I. On Betrothals and on the Banns

What are betrothals? Betrothals are a voluntary, deliberate, and mutual promise, expressed by a sensible sign, of future marriage between persons capable by law. A promise: true, not feigned; not a purpose, for this induces no obligation. Voluntary and deliberate, namely, with will and deliberation sufficient for grave sin, since betrothals bind under grave obligation. Mutual, for betrothals are an onerous contract, involving the condition: if you shall promise in return. Nevertheless, if the one promising should voluntarily wish to bind himself independently of the promise of the other, and this is certain, betrothals would not be had, nor consequently the impediment of public honesty, but a mere gratuitous promise binding only one party, by force of mere fidelity. It is said, and this is certain, because regularly spouses never intend to bind themselves gratuitously without the condition that the other also bind himself. But acceptance of a promise does not of itself include a promise in return; because anyone can accept the obligation of another without binding himself. Expressed by a sensible sign, for in any contract internal consent does not suffice, but consent externally expressed either by words or signs is required. Hence silence does not suffice for betrothals.

Nevertheless, per se, betrothals would be valid if parents contracted them in the presence of a son who is silent, provided the son internally and positively consents. For since parents, on account of their great love toward their children, are presumed to consult well for them, children are rightly judged to consent to their promise, and thus to express their own consent through the promise of the parents. But if the son internally dissents, "he is certainly not bound to those betrothals contracted by the parents. And I think exactly the same must be said if the son had himself negatively, neither dissenting nor consenting." L. 838. And the same must be said if parents contract betrothals for absent children, and those children, having been informed of the betrothals by the parents, do not contradict, namely, if they truly ratify the betrothals tacitly. Parents, not others; betrothals, not also marriage. Since in this matter the law is special, it is not to be extended. C. Si infantes, un., de Desp. imp. in 6; R. I. 28 in 6. But these things no longer have force after the Decree Ne temere, concerning which we must speak here at the end. Schmalz., 61 ff.; St. Thomas, IV, D. 27, q. 2, a. 2, ad 1; Suppl., q. 43, a. 2, ad 1; L. 831, 836-839.

Between capable persons, that is, those who are prohibited from marriage by no impediment. Therefore betrothals will be null if some impediment obstructs marriage. For when a diriment impediment stands, the thing promised either does not subsist, or is not in one's own power, and therefore there can be no promise of it. But when an impedient impediment stands, the thing promised is illicit, and there can be no promise of an evil thing. Except, unless the promise is not absolute but conditioned, namely, if dispensation is obtained, or is referred to a future time when the impediment ceases, as in betrothals of the prepubescent, or betrothals against the will of parents, where their dissent ceases. Moreover, no solemnity of law was commonly required for their validity, and neither the civil power nor local Ordinaries can attach it. S. C. C., July 8, 1865; March 23, 1878. Commonly. For in order that betrothals be valid in Spain and in Latin America, they had to be contracted by public writing. S. C. C., Jan. 31, 1880; S. C. Neg. Eccl. Extr., Jan. 1, 1900. Of future marriage; therefore, where the Decree of Trent was in force concerning marriage to be contracted before the pastor and witnesses, a contract in the present was neither marriage, because the Tridentine form was lacking, nor did it constitute betrothals, because a promise of future marriage was then not had, per se, nor virtually. As marriage contracted by proxy and by letters is valid, so also, per se, betrothals are valid. L. In sponsalibus 18, ff. de Sponsal.; St. Thomas, Suppl., q. 43, a. 1, 2, q. 55, a. 4; Schmalz., l. 4, tit. 1, n. 73-77, 247; E. M. Cf. 923.

But from the Decree Ne temere of the S. C. C., they must be made by public writing, in order that they be valid, signed by the parties and either by the Ordinary of the place, or by the pastor, or by two witnesses. But if both parties or either party does not know how to write, this is to be noted in the writing itself; and another witness is to be added, who, together with the Pastor or local Ordinary, or with the two said witnesses, signs the writing. For validly entering into betrothals, the parties are bound to sign the writing in one context with the pastor or Ordinary, or with the two witnesses; and it does not suffice that the writing, signed by one party with the pastor or with two witnesses, be sent to the other party, who in turn signs with the pastor or with two witnesses; and the date is also to be added, that is, the notation of the day, month, and year.

Here and in marriage, the pastor is the one who legitimately presides over the parish, or to whom in some defined territory the care of souls is primarily committed, or to whom in mission territory the care of souls is universally committed. The special law of Spain extended to Latin America remains abrogated, by force of which a public writing signed by a notary was required for the validity of betrothals. Indeed betrothals are invalid, if the aforesaid form is not observed, both for the external forum and for the internal forum, even if they are confirmed by oath, since the aforesaid form was prescribed for the common good. L. 1, 3, n. 177. But a simple promise of marriage without a promise in return remains valid. For the Decree Ne temere regards only betrothals. Betrothals cannot be contracted except before the local Ordinary or pastor, and not also before one delegated by either. They can, however, be celebrated before any local Ordinary or pastor whatever, provided this is within the limits of his territory, that is, in the proper territory, S. C. C., March 28, 1908, of the same Ordinary or pastor. All Catholics are bound by these decrees, whether they contract among themselves or with non-Catholics. Non-Catholics contracting among themselves are not bound by the aforesaid decrees. Therefore Catholics contracting otherwise contract invalidly, unless something else has been established by the Holy See for some place; but non-Catholics contract validly.

Is one who feignedly promised betrothals to another truly promising in return bound to contract marriage? Resp. In the negative. For 1. since the promise was feigned, he cannot be bound by force of the promise, even if it was confirmed by oath. St. Thomas, III, D. 39, q. 1, a. 3, q. 3. 2. "Granted that the one feignedly promising sinned against justice by deceiving the other party, nevertheless he was not bound from justice to put forth true consent, since there was no obligation upon him to enter into the contract, and, on the other hand, the other acquired no right over him from his own consent; therefore afterward he is indeed bound by reason of the deception to repair damages, but he is not bound by reason of the promise to put forth true consent and to contract marriage.

But it must be said otherwise if defloration intervened, because then the one deflowering is altogether bound to marriage, since he cannot then by another way repair the damage sufficiently equivalently." L. 833, 847, l. 3, n. 642. Hence, if a man induces a woman to sin under this condition, that he is going to take her in marriage if she agrees to his desires, then, after the crime has been committed, if not by force of contract, at least by force of unjust damage, according to the very common opinion, he is bound to take her if he can; otherwise it will suffice if he provides for her marriage.

The reason is, "because otherwise, if the deflowerer does not marry the deceived virgin, he will never render her an equivalent, nor repair the damage to be equaled." L. 1, 3, n. 642. And this holds even if the man vowed religion, orders, or chastity, and afterward knew the woman under a true or feigned promise of marriage. For the vow does not oblige, since a wholly notable change has been made, and a very grave obligation of justice has supervened. L. 1, 6, n. 833, 874. Nevertheless the Holy Doctor and others commonly except: 1. If from the marriage a very bad outcome is feared, such as discords, quarrels, scandals, etc. 2. If the man knew the woman, thinking her to be a virgin, but found her corrupted; or if she afterward had relations with another; for if this suffices in marriage so that separation is made, much more does it suffice when marriage has not been contracted. Sporer, 538 ff. 3. If there will be disgrace to the family. L. 849, 851. 4. If the man notably surpasses the condition of the woman, on account of the same reason of family disgrace. L. 1, 3, n. 642-650, l. 6, n. 851; St. Thomas, Suppl., q. 46, a. 2, ad 4; C. B. 1300. Cf. 928.

Are betrothals contracted through deceit giving cause to the contract void, even if the deceit is about a quality, for example riches, qualities of body or soul? This is disputed. The first opinion, sufficiently probable, affirms. For this is proper to betrothals, because marriages must be entered into voluntarily by mutual benevolence. The second opinion, more probable, denies. For this is common to any contract, that it is not void except by defect of consent or of object. "But then the deceived party has an action for voiding the contract on account of injury and defect of consent, and this holds even if the deception came from some third party, with the party ignorant." L. 835. "Lessius, etc., probably say that if the matter is intact, as happens in simple betrothals, and the error is invincible in conscience, the deceived party is not bound to stand by the contract, not even after the sentence of a judge." L., H. A., tr. 18, n. 2.

Are betrothals entered into through fear invalid by the law itself? If the fear is grave, this is disputed. The first opinion affirms, if the fear is extrinsic and unjust; for they would be valid if the fear were intrinsic, for example if someone promised, fearing lest he be compelled to pay a debt; or just, for then the contracting party would be unwilling irrationally. The reason is that fear dirimently impedes marriage, and betrothals are the way to marriage. The second opinion denies; nevertheless it adds that they can be rescinded by the one who suffered the fear; but if an oath was present, it must be observed until it is relaxed. The reason is that they are not invalid by positive law, which has nothing concerning betrothals; nor invalid by natural law, for fear of itself does not remove consent. "Each opinion is probable, but the first seems to me more probable..., because no one can be obliged to execute an act null in itself, and against which the law resists, such as marriage contracted while such fear endures would be... From these things it is inferred that from betrothals of this sort the impediment of public honesty by no means arises." L. 844.

If the fear is light and gave cause to the contract, the first opinion affirms, which Ballerini calls much more probable; but the second, more common and more probable to St. Alphonsus, denies. The reason is that the other is not judged to have inflicted a true injury, since light fear can easily be repelled. But whether in such a case the one who suffered the fear can rescind the betrothals in conscience, the first opinion, sufficiently probable, denies, on account of the reason just brought forward; but the second opinion, more common and more probable, affirms. "The reason is that since fear gave cause to the contract, so that otherwise it would not have been entered into, the one instilling fear is bound to rescind the contract; hence, just as he is bound to relax the pledge unjustly extorted by such fear, so the one who suffered the fear can revoke the pledge given." L. 844. Sanchez, l. 1, d. 14; l. 4, d. 16.

Do words in the present tense among prepubescents, apt for marriage, since this is null by positive law, have the force of betrothals? Resp. Affirmatively, from C. Si infantes, un., de Desp. imp. in 6, C. Tuae nobis, fin., e.t. The reason is that, when acts do not have force in the manner in which they are made, from the interpretative will of those contracting they have force in the better way in which they can, unless someone expressly dissents. But betrothals are contained interpretatively in marriage, unless in reality only the bond of marriage is expressly intended for binding oneself. For betrothals are not had except by a mere presumption of law. Sanchez, l. 1, d. 21, n. 3, 5; Schmalz., l. 4, tit. 2, n. 63; Pignatelli, Cons., tom. 9, C. 133, n. 46. Hence many said the same if adults contracted marriage clandestinely, that is, without the pastor and witnesses, in a place where Trent has been promulgated. But this must be denied altogether. S. C. C., June 8, 1595; Ferraris, v. Matrimonium, art. 2, n. 2; Benedict XIV, Quaest. can. 291, par. Ultimum. "The reason is that when an act is null not now on the part of those contracting, but on the part of itself, because it is against good morals and the law resists it, Trent, sess. 24, C. 1, then such an act produces no obligation." L. 841. Except, on the contrary, unless those contracting clandestinely expressly intend to bind themselves in the way in which they could. Sanchez, loc. cit., n. 6. But if there is question of civil marriage, from the Declaration of Leo XIII, March 17, 1879, where the Decree of Trent, sess. 24, C. 1, de Ref., has been promulgated, whether marriage is intended in the present or in the future, "the impediment of the justice of public honesty is not produced"; and therefore neither is had. E. M.

But after the Decree Ne temere it must be denied altogether that marriage in the present is converted into betrothals for the future. For they are two altogether distinct and quite different contracts. And they remain thoroughly distinct and different from the praised Decree, as is clear from its whole tenor. Indeed, for the validity of each contract, quite different formalities are required. Marriage cannot be contracted validly unless before the pastor or the local Ordinary or a priest delegated by either, and at least two witnesses. Betrothals cannot be contracted except by writing, signed by the parties and either by the pastor, or the local Ordinary, or at least by two witnesses.

Are betrothals valid which are entered into before the seventh year by malice, that is, by advertence of reason supplying for age? Resp. Affirmatively, "because, namely, the laws prescribing the seventh year are founded strictly on the presumption that the light of reason does not dawn except when the seventh year has been completed... C. Si infantes, un., de Despons. impub. in 6." Ithur., Cas. 30, n. 25. Therefore all who can licitly enter marriage among themselves can licitly enter betrothals, and prepubescents besides. C. A nobis 8, de Despons. impub.; St. Thomas, Suppl., q. 43, a. 2; Ferraris, v. Sponsalia, n. 15; C. Litteras, de Desp. imp.; C. Ad dissolvendum 13, e.t.; C. Accessit 5, e.t.; L. 14, ff. de Sponsal.

Are betrothals contracted between those having a diriment impediment under the express condition "if the Pope shall dispense," once the condition has been fulfilled, valid without new consent? Resp. Affirmatively. For consent perseveres per se until the fulfillment of the condition. Moreover, such consent is in itself honest and licit. Therefore there is no reason why consent must be renewed. L. 843, 859, l. 3, n. 650. But before the condition is fulfilled, they are neither betrothals, nor do they induce the impediment of public honesty. Nevertheless they oblige one to seek dispensation, if the Pope is accustomed to dispense in such an impediment. Therefore the bridegroom would sin if he contracted marriage with the sister of the bride without awaiting the event of the condition. But betrothals contracted with the same woman would be null, since it would be an illicit promise concerning an unjust thing, which does not oblige. If the Roman Pontiff is not accustomed to dispense, the betrothals would be altogether illicit and therefore of no moment, and they would induce no obligation. L. 11, cc.

Nevertheless, in the present, there are several who hold that the aforesaid betrothals are altogether void; and therefore there is no obligation of seeking dispensation. They rely on various Decisions of the Holy See.

Cf. A. S. S., vol. 1, p. 79 ff., 121.

St. Thomas says these things generally concerning betrothals under condition: "But if the said promise is made under condition, it must be distinguished; because either the condition is honorable, as when it is said: I will take you, if it pleases my parents, and then, while the condition stands, the promise stands, and when it does not stand, it does not stand; or it is dishonorable, and this in two ways; because either it is contrary to the goods of marriage, as if I should say: I will take you, if you procure poisons of sterility, and then betrothals are not contracted; or it is not contrary to the goods of marriage, as if I should say: I will take you, if you consent to my thefts, and then the promise stands, but the condition must be removed." Suppl., q. 43, a. 1.

But since, for betrothals to be validly contracted now, it is necessary that they have been contracted by a written act, it is necessary that the aforesaid condition was expressed in the same written act; otherwise the betrothals are altogether null.

What and how great is the obligation of betrothals? Betrothals oblige one to enter marriage under mortal sin. For they are an onerous contract in a grave matter. If a term has not been fixed, it will suffice if the one promising fulfills them according to the custom of the region, or when he is required by the promisee. Here it is to be noted that "if the other party, from forgetfulness, fear, shame, or a similar cause, should not ask, as especially happens in women, then the bridegroom is bound of himself, without petition, to contract marriage when he conveniently can... But if the other party, when she can conveniently ask, is silent, then she seems to assent to the delay." L. 845. Therefore one withdrawing can be compelled to marriage, even by a judge through censures; this, however, is rarely expedient because of the danger of an unhappy outcome. C. Requisivit 17, de Sponsal.; L. 846; St. Thomas, Suppl., q. 43, a. 1, ad 2.

Nothing concerning betrothals is had in C. G. But C. I. 53, 54; C. H. 43, 44; C. A. 45, 46; C. B. 1297 deny to betrothals a legal obligation of contracting marriage. Nevertheless, if the promise is duly established, the one withdrawing without just cause is bound to compensate the other for damage, from C. A. and from C. B. 1298; from C. I. and C. H., for expenses which he made on account of the promised marriage. But from C. I. and C. H., compensation must be sought within a year from the day on which the promise was to be fulfilled. By Roman law, one who is bound by betrothals is permitted to renounce the condition or pact, and afterward contract with another. L. Alii 1, C. h.t. But if, without previous renunciation, either the bridegroom or the bride marries another, he is marked with infamy. L. Quid ergo § 3, de His qui notantur infamia. By canon law, there is an obligation not only from fidelity, but also from justice, of contracting marriage, and there is an impediment, impeding marriage with another, and dirimently impeding marriage with blood relatives in the first degree. E. M.

Are later betrothals, entered into against a prior pledge, valid, and are they to be fulfilled before the prior ones? "It is certain that if the second bride was conscious of the prior betrothals, marriage must be contracted with the first." If she was ignorant, "the first opinion says that the bridegroom is bound to contract with the second, if he had copula with her..., but the second opinion, more common and more probable, says that the bridegroom is bound to contract with the first, even if copula with the second was present... The reason is that the promise made to the second bride is always null, as being about an illicit thing, since it had been promised to the prior bride; nor does an injury inflicted on another take away the right of this one. And this holds even if the second promise was confirmed by oath." L. 848. Nor indeed is the prior bride bound to yield her right, even if the other would suffer grave damage from defloration, because this woman must impute it to her own crime that she suffers such damage. It is indeed a grave sin, after betrothals have been entered into, to attempt other betrothals, which, as illicit, are also void; for there can be no force of an illicit promise, although both oath and copula intervene. For the oath cannot be a bond of iniquity. Copula cannot take away a right acquired by another. But one entering betrothals with another woman or another man falls from his own right as regards the prior betrothals. And the same judgment is to be made if he makes to another even a mere promise of future marriage. L. ibid.; Sporer, 237; Benedict XIV, Notif. 46.

Do sons subject to family authority sin by contracting betrothals and marriage without parental consent; and are these valid in such a case? As regards validity, it is certain that marriage is altogether valid, even without parental consent, and even if they altogether dissent. Trent, sess. 24, C. 1, de Ref. Matr. But as regards betrothals, when parents are unaware and even unwilling, they are never invalid for that cause alone; since from this it is not generally and necessarily had that they are illicit. For the consent of parents is not necessary per se, that is, from the nature of the thing, nor from positive law. The first reason is that every man, in choosing a state and an individual society of life, is of his own right and liberty. The second reason is that from Trent, loc. cit., marriage is valid without the consent of parents. But the same reason holds for betrothals, which are the way to marriage, because, namely, a man in this matter is of his own right. St. Thomas, II-II, q. 104, a. 5; St. Bonaventure, IV, d. 29, a. 1, q. 3. For that cause alone; for from another cause, even by reason of parents, betrothals can be entered into illicitly, if the parents are unwilling reasonably, for example, if the bride or bridegroom is imbued with bad morals, if such a marriage would redound to disgrace of the family, or if grave scandals or dissensions would arise from it. "But in the case in which the son could not enter such a marriage without sin, the authors say that he is not bound to it, even if he had contracted betrothals with an oath; because since this promise would be about an illicit thing, an oath cannot be a bond of iniquity... The authors commonly think the same must be said, namely, that the bridegroom is not bound to fulfill betrothals of this sort with grave injury to his parents, even if he deflowered a virgin, but that it suffices that he dower her... The reason is that the virtue of justice cannot oblige one to an act which cannot be fulfilled without sin... The authors agree, however, that children are excused at least from mortal sin if they contract marriage without the consent of parents from just causes... If a father impedes his son from some marriage without a just cause, then the son is not bound to obey, and the father sins gravely by impeding." L. 849.

The principal difficulty on account of which parents often are unwilling, and there is doubt both whether the parents dissent justly and whether the spouses themselves, after the promise has been made, are obliged, in practice arises from disparity of condition between the two contracting parties. "It is certain that if those contracting, at the time of the betrothals, were not conscious of the disparity, the betrothals are null, provided the ignorance was antecedent; nevertheless they are valid if it was concomitant... If they were already conscious, the authors commonly say that they are bound to marriage." L. 851. And betrothals of a noble man with an ignoble but honorable girl were declared valid. S. C. C., Aug. 28, 1751.

Except 1. if by reason of disparity in nobility disgrace to the family would come from that marriage. "The reason is that the promise is null, since it is about a gravely illicit thing, as something which cannot be fulfilled except with great detriment to the family." L. 851. Surely justice obliges that this detriment not be inflicted on the family. But not just any disparity suffices, "but a notable one is required, for example if a noble man betrothed the daughter of an artisan, mechanic, or farmer." L. 851.

Except 2. if by reason of disparity in wealth scandal is probably feared, for example, hatreds of relatives, etc., "because in that case the bridegroom would sin gravely against charity, and therefore, since to contract that marriage would then be an illicit thing, the promise made cannot oblige to it. And for the same reason Sanchez says, etc., that this must be said even if the bride suffered defloration. And even if, as Sanchez adds, ... there is no disparity between those contracting. I confess indeed that this is the common opinion, and, speaking per se, true, when the son could conveniently avoid scandals of this sort; but if he could not do so without grave inconvenience to himself, it seems to stand in the way of the reason adduced that charity does not oblige with grave inconvenience... Does not the bridegroom perhaps seem about to undergo grave inconvenience if he is forced to omit marriage with the girl with whom he believes he will lead a quiet life, on account of the vehement passion of love by which he feels himself affected toward her? All those authors, etc., indeed judge this to be a grave inconvenience... All the more because scandals of this sort..., once marriage has been entered into, easily vanish, and minds are reconciled." L. 851.

But if no scandals are feared by reason of notable disparity in wealth, nevertheless, because a promise of this sort is prodigal, St. Alphonsus, loc. cit., still thinks that the bridegroom is not bound to marriage. But from the common sense of men, it is certainly not illicit that a rich man contract marriage with a poor woman. Salm., c. 1, n. 82; Sanchez, l. 1, d. 14, n. 2. "Nevertheless," the same Holy Doctor adds, "since the fault of prodigality is not more than venial, any moderate just cause can remove the vice of prodigality." Hence St. Alphonsus adds, "the case can scarcely occur in which the bridegroom is not bound to take her, because some one of these causes will very rarely be lacking."

From C. I. 63; C. G. 148, children cannot contract marriage without the consent of parents before the twenty-fifth year has been completed, if they are males; the twenty-first year, if they are females. From C. H. 45-47, 320, marriage is prohibited to a minor, namely, before the twenty-third year of age, without the consent of the father, or, in his defect, of the mother; but to one of age, without the counsel of the father, or, in his defect, of the mother. From C. A. 49, minors and also those of age who cannot validly oblige themselves by themselves, also cannot validly contract marriage without the consent of the father, or, if he is lacking, of the tutor, or curator and judge. From C. B. 1304, 1305, 1331, he who has restricted capacity for contracting needs the consent of his legal representative; a son before the twenty-first year needs the consent of the father. In place of the father the mother succeeds, but a son declared legitimate does not need her consent. From the defect of consent of this sort, annulment of the marriage can be sought. But where there is truly question of the validity of the marriage itself, all contrary dispositions of civil law are of no force as regards the validity of the marriage itself, if otherwise it is valid by natural and canon law. Trent, sess. 24, C. 1, de Ref. Matr.; L. 849, 859, 851, 877, l. 3, n. 335; St. Thomas, Suppl., q. 47, a. 6; Ithur., Cas. 14, n. 7 ff.; E. M.

How are betrothals dissolved? Betrothals are dissolved by mutual consent, just as any contract whose obligation, as regards its stability, does not depend on another law, namely divine or human, as, for example, in marriage and religious profession. L. 854; St. Thomas, Suppl., q. 43, a. 3, ad 5. "Between adults, betrothals are dissolved by mutual consent, even if confirmed by oath, not only validly, but also licitly, if there is a reasonable cause; for otherwise it would be at least venial..., because an oath in favor of a third party, although principally made in honor of God, always includes the condition, if the other accepts, or if he does not remit." L. 855. "But between prepubescents, betrothals are not dissolved unless they themselves become adults, from C. De illis 7, de Despons. impub.... Sanchez, etc., say, moreover, that if one of the spouses dissented before puberty, and persevered in such dissent, the betrothals are dissolved when he comes to puberty. Nevertheless, if he dissented only internally, Sanchez, etc., judge that he can also withdraw in conscience; but Coninck, etc., more probably deny this, both because this benefit of withdrawing is not granted by law except to those objecting, which is certainly understood externally, and because, just as internal consent alone does not suffice for entering into a contract, so also internal dissent alone does not suffice for dissolving a contract." L. 856; Schmalz., l. 4, tit. 2, n. 32, 40-43. "Moreover, it is certain that he is an adult who by the habit of the body shows puberty, and can now generate." C. Puberes 3, de Despons. impub.

Betrothals are likewise dissolved if a notable change occurs or is discovered which, if it had been foreseen, the betrothals would not have been contracted, or which, if it supervened, would now be sufficient for rescinding them. The reason is that spouses are judged to be obliged under this understood condition. A change of this sort would be had if a diriment impediment is discovered; if grave enmity or hatred should supervene or be discovered between the spouses themselves, or the parents or blood relatives; grave infirmity, for example leprosy, consumption, syphilis, etc.; great debts or grave danger of fortune, reputation, etc. L. 863, 865; St. Thomas, Suppl., q. 43, a. 3, ad 3.

Betrothals are likewise dissolved if one party preferred to enter a more perfect state of life. St. Thomas, loc. cit. For they are judged to have been contracted also under this tacit condition. But if religious profession dissolves even ratified marriage itself, much more betrothals. Finally, betrothals are dissolved by the authority of the Supreme Pontiff, when a just cause intervenes, as is clear from the practice itself of the Church. A. S. S., vol. 15, p. 587.

Is a party laboring under a hidden defect sufficient for dissolving betrothals bound to manifest it before betrothals, or, once they have been contracted, before marriage? If the defect would render the nuptials pernicious, as infamy, leprosy, syphilis, etc. would be, he is bound to manifest it or to desist from the nuptials.

And the same must be said if the bride, from intercourse had with another, is pregnant, because then there is present the danger of damage to the bridegroom, namely, that he might have to support another's offspring, and that offspring might be counted among his own heirs.

But if the defect would only render the nuptials less desirable, as, for example, that the bride is not a virgin but corrupted, then, granted that she cannot deceive the man by pretending that she is immune from such a defect, if the man shows that otherwise he would not wish to take her; nevertheless otherwise, even if questioned, she can dissemble by answering equivocally. The first reason is that it is against justice. The second reason is that no one is bound to make known his own defect with his own infamy, if he does not injure the right of another. L. 863-865; La-Croix, l. 6, p. 3, n. 183.

Are betrothals dissolved by the crime of the other? By an atrocious crime of the other spouse, betrothals are dissolved on the part of the innocent one. Heresy, grave theft, homicide, or something similar is judged an atrocious crime, which produces grave damage or infamy. The reason is that a notable change of affairs is altogether present. On the part of the innocent one; for no one ought to gain advantage from his own delict. L. 860; C. B. 1299.

Is fornication a sufficient cause for dissolving betrothals? "If the fornication was before the betrothals, it is certain among all that the man, after the betrothals, once the fornication of the bride is known, can leave her. Conversely, the woman cannot rescind the betrothals on account of fornication of the bridegroom had before with another..., unless the man also had offspring from another, or unless he is known to have been given to this vice by mixing himself with many women." L. 861. The reason for the assertion is that the bride is thereby rendered notably less valuable, but not likewise the bridegroom. But the reason for the exception is that then it can rightly be feared that the bridegroom will not keep faith with the bride. Nevertheless St. Thomas says absolutely: "although those contracting betrothals have not yet given each other power over the body, nevertheless from this they become mutually suspect of not preserving fidelity in the future; and therefore one can provide for himself against the other by dissolving the betrothals." Suppl., q. 43, a. 3, ad 6. Add that the bride can also withdraw if, at the time of the betrothals, she would not have given consent if she had known that the bridegroom was a fornicator; for then there would be an error giving cause to the contract, and therefore consent would be lacking. And, if the bride is truly an honorable virgin, she by no means intends equally to marry an impure man as a chaste one. "But if the fornication was after the betrothals, it is certain that the bridegroom can leave the woman if she fornicated voluntarily... If the bride suffered fornication violently..., the more common and truer opinion affirms." L. loc. cit. But if the bridegroom fornicated after the betrothals, the authors more commonly and more probably say that the bride cannot withdraw, and much less if the man was compelled by fear. The reason is the same as that which is adduced for the preceding case. But as regards preserving the faith given, either the man or the woman is judged by equal right. Therefore, if the other party voluntarily fornicates, it seems more truly that the other can withdraw. Moreover, although the fall of the bride is held to be more shameful than that of the bridegroom, nevertheless the fall of the bridegroom produces a notable change of status. What fidelity can the bride henceforth hope for from such a bridegroom?

If both spouses fornicated, the first opinion holds that each is permitted to withdraw, because each is judged by the same right in preserving fidelity; the second opinion, that this is permitted to neither, because equal delicts are removed by mutual compensation; "the third opinion, more probable and common..., teaches that the bridegroom can well withdraw, but not the bride. The reason is that in this there would not be equal compensation, since the fornication of the bride is far more shameful than that of the bridegroom." L. 861, 862; H. A., tr. 18, n. 18; Diana, tom. 2, tr. 6, r. 14.

Are betrothals dissolved by a supervening impediment? "If the impediment is impedient, the authors very commonly and more probably... deny that the betrothals are dissolved, unless the impediment comes from a vow of religion, and very probably also of chastity... The reason is that other impediments do not have force today." "But if the impediment is diriment, it is certain among all that they are dissolved on the part of the innocent one... The mere reputation of such an impediment suffices, when there is an opinion of the impediment among the greater part of the neighborhood... Whether then they are dissolved also on the part of the guilty one, Dic. affirms, and Salm. think it probable, because, with such an impediment supposed, marriage has now become impossible. But Sanchez, etc., more commonly and more probably deny it, and say that then the obligation of betrothals is suspended until the impediment is removed; because it is not equitable that the delinquent gain advantage from his own crime." L. 857; St. Thomas, Suppl., q. 43, a. 3, ad 4.

Is he who has placed the impediment bound to obtain a dispensation, or to accept it when offered? "Some, as Filliucci, etc., say that he is not bound, even if the betrothals were sworn, unless he is obliged to this by reason of damage inflicted, namely defloration, or reputation defiled, because the promise is understood to have been made, things remaining in the same state.... Others, as Roncaglia, etc., say that he is bound, even apart from damage inflicted, to procure the dispensation together with the expenses..., even if they should be great. The reason is that each one is bound, in the way in which he can, to repair the right of another which he himself unjustly injured.... Finally others, more probably, as Sanchez, etc., say that he is indeed bound, even with damage inflicted excluded, if the dispensation can easily be obtained; otherwise, if great expenses and a long delay would be required for it; because the obligation arising from betrothals urges the spouse to employ only ordinary and easy means, not difficult and extraordinary means. Sporer, etc., nevertheless except the case in which the damage of defloration or of reputation must be repaired: because then he would be bound even to expend a great amount, but not so much that he would be forced to fall from his own state." L. 858.

Does the obligation of betrothals cease through a subsequent marriage only while the marriage lasts, as is certain; or are they also entirely dissolved, so that, when the spouse has died, the obligation of the prior betrothals no longer urges? The first opinion affirms, because an obligation once extinguished never revives. Moreover, when a thing previously subject to servitude or obligation passes into another state which does not bring an excuse from that obligation from accidental impotence, but of its own nature is repugnant to that obligation or servitude, then this is not only suspended, but entirely extinguished. But marriage of its own nature is indissoluble, and through it the spouse hands himself over perpetually into the power of the other. Therefore. The second opinion, which St. Alphonsus 875 says is absolutely more probable for himself, denies; because neither by positive law nor by natural law is it certain that betrothals are entirely annulled by a subsequent marriage, "as is clear in him who, after a vow of religion, should consummate marriage; for he, when the spouse had died, would indeed be bound to fulfill the vow."

Are betrothals dissolved by the reception of orders? - "By the reception of sacred orders it is certain that betrothals are also dissolved, but not ratified marriage. Thus all... and it is clear from the Extravagant Antiquae, on Vow." L. 871. But does he sin who receives sacred orders without the bride knowing or against her will? "The first opinion affirms that he sins gravely, and Sanchez, Palaus, etc., hold this. The reason is that by no law has it been granted to sacred order to dissolve betrothals, as has been given to the religious state.... But the second opinion, not less probable, denies, and Pontas, Navarrus, etc., hold it. The reason is that in the promise of betrothals there is always imbibed the condition: unless a better state is chosen." L. 871. - Whether betrothals are also dissolved by the reception of minor orders? "The first opinion affirms... because there is such a change of the bridegroom... that the bride is deservedly judged not to have wished to oblige herself to contract nuptials with him.... The second opinion, more common and truer, denies.... The reason is that in reality the state of minor orders is not of itself incompatible with marriage... as is clear from C. 1 and 2, de Cler. coniug." L. 872. But this proves that betrothals are not dissolved on the part of the one initiated into minor orders; it by no means proves that they are not dissolved on the part of the bride, to whom marriage with such a man could deservedly be grave.

Are betrothals contracted before profession dissolved by the entrance of one spouse into religion? - There are three opinions. The first asserts that they are dissolved on neither side. Of it St. Alphonsus says: "It does not seem sufficiently probable." The second, which Busembaum, Sanchez, and others hold, says that they are dissolved on the part of both. The holy Doctor shows that this is not sufficiently persuasive. The third, which "seems absolutely more probable" to St. Alphonsus, says that they are dissolved only on the part of the one remaining in the world, because on his or her part there then occurs a notable change, since it is deemed disgraceful to marry one who has deserted religion. But the other, by entrance, does not become incapable of contracting marriage, and therefore, if he goes out, he must stand by his promises. "The bridegroom would be bound before entrance to celebrate the nuptials, if this were necessary to legitimate offspring, to repair scandal, or to provide for the honor of the bride, if it could not be met in another way. And in this case it is not even permitted to the bridegroom after the celebration of marriage to enter religion and leave it unconsummated; for he cannot then desert the wife, who because of infamy could not find other nuptials." L. 870.

What as regards a vow of entering religion, or of receiving sacred orders, or of preserving chastity? - "It is certain, 1., that one vowing to enter religion vows licitly and ought to enter, nor is he bound to stand by the betrothals, if he truly wishes to become religious.... It is certain, 2., that by these three vows betrothals are dissolved on the part of the one not vowing, since by them the one vowing is deservedly judged to renounce the betrothals. It is certain, 3., that if someone after betrothals emits a vow not only of entering, but also of professing religion, then the betrothals are dissolved on the part of both; because the one vowing then becomes altogether incapable of contracting marriage." L. 873.

Are betrothals dissolved also on the part of the one vowing by a vow of preserving chastity, or of receiving sacred orders? - "If the vow precedes the betrothals, it is certain that they are invalid, because their promise, since it is about an illicit thing, does not oblige." - If it follows, the first opinion denies, and many grave theologians hold it. "The reason is that God does not accept the promise of a thing promised to another and accepted by him, nor is it held by any law that betrothals are dissolved by these vows ." But the second opinion affirms, and very many grave doctors hold it in St. Alphonsus and Sanchez, "who calls it most probable, and Salmanticenses, etc., commonly call it probable and safe, and St. Thomas teaches it absolutely, Suppl. q. 52, a. 1, ad 1....

The reason, which they more commonly hand down, is that the promise of betrothals is always judged to have been made under the condition: unless a better state is chosen. And they say that this holds even if the betrothals were sworn, because an oath follows the nature of the act." L. 873. It is confirmed by the Decision of the S. C. C., March 15, 1705, where it was said: a vow of chastity or of receiving sacred orders, through the election of a better state, annuls betrothals, even those confirmed by oath. But except "if the bridegroom were to make the vow in order to elude the bride.... Likewise more probably... even if the bridegroom vowed chastity without the intention of eluding, if afterward he obtains dispensation from the vow, he will not be able to marry another.... But not altogether improbably Bonacina and Sanchez deny this." L. ib. - De Angelis, Praelect. iur. can., l. 4, t. 6, n. 6.

Is the dissent of parents a cause for dissolving betrothals? - "I think it must be said," says St. Alphonsus 877, "that, if the father unjustly dissents from such a marriage, the son cannot withdraw from the betrothals, and both he himself and the father would sin if they wished to dissolve them. But otherwise, if the father justly contradicts, namely if the marriage would turn to the disgrace of the family; for then those betrothals do not oblige, since no one can be obliged to execute an unjust thing." And Laymann and Sanchez say the same, "with others commonly, if from such a marriage great scandals would arise among relatives." And hence it is clear that the dissent of parents is not a true impedient impediment of marriage. For the question is only of the honor and deference owed to parents. Hence some fault would not be lacking, grave or light according to the various circumstances, by contracting marriage, without the parents' knowledge, when no urgent cause exists. L. ib.

Can a bridegroom rescind betrothals if a rich inheritance comes to him? The doctors most commonly deny it, because the bridegroom "has not been deceived in the condition of the bride, in whom no change has been made." A change has indeed been made in the bridegroom, but in a thing extrinsic to this contract. But several probably affirm it, "because in such a case there now comes a notable change of things." The same consequently would seem to have to be said if someone contracted betrothals with one woman and afterward marriage with another of an exceedingly better condition is offered to him. This "I would not dare," says St. Alphonsus 876, "altogether to condemn"; nevertheless he adds: "I would never dare to depart from the contrary opinion, nor ever to advise it."

Can a bride withdraw from betrothals if the bridegroom departs elsewhere? - "It is certain that if the bridegroom transfers his domicile elsewhere, or if he goes away to a distant region, even with the intention of returning, the bride can at once pass to other nuptials; this is expressed in C. De illis 5, de Sponsal.... - But if the bridegroom has departed to a nearby place..., one must wait until he returns; or the bridegroom must be required to come within a fixed time to contract marriage; but if he, having been required, should delay his return for a just cause, either one must wait according to the judgment of a prudent man... or, what is safer, the cause is to be remitted to the judgment of the judge....

These things proceed, however, if in the betrothals no time was fixed for entering the nuptials.... When a term is attached to betrothals, one must look at whether it is attached to urge, or not to delay, the obligation of contracting marriage, or whether it is to end the obligation. It is attached to urge when the parties therefore fix the term so that neither party before it can compel the other to fulfill the contract. But it is to end when the term is attached so that, when it has elapsed, no obligation remains.... - Whether, when the term has elapsed by the defect, for example, of the bridegroom, the bride can withdraw, if he inculpably omitted entering the nuptials, detained by a just impediment? The first opinion denies.... The reason is that it is not equitable that one be deprived of his right who is impeded by a just cause from fulfilling his promises.... The second opinion, more common and more probable, affirms.... The reason is that the term is attached for this, lest the party who is ready remain for a long time without nuptials; otherwise a time would be fixed in vain. Moreover, this opinion is clearly proved from C. Sicut 22, de Sponsal.... Whether, when the term has elapsed, the party also remains free who culpably caused the delay? The first opinion, more common, denies.... The reason is that no one ought to draw advantage from his own crime.... The second opinion affirms..., and St. Thomas also expressly holds this in 4, d. 27, q. 2, a. 3, ad 2....

The reason seems to be that since the term was attached to end the obligation, when it has elapsed, the obligation ceases.... The first opinion is indeed far more common, and to me far more probable; but the second does not lack its probability." L. 866, 868. - S. C. de P. F., September 26, 1840, Collect. n. 1216; St. Thomas, Suppl. q. 43, a. 3, ad 2; L. 17, de Sponsal., ff.; L. 2, e. t., C.

Is one withdrawing from betrothals bound to restore the earnest money? That betrothals can be contracted with earnest money given, there is no doubt. For earnest money is a pledge given of fulfilling the thing promised. If the thing promised, as here, is licit, a pledge is licitly given for fulfilling it. - One who culpably withdraws from betrothals loses his own earnest money, and is bound to return that of the other party, and to restitution of as much as it was in that party's interest that such a contract be fulfilled. Cf. 926. - L. 852; Sanchez, l. 1, d. 30, 35; Schmalzgrueber, l. 4, t. 1, n. 126 ff.; L. 5, de Sponsal., C.; C. B. 1301.

Is one justly withdrawing from betrothals bound to pay the promised penalty? "If the penalty is generally attached against him who withdraws justly, it is certain among all that the promise of the penalty does not oblige." L. 853. For it is against the liberty of marriage. - If it is added against one withdrawing unjustly, "the first opinion, sufficiently probable, denies..., because liberty would still be injured...; but the second opinion, more probable, affirms.... The reason is that such addition of a penalty is contrary neither to natural law nor to positive law." L. 853, l. 3, n. 949. - From C. B. 1297, a promise of a penalty, if marriage is not contracted, is null. - St. Thomas, Suppl. q. 43, a. 1, ad 4; Sanchez, l. 1, d. 30 ff.; L. Titia 134, C. de Verborum obligationibus; C. Gemma 29, de Sponsal. et Matr., C. Requisivit 17, e. t.; S. C. de P. F., November 22, 1790, Collect. n. 603, v. 1.

Is the authority of a judge required for dissolving betrothals? "In the aforesaid causes, when they are manifest, the authority of a judge is not required for dissolving betrothals; otherwise it is required. But if the bridegroom, after his right of withdrawing has become known, nevertheless carnally knows the bride, he is judged tacitly to have renounced his right and to have ratified the betrothals.... Laymann and Palaus say that, when there stands a probable fear of an unhappy outcome, a man can licitly withdraw from betrothals." L. 878. But after the Decree Ne temere something else must be said for Catholics. Since betrothals are contracted by a public act, for their dissolution it is necessary that the public authority of the Church intervene.

What concerning kisses and embraces of betrothed persons among themselves? Kisses, embraces, and other similar acts which are shameful or less honorable are illicit to the betrothed in entirely the same way as to others. The reason is that betrothals confer on the betrothed no special right to intercourse and venereal pleasure, and therefore neither to those acts which contain a danger more or less proximate of venereal pleasure. - Kisses, embraces, and other acts honorable from their object and from the manner of performing them are permitted to the betrothed. The reason is that those acts are licit in themselves, and therefore, as they are permitted to others who are free, so also they are permitted to the betrothed. But the question is moved especially about the betrothed rather than about others, both because on the one hand these acts can more easily be permitted to them because of the special reason which has force for them, namely for mutually fostering benevolence, which is entirely necessary to them for future marriage, and because on the other hand there is also present a special danger of sin; whence counsel should generally be given to them that they abstain even from these acts, as far as can be done. - Billuart, diss. 6, art. 16; L. 950.

What must be thought of those acts of the betrothed which otherwise in themselves are honorable and licit, if they contribute to arousing venereal acts? Here the general rule holds: these acts are culpable only when either the cause is evil, or there is a proximate danger of consent. What if it is clear to the bridegroom or bride that the other sins in these acts because of a depraved affection? If those acts are done before others, the other can licitly permit those acts, lest he or she be defamed, or introduce suspicion of himself or herself, and lest others be scandalized. If those acts are done secretly, and it is certain that they are done maliciously, where the question concerns others and not betrothed persons, the doctors commonly teach that one is bound to repel those acts. But if the question concerns betrothed persons, for whom often in this matter a notable inconvenience could be present, because the other will certainly withdraw from the marriage, the general rule concerning scandal received seems to have to be applied, namely that this can be permitted if it cannot be impeded without grave inconvenience; but it must be impeded if this can be done without notable inconvenience.

What must be thought of these same acts when, from frequency of falls, the danger of consenting to subsequent venereal pleasure must be held as a proximate occasion of sin? - This question, like the preceding ones, can be raised even about looks and conversations themselves, which have a most just cause, as is clear of itself; whence parents can altogether licitly permit such looks and conversations, although great caution and prudence must always be applied in these things. But here the general rule concerning a necessary proximate occasion holds; for it is morally impossible that a bridegroom seriously thinking of entering marriage should not visit, look upon, speak to the bride, and according to custom show her other signs of benevolence which manifest his mutual love. Therefore the confessor should suggest not only general but also special means: that due moderation be preserved, and that necessity not be exceeded in showing these signs; and then that he never deal alone with her alone. Care is likewise to be taken that the marriage not be long delayed. But if these and other remedies do not obtain fruit, this one thing remains: that they be dealt with no otherwise than with other persons in occasions of sin and recidivists. Reuter, Neo-confess. 112.

Is intercourse had with one betrothed by words about the future adultery? - "More probably it is denied with Sanchez, de Matr., l. 1, d.

2, n. 2, Salmanticenses, Roncaglia. But Roncaglia and Salmanticenses judge that if one of the betrothed fornicates with another person, he must disclose in Confession the circumstance of the betrothals, as changing the species by reason of the injury inflicted on the other. But it is sufficiently probable with Trullench, Pontas, Diana, Covarruvias, Lugo, Sanchez, and Laymann that it is only an aggravating circumstance, since the bridegroom by betrothals acquires no right over the body of the other." L. l. 3, n. 447; l. 6, n. 647; Billuart, diss. 6, app. 1, question 3; Ithur., Cas. 6, n. 16; Lugo, de Poenit., d. 16, n. 177, 178.

Must banns be sent before marriage? - Marriage cannot be contracted licitly, although validly, without previous proclamations of the same, and the obligation is grave. Trent, sess. 24, C. 1, 5, de R. M.; C. Cum inhibitio 3, section 1, de Clandest. desp. - All who are to contract are subject to the law of proclamation. From usage, however, Princes are excepted, because their lineage is sufficiently known, and ordinarily their marriages are sufficiently public. The case of urgent necessity is also excepted, for example, if someone near death should wish to marry a concubine to legitimate offspring, and there would be danger in delay. - A parish priest omitting the denunciations, even if he knows that no impediment is present, sins gravely.

For the law obliges, although in the particular case its reason may cease; and a very grave danger is always present if this matter is left to the judgment of parish priests. But does a parish priest sin gravely if he omits only one proclamation without dispensation? It is controverted. Some affirm, because one proclamation out of three must be held a grave part of the whole precept. Others probably deny, because of the opposite reason. But to omit two denunciations is more probably grave. L. 991. - From a just cause the Bishop and his vicar general can dispense from the law of banns, more easily from one or another denunciation than from all. Trent, sess. 24, C. 1, de R. M. But dispensation must be obtained from both Bishops if the spouses belong to different dioceses.

For if impediments are not detected on one side and in one place, it does not follow that they cannot be detected on the other side and in another place. Yet there are not lacking authors who say that the Ordinary of either side can dispense with both, because of the unity of the act of both, and St. Alphonsus 1006 seems to approve. - The doctors commonly teach that the Bishop not only can, but also sometimes is bound to dispense, namely to avoid grave common or private damage, spiritual or temporal; indeed even because of a notable spiritual or temporal good of the community or of another private person. - L. 389-391, 1005-1007; C. I. 70 ff.; C. B. 1316; E. M.

Note: If for a grave cause the denunciations were omitted before marriage, lest, for example, it be maliciously impeded, "then before its consummation let denunciations be made in the Church, so that if any impediments underlie it they may more easily be detected." Trent, sess. 24, C. 1, de R. M. Therefore, if it is clear that there is no impediment, the spouses will not sin gravely against the Decree by consummating. Indeed Trent immediately adds that the denunciations can be remitted by the prudence and judgment of the Bishop. The parish priest cannot undertake to make the proclamations unless it is first clear to him concerning the free consent of both contracting parties. He must also inquire whether they are affected by any impediment, and whether they know the rudiments of faith, which they must afterward teach their children. Roman Ritual, de Sacr. matr.

Free state: It must be clear before the reception of Orders and before entering marriage. It can be proved by the sworn testimony of two persons. A process is of itself to be instituted, and the norms handed down in the Instruction of the Holy Office, August 21, 1670, with the attached declarations, August 29, 1890 and 1868, are to be observed as regards proving the death of a spouse. But if the aforesaid free state cannot be legitimately proved, then recourse must be made, after the faculty has first been obtained, to a supplementary oath. Holy Office, February 1, 1865.

In what place must denunciations be made? - "It is certain that they must be made in the parish of each contracting party..., because custom so bears. Laymann, etc., except, unless the parishes are very near.... If one of the spouses stays in some place briefly, Pontas thinks it suffices if they are made in the place where he actually lives. But far more probably Sanchez, etc., from the declaration of the S. C., say that they must altogether be made in the parish from which he departed, because denunciations are made for this, that impediments may be manifested, and therefore they must be made where the spouses have lived for a longer time. And here it must be noted that if one of the spouses is external, the parish priest must not make the denunciations unless after he has proved the free state before the Ordinary by an authentic document, as is had from the Instruction of the S. C. of the Holy Office.... But as regards vagi, Trent, sess. 24, C. 7, de R. M., commands parish priests not to assist at their marriages unless after diligent inquiry has been applied, and unless first they have obtained from the Ordinary license to assist. Hence Roncaglia rightly says that a parish priest would sin gravely if he did not observe such a precept." L. 991. - They are to be made in the parish church of the domicile or quasi-domicile of the spouses, or of simple residence and the immediately previous domicile, unless the spouses have left it for six months.

Nevertheless, monthly residence is now to be attended to only for marriage, and not also quasi-domicile. Hence if the spouses, where they now are, have come there for six months or at least for a month, there the denunciations are to be made; otherwise also in the place from which they departed. "For generally satisfaction is made to the Tridentine Decree if marriages are denounced where those intending to contract marriage are parishioners at the time of the denunciations." Schmalzgrueber, l. 4, t. 3, n. 14. But as regards place of origin and previous domicile, or where they lived longer, it is enough to seek testimony of free state through the documents of their Ordinaries, and through examination of witnesses, according to the cited Instruction of the Holy Office, August 21, 1620, confirmed by Clement X, or at least, by special indult, through the supplementary oath of those wishing to contract. But if one or both spouses have equal domicile in two places, or domicile in one place and quasi-domicile or monthly habitation in another, the banns must be proclaimed in both. - Many doctors say, moreover, that proclamations can be made outside the church in a place of great gathering, because thus the end of the Council is obtained. - L. 991; E. M.

It has been granted to the Archdiocese of Paris that written notices exhibiting future marriages be affixed in a conspicuous place of the church for three continuous Sundays or feast days, and that they remain affixed throughout the whole day from the first morning Mass to the last evening liturgical office. S. C. C., March 28, 1908.

At Rome, "from those who have stayed for six continuous months after attaining puberty in another diocese, a Document of free state is required, given by the Ordinary of the place. Those from outside the diocese shall exhibit a Document of origin, baptism, confirmation, and free state.... Once the publications have been carried out in the parishes of the contracting parties, and also in the parishes where the contracting parties have equal domicile or quasi-domicile..., the parish priest will be able to proceed to the celebration of marriage." Instruction of His Eminence the Cardinal Vicar of the City, April 5, 1902, A. S. S., v. 37, p. 223 ff. Cf. the more recent Instruction in M. E., v. 23, p. 28-34.

For proving free state, witnesses are to be duly examined according to the Instruction of the Holy Office, August 21, 1670, Collect. S. C. de P. F., v. 1, n. 192; Decree of the Holy Office, February 24, 1847, Collect. cit. n. 1011. Cf. also Decree of the Holy Office, January 13, 1869, Collect. cit., ed. 2, 1907, n. 1342.

When certain documents concerning the death of a spouse are not had, the response given by the Holy Office on July 20, 1898 concerning men who were present at the battle of Adua is to be applied to other similar cases. S. C. of Sacraments, December 16, 1910. Cf. Enchiridion, num. 996.

When must proclamations be made? - They must be made on feast days of precept, continuously, during the solemnities of Masses. Trent, sess. 24, C. 1, de R. M. On feast days of precept, at least in the place of the proclamations. On feast days. Several teach that they can also be made on a weekday if for some cause there is a great gathering of people at the church. Schmalzgrueber, l. 4, t. 1, n. 24. Continuously, i.e. with no feast day omitted from the first proclamation to the third. St. Alphonsus 992 thinks it probable that there is no grave sin if the feast days are not continuous, one or another having intervened, especially if the question concerns feasts other than Sunday. For there is slight danger that the people will forget. But can proclamations be made on feast days immediately succeeding each other, if they occur? It is controverted, and there is a twofold probable opinion. During the solemnities of Masses, i.e. in the parochial or conventual Mass. The doctors add probably that, from a just cause, they can be made in a sermon, or on the occasion of a procession, when the people are gathered. They cannot be made in private Masses, nor at Vespers. If, however, the parish priest has forgotten to make the last proclamation at Mass, and the nuptials are urgent, he can supply it at Vespers. Once the proclamations have been made, it is licit to contract at once even on the same day. But if, once the proclamations have been made, marriage does not follow within two months, more probably the proclamations must be repeated, unless it seems otherwise to the Bishop. Roman Ritual. And after three months have elapsed, there is also need of a new testimony of free state, unless again it seems otherwise to the Bishop. S. I. C., February 24, 1847, ad 4. - L. 991, 992, 993; E. M.

The S. C. C. in Pineroli, April 7, 1862, rescripted that "denunciations can be made on the aforesaid suppressed feast days, i.e. according to the Decree of Pius IX to the Subalpines; care is nevertheless to be taken that these be fulfilled at the time of the divine office when the greater number of the faithful is usually present in the church." But the authors add: with the permission of the Ordinary.

Must known impediments of marriage be revealed? - There is of itself a grave obligation of revealing impediments of marriage. The reason is drawn from the motive of religion and charity, and from the very precept of banns. - This obligation pertains to all, of whatever sex, age, parish, diocese, even friends and blood relatives; and it must be fulfilled as soon as morally possible, lest perhaps, once dispensation has been obtained from one or another proclamation, marriage immediately follow. But once marriage has followed, the positive law indeed ceases; but the natural law, according to circumstances, can require revelation. - The aforesaid obligation is present however hidden the impediments are, and even if someone knows them under a natural secret, even one simply committed or promised, even sworn. For a secret of this sort does not oblige when grave damage threatens the community or a particular person. But more probably there is no obligation of revelation if it is a secret committed for the sake of seeking counsel, for example to an advocate, physician, parish priest, etc. The common good seems to require this. But those who know impediments of marriage in this way must at least admonish the spouses to desist from the marriage. C. Praeterea 12, de Spons.

One is bound to reveal impediments, although he alone knows them and cannot prove them, since here the testimony of one suffices. One can, absolutely speaking, reveal an impediment if damage threatens an innocent person, or public damage would follow. Cf. V. 1, n. 1542. And the contracting parties themselves are bound to reveal it, since the question is not of undergoing a penalty, but of avoiding sin and scandal. - But one is not bound to reveal it with grave damage to himself, if grave scandal of others would follow from it, if the revelation would be useless or rather would harm those contracting in good faith, if dispensation had already been obtained, etc. - L. 994-1002.

Can a parish priest sometimes dispense in denunciations? - R. In the negative, because he has no jurisdiction in the external forum. "Nevertheless Sanchez, Laymann, etc., say very probably that in cases in which the Bishop is bound to dispense, and cannot be approached, and there is danger in delay, he can declare that the precept of proclamations does not oblige, provided he is certain that no impediment is present. Indeed in cases of this sort Busembaum, Pontas, etc., judge that the spouses themselves, if they are certain that they are not impeded, can enter nuptials without denunciations." L. 1007.

What is the parish priest to do if the spouses are already in the Church to contract marriage, and he detects that a hidden impediment is present? - If the nuptials cannot be delayed without danger of infamy or other very grave inconveniences, and the penitent is in invincible ignorance of the impediment, the admonition is to be omitted, and the celebration of marriage is to be permitted until dispensation is obtained. If the penitent is in vincible ignorance, or if he openly knows the impediment, and the marriage cannot be delayed without infamy or scandal, not even to obtain dispensation from the Bishop, then the difficulty is very great. According to St. Liguori and others, the confessor could declare the law of the Church concerning impediments not to oblige in such straits of infamy and scandal, and proceed to the celebration of marriage. Certainly every power has been given unto edification, not unto destruction. Nevertheless, as soon as possible, at least for caution, he ought to request dispensation. According to others, simulation of the contract of marriage could be permitted with the purpose of seeking dispensation from the impediment as soon as possible. But, they say, an impediment cannot cease naturally; for an invalidating law never ceases on account of a particular inconvenience, whatever it may be. But whenever the Bishop can be approached, he must be approached, because, according to the common opinion, in that case he can dispense from ecclesiastical impediments.

C. Ubi 2, de Desp. impub.; L. 613, 1122; Monit. Eccles., v. 12, p. 16 ff.

Nor are there lacking those who likewise hold that, at the article of death, when grave danger would be present for the eternal salvation of the sick person, the ecclesiastical law of impediments ceases by force of the more urgent natural law, namely of charity, and that at least then there is room for legitimate epikeia. M. E., v. 20, p. 177, 474.

But in the present matter almost every difficulty vanishes. For Bishops, in the aforesaid case, have among the quinquennial faculties the faculty "of dispensing over the impediments of adultery and affinity from illicit intercourse, even in marriages to be contracted, and of subdelegating, as regards the aforesaid impediment of affinity, the faculty of dispensing, even habitually, to parish priests of their own diocese." Form of Faculties, May 5, 1896. To parish priests, and also to rectors, so called, who exercise the care of souls in some district, although they are not parish priests in the strict sense; and also to those priests who, during the vacancy of a parish, or on the occasion of sickness or absence of the parish priest, are deputed as administrators of the parish. S. Poenitentiaria, July 17, 1901. Cf. 1044; E. M. de Leg., n. 264, and here 955.