The kinds of title

TITLE is a cause sufficient to confer property in a thing. There are several kinds of title, some derived from the natural law, others due to positive law, and others which have their effect from the will of private persons. They may be reduced to title by occupation, by accession, by prescription, and by contract. On account of its importance and the abundance of material we will treat of contract in a separate Book; the other three titles must be considered here.

Occupation is the taking possession of some material thing with the intention of making it one’s own. It will be a lawful title to ownership of property if the thing occupied had previously no owner, and actual possession is taken of it with the purpose of making it one’s own. If these conditions be fulfilled, it seems useless to investigate further how occupation is capable of conferring property. Whether the fact of occupation sanctioned by the community is sufficient, or whether we say that by occupation a man’s labour is mingled with the thing, and thus the connection of ownership is set up, is really immaterial. It is a title universally acknowledged and is derived from Nature herself.

As is clear from the definition, there cannot be occupation without actual, or at least constructive, taking possession of the thing, whether it be movable or immovable; it is not sufficient merely to see the thing at a distance, nor is it enough to take hold of it with the intention of seeing what it is, without any idea of retaining it for one’s own.

Most things of value, especially the land, have owners already, and so a title to ownership by occupation can only arise with reference to certain classes of property which are not of very great importance. In moral theology this title is at the root of ownership derived from finding lost property, treasure-trove, and the capture of fish and wild animals. Here English law only partially agrees with what seems safe in conscience.

The finding of things of value without an owner confers ownership in the things found if they be taken possession of with the intention of making them one’s own. Whether they ever had an owner or not is immaterial in conscience, provided that they have none at present. English law, indeed, grants property which belonged to someone who died intestate and without heirs to the Crown, under the name of bona vacantia, and when such property is claimed by the Crown, its title of course prevails. If the Crown does not claim the property, the first who should occupy it would seem to be safe in conscience if he kept it. The same doctrine may be applied to wreck found, which positive law requires to be delivered to the receiver of the district, and this officer, if no owner appear within a year, sells the same and pays the proceeds into the Exchequer.

Any money, coin, gold, silver, plate, or bullion, found hidden in the earth or other private place, the owner thereof being unknown, is called treasure-trove. By English law it belongs to the Crown, but if the Crown does not claim it, the finder would be justified in keeping it.

One who finds property that has recently been lost may be bound in charity to take possession of it and try to discover the owner, but there is no obligation to do so in justice. If, however, he take possession of it, he is bound in justice to take reasonable care of it, and to use ordinary diligence to discover the true owner. On the true owner being discovered the finder has a right to be compensated for any expenses he has been put to in consequence of keeping the property, but he must deliver it up to the owner. As English law does not grant prescription in movables, this doctrine will hold even though the owner be discovered after the lapse of years; if the property still remains intact or in its equivalent, it belongs to the original owner and must be restored to him. The finder of lost property acquires thereby a qualified property in it which is valid against all save the true owner, and if the true owner cannot be discovered within a reasonable time, the title of the finder becomes absolute, and he may use it as his own.

Animals are either domestic, tamed, or wild. The property in domestic animals such as dogs, sheep, kine, pigs, always remain with the owner, however much they may stray, as long as they are not so utterly lost that there is no hope of finding the owner. Such animals always belong to their original owner as long as he can assert his ownership over them, in the same way as his household furniture belongs to him. Wild animals which enjoy their natural liberty and go where they please belong as a general rule to him who first captures or kills them. Such a one makes them his own by occupation, for before he took them they belonged to no one. English law has modified this general rule to some extent, for if a trespasser capture or kill a wild animal on another person’s land, it belongs to the owner of the soil on which it has been started and killed; if a trespasser start an animal on one person’s property and kill it on another’s, it belongs to the owner of the former. These rules of positive law give the owner of the property at least the right to vindicate his claim, which cannot then be lawfully resisted by the trespasser.

Animals which have been tamed, such as pigeons, bees, young pheasants that have been hatched under hens, belong to their owner as long as they retain the habit of returning to his premises, but if they lose that habit and recover their natural liberty, they belong to the first who takes them, like wild animals. Animals which are enclosed like deer in a park, rabbits in a warren, or fish in a pond, belong to the owner of the enclosure, as long as he can exert his control over them. If they recover their natural liberty, they are primi occupantis.

A poacher may be guilty of sin by damaging the property of another by trespassing on it, and from the fact that he exposes himself to grave personal risk or to the danger of violently resisting lawful authority if he is caught. By the mere fact of capturing wild animals he does not commit a sin against justice, unless he kills so many in a particular property that the right of killing game therein is seriously lessened in value, and the owner in consequence suffers considerable loss, because, for example, he cannot let it at so high a price.

Accession is the increase of property either by natural production or by the union of one thing with another. When this takes place, legal and moral questions arise as to the owner of the increase. There are two leading maxims which settle such questions, Res fructificat domino and Accessorium sequitur principale, ‘The maxim Res fructificat domino seems to follow necessarily from the nature of property and ownership, for he who has the absolute ownership of something has a right to reap the benefit of all that it is, of all its activities, and of all that it produces. And so if the field is mine, I have a right to the grass, wood, or other commodity which it produces. If the tree is mine, I have a right to the fruit; if the mare is mine, I have a right to the foal; in the latter case the maxim Partus sequitur ventrem is also applied.

Jurists and theologians divide fruits into natural, industrial, mixed, and civil. Natural are such as grass, which grows without human labour and care; industrial are the product of industry, as a book or a new invention; mixed are partly natural, partly industrial, as a crop of wheat or potatoes; civil are such artificial fruits as rent from houses and land, interest from money lent. In all these cases the maxim may be applied, Res fructificat domino. In the case of mixed fruits, if the material belongs to the labourer the whole produce will belong to him; if the material, the field for example, belongs to someone else, then the owner of the field and the labourer whose labour aided in the production of the crop have each their right to a portion of the produce. Whether the crop be divided, or a money equivalent be paid to one or the other, is immaterial, With regard to improvements made on land or in houses, the general rule is that, Quidquid solo inaedificatur, plantatur, seritur, solo cedit. However, first of all by custom, and in modern times by statute, an outgoing tenant has a right to compensation for the improvements he has made on his holding, provided that certain conditions have been fulfilled.

When one thing is added to another, the general rule is that what is accessory becomes the property of the owner of what is principal. And so the owner of land has the property in gradual increments made to it by alluvion; an island formed in a river belongs to the owner of the bed. If a river suddenly changes its course, or the sea suddenly retires, the rule does not hold; the ownership remaining as before. If wood belonging to another has been used in a building, the property is transferred to the owner of the building, with the obligation of making compensation for the wood. Similarly a painting on another’s canvas belongs to the painter, but he must pay for the canvas. When a new form has been introduced into the material, as by baking bread, making wine or oil, the product belongs to the workman, but compensation must be made for the material. The ownership is then said to be acquired by specification, When liquids or solids belonging to different owners have been mixed, they should be separated if possible, and each owner will retain his separate property. If this is impossible, the former owners still retain their right to a proportionate part of the whole or to its value.

As the term is used here in moral theology, prescription is a title by which the ownership of property is gained or lost through adverse possession during the time and in the manner laid down by law.

In English law the term prescription is only used with reference to incorporeal hereditaments—i.e., rights and profits annexed to or issuing out of land. Of these the chief are advowsons, tithes, commons, ways, offices, dignities, franchises, pensions, watercourses, lights, annuities, and rents. Land and movables cannot be claimed by prescription. However, the Statute of Limitation, 3 & 4 William IV, c. 27, and the Real Property Limitation Act, 1874, have the same practical effect as Prescription Acts, with regard to real property, and it will be convenient to consider them here as such.

The mere possession of property belonging to another even for a lifetime would not of itself transfer the ownership to the possessor. But as it is so much easier to prove possession than ownership, and because those who have been in peaceful possession of property for a long time should not be liable to be unwarrantably disturbed, and, moreover, in order that owners of property may look after their rights, the legislature has authority to confer a right to property, in consideration of long and peaceable possession. This is what both ecclesiastical and civil laws of prescription do, and these laws avail not only in the external forum, but also in the forum of conscience.

In order that ownership of property may be transferred by prescription, certain conditions are requisite either from the nature of the case or by positive law. Theologians usually reckon five such conditions—viz.: (a) the property must be such as the law allows to be prescribed; (b) there must be good faith in him who prescribes; (c) consequently there must be some sort of title; (d) there must be possession (e) for the time required by law.

(a) As prescription depends for its validity on positive law, there can be no prescription which the law does not recognize. English law does not recognize any title to movables by prescription, as we have already seen. Ecclesiastical law acknowledges a right of prescription to both movables and immovables. Inasmuch as laymen cannot hold benefices, they cannot gain a title to them by prescription, though clerics may do so. .(b) Good faith is the second condition required for prescription, English law does not expressly require good faith, but it is certainly required in conscience. He who prescribes must not know that the property which is in his possession belongs to someone else; if he knows this, he can never become its owner by prescription. This was defined by the Fourth Council of Lateran, c. 41, and the reason is plain.¹ For as soon as anyone is conscious that he has something which belongs to another, he is bound to restore it to the owner, and the longer he keeps it against the owner’s will the more grievous sin of theft does he commit. Positive law could not by prescription transfer another’s property to one who was in bad faith, for such a law would not be for the common good, but would foster crime. The user, then, by which property is acquired by prescription must be without the consciousness of wrongdoing; in one who frees his property from a servitude by prescription, there will be good faith if he put no obstacle in the way of the other’s enjoying his right; he is not required to warn him that prescription is running against him. If during the time required for prescription a doubt about the right to the property occurs to the possessor, he must make all needful inquiries, and satisfy his conscience that at least no one else has a certain title to the property in question.

The time during which a predecessor in title held possession of the property may be reckoned together with the period during which the present possessor has held it in order to complete the time required for prescription, if possession was always held in good faith. Even if a predecessor in title was in bad faith, this will not prevent a successor from gaining a title by prescription, provided that the latter possesses the property in good faith for the full time required by law.

(c) Inasmuch as good faith is required, as we have seen, and this cannot exist without some colourable, supposed, or at least presumed title, the third condition requisite for prescription is some sort of title. The quality of the title affects the period of time required for prescription by ecclesiastical law,as we shall see; no special title is expressly required by English law.

(d) No prescription can be had without uninterrupted, open, and peaceable possession. The prescription must be nec vi, nec clam, nec precario. It is precisely the possession for the period required that furnishes the ground for the transference. of ownership by prescription. When the term is up the property is vested in the possessor, who acquires also a right to all the fruits, if any, which he has meantime reaped from the property; for what is accessory follows the principal.

(e) Different systems of law require different periods of time for prescription, and the time varies with different kinds of property.

A great change in the ecclesiastical law of prescription was made by the new Code, as is clear from Canon 1508, which is as follows: ‘‘’ The Church accepts for ecclesiastical property prescription as a mode of acquisition and of freeing one’s self from burdens as it exists in the civil legislation of each nation respectively, with the exceptions laid down in the following canons.” Canon 1509 exempts certain classes of property from prescription, Canon 1510 lays down that sacred things in the possession of private persons can be prescribed by private persons, but that sacred things which are not in the ownership of private persons can only be prescribed by a moral ecclesiastical person against another moral ecclesiastical person. In general one hundred years are required to prescribe against the Apostolic See, and thirty years are required to prescribe against other ecclesiastical moral persons, according to Canon 1511.

The term required by English law for the acquisition of rights by prescription varies according to circumstances. At common law, time immemorial was required to establish a prescriptive right, but the Prescription Act, 1832, provided that with respect to rights of common, and all other profits or benefits to be taken and enjoyed from or upon any land, where there shall have been an enjoyment of them by any person claiming right thereto without interruption for thirty years next before the commencement of any action upon the subject the prescriptive claim shall no longer be defeated by showing only that the enjoyment commenced at a period subsequent to the era of legal memory. It is also provided that the time during which the adverse party shall have been an infant, idiot, non compos mentis, or tenant for life, or during which any action as to the claim shall have been pending and diligently prosecuted, shall be excluded in the computation of the period of thirty years. But where there has been an enjoyment for sixty years the claim is to be absolute and indefeasible.

Rights of way and other easements, or any watercourse, or the use of any water, to be enjoyed upon, over, or from any land or water, and also as to the access or use of light to and for any dwelling-house, workshop, or other building, are prescribed after twenty or at least forty years, instead of thirty and sixty respectively. An uninterrupted enjoyment of lights for twenty years constitutes an absolute and indefeasible right to them.

¹ Can. 1512.

Prescriptive rights may be extinguished by abandonment, express or implied; and after a period of twenty years’ nonuse, or sometimes even after a shorter period, abandonment will regularly be presumed. They are also extinguished by operation of law when the dominant and servient tenements come into the possession of the same owner in fee.

As we have seen, the right to-real property is by the Real Property Limitation Act, 1874, extinguished after twelve years’ adverse possession. The Limitation Acts which affect the ownership of real property differ from other Limitation Acts which concern personal property or a right of action in that the latter only bar the remedy after the lapse of the time fixed by law; they do not take away the right; the former, on the contrary, extinguish the right.

The conditions for prescription in the United States are in general the same as in England, except that as a rule a period of twenty years is necessary and sufficient to acquire both land and incorporeal hereditaments, and also to extinguish those rights. In some States squatters who have cultivated plots of land in good faith may become owners of them by prescription in a shorter space of time than twenty years.

The subject of prescription is a thorny one in English law, and it would be imprudent for a confessor not otherwise specially skilled to venture to determine questions of right by prescription. What has been said will, it is hoped, enable him to judge how far conscience may follow the law, and when a penitent should be recommended to consult a lawyer.

For acquisitive prescription there are required: a prescriptible thing, possession prescribed by law, a just title, good faith, and the time established by law (St. Alphonsus, III, 504).

I. A prescriptible thing. All things are prescriptible which can be the object of private ownership, unless they are excluded by positive law, ecclesiastical or civil.

1. Which can be the object of private ownership: hence those things cannot be prescribed which pertain to public ownership, that is, which are destined for the use of the community, such as roads and a river;¹ the contrary must be said concerning those things which pertain to the private ownership of the State, province, or municipality.

2. Unless they are excluded by positive law. Which things are excluded by civil law, you will find in the respective civil Code; which by ecclesiastical law, is set forth in n. 811.

II. Possession held with the intention of ownership, continuous, and endowed with other conditions perhaps established by law. It is said:

1. Possession: that is, physical or moral detention of a thing.

2. Held with the intention of ownership, that is, held in one's own name. Those who possess a thing in another's name cannot acquire it by prescription; here belong, for example, the tenant, the depositary, the usufructuary, and others who possess a thing by a precarious title, as it is called.

3. Continuous, that is, not interrupted, for example by a lawsuit which is moved concerning the thing.

4. And with other conditions, etc.; these conditions should be drawn from the law.

III. A just title. It is said:

1. Title. Title in general is the reason on which possession is founded. Title taken universally is distinguished into title translative and non-translative of ownership. Title translative of ownership is again divided into true, colorate, putative, and legally presumed. True is that which both exists and is valid; colorate, that which exists and is invalid, either because the one transferring the thing lacks ownership of it, or because the translative act is null on account of a defect in form; putative, that which is thought to exist but does not exist; legally presumed, that which is presumed by law to exist, whether in fact it exists or does not exist. A true title, as is clear, is never required, because of itself it transfers ownership. A title non-translative of ownership is called defective, and never suffices.

2. Just, that is, a title which is recognized by law, and indeed deservedly.

IV. Good faith. 1. Good faith can be taken both theologically and juridically. What theological good faith is was explained in n. 776. Juridical good faith is that which is required by civil law, whether it coincides with theological good faith or does not coincide with it.

2. Theological good faith is always required in the forum of conscience, and it must be had throughout the whole time established for prescription. "It is necessary," so says Lateran Council IV, "that he who prescribes should in no part of the time have consciousness of another's thing."² For the rest, this is clear from the fact that as soon as good faith ceases before the time is ended, an obligation of restoring arises. Nevertheless, from the same Council (l.c.), venially bad faith does not prevent it (St. Alphonsus, III, 511).

Corollary I. One who possesses one part in bad faith and another in good faith can prescribe this other part.

Corollary II. One who possesses first in good faith, afterward in bad faith, and then again in good faith, must prescribe by this last possession.

Corollary III. One who in good faith succeeds a predecessor in bad faith can acquire or not acquire a thing by prescription according as the civil law is not opposed or is opposed.

Corollary IV. One who, after possession begun in good faith, begins to doubt whether the thing is his, and, after inquiry into the truth, continues to doubt, can without fault and therefore in good faith continue possession and, when the time is completed, prescribe. But one who before possession begun doubts whether the thing is his or belongs to a determinate other person, is bound to divide it, and therefore cannot begin prescription of the whole, though he can begin prescription of the part (St. Alphonsus, III, 504, 625). Make an exception, with sufficient probability, if with doubt he succeeds a predecessor in good faith, since the predecessor seems to transfer his whole right to the successor (St. Alphonsus, I, 37 at the end). But if someone doubts concerning the good faith of the predecessor, let him presume good faith, unless indications of bad faith are such that they ought to create the contrary presumption.

Corollary V. If someone is subject to guardianship, and therefore is civilly incapable, the good faith of the guardian seems to be required, and also to suffice. It seems to be required because the guardian, before the law which establishes prescription, acts the person of the one subject to guardianship. It suffices rather probably because the law, which indeed regards only the guardian, seems honest. Likewise and for the same reasons, if it is a question of a moral person, the good faith of those who can act the affairs of the moral person even before the law seems to be required and to suffice.

Nevertheless, in the former case the minor, and in the latter the voters, who judge the thing to belong to another, are bound, insofar as can be done, to remove the good faith of those who represent their persons.

Corollary VI. A thief who, having forgotten the theft, has possessed another's thing in good faith through the required time, cannot prescribe it, since a law which deprives someone of ownership of a thing in favor of him who took the said thing by theft seems dishonest (cf. St. Alphonsus, III, 515).

V. Established time. How much time is required for different things, draw from the respective law. Note, however:

1. A possessor can add to the time through which he himself possessed the thing the time through which a predecessor or predecessors possessed it in a manner useful for prescribing.

2. If prescription is suspended, the time which preceded the suspension is computed with the time following the suspension; but if it is interrupted, prescription must be begun anew. But when prescription is suspended, and when it is interrupted, the law establishes. Note this one thing: by force of natural law prescription is interrupted by bad faith.

¹ In these the State has rather ownership of jurisdiction than of property.

² Cap. 41.

III. Titles of restitution, that is, the reasons or roots from which the obligation of restitution arises, are: 1° another's thing materially unjustly possessed; 2° another's thing formally unjustly accepted; 3° mere damaging, which takes place when someone merely injures the good of another, or unjustly impedes him from acquiring a good. A contract, whether not observed or violated, is referred according to the circumstances to one of the assigned titles (St. Alphonsus, III, 548).

X. Canonical title, if it is a question of major Orders. A title of support is understood, that is, a guarantee by which provision is made for the suitable and of itself perpetual support of the ordinand. It is required, however, if it is a question of receiving major Orders (canon 974, § 1, 7°),¹ lest perhaps the ordained man be forced to provide for himself by begging or in some other way which cannot be reconciled with the dignity or offices of the state. "One ordained in sacred Orders, if he loses the title, is to provide another for himself, unless, in the judgment of the Bishop, provision has otherwise been made for his suitable support" (canon 980, § 1). "But those who, apart from an apostolic indult, knowingly ordain their own subject in sacred Orders without a canonical title or permit him to be ordained, must themselves and their successors provide the necessary sustenance to the same needy person, until provision has otherwise been made for his suitable support" (canon 980, § 2). Finally, if a Bishop has ordained someone without a canonical title with an agreement that the ordained man not ask sustenance from him, this agreement lacks all force (canon 980, § 3). With respect to the required title, observe:

1. For secular clerics the canonical title is the title of benefice, and, failing that, of patrimony or pension. This title must be both truly secure for the whole life of the ordained man and truly sufficient for his suitable support, according to the norms to be given by Ordinaries for the different necessities and circumstances of places and times (canon 979). If not even one of the titles just assigned is available, it can be supplied by the title of service of the diocese, and, in places subject to the Sacred Congregation of Propaganda Fide, by the title of mission (canon 981, § 1). Now:

a) The title of benefice is that which is founded in a benefice; but a benefice actually obtained and peacefully possessed is required. But resignation of the benefice by whose title the cleric was ordained is null unless express mention is made that the cleric had been promoted by that title and had substituted for it another legitimate title of ordination, by grant of the Ordinary (canon 1485).

b) The title of patrimony is that which is founded in patrimony. By the name of patrimony here are understood goods possessed by the ordinand and sufficiently free from mortgage or other burden. "It is indifferent whether the patrimony is constituted in stable and certain fruitful goods, or in things which are equated with immovables. Thus a lay chaplaincy can be a title of patrimony, provided those who enjoy the right of naming have pledged their good faith, with the authority of the Bishop interposed, that they will not revoke the chaplain until provision has been made for him by a suitable benefice or patrimony."²

c) The title of pension is that which is founded in a pension. By the name of pension is understood a stipend of support assigned to the ordinand and to be supplied to him annually, whether from ecclesiastical benefices or from other goods. Hence also a personal pension.³

Note. As formerly, so also now the insufficiency of one title can be supplied by another title.⁴

d) The title of service of the diocese and of mission carries with it that the ordinand, by interposing an oath, devotes himself perpetually to the service of the diocese or mission, under the authority of the local Ordinary for the time being. The Ordinary must confer on the priest whom he has promoted by the title of service of the church or mission a benefice, office, or subsidy sufficient for his suitable support (canon 981).

2. For religious, the title is established as follows:

a) For Regulars the canonical title is solemn religious profession, or the title, as it is called, of poverty (canon 982, § 1); note that solemn profession alone is a title for Regulars.

b) For religious of perpetual simple vows, whether emitted in an Order or in a religious Congregation, the title is that of the common table, of the Congregation, or another similar title, according to the norm of the constitutions (canon 982, § 2); that is, as the legitimate constitutions have established or will establish in the future.

c) Other religious, that is, religious of temporary vows, whether emitted in an Order or in a religious Congregation, and likewise novices, as regards the title of ordination, are governed by the law of seculars (canon 982, § 3). The title of the common table does not belong to these religious, because they are not yet devoted to religious life, and therefore lack the right of receiving perpetual support from the goods of the religious institute.

¹ Council of Trent, session 21, cap. 2, De reformatione.

² Gasparri, n. 606.

³ Aertnys-Damen, II, 590; cf. St. Alphonsus, VI, 817.

⁴ Cf. Benedict XIV, Quaestiones canonicae, 46.

What is the title required for prescription? The title required of possession in general is the cause from which we hold or possess a thing. One title is translative of ownership, which per se is ordered to transferring ownership, such as sale; another is non-translative, which per se is not ordered to transferring ownership, such as lease. The latter is defective, for of itself it is insufficient for prescription. Indeed, it perpetually obstructs prescription, for it always shows another owner. And thus it is better to have no title than to have a defective title. But the former, if not true and existing in reality, at least apparent, thought to exist, or presumed, is necessarily required for prescription. For, with every title lacking, one cannot prudently judge the thing to be his; and therefore without every title, he cannot be a possessor in good faith. C. I. 701, 2115 ff.; C. G. 550, 2228 ff.; C. A. 1461; C. H. 433, 1434, 1940, 1952, 1953, 1954, 1955, 1959.

Now concerning this title it must briefly be said that it is not absolutely required to be true, but generally a title thought to exist, apparent, or presumed suffices. "For if there had been a true purchase, or donation, etc., prescription would not be required; therefore an apparent title is required, such as purchase, for example, from him who was thought by the buyer to be the owner, although he was not the owner. But the reason is that without title there could not have been good faith at the beginning of possession. Yet because the title could have been present at the very beginning, and afterward be lost through forgetfulness, it was therefore established that a presumed title suffices. But to presume title, possession for that ordinary time required for prescription does not suffice; rather possession for 30 or 40 or more years is required, which is customarily called possession of the longest time: and this indeed when the law does not resist, nor from elsewhere is there presumption of bad faith in the possessor. But if the law resists, or there were a presumption of bad faith in the possessor, possession for immemorial time would be required, as is clear from C. I. de Praescr. in the Sixth.

But if there were not only presumption, but it were established concerning the bad faith of the possessor, or concerning ignorance of a law not doubtful, which ignorance, even if it were invincible, is equivalent to bad faith in this matter; then even possession for immemorial time would not suffice; because a possessor in bad faith prescribes at no time. But the law is said to resist possession not because it is made in some way to the contrary, but because it positively prohibits such possession." Lugo d. 7. n. 15; L. 505. Cf. here n. 855.

There is required 14. as regards receiving sacred orders, a title of honest support, Trent, sess. 21, C. 2; otherwise the Bishop ordaining or granting dimissorials is himself bound to support the one ordained in sacred orders until that man has a title. C. Cum secundum, de Praeb.; C. Recepimus, de Aetate et qualit. ordin. The ordinary, ecclesiastical title of support can be either poverty or a benefice sufficient for support, according to the synodal assessment of his diocese. By the title of poverty only solemnly professed Regulars are ordained, but not novices. St. Pius V, Const. Romanus Pontifex. For when the solemn vow of poverty has been emitted, there is a certain hope of support from the goods of the community. Leo XIII, Bull Conditae, § VI. The Passionists are excepted. The religious of the Society of Jesus are excepted, who can be ordained after simple vows; and if afterward they are dismissed from religion, the Society is by no means bound to support them. As regards the title of benefice, it is required that the benefice already be possessed peacefully. In the name of a benefice someone can also be ordained under the title of perpetual coadjutorship, or of daily distributions, or of chaplaincy, or of pension, or of perpetual prestimony; but Mass stipends by no means suffice for a title, since they are uncertain. "But he cannot resign that benefice unless mention is made that he was promoted under the title of that benefice; nor is that resignation to be admitted unless it is established that he can live suitably from elsewhere." Trent, sess. 21, C. 3, de Ref.

Besides the ecclesiastical title of benefice and of poverty, there is also the patrimonial title, which is extraordinary, namely, of patrimony or pension. As regards the title of patrimony, not all can be ordained under this title, but only those whom the Bishop judges are to be assumed for the necessity or convenience of his churches. Trent, sess. 21, C. 2, de Ref. Cf. 904. The patrimony must be constituted in legal form, upon a certain and immovable thing, and of its nature fruitful, or quasi-immovable, as in public bonds, S. C. C., June 29, 1704, peacefully possessed, and not burdened by debt or mortgage. By pension, however, a perpetual revenue suffices, even one redeemable, provided that, if it is redeemed, it is applied to the purchase of another revenue or of lands. It also suffices if someone, from his revenues, donates by instrument so many annual gold coins as are sufficient for support.

It suffices that some Count or Community obligate its goods for supporting the cleric. The title of one's own industry does not suffice. Patrimony cannot be renounced without the Bishop's permission, even after the attainment of a benefice sufficient for support. The Bishop's permission, however, suffices if someone either obtains a sufficient ecclesiastical benefice, or from elsewhere has that from which he can live. Trent, loc. cit.; L. 813-824; Benedict XIV, Notif. 26.

There are other extraordinary titles, for which a particular Indult of the Apostolic See is needed. As regards Regulars, there is the title of the common table, namely, for those Regulars who either pronounce no vows, or only simple vows. For secular clerics there is also the title of service of the church, and the title of mission. Collect. S. C. de P. F., n. 1179 ff.; E. M., Suppl. alter., p. 4 ff. They cannot depart from the church and from the mission, and they are supported by the alms of the faithful.

The alumni of the American College of Louvain, clerics of the United States of North America, who by force of the Pontifical Indult of Jan. 2, 1909, are promoted to sacred orders under the title of service of the church, are bound to issue a written promise that they will serve their own diocese faithfully. S. C. Cons., July 29, 1909.

A title can indeed be lost, but then another must absolutely be substituted for the lost title. And Regulars of solemn or simple vows constituted in sacred orders, expelled or dismissed, remain perpetually suspended, "until provision is made for them in another way by the Holy See; and, moreover, they have found a benevolent Bishop to receive them, and have provided for themselves an ecclesiastical patrimony." But those who have voluntarily obtained dismissal, or have been dispensed from simple vows, or are free from them because the time of temporary vows has elapsed, "are not to leave the cloister until they have found a benevolent Bishop to receive them, and have provided for themselves an ecclesiastical patrimony; otherwise they remain suspended from the exercise of the orders received." Decree Auctis admodum, S. C. EE. et RR., Nov. 4, 1892. E. M.

To dispense from the title of sacred ordination belongs to the S. C. C. S. C. Cons., Feb. 27, 1909.

What and how great is the obligation of betrothals? Betrothals oblige one to enter marriage under mortal sin. For they are an onerous contract in a grave matter. If a term has not been fixed, it will suffice if the one promising fulfills them according to the custom of the region, or when he is required by the promisee. Here it is to be noted that "if the other party, from forgetfulness, fear, shame, or a similar cause, should not ask, as especially happens in women, then the bridegroom is bound of himself, without petition, to contract marriage when he conveniently can... But if the other party, when she can conveniently ask, is silent, then she seems to assent to the delay." L. 845. Therefore one withdrawing can be compelled to marriage, even by a judge through censures; this, however, is rarely expedient because of the danger of an unhappy outcome. C. Requisivit 17, de Sponsal.; L. 846; St. Thomas, Suppl., q. 43, a. 1, ad 2.

Nothing concerning betrothals is had in C. G. But C. I. 53, 54; C. H. 43, 44; C. A. 45, 46; C. B. 1297 deny to betrothals a legal obligation of contracting marriage. Nevertheless, if the promise is duly established, the one withdrawing without just cause is bound to compensate the other for damage, from C. A. and from C. B. 1298; from C. I. and C. H., for expenses which he made on account of the promised marriage. But from C. I. and C. H., compensation must be sought within a year from the day on which the promise was to be fulfilled. By Roman law, one who is bound by betrothals is permitted to renounce the condition or pact, and afterward contract with another. L. Alii 1, C. h.t. But if, without previous renunciation, either the bridegroom or the bride marries another, he is marked with infamy. L. Quid ergo § 3, de His qui notantur infamia. By canon law, there is an obligation not only from fidelity, but also from justice, of contracting marriage, and there is an impediment, impeding marriage with another, and dirimently impeding marriage with blood relatives in the first degree. E. M.

The fact by which dominion is justly acquired is called a mode of acquiring, and indeed original if the thing which is acquired by that fact was no one's at the time of acquisition; but derivative if at that time it was in the dominion of another. - Five modes of acquiring dominion can be enumerated: occupation; prescription; accession; contract; succession, whether legal or testamentary. Concerning the two latter we shall treat in the Treatise on Contracts.

201. State of the question. - In the present question, as is clear, the matter treated is dominion over goods distinct from man himself, which are either the effects of his faculties and operations, or the external goods of fortune. But the mode of acquiring dominion is diverse according to the title. A title is a cause apt of itself to confer dominion: it consists in some fact furnished with the authority of law, by which a thing is acquired; for from law it has that it is a title of dominion, since every right arises from some law.

Some modes are primitive or original (porspronkelijke), by which, at the origin of the human race, the first dominions were acquired and according to which the first division of things was made, when as yet nothing was possessed: these are production (or labor), as to the fruits of human intellectual and bodily operations, and occupation, which includes some labor, as to external goods;¹ all other modes are derived (afgeleide) from these, which they suppose, whether they be legal, because they arise either from natural law and from the nature of things, as invention and often accession, or from positive law, as prescription; or whether they be conventional, from the free convention of men, as succession and contract.

¹ Thus also Pius XI, in the encyclical Quadragesimo anno, May 15, 1931, II, 1 at the end.

But in our times, because there is no longer question of the first acquisition of things, primitive or original modes are called those by which right and dominion are acquired simply, namely, a thing of no one which never had an owner or at least actually does not have one or has ceased to have one: these are principally occupation and labor, to which are connected, from the nature of the thing, invention and accession, and from civil law, prescription. But derivative modes are called those by which dominion is transferred, namely, a thing which is under some dominion and the right to it is transmitted to another, and the dominion of some thing is derived from one to another: these are succession and contract.

Concerning the mode of acquiring dominion in the effects and fruits of intellectual and bodily labor nothing special occurs to be said; hence we must treat only of the modes of acquiring dominion in external things. But the derivative modes are considered in the third section of the third part of the treatise, where contracts are treated; hence we shall speak only of the primitive modes, namely: 1) of occupation (toeeigening); 2) of invention (pntdekking); 3) of accession (aanwas of natrekking); 4) of prescription (veraring). But labor is reduced to one of the preceding: when it is occupied about one's own thing, to the right of accession; if about another's thing, it is referred to contract; if about a thing of no one, it presupposes occupation and is included in it.

202. Diverse things to be acquired are distinguished:

1. vacant things² (onbeheerde goederen), which have never had an owner, whether they are animate, as wild animals in the woods, or inanimate, as a jewel at the bottom of the sea;

² Thus Noldin, Van Roey, Prummer, etc. Entirely conformably to French law, art. 539 C.C., which distinguishes between vacant goods and things of no one - and abandoned successions or goods of the deceased without an heir. On the contrary, others call only these latter goods vacant.

2. abandoned things (verlaten goederen), which have had an owner, but actually do not have one, because the owner in some way has abdicated actual detention of the thing from himself, as treasures formerly hidden, fruits which are left after the harvest has been completed, goods of a deceased man who did not institute an heir or which the heirs have renounced;

3. lost or mislaid things (verloren goederen), which even actually have an owner, but one unknown or uncertain, because, against the will of the owner, they have fallen out of his possession, as a gold ring found in the street.

182. The chief modes of acquiring property are the following:

1. First occupancy: that is, taking possession of any material object that is really without an owner. (No. 174.) Domestic animals, even when they have strayed far from their owner, remain his property; but wild animals, though captured and tamed, if once they have regained their native liberty, are considered as belonging to no one till captured again, when they become the property of their new captor.

2. The finding of lost articles. These have an owner to whom they must be returned, if he can be discovered with reasonable effort. If, however, the owner cannot be discovered, the articles become the property of the finder. When hidden treasures of great value are found in civilized lands, their ownership or apportionment is settled according to existing laws that have been enacted for such cases. The goods of those who die intestate, and without natural heirs, are to be disposed of as the laws direct.

3. Accession is a title to new property that is added to my former possessions, either naturally, e. g., by birth, as with the young of cattle, or by alluvion, as by deposits of soil on a river bank; or accidentally, or even designedly, as when another plants or builds on my grounds, or in other ways improves my property. In these instances, disputed claims may arise which the civil law is to decide.

4. Prescription is a title to ownership of property based on the fact that it has been held in quiet and bona fide possession for the space of time appointed by the law. This supposes: 1. That the property is such as can be lawfully acquired by a private person. 2. That the person in possession has honestly considered it all along as his property. 3. That he has remained in undisputed and uninterrupted possession during the required time.

The common good demands that claims to property reaching back beyond a reasonable period should be disregarded, in order that ownership may be settled on a solid basis.