Hypocrisy

To pride is opposed humility, the virtue which occupies the mean between the two extremes of pride and pusillanimity or mean-spiritedness. The mean-spirited man refuses to take the place for which his talents fit him, and which God intends for him. He puts himself beneath his equals and inferiors to the detriment of his dignity and office; he is afraid to exercise the authority entrusted to him, and the public good suffers in consequence. Humility, on the other hand, keeps a man in his place both with respect to God and his fellow-men. It is grounded on the knowledge of God and of self; the humble man knows and acknowledges that he has nothing but what he has received from God, that he is utterly and entirely dependent on God every moment of his life, that if left to himself he will fall into the lowest depths of sin and degradation; and this knowledge causes him to think much of God and little, very little, of self. This is the virtue so much recommended by our divine Lord: “‘ Learn of me, because I am meek and humble of heart.’’¹

Pride leads to many other vices, among which are: presumption, ambition, vainglory, boasting, and hypocrisy.

(a) Presumption is the inclination and wish to undertake what is above one’s capacity. Ordinarily it is a venial sin, but it will be mortal if it is the occasion of serious harm to the cause of God or our neighbour.

(b) Ambition is the inordinate striving after dignities and honours. The inordinateness consists in striving after honours to which one has no just claim or greater than one’s due, or by unlawful modes and means, or with too great eagerness. Apart from such inordinateness it is not sinful to seek after honours and dignities, as these belong to the class of things that are in themselves indifferent; it is a meritorious act to seek with moderation after dignities and honours in order thereby to be able to do more for God and one’s fellow-men. “If a man desire the office of a bishop, he desireth a good work.”² Such an act belongs to the virtue of magnanimity. Ambition is commonly a venial sin, but it becomes mortal when it is the cause of serious harm, or when the means employed to attain its end are grievously sinful.

(c) Vainglory is the inordinate striving after the esteem and praise of men. It is not wrong but praiseworthy to seek after and preserve a good reputation, which, as Holy Scripture teaches, is better than great riches.³ But inordinateness, vanity, and sin come in when the esteem and praise of those men is sought whose esteem is not worth having, or when esteem is sought for what does not deserve esteem, or not so great as is sought after, or when glory is not referred to the proper end. It is usually a venial sin, but may become mortal in the same way as ambition.

(d) Boasting is the inordinate bragging about one’s own good qualities or gifts, or even about what is sinful. If the inordinate display is in action rather than in word it is called ostentation.

(e) Hypocrisy is the feigning of virtues and qualities that one does not possess.

¹ Matt. xi 29.

² 1 Tim. iii 1.

³ Prov. xxii 1.

IV. The daughters of pride are:

1. Presumption, "which is the inordinate appetite of undertaking something beyond one's powers. It is commonly only venial. It becomes mortal, however, if it brings harm to God or one's neighbor; for example, if you presume ecclesiastical jurisdiction, the power of sacred Order, likewise the office of physician, advocate, confessor, etc., without due skill" (St. Alphonsus, V, 66).

2. Ambition, "which is the inordinate appetite for dignity and honor not owed, or greater than is owed; as if you seek a benefice or office of which you are unworthy; or by an illicit manner and means, for example, by simony. It is per se a venial sin. But it becomes mortal either by reason of the means through which honor is sought, or by reason of the harm which is brought upon one's neighbor. Finally, if honor is sought moderately for an honorable end, it will be an act of magnanimity" (St. Alphonsus, cited place).

3. Vain glory, which is the inordinate appetite of praise and fame to be obtained by the manifestation of one's own excellence. "It is called vain when it is sought from a bad, false, or fictitious thing; or from something which is not worthy of glory, or not of so much glory, as from riches, trifles, etc.; or among those who do not judge rightly about the thing; or without a due end. It is per se a venial sin; often mortal by accident, as was said concerning ambition" (St. Alphonsus, cited place).

By vain glory one sins in two ways:

a) "Directly; and this either by words, and it is boasting, which is venial per se, if it is about good things, for example, fasting, prayer, etc., although by accident, often by reason of harm, if it is false, it becomes mortal; as also: 1. If one says something against the glory of God, as in Ezekiel 28: 'I am God.' 2. If he breaks forth into insults; for example, 'I am not as the rest of men, an adulterer, etc., or even as this man.' 3. From an evil end. 4. If it is done with notable harm to one's neighbor. 5. If it is about a mortally evil matter... Or by deeds, which, if they are true and have something of admiration, is called the invention of novelties, for the common people are accustomed to admire these, such as foreign garments, opinions, etc.; mortal, if it notably corrupts youth or morals. But if the deeds are false, it is hypocrisy; for example, if someone does some good thing so that he may seem good, although he is not" (St. Alphonsus, V, 66; St. Thomas, II-II, q. 132, a. 5).

b) "Indirectly, insofar as someone does not wish to be less than another. This happens in four ways: 1. Through the intellect; and it is pertinacity, by which someone adheres too tenaciously to his own opinion, which is mortal if truth of great moment is opposed, or if it is joined with danger to a third party, for example, if a physician remains in his opinion with danger to the sick person. 2. Through the will; and it is discord, by which one sins mortally when it concerns the good of God or of one's neighbor, in which they ought to be concordant. 3. Through words; and it is contention, which is mortal when, with a mind to contradict, you wrangle about truth pertaining to the faith or to the salvation of soul or body. 4. Through deeds, when someone does not wish to carry out what he ought; and it is disobedience" (St. Alphonsus, cited place; St. Thomas, cited place).

Divisions of Lies.—(a) Intrinsically, or in respect to its nature as a departure from the speaker’s mind, every lie is either an exaggeration, which tells more than the truth, or a suppression, which tells less than the whole truth. He who affirms what he does not believe, or who states as certain what he thinks is uncertain, exaggerates; he who denies what he believes, or who states as doubtful what he holds as certain, is guilty of suppression.

(b) Extrinsically, or in respect to purpose, mode, and result, lies are of many kinds. As to mode, a lie is either spoken or acted, the former being a falsehood and the latter a simulation or hypocrisy. As to its immediate purpose, a lie is meant either to express falsehood only or to deceive, the former being misrepresentation and the latter deceit (e.g., if Claudius knows that he calumniated and that Sempronius heard the calumny, and yet brazenly denies the calumny to Sempronius, there is misrepresentation); if Claudius tries to mislead others who only suspect him and gives false alibis, there is deceit. As to its ulterior purpose, a lie is meant for good (an officious or jocose lie) or for evil (a pernicious lie), or is directed to both good and evil. As to its result, a lie sometimes produces and sometimes does not produce a statement at variance with fact; it sometimes deceives and sometimes does not deceive the auditors.

Sinfulness of Hypocrisy.—(a) Hypocrisy in its strictest sense is the simulation of one who wishes to seem but not to be virtuous. This sin is mortal, since it cares nothing for virtue, and its external pretense is but a mockery. It is this hypocrisy that is so scathingly denounced in Scripture.

(b) Hypocrisy in a less strict sense is the simulation of one who is in mortal sin, but wishes for some reason to appear virtuous or to lead a double life. The sin is mortal or venial according to the motive; for example, to act the hypocrite in order to seduce another is a mortal sin, though, if the motive is only vanity, the sin is venial. It should be noted that it is not hypocrisy for a just cause to conceal one’s sin by dissimulation; indeed, Isaias severely blames those who scandalize others by flaunting their wickedness before the public (Is, iii. 9).

(c) Hypocrisy in the widest sense assumes the appearance of a high degree of sanctity above that requisite for salvation, as when a person of ordinary goodness tries to gain the reputation of miracle-worker, or to pass as one better than others in faith, zeal, humility, etc. This sin is not mortal in itself, but it may become mortal on account of some motive, some means, or some other circumstance. There is no hypocrisy at all, however, in showing oneself for the virtue one really has; on the contrary, he lies, who being good pretends that he is not good, or who being free of a vice pretends that he is guilty of it.

What are the daughters of pride and vainglory? "Those vices which of themselves are apt to be ordered to the end of some capital vice are called its daughters." S. Th. 2. 2. q. 132, a. 5. The daughters of pride are three: 1. Presumption, which is an inordinate appetite of undertaking something above one's powers. It is commonly only venial. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 130, a. 1; q. 134, a. 2 ad 4; q. 21, a. 4. Nevertheless it becomes mortal if it brings grave harm, e.g., if someone presumes to obtain ecclesiastical jurisdiction, the office of physician, etc., without due knowledge. But insofar as presumption is a special sin, opposed to theological hope, it is always a mortal sin, unless imperfection of act excuses. 2. Ambition, which is the inordinate appetite of dignity and honor not owed, or in an undue way and by an undue means. It is per se a venial sin. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 131, a. 1. But it becomes mortal by reason of the matter from which; or by reason of the means by which; or by reason of the end for which honor is sought; or by reason of the harm which is inflicted on one's neighbor. 3. Vainglory, namely the desire of empty glory, whose end is the inordinate manifestation of one's own excellence, whether true or fictitious. It is per se a venial sin. It is often mortal per accidens, as was just said concerning ambition. But to perform even sacred things on account of vainglory, e.g., to preach, does not exceed venial sin. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 132, aa. 3, 4; q. 162, a. 7; L. 66. Pusillanimity corresponds by opposition to the three daughters of pride, by which someone, distrusting himself too much, refuses honors, glory, or an office for which he is worthy. It is venial from its genus; and it becomes mortal if you refuse that to which you are bound under mortal sin. L. 67.

Moreover, the daughters of vainglory, which St. Thomas constitutes as a capital vice, are assigned thus by the same Holy Doctor, 2. 2. q. 132, a. 5. A man can tend to the manifestation of his own excellence in two ways: "in one way directly, either by words, and thus there is boasting; or by deeds, and thus, if they are true things having some admiration, there is presumption of novelties, which men are accustomed to admire more; but if they are false, thus there is hypocrisy. In another way someone strives to manifest his own excellence indirectly, by showing himself not to be less than another, and this in four ways. First indeed as to the intellect, and thus there is pertinacity, by which a man cleaves too much to his own opinion, being unwilling to believe a better opinion. Second as to the will, and thus there is discord, while he does not wish to depart from his own will so that he may agree with others. Third as to speech, and thus there is contention, when another by words quarrels noisily against another. Fourth as to deed, and thus there is disobedience, namely while someone does not wish to execute the precept of a superior." And thus these vices are fittingly called the daughters of vainglory.

Boasting is a certain vain proclamation of one's own excellence, and is per se venial if it is concerning good things; and it can be grave per accidens. If it is concerning lightly evil things, it is likewise per se light, grave per accidens, if, for example, it proceeds from a grave cause against God or neighbor. But if it is concerning gravely evil things, it is grave, because the approval of a work has the same species as the work, which therefore must be expressed in confession, at least when complacency concerning the same sin was joined with the boasting. At least when, etc.; because, if it was without that complacency, many hold that it is not necessarily to be explained. For any boasting concerning mortal sin, abstraction made from complacency in it, is of the same species, namely that someone glories in this, that he has offended God. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 112; L. 26, 66, 67; l. 3, n. 426; Lugo, de Poenit., d. 16, n. 266 seqq.

Presumption of novelties, which is also called ostentation, if those deeds have nothing of admiration, is also per se venial. And thus it is light to be dressed in foreign garments, or to adorn oneself too much from lightness of mind, vanity, etc.; but grave if it is such as notably to corrupt morals. L. 66, 67. Presumption of novelties can be in opinions, in a mode of speaking, in a mode of acting, etc.

Hypocrisy, by which someone "does not care to have holiness, but only to appear holy... is a mortal sin.... To simulate holiness from which one is deficient through mortal sin... is not always a mortal sin, but sometimes venial," according as it happens to oppose charity or not. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 111, a. 4. Likewise to simulate improbitity is a sin, and can be mortal. S. Th. ibid., a. 1; L. 66, 67.

Pertinacity. "Someone is called pertinacious who is imprudently holding, as if wholly tenacious." Hence pertinacity is opposed to perseverance; for the persevering person persists in his own opinion "according as he ought"; but the pertinacious person perseveres in it "more than he ought." And therefore it is a sin because of excess. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 138, a. 2.

Discord is a dissent of wills concerning the good which we ought to will from charity. Moreover, since certain goods can be owed to one's neighbor not only from charity, but also from justice, discord and dissent from the rendering of similar goods is opposed both to charity and to justice. Discord is per se from its genus a mortal sin. For it directly repugns to charity. But per accidens it can become venial, from the smallness of the owed good in the rendering of which we do not wish to consent. Indeed, sometimes it will be no sin, if it arises, namely, from a probable judgment, from which one person judges this, another that, for the honor of God and the utility of neighbor, and if the mode of dissenting is not opposed to charity. - Struggl, tr. 4, q. 5, n. 38; S. Th. 2. 2. q. 37.

Contention is the impugnation of truth with confidence of shouting. Contention is from its genus a mortal sin. The reason: because by charity we ought to will and communicate to others truth necessary or useful for the salvation of the soul, or even of the body; and therefore to impugn it, and to wish to defeat it, is opposed to the virtue of charity, and is from its genus a mortal sin. - Struggl, tr. 4, q. 5, n. 39; S. Th. 2. 2. q. 38.

Disobedience, properly and speaking per se, or formal disobedience, is had only when "someone contemns a precept, because moral acts have their species from the end. But when he does something against a precept, not on account of contempt of the precept, it is disobedience only materially, but formally pertains to another species of sin," according to various motives, e.g., to the species of theft, homicide, etc. Therefore disobedience by its nature is a grave sin. For not to obey the precepts of God and of Superiors is contrary to charity. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 105, a. 1.

What is simulation? - A lie not by words, but by deeds, is called simulation. Yet not every simulation is a lie: for to simulate is indeed to do one thing and to will to signify another, and consists in this; but deeds are not, as words are, destined to signify the mind and to speak to others; therefore by these no one lies unless he uses them to deceive someone. Wherefore, if someone uses them only for concealing the truth, every lie is absent. And if a lie is sometimes absent from the very words, when someone is not questioned by right concerning some matter, how can that right always be present in deeds, so that you must do this or that, lest another be deceived? To simulation or to lying pertain hypocrisy, boasting, irony. All are opposed to the virtue of truth, which is a special virtue through which man duly orders his outward things, whether words or deeds, to something as sign to thing signified. St. Thomas, 2. 2, q. 109, a. 2.; q. 110, a. 2.; q. 111, a. 1.; Quodl. 6, a. 17.; Quodl. 8, a. 14. "Hypocrisy is a simulation by which someone simulates the person of another, as when a sinner simulates the person of a just man." St. Thomas, 2. 2, q. 111, a. 2. Generally and of itself hypocrisy is a light sin. It becomes grave from a gravely depraved end, or another gravely evil circumstance. St. Thomas, 2. 2, q. 111, a. 4. Boasting is properly said "when someone extols himself above that which is in him." And it is grave or light by reason of a grave or light object. St. Thomas, 2. 2, q. 112, a. 2. Irony is had when "someone says lesser things, departing from truth, for instance when he asserts about himself some vile thing which he does not recognize in himself, or when he denies about himself some great thing which nevertheless he perceives to be in himself; and it is always a sin," light of itself, grave per accidens....

St. Thomas, 2. 2, q. 113.

168. Scholion. On simulation and hypocrisy. Simulation and hypocrisy can be reduced to lying. For it belongs to the virtue of truth that someone show himself externally through external signs such as he is. But external signs are not only words, but also deeds. Falsity in words is lying; but falsity in the signs of external deeds is simulation³¹¹ (Verstellung). But hypocrisy is a species of simulation; for it is the simulation of another person and notably the vice of him who does not have holiness, but nevertheless externally so conducts himself that he may be regarded as holy. Simulation and hypocrisy must be judged especially from the end of the agent. For often they are assumed as means for obtaining a very depraved end, e.g., the kiss of Judas. When a dishonorable end is absent, they are venial sins or even wholly lack culpability. For external deeds are not so clearly and certainly significative as words, but often are of ambiguous interpretation, and therefore they must be regarded as amphibologies, which sometimes can be permitted from a reasonable cause. Thus, e.g., from a grave cause a cleric can proceed in lay dress, although then many will regard him as a lay man.

The malice of lying.

³¹¹ Ibid. q. 111, a. 1.

S. Th. II-II, q. 109, a. 4; q. 111, 112 and 113.

864. Diverse species of lying. - On the part of the act by which it is committed, lying is divided into lying strictly so called, which is made by spoken or written words, or equivalent signs, and simulation, which is made by deeds, of which hypocrisy is a species. - On the part of the very account of lying, it is divided into boasting, or a lie which transcends truth toward the greater and is opposed by excess on the part of the object, and irony, or a lie which falls short of truth toward the lesser and is opposed to truth by defect. Of these we must now speak specifically.

865. Simulation (veinzerij) properly so called or formal, is lying by deeds, by which someone through external actions intends to signify something other than what he has in mind, for example if someone displays signs of friendship from a hostile mind, as Judas did; from it is distinguished simulation improperly so called and material: it is dissimulation, or an ambiguous action for concealing the truth, which is licit from a just cause, whenever others can gather the mind of the one dissimulating from the circumstances. Thus Christ (Luke XXIV, 28) feigned that He was going farther, in order to excite the disciples to exercising hospitality.

Therefore not every fiction is simulation, but conversely every simulation is fiction.

866. Hypocrisy (huichelarij) is the simulation of another person, especially if a sinner simulates the person of a just man, and thus it is taken in the New Testament (Luke XIII, 15) and in theological speech, as the simulation of holiness which someone does not have (schijnheiligheid); from which differs the hiding of sin (or silence about it) by which someone, for example, is silent about it lest scandal be generated therefrom.

Hypocrisy is a mortal sin 1) when holiness is contemned, as in the Pharisees: for thus "that man is called a hypocrite whose intention is borne toward both, namely, that he does not care to have holiness, but only to appear holy" (q. 111, a. 4); therefore he contemns holiness, not wishing to acquire it but wishing to persevere in sin, and yet at the same time he strives to please men by simulating it; 2) also when it proceeds from a mortally evil end, for example, to dissemble or spread heresy, to acquire a benefice unjustly, to obtain seduction and fornication, etc.

But if the intended end is light, not repugnant to charity, it will be a venial sin, for example, when someone delights in the fiction itself, or if he simulates greater holiness.

Of itself hypocrisy is directly opposed to truth, yet indirectly and accidentally it can be contrary to many virtues according to the remote end, or according to the instrument or means of the act, or something else of this sort.

867. Boasting (snoeverij, grootspraak) is a lie by excess, by which someone through words extols himself above that which he really is. It is mortal if it is done with injury to God (Ezek. XXVIII, 2) or great injury or contumely of the neighbor (Luke XVIII, 11); hence 1. boasting about a good work is a sin of itself venial (IV Kings XVIII; Ezek. XXVIII, 15); 2. about an evil work (Prov. II), if it includes approval of it (which often happens if the deed was done), it is mortal or venial according as the approved work is; hence there is a twofold sin: one of boasting (Jer. XLVIII), another of delight in evil, to which a third, scandal, is often added; 3. but if it includes only approval of a circumstance, for example dexterity, which often happens if the matter concerns a fictitious work, of itself it does not exceed venial sin.

868. Irony (zelfkleinering) is not taken here for the figurative speech by which something is said mockingly by the contrary, but is a lie by defect, by which someone asserts about himself some vile thing which he does not acknowledge in himself, or by which he denies about himself something great which nevertheless he perceives in himself. Although by reason of the matter they are equal, because they are concerned with the same thing, namely, with the condition of the person, nevertheless irony ordinarily is a lesser evil than boasting, which is accustomed to proceed from a baser motive, namely, from appetite for gain or honor; yet it is graver if it is done to deceive craftily with notable detriment.

To lying are reduced simulation, Hypocrisy, Boasting, and Irony. Simulation is defined by St. Bonaventure, lib. 3 of the Pharetra, cap. 25, from the holy Fathers: It is a showing, in deed alien from the things that truly are.

Hypocrisy, however, is defined by the holy Doctor there, and in the Centil., sect. 18: It is the will simulating itself fallaciously under the species of sanctity in the open, and acting vilely in secret. Therefore hypocrisy is simulation in a certain matter, namely virtue. See St. Bonaventure, in the cited place of the Pharetra, discoursing most excellently with the Fathers.

Irony is defined by St. Bonaventure in the Mirror of the Soul, cap. 1: It is a detestation of another by way of the contrary; but this is reduced to pride.

Boasting, however, is said of that by which one enumerates his own goods, that he may appear praiseworthy, as St. Bonaventure says, in the cited place of the Centil. and lib. 3 of the Compend. of Theological Truth, cap. 15. Wherefore it is reduced rather to pride, although when it exalts itself above what is, it has a certain injustice.

These vices are opposed to truth, and have the character of a lie, and accordingly can be both mortal and venial.

From the end, however, as St. Bonaventure says (question above on man), and with him Tannerus (disp. 6, quaest. 2, dub. 1, num. 18), it is gathered when they are grave; for if the end be gravely contrary to Charity, or justice, etc., they will be mortal; if, for example, someone feign sanctity in order to deceive in faith, or chastity, or to steal. But if the end is not opposed to Charity, etc., they will be venial, for instance the mere pleasure in the fiction, of which Aristotle speaks, 4 Ethics, cap. 7.

For to deceive someone precisely is not grave, unless either a bad end, or a grave harm, follows.

So also Boasting from the root of pride is mortal, if it be born of mortal pride, for instance gravely exalting oneself, as is said of the King of Tyre, Ezech. 28: Thy heart was lifted up, and thou saidst: I am God. Or if, in boasting himself, he bursts into the insults of others, like that Pharisee, Luke 18: I am not as the rest of men, rapacious, etc., even as this one.

Irony, by which one preaches lesser things of himself against the truth, is a lie, yet lighter than Boasting, as St. Thomas teaches, quaest. 113, art. 1 and 2, after Aristotle, lib. 4 of the Ethics, cap. 7.

The reason is, because Boasting arises, for the most part, from a baser motive, namely from the appetite of gain, or honor; but Irony from the fact that one shuns, though inordinately, being burdensome to others by self-exaltation; yet if one humbles himself in order to deceive deceitfully, it can be grave, of which Eccl. 19: There is one that humbleth himself wickedly, and his interior is full of deceit.

Boasting and irony can also concur in the same act, if one casts himself down with false humility, that he may be esteemed, as Christ says, Matth. 6: For they disfigure their faces, that they may appear unto men to fast, as the holy Doctor observes in the Diaeta, tit. 2, cap. 6, where he assails them, saying that these feed a double adversary.

It is also usually doubted concerning figurative words. It is answered that these are free of lying, as St. Augustine teaches, On Lying, cap. 2, and lib. against Lying, cap. 10. For they have truth in their own genus, according to the institutions of the Rhetoricians.

Likewise amphibological enunciations are without the note of a lie, if the speaker does not intend to deceive, as Tannerus notes, disput. 6, quaest. 2, number 25.

It is also doubted concerning mixed speeches, namely those which have their sense partly in the voice, partly in the mind, as when to one asking 100 florins you say: I will give them to you; but understanding, if I owe them.

The first opinion is that these are lies. So Sotus, lib. 8 de Iust., quaest. 1, art. 7; Cajetan, quaest. 89, art. 7; Azor, tract. 1, lib. 11, cap. 4, question 5; Aragon there, and others. The reason is, because that speech, taken as a whole as uttered, is false.

The OPPOSITE others teach; whom Valencia follows, disput. 5, quaest. 15, point 2, and disput. 6, quaest. 7, point 4; Toletus, lib. 4, cap. 21, and lib. 5, cap. 58.

The TRUE opinion, therefore, admits equivocations in this sense, when we are illicitly asked to say something, as Tanner notes, num. 31. For thus Christ, Mark 13, according to the truer sense of the Fathers, says: But of that day or hour no man knoweth, neither the Angels in heaven, neither the Son, namely that he reveals it to others, or knows not, that is, makes not to know; or knows not so as to reveal, as St. Bonaventure teaches, in 4, dist. 48, quaest. 4, and with him Tanner, num. 31. So the holy Doctor expounds it with Chrysostom, homil. 47, on John 7: Go you up to this festival day, but I go not up, understanding, not now with you; for afterwards he went up. Similar is that of John 11: Lazarus sleepeth, when he was dead, and that of Luke 8: The girl is not dead, but sleepeth, as the holy Doctor observes in his commentaries, and with him Tannerus in the place cited.

We HAVE also the example of the holy Father Francis, at Navarrus, cap. Humanae aures, Tanner, num. 32; for being asked whether a certain man had passed that way, the holy Father, holding his hand in his sleeve, said: He did not pass this way. And although Sotus, on concealing a secret, memb. 3, quaest. 3, says that St. Francis was deceived in that opinion, yet he is to be esteemed of more worth than Sotus, as Tanner warns, num. 32.

So also Samuel, 1 Kings 16, said: I am come to sacrifice to the Lord, when he had come to anoint David king. Which equivocations St. Gregory praises there, for warding off the violence of the tyrant.

EXCLUDING, however, a grave cause, it is not lawful to use equivocations; for by the remaining truth we are bound, otherwise all human society would be done away, as St. Thomas argues, quaest. 114, art. 2, ad 1, and St. Bonaventure, lib. 3 of the Pharetra, cap. 3, § De mendacio. Therefore the holy Fathers there alleged assail it gravely. So St. Isidore in the Synonyma, cap. 11: Beware of a lie in all things, for by a lie faith is taken away; and St. Augustine in the Enchiridion, cap. 22: Assuredly words were instituted not that men might deceive one another by them; but that each one might by them convey his thoughts into another's knowledge; and lib. 1 of Christian Doctrine, cap. 36: No one lying keeps faith in that wherein he lies. For this he assuredly wishes, that he to whom he lies should believe him, which faith he nevertheless does not keep by lying to him. Tanner, in the Mirror of the Soul, cap. 2. St. Bonaventure condemns suspect and equivocal locutions in contracts. On these, with an oath added, I treated in disp. on Oaths, quaest. 10.