remote, according as the means exercises a greater or lesser influence and is more or less connected with the work of the other.

By reason of intention, one kind of cooperation is formal, when the cooperator consents to the will of the principal agent and intends the latter's work; another is merely material, when he does not consent to the latter's intention, but acts from another intention with foresight that the other will use it to perpetrate his work.

Now the question is asked whether it is licit to cooperate in sterilization.¹ Here the question concerns illicit sterilization; for if the sterilization is licit, it is also licit to cooperate in it, provided this is done by means which are not evil.

¹ Cf. Grosam, Die Sterilisation auf Grund privater Auktorität und auf Grund gesetzlicher Ermächtigung, in Theologisch-praktische Quartalschrift, 1930.

II. Formal cooperation, which proceeds from an evil intention and from approval of illicit sterilization, is always evil and prohibited. Indeed, it is a sin of the same species as sterilization, as a concurrence formally intending and approving it. Hence it is a special sin against justice.

Such are not only those who spontaneously offer themselves to be sterilized, but also physicians who, on their own initiative and without being bound by a public office, deliberately carry out an illicit sterilization; editors and writers who recommend and propagate it from conviction; deputies who approve by vote a law that sterilization is to be performed; and spouses who consent to the sterilization of their consort. Indeed, negative cooperators could in this way be guilty, namely, magistrates, officials, and agents who knew that evil sterilizations were being performed in their territory, provided they could and by reason of office ought to impede them, and could do so without inconvenience, but did not.

III. Merely material but real cooperation, whether immediate or mediate, proximate or remote. Merely material cooperation is that which, without an evil intention or consent to another's sin, someone freely affords to the action of another, but rather unwillingly, in order, for example, to avoid an inconvenience or loss, or to procure gain for himself.

1. If it is immediate, it is always evil, because it consists in the execution of the evil action itself. There is an exception when external goods of fortune are involved, to the removal of which the owner can consent; but this exception does not come under consideration in the question of sterilization, to which it is licit for no one to consent unless it were necessary for bodily health. Hence immediate cooperation in the action of decreeing or performing sterilization is intrinsically evil, just as sterilization itself is, and indeed it is a sin of the same species as the work itself.

Thus physicians who perform the operation unwillingly because they are compelled by law themselves cooperate immediately in the execution of a wicked law; or two physicians who together immediately execute the operation of sterilization itself.

2. Mediate cooperation, however, is that which supplies the means required for performing sterilization, by preparing or assisting. This also is of itself illicit unless there is a grave reason, and indeed a proportionately grave one; that is, a reason graver in proportion as the cooperation is more proximate and in proportion as it is more necessary, that is, as the sterilization would more probably be prevented if the cooperation were refused.

For it is licit to place a cause good or indifferent in itself which has two equally immediate effects: one good, which alone is intended, and the other evil, provided there is a proportionately grave reason for acting. But merely material mediate cooperation has immediately a good effect which alone is intended. Therefore it is licit, provided the action is not evil in itself and there is a proportionately grave reason or a sufficient cause for cooperating.

Such cooperators are assisting physicians and nurses; a nurse who, for example, under the direction of a physician, attends to a Roentgen apparatus; subordinate officials who, by writing records or giving some assistance, cooperate in the execution of the law; workers who prepare the instruments or keep them clean or heated; and a fortiori those who hand instruments to the physician during the operation.

Cooperation that is altogether proximate, such as that of assisting physicians or nurses who attend to the apparatus, demands a most grave cause, for example, if they would lose their means of support but nevertheless could not impede the sterilization. It would very rarely be licit for Catholic Sisters, for example, if otherwise they would be expelled from the institution with great harm to religion.

Proximate but more remote cooperation requires a lesser cause, yet one still grave, for example, a grave inconvenience, and a greater cause in proportion as the cooperation is more proximate.

Cooperation can be altogether remote, for which the reason of one's office itself suffices. Thus it is licit for servants to keep the operating room or chamber clean or heated.

In a case in which there is not a sufficient reason for mediate cooperation, there is a sin against the virtue which is injured by the action of the principal agent; in the present case, against justice, because it is to assist in injuring justice by an unjust sterilization, although the sin is not of the same most specific species or the same gravity. Moreover, scandal, which can arise, is to be avoided; concerning it only those who know all the circumstances of places and persons can judge. This is not always easy. Hence, if it is doubtful whether scandal is to be feared in the concrete case, judgment concerning it in determinate circumstances pertains to the local Ordinaries, who are able to know and estimate all the circumstances.

IV. Moral cooperation is especially that by which someone positively influences the will of him who does evil, and it coincides with direct scandal or scandal inducing one to sin. It is committed, for example, by commanding, counseling, praising, requesting, protecting the sin, in the present case sterilization, or consenting to it.

This is a sin against charity, because it is scandal; and at the same time against the virtue which it induces one to violate, because it directly induces one to this. In the present case it is against justice, which is injured in a special manner whether by private sterilization or by public sterilization.

Such are those who by private authority decree that someone is to be sterilized; those who summon a physician and request sterilization for another; those who command sterilization or invite another to it; and those who report the sick in order that they be sterilized.

V. Observation. Illicit cooperation is not only a sin against the virtue or precept to whose violation concurrence is afforded; it is also against charity when the sin would be prevented if the cooperation were omitted.

VI. Applications. From the foregoing it follows:

1. It is illicit to recommend or counsel sterilization, to request it or formally consent to a request for it, to present a report or vote concerning persons infected with hereditary disease in order that they be sterilized, or to summon a physician for this purpose; because to recommend, counsel, request, or in any way procure a thing intrinsically evil, and so forth, is likewise intrinsically evil. But merely to report or explain the law of sterilization without approval, merely to indicate diseases or merely to report sick persons while nevertheless knowing that they are to be sterilized, and to summon a physician without saying anything, are not intrinsically evil. Hence, by these means, merely material cooperation can be licit for a grave cause and with scandal excluded. Scandal, however, could easily arise from a public explanation of the law made ex officio.

2. It is illicit for physicians to perform the operation of sterilization or to take active parts in carrying out the very act of sterilizing, because this is to do something intrinsically evil. On the contrary, to be present or assist during the operation, to hand over instruments, or to watch over the patient is not of itself intrinsically evil. Wherefore, merely material cooperation in this manner can be licit, but only for a graver cause, because it is altogether proximate cooperation.

3. Likewise, it is illicit for a physician to persuade patients to present themselves for the execution of sterilization, even if he acts thus from the obligation of a public office or of the law, and after the tribunal has pronounced a sentence of sterilization, because to counsel a thing intrinsically evil is always intrinsically evil. Nevertheless, perhaps it would not be illicit to say, "You know the provisions of the law," and merely to declare them without adding persuasion, but only for a graver cause, because this is proximate cooperation.

4. Likewise, it is illicit to present oneself voluntarily for sterilization, because this is to request and consent to a thing intrinsically evil, even if it is done lest a person, after the sentence of the tribunal has already been pronounced, suffer force through compulsion. Rather, he ought not yield except to violence. It is sufficient, however, that force begin to be applied, for example, if an official places his hand upon the shoulder, or if he declares that he has come to employ the force of compulsion. It is not necessary to offer further resistance, because it is then evident to all that the person does not proceed voluntarily but yields to compulsion.

5. Likewise, it is illicit for anyone to permit sterilization to be performed upon himself; rather, he ought to avoid it insofar as is morally possible for him, and to withdraw himself from the sterilization to be imposed.

6. Likewise, it is illicit to compel the sick by force to present themselves for sterilization, even if someone acts thus after the sentence of the tribunal has been pronounced and from the obligation of his office, because this is to compel another to a thing intrinsically evil. This is to be understood of officials who act by their own authority and according to their own judgment, but not of altogether subordinate agents who merely ministerially execute orders by leading persons to a determinate place, and who do not always understand the nature of the thing prescribed or to be executed. These appear to be excused by reason of their office, unless something were demanded of them out of hatred of religion or something manifestly dishonorable.

7. Likewise, it is illicit to discharge the office of judge in a special tribunal instituted solely to treat cases of sterilization. A fortiori, it is illicit to pronounce a decretory sentence that sterilization is to be executed, because this is to command a thing intrinsically evil.

Let it not be thought that the judge only pronounces that the conditions indicated in the law have been verified, upon the presence of which the law itself commands sterilization. On the contrary, the judge does not merely declare the law, but as a superior applies the law by his authority to particular cases and persons. For these he commands in the concrete, authentically intimates the obligation to them, and renders them liable to sterilization, since the law commands that they be rendered liable. Hence he establishes and introduces a new obligation, wherefore his sentence is like a particular law.² But directly to command a thing intrinsically evil and to oblige one to it is illicit.

² St. Thomas, II-II, q. 67, a. 1.

The judge, namely, cannot licitly apply an iniquitous law; iniquitous, I say, not only by reason of incompetence, because it is enacted concerning things not subject to the civil power, for in that case the Church could sometimes concede this or renounce its right; but iniquitous by reason of the matter or the thing prescribed, because it commands against the natural law. It is never licit, namely, to command a thing intrinsically evil and contrary to natural right.³

³ St. Thomas, II-II, q. 60, a. 5, ad 1.

You will object: a. The judge does not act spontaneously and freely, but is compelled by the force of law. Therefore he is not responsible for the effect of the law. One who is compelled appears to afford only merely material cooperation, which can be licit for a grave cause.

Response. He is compelled not by physical force but by moral violence which leaves freedom. What is done from fear is involuntary in a qualified respect, because it is done with repugnance, but is voluntary simply. The judge acts as an agent, while the legislator gives the mandate. Just as the legislator is responsible for the mandate of the law, so the judge is responsible for the execution of the mandate or law. And just as it is not licit to command something intrinsically evil, neither is it licit to execute it. Thus the judge cooperates immediately in the execution of the iniquitous law; and he formally moves another toward a thing intrinsically evil by commanding it, which is direct scandal.

b. St. Thomas says that it is licit for a judge to condemn an innocent man whom he knows by private knowledge to be innocent, but who publicly and juridically has been convicted of a crime.⁴ In judgment he ought to be directed not according to what he himself knows as a private person, but according to what becomes known to him as a public person.

⁴ St. Thomas, II-II, q. 67, a. 2, and q. 64, a. 6, ad 3.

Response. It is one thing to apply a law which is just in itself and favors the common good but which per accidens has an evil effect; it is another to apply a law unjust according to itself. It is one thing to compel him who has been juridically convicted of a crime according to laws just in themselves; it is another to compel him who is plainly manifest to be innocent and whom iniquitous laws alone intend to oblige to something intrinsically evil. This latter plainly cannot be licit, whereas the former could appear licit in certain circumstances.

c. According to many, it is licit for a judge to pronounce a civil divorce, which nevertheless is intrinsically evil.

Response. Those who think thus say that civil divorce is not intrinsically evil, because it does not dissolve the marriage but only the civil contract, and removes civil protection from the marriage, and consequently the opposition of the law to new civil nuptials. It is altogether another thing to command something intrinsically evil, which is never licit. Hence, if the pronouncement of civil divorce were evidently intrinsically evil, neither could it ever be licit.

No solid probability belongs to these and other similar little arguments which could be adduced. Wherefore it is in no way probable that it is licit for a judge to pronounce the execution of sterilization.

2. What is co-operation in another’s sin, and how far is it unlawful?

Co-operation, in general, is the helping of the principal agent in the doing of an action. Hence one who helps another to commit sin co-operates with him in that sin. This co-operation is formal or material. There is formal co-operation when help is given to do what is sinful and what can not be done without sin. Co-operation is material when help is given by doing something which is not sinful in itself, but which the principal agent abuses in order to commit sin. Formal co-operation in another’s sin is never lawful; material co-operation is lawful when the action of him who co-operates is good, or at least indifferent, and when there is a sufficient reason for the co-operation proportionate to the evil co-operated in, and to the closeness of the co-operation.

2. When is co-operation in another’s sin lawful?

Formal co-operation in another's sin is never lawful; material co-operation is lawful provided that the action by which co-operation is given is good or at least indifferent, and provided that there is a good and proportionate reason for the co-operation (see p. 152).

Case.—John, a public hack driver, declares, in confessing his sins, that he is in the habit of driving people to brothels. This he does at times on their simple request. At other times, in response to their demand if he knows of such places, he replies affirmatively, and drives them there. John argues that since such resorts are allowed to exist, it is not unlawful to drive his patrons to them, nor wrong to inform them of their existence and location; otherwise his business and income will suffer gravely, as others are prepared to do this work.

Questions:

1. What is formal, what is material cooperation?

2. What constitutes a grave cause sufficient to make material cooperation lawful?

3. What of the existence and the renting of houses to prostitutes?

4. Did John act rightly?

5. What is the confessor’s duty?

Solution.—1. Formal cooperation is that by which we aid another in his sin, and consent to the malice of the sin. Material cooperation is the aid we give to the action of another, not as it is sinful, but precisely as it is a physical action. It is either: (1) immediate, if one take part in the sinful deed; or (2) mediate, if one performs acts that lead up to or follow the sin.

Formal cooperation is never lawful. It includes the consent of the will to the sin of another. It contains a two-fold malice: against charity and against the particular virtue violated.

Material cooperation is lawful if the two following conditions are present: (1) The action of the one cooperating must be good, or at least indifferent; (2) there must exist for his action a just cause, proportioned to the gravity of the sin, and the proximity of the cooperation.

2. What constitutes a grave cause in this matter depends on the estimation of prudent men. St. Alphonsus (Theol. Mor. Lib. II, No. 59) gives the following rules: The cause which permits material cooperation must be proportionately more serious and more weighty, (1) when the sin committed is graver; (2) when it is more probable that without your cooperation the other will not sin, or when the effect is more certain; (3) when your cooperation touches more proximately on the sin; (4) when you have less right to place the cooperating action; (5) when the sin is against justice, detrimental to a third party.

3. In large cities, in order to avoid greater evils, brothels are permitted by law, and according to a probable opinion it is morally lawful to rent houses for such purposes (Sabetti, No. 187). If, however, grave injury would thereby result to an otherwise respectable neighborhood, or if the location were such as to offer a greater opportunity for vice, such renting would not be permissible.

4. To answer the fourth question, we must determine the nature of John’s cooperation. It does not appear that he cooperated formally, since he did not intend the evil involved. His cooperation, then, was only material. Further, it was not immediate, as it preceded the sins committed. Since, therefore, John’s action of driving his “fares” was morally indifferent and since his livelihood depends on the good will of his patrons, it does not seem that he was guilty of serious sin. It is clear, though, that material cooperation is not Permissible without a sufficient reason. The first reason assigned by John for his course of action viz. that such places are allowed to exist, was not sufficient. It should be remarked also that if John’s passengers would be unable to resort to the houses they seek without his assistance and information, his cooperation would be much more proximate than it is and the reason for it would have to be correspondingly much graver.

5. One of the reasons given for John’s actions seems to be sufficiently grave to exempt him from mortal sin. The confessor should admonish him, however, of the danger that lies even in material cooperation and of the duty of avoiding it in future or of making it more remote, as far as this may be possible.