Internal Causes of Sin

The general internal cause of every sin is disordered love of self, according to Augustine's saying: "Two loves have therefore made two cities: namely, love of self even to contempt of God made the earthly city, but love of God even to contempt of self made the heavenly city."¹ This disordered love manifests itself by a threefold concupiscence: namely, the concupiscence of the flesh, by which man is inclined to the pleasure of taste and touch; the concupiscence of the eyes, by which he is inclined to riches and temporal goods; the pride of life, by which he is enticed to the undue honors of his estimated excellence (St. Thomas, I-II, q. 77, aa. 4 and 5).

Specifically and practically, culpable ignorance, concupiscence, slothfulness, and malice are assigned as internal causes of sin.

¹ De civitate Dei, bk. 14, c. 28.

I. Culpable ignorance; which can be a cause of sin to the extent that man, if he had expelled the ignorance, would have abstained from the depraved act. To this cause also belongs defect of consideration, which is a certain actual culpable ignorance, concerning which the prophet Jeremiah says: "With desolation the whole land is made desolate, because there is no one who reflects in the heart."¹

¹ Jer. 12:11.

II. Concupiscence - by which here is understood every passion or motion of the sensitive appetite - is the cause of sin according to these words of St. James: "Each one is tempted by his own concupiscence, drawn away and enticed. Then concupiscence, when it has conceived, brings forth sin."¹ Sins which are perpetrated from concupiscence are called sins of weakness (St. Thomas, I-II, q. 77, a. 3). Such commonly are self-pollutions, morose delectations, drunkenness, hatred of neighbor, blasphemies, which nevertheless by others are also uttered from malice (St. Alphonsus, VI, 463).

¹ James 1:14.

III. Slothfulness, i.e., lack of zeal and affection toward those things which concern the salvation of the soul. From slothfulness commonly arise neglects of Mass, of the abstinence to be observed, etc.

IV. Malice, i.e., the depravity of the will by which someone sins even if vehement passion does not incite him to sin. Among sins from malice are counted hatred of God, hindering the good which priests and other good men promote; likewise, commonly, sins against the Holy Spirit, and those which are said to cry to heaven.

Finally, note that one actual sin is sometimes the cause of other sins: first, indirectly, when God, in order to punish sin, permits that someone fall into sin, whether light or grave. Of this both the doctrine of the Saints and especially St. Paul in the Epistle to the Romans is witness: "On account of this," i.e., on account of the sin of neglecting the glorification of God, "God handed them," that is, the ancient philosophers, "over to passions of shame."¹ In another way, directly, sin is the cause of sin, namely by force both of an increased inclination toward sins of the same species and of the connection which exists among depraved acts of diverse species. Thus - the examples are legion - thus Cain first sinned by envy against his brother, then by hatred, then by homicide, and finally despaired of the mercy of God... Thus also Judas first sinned by avarice, then handed over Jesus Christ, and finally brought death upon himself (St. Alphonsus, Sermoni compendiati, Twenty-Second Sunday after Pentecost). To this, moreover, those sins especially are to be referred which are called capital, because from them as from heads other sins naturally arise. Of these there will be a specific discussion later.

¹ Rom. 1:26.

The Causes of Sin.—The causes of sin are partly internal (i.e., those which are in man himself) and partly external (i.e., those which are without).

The internal causes of sin are: (a) ignorance in the intellect; (b) passion in the sensitive appetites; (c) malice in the will.

Since ignorance and passion may render an act involuntary (see 40 sqq.), the sins that result from them are of two kinds, viz., material and formal. (a) Material or objective sins are transgressions of the law that are involuntary, and consequently not imputable as faults. Examples: Blasphemies uttered by one who is delirious or hypnotized; breaking of the fast by one who is inculpably ignorant of the law; imprecations pronounced by a person out of his mind through fear. (b) Formal or subjective sins are transgressions of the law that are voluntary, and hence imputable as faults. They are not only against the law, as is the case with material sins, but they are also against conscience.

Ignorance, passion and malice cause sin as follows:

(a) Every sin results from practical error (i.e., from a wrong decision as to what one should do here and now), for the will chooses wrong only after the intellect has decided on wrong. In this sense, then, it is said that all who sin are in error (Prov,, xiv. 22), and that every sinner is in ignorance (Aristotle, Nich. Ethics, Bk. III, c.1, 1110b 27). But not every sin results from speculative error (i.e., from a false notion or judgment about the lawfulness of an act in general). else we should have to hold that everyone who sins is in error against the faith;

(b) Speculative ignorance causes formal sin, when the ignorance is culpable and leads to wrongdoing, as when a person has never taken the pains to learn what the law of fast requires and in consequence violates the law, or when an automobilist through carelessness does not see a person crossing the street and runs him down. Speculative ignorance causes material sin, when the lack of knowledge is inculpable and leads one to do what one would not otherwise do, as when a child shoots a playmate, not knowing that this is a sin, or a soldier shoots a comrade whom, on account of darkness, he mistook for an enemy spy;

(c) Passion, by clouding the judgment and vehemently inciting the will, leads one to act against one’s better knowledge and to choose inordinately the concupiscences of pleasure, or possessions, or glory (I John, ii. 16). If the passion is voluntary, the resulting sin is formal; but, if the passion is involuntary and takes away the use of reason, the sin caused is material;

(d) Malice is found in a sense in every formal sin, inasmuch as every sin is committed out of choice. But malice in the strict sense, as here understood, is a choice of sin made, not on account of preceding ignorance or passion, but on account of some corrupt disposition of the sinner which makes sin pleasing or acceptable to him, such as a vicious habit or inclination which he cultivates, or willful despair or presumption which he entertains.

Ignorance and passion do not always make an act involuntary (see 40 sqq.), and hence three kinds of formal sins may be distinguished according to the three kinds of causes from which they proceed:

(a) sins of weakness, which are those that result from antecedent concupiscence or other passion that lessens without taking away the voluntariness of an act. Since the First Person of the Trinity is especially described by the attribute of almighty power, sins of this kind are sometimes called sins against the Father;

(b) sins of ignorance, which are those that result from antecedent and vincible ignorance. Since wisdom is especially attributed to the Second Person of the Trinity, sins of this kind are called sins against the Son;

(c) sins of malice, which are those that proceed entirely from a free will that is undisturbed by ignorance or passion. Since love is especially ascribed to the Third Person of the Trinity, sins of this class are sometimes called sins against the Holy Ghost. Example: One whose heart is so set on wealth that he decides to sacrifice the friendship of God for new acquisitions; one who sees clearly the offense to God a sin entails, and deliberately chooses it; one who is so jealous of a neighbor that he schemes to ruin him; one who sins habitually without fear or remorse.

Other things being equal, sins of malice are graver than sins of weakness and sins of ignorance, since the former are more voluntary, more enduring, and more dangerous. But just as sins of ignorance and sins of weakness may be mortal, as when their object is seriously wrong, so sins of malice may be venial, as when their object is not seriously wrong. A fully deliberate lie that works no great harm is venially sinful, whereas a murder committed by one who was intoxicated or moved by rage is a mortal sin, if there was sufficient reflection.

What is the direct and indirect voluntary; voluntary in itself and in the cause; positive and negative? - The voluntary, by reason of the act of the will by which it proceeds from the will, is one thing direct, another indirect. The direct is from the will acting. The indirect is from the will not acting, not prohibiting, namely which ought and can prohibit. For "not always is that which follows upon a defect of action reduced, as into a cause, into the agent from the fact that he does not act, but only then when he can and ought to act. For if the helmsman could not direct the ship, or the governance of the ship had not been entrusted to him, the sinking of the ship, which would happen through the absence of the helmsman, would not be imputed to him. Therefore, since the will, by willing and acting, can impede this which is not to will and not to act, and sometimes ought to, this which is not to will and not to act is imputed to it as existing from it." S. Th. 1. 2. q. 6. a. 3; 2. 2. q. 69. a. 7; 3. p. q. 47. a. 1. Namely, it must be what one ought and can prohibit, so that one is in fault. And thus no one would say that every good which you do not do is voluntary to you, even indirectly, and consequently imputable, although absolutely you can do it, but are not bound to do it; and much less every evil which you are not bound in any way to impede.

If nevertheless someone knowingly posits an act incompatible with another act, which is omitted, for performing which there is no obligation, since that omission is free, it is indirectly voluntary, although not imputable to fault; for example, if you wish to study without wishing not to go to visit a church, when there is no obligation; and, on the contrary, it is imputable to merit, as if you wish to pray and therefore omit recreation, without saying, I wish to omit it. Cf. Commentary de Act. hum., Fourth, n. 9. Cf. here the following paragraph and n. 35.

The voluntary, by reason of the object which immediately terminates the act of the will, is one thing voluntary in itself, another voluntary in the cause. The first is had when someone immediately wills something in itself; the second, when someone wills the cause from which some effect is going to follow, even if he foresees this effect; for then he does not will it in itself, but in another, namely in its cause. Foresees, that is, merely foresees; for if besides this he wills it, that effect will already be directly and in itself willed and voluntary, and not merely in the cause. From this it follows that that effect will no longer be willed and voluntary as an effect; nor likewise will its cause be willed and voluntary as a cause; but then the effect, with respect to the will, will have the notion of an end, and the cause the notion of a means. For that which someone wills on account of itself has the notion of an end; what someone wills on account of another has the notion of a means. Nor indeed is it valid to object that if the effect is merely foreseen, and the will is not borne into it by its own act, then that effect is outside the intention, and in no way can it be voluntary, not even in the cause. For because the will, by not willing the cause, can impede the effect, and sometimes ought to impede it if it is evil, the effect is imputed to it; consequently, since it is not willed in itself, it will be willed in the cause. S. Th. q. 6. a. 3; q. 71. a. 5.

And thus evil works committed against one's neighbor in drunkenness are voluntary in the cause for him who was voluntarily made drunk, foreseeing those evils from previous experience, although he neither willed nor intended those same evils. If someone writing a bad book foresees many spiritual evils from it, although he does not intend them, they are imputed to him, and they are voluntary to him not in themselves, but in the cause. But if the effect is good, and someone who posits the cause foresees it, he is already judged implicitly to will it, and he does not lack his merit, since the good is the object of the will, not evil. If you give your goods to a monastery, foreseeing the spiritual goods thence to come, you certainly do not lack merit. Therefore there is a distinction between good and evil; for good, at least in some way, we ought to intend; evil, on the contrary, cannot be intended, but ought to be avoided. Suarez, d. 1, s. 4.

Several theologians altogether distinguish the voluntary in itself and the voluntary in the cause from the direct and indirect voluntary. And thus Suarez says, "The voluntary in itself is sufficiently clear; for then something is said to be voluntary in itself when it is willed in itself, so that the will is immediately concerned with it, either by a proper act, if it is voluntary direct, or through the lack of an act, if it is indirectly voluntary." D. 1, s. 4. Likewise S. Th. q. 77. a. 7: "Two things seem to have to be considered. First, that something can be voluntary either according to itself, as when the will is borne directly into it, or according to its cause, when the will is borne into the cause and not into the effect; as is clear in him who voluntarily becomes drunk. For from this, what he commits through drunkenness is imputed to him as quasi-voluntary. Secondly, it must be considered that something is called voluntary directly or indirectly. Directly indeed is that into which the will is borne; but indirect is that which the will could have prohibited, but does not prohibit."

But others call the voluntary in itself and in the cause the direct and indirect voluntary, and express this by another division, namely of the positive and negative voluntary. Gury, Ballerini, n. 5. Now, with a comparison established between both divisions, the voluntary in itself and in the cause, and the direct and indirect voluntary, and insisting upon the doctrine of the Angelic Doctor, it must be said that the direct voluntary includes under itself both the voluntary in itself and the voluntary in the cause. For the direct voluntary is said by the Angelic Doctor to be "that which proceeds from the will as from an agent," q. 6. a. 3 ad 1. But both the voluntary in itself and the voluntary in the cause proceed from the will insofar as it is acting and willing.

But the indirect voluntary can be reduced both to the voluntary in itself and to the voluntary in the cause. The indirect voluntary is said by the same Holy Doctor to be "that which is from the will as from a non-agent," l. c. But both the voluntary in itself and the voluntary in the cause include the acting and willing will. Therefore the indirectly voluntary is neither properly voluntary in itself, nor likewise properly voluntary in the cause. Nevertheless it can be reduced to both; for the indirectly voluntary is said either only of the interior act of the will, or also of the exterior act. If the first, since not willing is immediately from the will, it can be called voluntary in itself. If the second, since externally not acting is as it were the external object completing that not willing, just as the former is in some way voluntary in itself, so also is the latter, since one complete non-act is as it were constituted from both the lack of an interior and exterior act; for example, not willing to hear Mass, and not hearing Mass in fact, just as one complete act is constituted from the internal and external act of willing to hear Mass and of hearing Mass.

Now, as from the positing of an act, as from a cause, some effect can follow, so from the omission of an act another act can follow, which, although it is not properly the effect of that omission, just as that omission is not properly the cause of the following act, since not acting cannot properly be a cause, nevertheless it can be considered as an effect. And thus it can be called voluntary in the cause; for example, the death of those sailing, indirectly voluntary, is, in the sense stated, voluntary in the cause for the pilot of the ship who desists from steering.

What is required so that an evil effect which follows, voluntary only in the cause or indirectly, be imputable to the will as fault? - The following conditions are required: 1. That he who posits or omits the cause advert, at least confusedly, that such an effect will follow from that cause; because nothing is willed unless in some way it is known beforehand.

2. That the agent be able to impede such a cause; because there is no obligation to impossibilities.

3. That the agent be bound, by reason of that effect, to remove or omit that cause; because the effect following outside the intention is not imputed to one pursuing his own right. For then the agent in reality does not will the effect, but wills the permission of the effect. L. 1. 5. n. 15; S. Th. 1. 2. q. 6. a. 3; q. 21. a. 2; C. I. 1151 f.; C. G. 1182 f.; C. H. 1092 ff.

When is someone bound to remove the cause, by reason of an evil effect that will follow? - 1. He is bound when it of itself, directly and primarily, produces nothing except an evil effect. For then the cause is evil in itself. It is said, of itself, directly and primarily, produces nothing except an evil effect, because one would not therefore be bound to remove the cause if the evil effect followed merely accidentally; for then the cause would not therefore be evil in itself. Nor would he be bound if the cause of itself, directly and primarily, produces a good effect, and only through this as a medium an evil effect follows; for a cause according to moral estimation is judged from its effect of itself, directly, and primarily, and accordingly it is then simply honorable in itself. Therefore then one would not will the evil, but would will the good, and would only permit the evil. Likewise one would not therefore be bound to remove the cause because it equally, directly and primarily, as if in a parallel manner, influences a good and an evil effect. For then the cause in itself, according to moral estimation, is indifferent, and honorable, insofar as it is subject to the honorable intention of the agent; for the evil effect is not intended, but permitted. S. Th. 1. 2. q. 20. a. 5; q. 73. a. 8; 2. 2. q. 64. a. 7.

2. Someone is likewise bound to remove the cause by reason of an evil effect that will follow, when, although the cause is honorable or indifferent in itself, nevertheless someone is bound to impede the effect from justice, or from charity, or from a precept that presses to be fulfilled; for example, if someone wished to play for the sake of recreation while the last Mass on Sunday will soon be celebrated, so that consequently he omits it from distraction. "For he who is bound to the law must necessarily be bound to procure the ordinary means, and the means proximately necessary from the very nature of the thing, for observing the law..... Ordinary, I say; for human laws do not compel to extraordinary and excessively difficult things." Ithur., case 32, n. 4. Hence "the reason can be given, that by reason of the precept that cause and the effects following from it, although physically they are connected only accidentally, and one is not the cause of the other, nevertheless morally are judged to have the notion of one unsuitable object, or one to be avoided by the will, and therefore the will of one is judged the virtual will of the other." Suarez, tr. 2, d. 1, s. 4, n. 9.

3. Finally, someone is bound to remove the cause by reason of an evil effect that will follow, when, although the cause is honorable or indifferent in itself, nevertheless there is no proportionate necessity, utility, or fittingness on the part of the agent. For then an honorable end of the one operating is lacking; for evil is to be avoided, and it can be permitted when there is a rational and just cause. Besides, to will such a cause then often shows an evil affection directly toward that evil effect that will follow; or at least there is often a proximate danger of such evil affection. But a greater or lesser reason is required for positing the cause according as it is a cause of itself, or from its own nature influencing such an effect, or an accidental cause, namely one which does not influence such an effect from its intrinsic nature, but from some extrinsic condition of things. Likewise the greater reason is required for acting in such a case, the more proximately the cause touches the evil effect, the more probable the evil effect is, the less right one has to the action considered in itself, and the graver the effect itself is, if one is bound by office to impede the evil. For if a proportionately grave reason is not had, natural honesty itself obliges us to omit that cause. L. 1. 1. n. 152; l. 5. n. 14; S. Th. 2. 2. q. 64. a. 7.

Is the effect which follows, gravely evil, voluntary only indirectly or in the cause, always imputable as grave fault, so that someone contracts the grave malice proper to that effect, if he illicitly posits the cause without any sufficient reason? - R. 1. Affirmatively, if that cause of itself, or from its intrinsic nature, gravely influences the effect. The reason is that if the cause of itself gravely influences the effect, the grave malice from the effect redounds into the cause. Therefore someone contracts the grave malice proper to the effect itself by willing its cause without any sufficient reason. Moreover, at least practically speaking, one who wills the cause, of itself gravely influencing an effect gravely evil, without any sufficient reason, in reality directly wills the grave malice of that effect, and does not merely permit it; since the cause and effect are inseparably connected with one another, so far as concerns the very nature of the thing, and no other honorable reason is present for positing the cause on account of another honorable effect, as is supposed.

R. 2. Negatively, if that cause of itself influences that effect only lightly. The reason is that, since the cause of itself has only a light influence upon that gravely evil effect, a cause of this kind is not of itself sufficient for the positing of the effect, and accordingly, so far as concerns the nature of the thing, they are not inseparably connected with one another. Therefore it is not the case that because someone wills the cause, he also wills the effect, but he wills only the permission of the effect, if perhaps it follows. Accordingly he does not contract the grave malice proper to the effect. But since the malice of the effect redounds into the cause by reason of the influence which the latter has upon the effect, where the influence is light there is only light malice; and consequently, with the direct intention of the gravely evil effect always excluded, someone willing a cause that influences such an effect only lightly, although he will not sin gravely, nevertheless will sin lightly. And this is the proper reason why, although there is no smallness of matter in venereal matters, nevertheless there is such in those acts of mere sensuality, as are looks, from a cause of mere curiosity, at less honorable things, with the intention of the venereal thing itself again excluded, as the very common opinion of theologians holds.

R. 3. Again negatively, if the cause in no way of itself influences that evil effect, but the effect follows merely accidentally, or from extrinsic circumstances. The reason is that since the effect follows only accidentally, there is no connection, so far as concerns the nature of the thing, between the cause and the effect. Therefore it is not the case that because someone wills the cause, he also wills the effect, but he wills only the permission of the effect, if perhaps it follows. But since the malice of the effect in no way redounds into the cause, for the effect does not follow from that cause of itself, but merely accidentally, someone willing the cause, with every intention of the evil effect excluded, contracts none of its malice, neither grave nor light, although perhaps otherwise he also sins gravely. And thus, if someone foresees pollution from some excess of drink or food, without willing and intending it, he will sin lightly, or perhaps even gravely, by reason of that excess, but by no means will he sin by reason of the pollution, since this effect is not willed, but happens outside and against the intention, and the cause is outside the genus of lust. Nor indeed is someone bound to remove all causes influencing only accidentally into some evil effect, by reason only of that evil effect itself. For in actions only this one thing must be attended to: whether they are the cause of this effect, or not. For if they do not have the force of a cause, it is ridiculous that they must be avoided on account of an effect of this kind. And in no way is someone bound to abstain from positing such a cause, if a reasonable motive is present for positing a cause of this kind.

Cf. 40. 1, 4; Suarez, tr. 2, d. 1, s. 4, 5; Sanchez, l. 9, d. 45, n. 14 ff.; L. 1. 3. n. 484; Salm., tr. 26, c. 7, n. 41; S. Th. 2. 2. q. 154. a. 5; 3. p. q. 30. a. 7; d'Annibale, 4th ed., p. 1, n. 157, note 15.

When is an effect willed in the cause imputed? - It is imputed, speaking of itself, first when someone has posited the cause, or from the time when he could and ought to have impeded it, if he noticed it after the cause had been posited. "The reason is that the free volition, or non-impeding, of an evil effect is formally evil, but not the physical existence of the effect; and accordingly formal sin is committed when there is such a perverse volition or nolition.... Thus therefore, he who, for example, has offered poison to another ... does not sin when the death of the other follows ... but when he freely posited the cause of this effect." Struggl, q. 1, a. 3, n. 32. Speaking of itself; for if someone can impede an effect of this kind right up to its execution, and does not impede it, or is pleased in its futurition or existence, he continues in his mind the sin whose cause he previously posited freely and culpably. Consequently someone must then confess the effect as if it were the external act and object, the complement of the sin. But it would be otherwise if, after the cause had been posited, before the effect follows, he retracts the will, or confesses the sin committed. L. 1. 5. n. 10; S. Th. 2. 2. q. 79. a. 3 ad 3.

Note: Since the cause, as such, participates in the specific malice of the effect, but not in a different malice, it suffices in confession to accuse only the malice of the effect; or if the cause has in itself another special malice, it suffices to state each separately. And thus, if because of play you omitted Mass, it suffices to accuse this omission; if because of theft you likewise omitted Mass, you can then accuse separately the theft and the omission of Mass. L. 1. 5. n. 9; Lugo, de Poenit., d. 15, n. 479.

You will resolve: 1. "If the cause of pollution is one gravely influencing it, and the man does not abstain from positing that cause or action, it is clear that the pollution is imputed as sin, even if it was not intended, provided it was at least confusedly foreseen. But causes of this kind are without doubt all those which of themselves are grave faults in the genus of lust, namely touches or sights of the shameful parts of another's or one's own body with base and deliberate delight; the sight of human intercourse; and morose thoughts about venereal matters. Therefore all pollutions arising from these causes are certainly mortal. Thus S. Th. a. 2. q. 154. a. 5, and others commonly. And then that base act which is the cause of pollution has a special malice against nature, as Sanchez says, de Matr., l. 9, c. 45, n. 23, and all agree." L. 1. 3. n. 482. A special malice, namely of the effect or pollution, which is a sin against nature, besides the proper malice which consists in delight excited from a base object. Gravely influencing; therefore, if the cause, whether by reason of itself or by reason of the disposition of the subject, does not gravely influence, grave fault is absent by reason of the pollution perhaps going to follow, since then it follows outside the intention and accidentally. Of themselves are grave faults: "the common and more probable opinion teaches that pollution is not mortal (namely in the cause), unless it comes from a cause of itself mortal in the genus of lust.... The reason is that, since pollution is not willed except in the cause, it will be evil in that degree in which the cause itself is evil." L. 1. 3. n. 484. In the genus of lust, whence "it is inferred that the pollution which happens outside the intention from causes illicit even mortally in another genus than lust is not mortal, as from drunkenness, or from eating too immoderately or on a forbidden day." L. 1. 3. n. 484, 477; Salm., Theol. Schol., tr. 13, d. 10, n. 274; Theol. Mor., tr. 26, c. 7, n. 41.

2. "If someone, about to do some necessary or lawful and honorable thing, foresees that pollution will naturally follow, and this applies much more to distillation, which nevertheless he in no way wills or intends, then, provided the danger of consent to the delight is absent, he is not bound to abstain from such an action; because the effect following accidentally and outside the intention is not imputed to one pursuing his right. Hence, notwithstanding pollution, it is lawful to hear the confessions of women, to study cases of conscience, to touch oneself from necessity, cautiously and from necessity to kiss women, to embrace according to the custom of the country, if otherwise one would have to be regarded as uncivil." L. 1. 3. n. 481. "It is lawful for someone who suffers a great itching in the private parts to drive it away by touch, even if pollution follows." L. 1. 3. n. 483. The reason is that these acts either of themselves influence only lightly, or although they of themselves gravely influence, nevertheless, since they are not done from a base cause of concupiscence and delight, but from an honorable, necessary, useful, suitable cause, they no longer have the same force and influence upon the effect, which is gravely increased by that evil propensity of the will, and on the contrary is greatly diminished by the will turned elsewhere and resisting as far as it can. Hence the evil effect, if it follows, is attributed rather to natural constitution, or to weakness of nature, than to the aforesaid acts as cause. Besides, with the aforesaid honorable end standing, someone is not bound to abstain from the cause in order to impede the evil effect. For when a cause has two effects, one good, the other evil, it can be posited from the intention of the good effect alone, by behaving permissively toward the evil. Therefore that evil effect, in the case, truly follows accidentally and outside the intention. L. 1. 3. n. 483; l. 5. n. 14; S. Th. 3. p. q. 80. a. 7.

3. "It is inferred that the pollution which arises from a not prolonged conversation with a girl, or from a slight glance, or from curious reading venially base, is only venial; because, as has been said, since those causes influence lightly, the subsequent pollution proceeds rather from a natural cause than from them." L. 1. 3. n. 484. But if someone has a just cause, he sins in nothing. L. 1. 5. n. 29. A just cause is "any reasonable cause of necessity, utility, or fittingness." L. 1. 3. n. 484; l. 5. n. 29.

4. A fortiori grave fault is absent in those actions which influence remotely and accidentally, since they are outside the genus of lust. Therefore, although pollution or an evil commotion is foreseen as going to follow, it is lawful to ride horseback, not only for the sake of necessity and utility, but also for recreation; to recline in some position in order to rest more comfortably; moderately to take hot foods or drink; to lead honorable dances, etc. L. 1. 3. n. 483. Grave fault is absent; for whether light fault is present in the positing of such causes without a just reason, on account of the effect going to follow, is disputed. Holzmann and others deny it, "because, as they say, the pollution arises rather from the weakness of nature than from that cause, which concurs to pollution only accidentally and remotely. But Sanchez, Lessius, and others more probably affirm it..., because without a rational cause to permit pollution always seems something unbecoming and disordered." L. 1. 3. n. 484; Sanchez, de Matr., l. 9, d. 45; Sporer, de Matr., n. 644 ff.; Lessius, l. 4, c. 3, d. 14, n. 97-103.

382. Preliminary note. Since sin, that "mystery of iniquity," is the greatest among all evils, it is of great interest to know its causes; for if its causes are clearly known, it will also be easier to avoid sin itself. For this reason St. Thomas treats at greatest length, that is, through ten questions in 45 articles, of the causes of sins.¹ But we, studying brevity, cannot treat specially except of the efficient cause and of the exciting causes. For four causes are customarily distinguished: material, formal, efficient, final.

The material cause² of sin is that in which sin resides, namely first of all the will, and then also the sensitive appetite and the intellective faculty, but not the external members. For where there is virtue, there sin can be. But in those powers, as being in some way free, virtue can be, but not in the external members, since these are necessarily moved. Thus, for example, the virtue of temperance is in the concupiscible appetite, but fortitude is in the irascible appetite.

The formal cause of sin is its essential constitutive element, namely aversion from God, the ultimate end, if there is question of mortal sin, and disordered conversion to created good.

The principal efficient cause of sin is its author, namely the perverse will, as will soon be proved more broadly. Nevertheless several other secondary efficient causes exist, as will be said below.

The final cause of sin is its intended end. There are indeed diverse particular ends of diverse sins, but the common end of all sins is earthly happiness disorderedly sought.

Leaving aside the material, formal, and final causes, we now treat only of the efficient cause of sin, which indeed is twofold: one interior, namely the faculties of man: intellect, will, imagination, sensitive appetite;³ the other exterior, namely the devil, the world, external goods.⁴

¹ S. theol. 1, 2, q. 75-84.

² It is often also called the subject of sin. S. theol. 1, 2, q. 74.

³ S. theol. 1, 2, q. 75, a. 2.

⁴ Ib. a. 3.

383. Principle. The adequate efficient cause of sin is neither God nor the devil, but only the perverse will. So all Catholic authors. It is proved by parts:

a) God is not the cause of sin, as Simon Magus, several Gnostics, the Manichaeans, the Albigensians, Calvin, Zwingli, Beza, and others wished, teaching that God from eternity positively defined and willed all sins which happen in the world.^4a But this is manifestly false and impious. For in Scripture it is said: "Thou art not a God willing iniquity";⁵ and: "Let no one, when he is tempted, say that he is tempted by God; for God is not a tempter of evils, and he himself tempts no one."⁶ Hence the Council of Trent deservedly defined:⁷ "If anyone says that it is not in the power of man to make his ways evil, but that God works evil works just as he works good works, not only permissively, but also properly and by himself, so that the betrayal of Judas is his own work no less than the calling of Paul, A. S." - This dogmatic truth can easily be proved also from natural reason. For God made every creature for himself and draws all men to himself. Moreover mortal sin is essentially aversion from God, as was said above. Therefore if God willed or caused sin, he would will contraries, namely to convert men to himself and to turn them away from himself.

For greater clarity, however, two things must be distinguished in sin, namely the act itself materially considered and the malice or deformity of the act.

The act materially taken is some being and good, and therefore is caused by God, since there cannot be any being which is not caused by God. Hence, for example, the physical act of adultery is caused by God.

But the malice or deformity of the act, in which precisely the essence of sin consists, is in no way caused by God. For it is privation and defect. To declare this matter more, St. Thomas often uses the example of a lame leg. For just as the soul moves the lame leg and causes the motion, but not the lameness itself, so God moves man to the act and causes the action, but does not cause the defect and disorder of the act. Likewise, as lameness comes from a sick leg, so the disorder or sinfulness of the act comes from the perverse will of man.⁸ Hence God in no way wills or causes the evil of fault which is found in any sinful act, although he causes the physical act of sin. But God permits all sins, because unless God permits, nothing would happen. In this sense St. Augustine said:⁹ "That which happens even against his [God's] will does not happen apart from his will, because it would not happen if he did not permit it; and certainly he does not permit unwillingly, but willingly."

^4a Cf. Billuart, De pecc. diss. 5, a. 9.

⁵ Ps. 5, 5.

⁶ Iac. 1, 13.

⁷ Sess. 6, can. 6 de iustif. (Denz. n. 816).

⁸ Cf. S. theol. 1, 2, q. 79, a. 2.

⁹ Enchir. c. 100 (Migne, Patr. lat. 40, 279).

384. b) The devil is not the direct and sufficient cause of sin. The reason is that the devil cannot cause sin in us except either by directly moving the will to sinning, or by proposing some evil object and efficaciously persuading that this object is to be sought. But he can do neither. Therefore...

alpha) The devil certainly cannot sufficiently move the human will, for the human will is essentially free, and therefore its essence would be destroyed if some extrinsic agent could force it to some act. Wherefore St. Thomas in many places forcefully teaches that an evil angel cannot directly and sufficiently move the human will.¹⁰ Indeed man can and must resist the devil, and therefore St. Peter admonishes: "Your adversary the devil, as a roaring lion, goes about seeking whom he may devour; resist him, strong in faith";¹¹ and St. James similarly says: "Be subject therefore to God; but resist the devil, and he will flee from you."¹²

beta) Next, the devil cannot efficaciously move the will by proposing an object, because the will is moved necessarily by no object except by the ultimate end alone. Indeed the devil can stain the human imagination with unlawful images of every kind; indeed he can totally disturb the use of reason, and also cause most vehement disordered motions in the sensitive appetite; but since the human will always remains free mistress of its acts, hence the devil cannot sufficiently and certainly cause formal sin. St. Thomas¹³ briefly states this truth in this way: "The devil by his own power, unless he is restrained by God, can induce someone by necessity to doing some act which of its own genus is a sin, but he cannot induce the necessity of sinning."

There have been those who taught that all sins of men are at least from the suggestion of the devil. But St. Thomas¹⁴ expressly denies this, teaching: "Occasionally indeed and indirectly the devil is the cause of all our sins, insofar as he induced the first man to sin, from whose sin human nature has been so vitiated that we all are inclined to sin.... But directly he is not the cause of all human sins, such that he persuades individual sins. Origen proves this from the fact that, even if the devil did not exist, men would have appetite for foods and sexual things and the like; and this could be disordered unless it were ordered by reason, which is subject to free will." - These things must be kept before the eyes; for they serve to foster our humility. For we must not say, as the first parents did in paradise: The devil seduced us to sin; but it is necessary humbly to confess: I have sinned exceedingly through my fault, through my most grievous fault. Therefore only the perverse will, led by disordered love of self, is the adequate cause of sin. Indeed besides the devil, also perverse men, worldly allurements, and one's own disordered passions can instigate to sin, but it belongs to the will alone to consent to sin, and without that consent no sin can ever be present.

¹⁰ Cf. S. theol. 1, 2, q. 9, a. 6; q. 80, a. 1 et 3; De malo q. 3, a. 4.

¹¹ 1 Petr. 5, 8.

¹² Iac. 4, 7.

¹³ S. theol. 1, 2, q. 80, a. 3.

¹⁴ L. c. a. 4.

St. Thomas, I-II, q. 75, a. 1 and 2; De Malo, q. 1, a. 3.

461. In what way sin has a cause. - Sin 1) on the part of the act (the material element), has, like any act and any being, an efficient cause per se, namely, the power of man, especially the will insofar as it intends some created good; 2) on the part of disorder (the formal element), it has a cause in the mode in which negation can have a cause:

a) an efficient cause per accidens: for upon the placing of one effect there follows the absence of another; and thus a cause intending the placing is, per accidens, the cause of the consequent negation, as fire by causing heat consequently causes the privation of coldness. Thus the will intending a created good opposed to law at the same time produces the privation of conformity with law annexed to this good, which nevertheless it does not intend, but which it causes consequently, per accidens, and outside its intention. Whence the cause of sin per se on the part of the act is also per accidens the cause of disorder;

b) it has a deficient cause: for in sin there is not mere negation but privation; but that which ought to be in some effect would never be absent except on account of the defect of some cause. Therefore the will causes sin insofar as it defects from the direction of the rule of reason and the law of God, that is, insofar as it does not attend to it or does not use it. Nor is this defect or lack of the rule already sin (although it is a physical imperfection), but rather that the will proceeds with this lack to choosing and acting.

462. Sin has four interior causes on the part of the act: two proximate and immediate, reason and will, which are required in every sin; two remote and mediate, sensitive cognition and the appetite following, when sin is concerned with sensible good. In this case the imagination begins (at least ordinarily) and proposes a delectable good to the sensitive appetite, and immediately by that very fact the appetite is moved into it, preceding reason and enticing it to approve it and judge it good. Then reason adverts to the various advantages and disadvantages of this delectable good, even that it is or perhaps is against the law of God. Nevertheless reason, defecting from the rule, can approve it: then the will, by consenting to it, completes and perfects (through delight, through desire, or through the work) the notion of sin (James I, 14-15).

463. Division of the question. - Therefore sin is from reason directing badly, from appetite inclining under the guidance of imagination, and from will perfecting. Hence we shall speak:

1. of ignorance, which is the cause of sin on the part of reason;

2. of infirmity or passion, which is the cause of sin on the part of the sensitive appetite;

3. of malice (or contempt), which is the cause of sin on the part of the will.

Thus according to that saying of Isidore, De Summo Bono, book 2: "In three modes sin is carried on, that is, by ignorance, infirmity, and industry." Namely, sins are called sins of ignorance, infirmity, or malice, according as their principal cause or principle of sinning is ignorance, passion, or malice.

1. This distinction, however, is not essential and specific, but merely accidental of gravity, because it is not from the object. Therefore the same sin, for example, of homicide, can be from ignorance, passion, or malice.

St. Thomas, I-II, q. 76; De Malo q. 3, a. 6, 7, 8.

464. On the part of reason, the cause of sin is ignorance and inconsideration of the intellect, not any whatever, but that which removes knowledge (whether universal knowledge of right, or particular knowledge of fact or circumstance) by which, if it were present or present more fully, sin would not occur. Whence it is not the cause of sin per se, but per accidens, insofar as it removes that which would impede sin. But if someone is so disposed that without ignorance he would nevertheless sin, ignorance would not be the cause of sin: such a one does not sin from ignorance or on account of ignorance, but sins with ignorance or while ignorant. Thus if ignorance is concomitant, or even if it is affected but precisely for sinning more freely.

For every sin, even one done from malice, ignorance or error is required in the ultimate practical judgment, by which reason erroneously judges such an illicit act to be good for itself here and now; but sins of ignorance are called those which proceed also from a culpably erroneous speculative judgment.

1. It is called ignorance of bad election. Cf. Ethics III, lect. 3; I-II, q. 6, a. 8; II Sent. d. 39, q. 1, a. 1, ad 4.

2. "Ignorance sometimes excludes the knowledge by which someone simply knows that this which is done is evil, and then he is said to sin from ignorance; sometimes it excludes the knowledge by which man knows that this now is evil, as when one sins from passion; sometimes it excludes the knowledge by which someone knows that this evil is not to be sustained on account of the attainment of that good, although he simply knows that this is evil, and thus he who sins from malice is said to be ignorant." I-II, q. 78, a. 1, ad 1. Cf. De Malo q. 2, a. 3, ad 9.

465. Ignorance can be sin (the contrary was condemned in Coelestius and Abelard), not indeed according to itself, for it is an intellectual evil, not a moral one, but by reason of preceding negligence in learning or actual negligence in considering (Luke XII, 48; I Tim. I, 13). Nevertheless not every ignorance is sin: for invincible ignorance, which someone could not repel, is not sin, as is clear from propositions 68 of Baius and 2 of Alexander VIII, condemned; but vincible ignorance is only sin if it concerns those things which someone is bound to know, or which are necessary for directing his own acts and without which he cannot rightly exercise the due act.

1. "Negative infidelity is sin." "Invincible ignorance of the right of nature in the state of fallen nature does not excuse from formal sin."

Whence for sin it does not suffice that ignorance be voluntary, but in addition it must be culpable. For this three things are required: in order that it be voluntary, 1) that someone could have removed it, that is, had the means for that, and 2) that he adverted to it in some way; but in order that it be culpable, in addition 3) that someone was obligated to impede the ignorance, that is, to apply means lest ignorance follow. Thus ignorance of medical science is not culpable for a farmer and advocate, but for a physician.

Moreover all are bound to know a) the articles or fundamental truths of faith, b) the universal precepts of right, namely, of the Decalogue and of the Church; c) but individuals are bound to know those things which regard their state or office, at least those things which are common and occur often.

Indeed ignorance can be a special sin. Vincible ignorance 1) of a thing which we are bound to know habitually or by reason of itself (ignorance of right) is a special sin of omission, diverse from the sins which follow from it, because ignorance itself is morally evil in itself, and because one sinning thus violates two diverse precepts.

Thus, for example, if someone voluntarily were ignorant of the Incarnation or the malice of adultery or the five precepts of the Church, and therefore blasphemed Christ, or committed adultery, or ate meats, he would be guilty of a double sin.

On the contrary, 2) ignorance of a thing which someone is bound to know, not indeed permanently and by reason of itself, but transiently and on account of the work here and now to be placed (ignorance of a particular fact, for example, of a circumstance of the act), is not a sin distinct from the sin which follows from it or to which it exposes, because it is not evil except by reason of the evil effect, and therefore one sinning does not act except against one precept and one virtue.

Thus negligence of inquiring whether the present day is a day of fast (even if it were not a day of fast), because from the same precept one is bound to fast and to inquire.

466. Principles. I. Invincible and antecedent ignorance per se totally excuses from the whole sin the work which is done from it, because it renders it involuntary (Gen. IX, 21); per accidens it does not entirely excuse if it is not total but partial, because only the circumstance is unknown which, if known, would prevent the sin, and nevertheless the sin is done knowingly, for example, the killing of a man by one who does not know that he is his father (Gen. XXXVIII). Whence it excuses insofar as it is ignorance.

II. Invincible and concomitant ignorance does not entirely excuse: it excuses from sin the external work which is done with it, because it renders that work non-voluntary; but it does not totally excuse the one operating, because it does not take away every will of sinning or internal affection toward sin, since the work would nevertheless be done if ignorance were not given, for example, one who kills an enemy, thinking him to be a beast, when nevertheless he would kill if he knew. Such ignorance neither excuses entirely, nor accuses.

III. Vincible and consequent ignorance concerning these things which someone is bound to know, if it is the cause of sin which otherwise would not occur, does not totally excuse from sin the work which is done from it, because it remains voluntary (since the ignorance itself is voluntary), but it diminishes it because it renders it involuntary in a certain respect. Whence it accuses, as voluntary, and does not excuse from the whole but from so much, for example, wounding from drunkenness.

IV. Vincible but affected ignorance, and excited precisely for sinning more freely, in no way excuses from sin but rather increases it, because it proceeds from a greater will of sinning. Whence it simply accuses.

St. Thomas, I-II, q. 77; q. 9, a. 2; De Malo, q. 3, a. 9, 10, 11.

467. On the part of the sensitive appetite the cause of sin is passion, by which man is moved toward a sensible good or is drawn back from a sensible evil, against the good or order of reason. But since passions are certain sicknesses of the soul, which weaken and impede the use of reason and of the will, the sins which proceed from them are commonly called sins of infirmity (Rom. VII, 23; James I, 14).

468. Passion cannot directly draw or move the will, but only indirectly. And indeed:

1. on the part of the subject, by a certain subtraction, by distracting power from the will: for since all the powers proceed from the soul as from one root, it follows a) that the intense exercise of one potency diminishes the force of acting in the others, and b) that man, while he attends vehemently to one thing, is less attentive to other things. Hence the more intensely the sensitive appetite acts, the more remiss the force of the will becomes, or the motion of the will is impeded;¹

¹ The argument concludes for the present state, for powers which need organs, because these, in the present state, lose their powers by exercise; it is not valid for powers which exercise themselves without an organ.

2. by contrariety, on the part of the object or good which reason apprehends, by inclining toward a good contrary to reason: a) for to a man in passion that appears good which does not appear so to him when existing outside passion, just as to one loving or angry there appears a good which does not appear to one who is quiet, and thus passion often tends into an object contrary to reason; moreover b) passion imports a vehement apprehension of the imagination, which reason needs in its exercise, and by which in the case it is inclined especially to consider and approve the object of passion and to judge it good. Hence it happens that the judgment of reason, and consequently the will, often follow passion and act otherwise than if passion were not present;²

² How passion can incline to sinning notwithstanding an opposed universal moral knowledge, St. Thomas indicates, a. 2, ad 4: "He who has knowledge in the universal, on account of passion is impeded lest he be able to take under that universal (proposition), and to arrive at the conclusion; but he takes under another universal, which the inclination of passion suggests, and under it concludes. Hence the Philosopher says, in VII Ethics, that the syllogism of the incontinent man has four propositions, two universal: of which one is of reason, for instance, that no fornication is to be committed, the other is of passion, for instance, that delight is to be pursued. Passion, therefore, binds reason lest it take and conclude under the first; hence while it lasts, it takes and concludes under the second." Cf. De Malo q. 3, a. 9, ad 7.

3. by bodily change, sometimes so transmuting the body that the imagination depends solely on the disposition of the body and is no longer ruled by reason; in this case it totally binds the cognition of reason and impedes its deliberation and use, and consequently sin: thus many, on account of the abundance of love and anger, have been turned into insanity.

469. Inordinate love of self is the cause of every sin. - For to love someone is to will good for him; but by sin someone inordinately wills good for himself; hence sin proceeds from this, that one inordinately loves himself.

But the good which man inordinately seeks for himself is threefold:

a) delectable goods according to touch or the sense of the flesh, which pertain to the conservation of the individual and of the species, and the inordinate appetite for these is the concupiscence of the flesh or natural concupiscence;

b) delectable goods according to the apprehension of the imagination, such as monies, external goods, splendor, pomp, adornment of garments, etc., and the inordinate appetite for these is the concupiscence of the eyes or the cupidity of those things which outwardly appear to the senses and, thus known, please;

c) finally, the inordinate appetite for a difficult or arduous good, and therefore an excellent one, is called pride of life, which is the appetite of excellence.

These three are the cause of all sins (I John II, 16); to these also can be reduced all passions which are the cause of sin: to the first two, all passions of the concupiscible appetite; to the third, all passions of the irascible appetite.

I suppose, from the tract. on Human Acts, dissert. I, the division of ignorance into antecedent, concomitant and consequent. Re-read.

I say 1°: Ignorance can be a cause of sin ¹, not per se, because since it is privation and not a being, it cannot of itself influence an act; but per accidens, as removing what prohibits, inasmuch as it removes knowledge which, if present, sin would not be committed. ¹ Here q. 76, a. 1, o.

I say 2°: Concomitant ignorance is not a cause of sin ², because it does not remove knowledge which, if present, would impede sin, but with it present sin is committed equally. Antecedent and consequent ignorance are causes of sin, because they take away knowledge by which, if present, sin would be prohibited: yet with this difference, that antecedent ignorance is only a cause of the act of sin, or of sin taken not formally but materially, because the act following from it, as regards the circumstance of sin, is involuntary, since that circumstance is invincibly ignored; but consequent ignorance is a cause of sin formally, because the act following from it, even as regards the character of formal sin, is voluntary, since this character is voluntarily and vincibly ignored. Concerning antecedent or invincible ignorance of divine and natural law, whether it exists and whether it excuses from sin, we shall speak more fully in what follows. ² Ibid.

I say 3°: Invincible ignorance is not sin; vincible ignorance of things one is bound to know is formally in itself sin, not however on account of its own self, but on account of negligence in learning ³. But all are bound commonly to know: 1° the things that are of faith, 2º the universal precepts of law, 3° each one, those things which pertain to his state and office. ³ Ibid., a. 2, o.

The Reason of the first part: because invincible ignorance, since it is not in our power to overcome it — for it is called invincible because it cannot morally be overcome — is not voluntary. It will appear more clearly from what must be said below.

The Reason of the second part is: because voluntary omission of a due act is formally in itself sin. Yet vincible ignorance of things one is bound to know is voluntary omission, at least indirectly, of a due act, namely due cognition, in negligence of learning. Ergo.

[You will ask 1° what things are causes of vincible ignorance.

I answer. Four are counted, namely: negligence, passion, wicked habit, thoughtlessness.

1° Negligence. « When anyone, says St. Thomas, 1a 2ae, q. 76, a. 3, c, neglects to learn, on account of labor or other occupations, that whereby he would be withheld from sin, such negligence makes ignorance itself voluntary, and sinful, provided it be of things one is bound and able to know. » But that ignorance be sin, there is required 1° that it be of things one is bound to know, e.g., things that are of faith and the universal precepts of law, or those which concern one's own state or office; 2° that negligence in learning be voluntary and culpable, that is, that man advert to the obligation imposed upon him and to the means proposed to him for acquiring competent knowledge, and refuse to employ them; for, as the Angelic Doctor says, q. 3 de Malo, a. 7, c, negligence from which culpable ignorance is born is nothing else than « not applying the mind to knowing what one ought to know. »

2° Passion. For ignorance becomes voluntary through passion when someone deliberately wills to follow it, foreseeing at least confusedly and in general the evil effects naturally about to arise from such passion, though he perceive them not in particular; for then he wills them at least in their cause. Whence St. Thomas says, q. 3 de Malo, a. 10, c: « Posited that reason be bound by passion, it is necessary that perverse choice follow. But it is in the power of the will to repel this bond of reason. For reason is bound from this, that the intention of the soul is applied vehemently to the act of sensitive appetite, whence it turns away from considering in particular what it knows habitually in universal. To apply intention to something or not to apply it exists in the power of the will. Whence it is in the power of the will that it exclude that bond of reason. The act therefore committed which proceeds from such a bond is voluntary: whence it is not excused from guilt, even mortal. But if the binding of reason through passion proceeded so far that it were not in the power of the will to remove a bond of this kind, suppose that through some passion of soul one should fall into insanity, whatsoever he might commit would not be imputed to him as guilt, as neither to another madman, except perhaps as regards the principle of such passion, which was voluntary; for the will could have impeded from the beginning that passion proceed so far. »

3° Wicked habit. Ignorance becomes voluntary by reason of a wicked habit, when namely someone does not care efficaciously to amend a wicked habit. For those acts are sins formally which are sufficiently voluntary in themselves or in their cause. Yet acts which proceed from a wicked habit are sufficiently voluntary in themselves or in their cause, namely in the bad custom which was voluntarily contracted. They are also sufficiently deliberate; for, as St. Liguori says, lib. II, de Peccatis, n. 4, « sinners of this kind ill habituated, although they have cognition less prompt than others, nevertheless always have some actual cognition of their crimes sufficient for rendering acts deliberate and mortal. For since they make little account of sin, there is not made in their souls that sensible and memorable impression which is made in another having conscience less depraved: and hence it happens that in their memory there remains no vestige of that actual cognition which they had sufficiently before concerning the sin, or a vestige so light, that being questioned they easily answer that they did not advert. » Ergo.

4° Thoughtlessness. To prudence pertains to regulate all actions of man; and since nothing right or rightly done can be done without her guidance, and thoughtlessness is opposed to her, whatever acts are done together with ignorance arisen from thoughtlessness become sins, because such ignorance can easily be overcome. Thus St. Thomas proves, 2a 2ae, q. 53, a. 4, c, that thoughtlessness is a special sin contained under imprudence: « Consideration chiefly pertains to judgment. Whence also defect of right judgment pertains to the vice of thoughtlessness, insofar namely as someone fails in judging rightly from this, that he will not consider the things he can consider. »

You will ask 2° whether culpable ignorance of things one is bound to know is a special sin distinct from the sins of which it is the cause.

I answer. 1° Ignorance of things which man is bound to know not on account of themselves but on account of the work here and now to be done or avoided, is not a special sin distinct from the sin which follows from it, because by no other title is one bound to know those things than by reason of the work here and now to be done or omitted; and thus it takes its whole malice from that work, no otherwise than an act good or indifferent from elsewhere which is the cause of culpable omission takes its whole malice from the omission, and constitutes one sin only with it. Hence he who approaches one not his own, vincibly ignoring that she is married ¹, commits one sin only of adultery; likewise he who does not fast on the vigil of St. Matthew, vincibly ignoring it to be the vigil ² : and it suffices to say in confession: « I committed adultery, I did not fast on the vigil of St. Matthew, » without his accusing his vincibile ignorance. ¹ If he apprehend at least confusedly that she is married; otherwise, if he think not at all of her state, and nothing from elsewhere ingers this suspicion into him. ² If this transgression of the law of fasting happen from mere inadvertence, although actual ignorance be vincibile, it is indeed material sin, but not formal.

2° But ignorance of things which man is bound to know on account of themselves is a special sin distinct from the sin of which it is the cause, opposed to studiousness. For then ignorance does not take its malice from the effect or consequent sin, but has it according to itself, inasmuch as it is against the precept of knowing these things on account of themselves and not on account of a work here and now to be done or omitted. Hence he who from vincible ignorance of the Incarnation blasphemed against Christ would sin with twofold sin: of ignorance against infused studiousness, and of blasphemy against religion; likewise he who from ignorance that adultery is sin would commit it; also a confessor, judge, physician who vincibly ignores the things of his office or state, by this very fact sins with a special sin of ignorance, and if thence he act badly, or there be proximate danger of acting badly, he commits another distinct sin; for he is not bound to know these precisely by reason of a work here and now to be done or omitted, as in the first answer, where such obligation is transient with the work, but by reason of state, and therefore it is permanent.

You will ask 3° what ignorance is reckoned invincible.

I answer. that ignorance to be invincible which cannot be overcome with moral diligence employed. I say moral, not supreme, but such as prudent and God-fearing men are wont to employ in similar business.