Marriage contracted under grave fear

637. On the Defect Itself. 1. Matrimony entered because of grave force or fear, inflicted from outside and unjustly in order to contracting, is invalid.¹

a. By the term force is not understood absolute coercion, which can be inflicted only on external acts while the will internally resists, and which therefore removes the voluntary, but conditional or moral coercion, which moves the will to willing under threat or infliction of evil, so that the will consents in order to avoid evil, though otherwise it would not have consented. This coercion, which is the infliction or threat of evil, stands to fear as cause to effect. Therefore force is rightly reduced to fear, and indeed to that fear which diminishes consent but does not remove it.

b. Matrimony entered from grave fear is not declared invalid by the Church for this reason, as if true consent were lacking; but true consent, nevertheless extorted by fear, the Church declares invalid, in order that provision may be made for the full liberty of marriages, without which marriages cannot be happy.

2. That fear dirimently impedes matrimony by ecclesiastical law is certain; whether also by natural law is disputed.

Those who, with Sanchez, Lugo, Schmalzgrueber, Gasparri, Kugler, deny this, argue in this way: this fear does not remove the voluntary, since it does not impede sufficient deliberation; therefore consent is present, which by natural law is required for the value of the matrimonial contract. Moreover, fear unjustly inflicted does not remove liberty more than fear justly inflicted or inflicted by a natural cause; but fear inflicted by a just or natural cause does not dirimently impede matrimony. Those who, with St. Thomas, Pontius, Tamburini, Reiffenstuel, Rosset, Ballerini, Aichner, affirm this, concede that consent is present, which by natural law is required for the value of other contracts; but the matrimonial contract by its nature requires altogether full liberty in contracting. For other contracts entered from fear unjustly inflicted are rescindable; but since matrimony cannot be rescinded, it is required that from the beginning it be invalid. Each opinion is probable, but the latter seems to be preferred. Wherefore only when the cause of fear has been removed can matrimony be entered, or a matrimony invalidly entered be convalidated: for so long as the fear unjustly inflicted endures, the cause of inefficacious consent also endures.

¹ Cn. 1087, 1.

638. Declaration. In order that fear certainly invalidate matrimony, it must be: a. grave; b. unjust; c. inflicted in order to matrimony.

1. Grave; fear not only absolutely but also relatively grave dirimently impedes matrimony; but light fear does not invalidate matrimony.

If it is doubtful whether fear is to be judged grave, one must stand for the value of the matrimony, both from the general principle: in doubt one must stand for the value of the act, and because of reverence for the sacrament.

2. Unjust; fear is said to be unjustly inflicted if someone threatens evil which he has no right to inflict; if someone by a lie pretends that grave evil threatens another, in order that he may extort that person's consent.

Therefore in particular cases one must attend to whether the evil to be inflicted on another is against justice. Thus if a seducer is compelled by a judge, under threat of penalty, to marry the injured person, the fear is unjustly inflicted, because the judge has the right of demanding only either matrimony or dowry. If an uncle threatens his niece that he will deny her a sum of money, unless she marries a determinate young man, which money he had decreed to give in the case of matrimony, the fear is not unjustly inflicted, because the uncle is not held to give the money. If a physician threatens a girl that he is unwilling to devote care to her gravely ill mother unless she enters matrimony with him, the fear is unjustly inflicted if the physician is held to devote care.

3. Inflicted from outside and in order to matrimony. From outside: for fear produced by an internal cause can never be unjust. In order to matrimony: for that fear dirimently impedes matrimony which compels the contracting party to choose matrimony in order to free himself or herself from fear.

Moreover, it makes no difference whether it was inflicted by the other contracting party or by some third person, e.g., by that person's father; whether it is inflicted on the contracting party himself or herself, or on that person's blood relatives, relatives by affinity, etc.

That grave fear, but not inflicted for the sake of extorting consent, does not dirimently impede matrimony is now certain, since the Code says that no other fear invalidates matrimony besides that which compels one to choose matrimony in order to free himself or herself from unjustly inflicted fear, Cn. 1087.

4. Reverential fear of itself is light, but sometimes in certain circumstances it can become grave.¹ Wherefore also reverential fear, if it is grave and unjustly inflicted in order to contracting, can invalidate matrimony.

Article Four.. On the Effects of Matrimony.

Since the effects of the sacrament of matrimony have already been discussed (n. 489), a few things remain to be said concerning the effects of matrimony as contract, some of which refer to the spouses, others to the children.

¹ Cf. De principiis, 15th ed., n. 56.

Violence is the onset of force too great to be resisted, and fear is a perturbation of mind arising from present or future danger. Here we treat of fear caused by extrinsic violence, inasmuch as it is a diriment impediment of marriage.

When marriage is contracted through grave fear, caused unjustly by a free agent with a view to extorting marriage, ecclesiastical law makes it null and void. Whether such a marriage is invalid by natural law is a moot point among Doctors. Fear may, indeed, sometimes be so excessive that it takes away the use of reason, so that a man under its influence does not know what he is doing. If a man married under the influence of such terror, the marriage would of course be invalid for want of consent. But commonly even grave fear does not produce such effects; a man in danger of shipwreck or death knows as a rule what he is doing, and if he marries in such circumstances, though induced by fear to do so, the marriage will be valid. But when he is unjustly forced by someone to marry against his will, the injury done to him is a sufficient reason for the Church to make the marriage null and void, even though he knew what he was doing and consented to the marriage. The only difference between this case and the former lies in the injury inflicted by the fear caused by a free agent. This however, does not seem sufficient ground for asserting the nullity of the contract by natural law, though it affords a just reason why positive law should make it invalid. The better opinion, then, seems to be that grave fear is a diriment impediment of marriage by ecclesiastical law when the fear is caused unjustly by someone with a view to compelling the party to marry against his will. Hence, if one who had violated a woman was threatened with a beating and married her in order to escape it, the marriage would be valid. Fear arising from reverence for parents and superiors is in general not sufficiently serious to make marriage contracted under its influence null and void. In certain circumstances, however, such a fear may become grave and sufficient to annul marriage. Much depends on the character of the party who was influenced by fear and on the means employed to compel acquiescence to the wishes of harsh and severe parents or guardians. The question as to whether in any particular case there was grave fear is a question of fact to be determined by the ecclesiastical judge after weighing all the circumstances of the case (Can. 1087).

Although marriage has beer contracted under the influence of grave fear sufficient to render it invalid, the marriage may afterward become valid if fear disappears, and the party who was under its influence freely cohabits with the other and expresses matrimonial consent. In this case it will not be necessary to repeat the external solemnization of the marriage unless the impediment was publicly known. It will be sufficient if the parties manifest their consent to be man and wile privately when freed from the influence of grave fear.

As may be gathered from what has already been said, slight fear, such as any ordinarily constituted person can despise, does not invalidate marriage, even when it is caused unjustly with a view to extort marriage.

These few things must be established:

832. • I. Grave fear certainly invalidates matrimony by ecclesiastical law, and more probably also by the natural law ¹, as follows a fortiori from what was said concerning Contracts, volume 1, no. 780.

¹ Whichever law you say invalidates it, this impediment admits no dispensation; rather, it is necessary that the cause of fear be removed. Thus Alexander III, canon Cum locum 1, On Betrothals and Matrimony: Since consent has no place where fear or coercion intervenes, it is necessary that, where the assent of each is required, the material of coercion be removed.

Therefore, while the cause of fear perseveres, the invalid matrimony is revalidated neither through intercourse nor through cohabitation, for these things are otherwise presumed to have been extorted by fear. For while fear endures, just as matrimony cannot be validly contracted, so neither can an invalidly contracted matrimony be revalidated. It must be said otherwise if intercourse is admitted entirely freely and with marital affection, as the Doctors commonly hold after St. Thomas (In IV Sentences, distinction 29, question 1, article 3, minor question 2, reply to objection 2), or even if cohabitation is voluntary, which, according to canon Ad id 21, On Betrothals and Matrimony, is accepted as a ratification of consent. In this case, if the impediment was occult, it certainly will not be necessary to renew consent again before the Pastor, according to the general doctrine which Benedict XIV confirms from decrees of the Sacred Penitentiary issued by the authority of St. Pius V, Declarations of the Sacred Congregation of the Council, and the practice of the Sacred Roman Rota (Instruction 87, no. 62).

Nevertheless, it is not necessary also to admit what he himself adds, as though relying upon the authority of Sanchez (On Matrimony, book 2, disputation 36, no. 4), whom he highly praises, namely, that it is necessary for the other spouse also, who did not know the impediment, to be informed of it when the matrimony must be revalidated by new consent. For although Sanchez teaches this (l.c.) as more probable when the consent of each contracting party is invalid because of an impediment by which each is rendered incapable of contracting by the law itself, he nevertheless teaches the opposite concerning the present case, when there is question of a defect of consent alone, as also happens when either contracting party consents fictitiously. Thus he writes (On Matrimony, book 4, disputation 18, no. 2): Second, it must be supposed that if, after a matrimony extorted by fear, intercourse voluntarily had with conjugal affection follows, the prior matrimony is ratified and begins from that time to be valid, if the other party, who consented without fear, perseveres in the original consent. And the reason is that, since it is not necessary that the consents be simultaneous, and the consent of the one who did not suffer fear was legitimate, only the voluntary consent of the one who had consented through fear was wanting for the matrimony, as I said in book 4, disputation 15, no. 2. But this consent is sufficiently expressed through intercourse, etc., from chapter 15, question 30, On Betrothals. Therefore, when it follows, the prior matrimony is ratified. And in the same manner, a little later (ibid., no. 3), he reasons concerning consent expressed through lengthy mutual and voluntary cohabitation, confirming it from the explicit definition of the law in canon Ad id 21, On Betrothals and Matrimony. Therefore that opinion of Lambertini must be set aside, since it is not only destitute of foundation but also opposed to the dispositions of Canon law cited by Sanchez.

The following conditions, however, are required, namely, that the fear be instilled: 1. by an external and free cause; 2. unjustly; 3. for the end of contracting matrimony.

II. Light fear, even if unjust, does not invalidate matrimony ². The reason is: 1. because light fear is not considered to influence consent gravely and efficaciously; 2. because by positive law grave fear alone renders matrimony invalid; 3. because otherwise innumerable marriages would be invalid to the greatest detriment of society.

² In a doubt whether fear is to be considered grave, the common doctrine is that judgment must be made in favor of the validity of the matrimony, both because the cause of matrimony is favorable and because of reverence for the Sacrament, as Laymann says (book 5, treatise 10, part 2, chapter 5, no. 4). To this pertains the statement of Innocent III, canon Licet 47, On Witnesses and Attestations: It is more tolerable to leave some persons joined contrary to the statutes of men than to separate persons legitimately joined contrary to the statutes of the Lord. See Schmalzgrueber, book 4, title 1, no. 432.

The disagreement of the Doctors concerning the sufficiency of reverential fear is easily reconciled if you consider that this fear also, according to the variety of circumstances, is deservedly regarded sometimes as light and sometimes as grave, as was said in the Treatise On Human Acts. Thus Laymann with others, l.c., no. 3, who judges by a similar reason concerning importunate entreaties, which, according to the differing circumstances of persons, may be contradicted easily or only with great difficulty, as Sanchez, book 4, disputation 7, no. 7, Koninck, Lessius, etc., also note.

747. Principle. A matrimony entered on account of force or fear is invalid when the fear is: a) grave (absolutely or relatively); b) unjustly inflicted by a free extrinsic cause; c) deliberate, that is, inflicted in order to extort matrimony; and persevering at the time of the celebration of the matrimony. Thus by ecclesiastical law,⁵⁶¹ and more probably also by natural law. But no other fear, even if it gives cause to the contract, carries with it the nullity of the matrimony.

Explanation. What grave, unjust fear inflicted from without is was already said in I, n. 68.

Deliberate fear, or fear inflicted in order to extort matrimonial consent, is present when the fear is inflicted for the precise end that matrimony be contracted with a determinate person, or at least with a person to be chosen; or, as the Code of Canon Law, can. 1087, § 1, says, it is fear "from which, in order that someone free himself, he is compelled to choose matrimony." This condition seems necessary for invalidating matrimony; for if fear was inflicted for another reason, for example, to obtain money, to satisfy lust, and so forth, and matrimony afterward follows accidentally, the impediment is not present. Such is the far more common and truer opinion, and the opinion more conformable to the decisions of the Sacred Congregation.⁵⁶²

No other fear (for example, just fear, or fear inflicted from within) carries with it the nullity of matrimony (can. 1087, § 2).

The following solutions more fully explain the proposed principle concerning unjust fear:

a) A man living in concubinage who is in danger of death, for example, because of grave illness, an impending shipwreck, and so forth, contracts matrimony with his concubine because he gravely fears hell after death. - The matrimony is valid because the grave fear was not inflicted by a free extrinsic cause.

b) A father finds a young man acting shamefully with his daughter and threatens him with accusation before a tribunal unless he marries her. - The matrimony is valid because the fear was indeed inflicted by an extrinsic cause, but justly. For in these circumstances the father has the right of accusing. The matter is otherwise if the father threatens the young ravisher with death; for no private man can (except in legitimate defense) justly threaten or inflict death upon another. In this case the matrimony is null.⁵⁶³

c) Peter is oppressed by very great debts contracted with a wealthy Jew. The Jew demands the money lent. Peter, seeing no other escape from his straits, at length proposes to take the Jew's daughter as wife; this is done and the debts are extinguished. The matrimony is valid because the fear was not deliberate, that is, inflicted in order that matrimony be contracted.

Proof. From ecclesiastical law, that fear furnished with the conditions adduced invalidates matrimony is evident both from the texts of the law and from the constant practice of the Church.⁵⁶⁴ Thus Alexander III already says: "Since consent has no place where fear or coercion intervenes, it is necessary that where the assent of anyone is required, the occasion of coercion be repelled. But matrimony is contracted by consent alone, and when inquiry is made concerning that consent, the one whose mind is to be investigated ought to enjoy full security, lest through fear he say that what he hates is pleasing to him, and the outcome which is accustomed to proceed from unwilling nuptials follow."⁵⁶⁵ The Code of Canon Law, can. 1087, establishes the same. - Just as consent given without the form prescribed by law cannot produce true matrimony between Christians, so likewise the Church establishes that no consent, however true, given under grave and unjust fear can cause true Christian matrimony.

⁵⁶¹ Cf. Code of Canon Law, can. 1087.

⁵⁶² Feije, De imped. et dispens. matrim., n. 134; Gasparri, De matrim. II, n. 821; Aichner, Comp. iur. eccl., § 168; Wernz-Vidal, Ius can. V, n. 501; De Smet, loc. cit., n. 537; and many others hold this opinion. The Sacred Congregation of the Council on May 10, 1890, favors this opinion so openly that the opposite opinion of Lugo, Schmalzgrueber, and others has now become little probable.

⁵⁶³ Cf. the causa Benvenuti-Tazioli, resolved by the Sacred Roman Rota on January 28, 1918 (Acta Ap. Sed. XI, 22 ff.).

⁵⁶⁴ cc. 13, 14, 15, 28, X 4, 1; Code of Canon Law, can. 1087; Sacred Congregation of the Inquisition, February 15, 1901; Sacred Roman Rota, July 10, 1910, and innumerable Roman decisions.

⁵⁶⁵ c. 14, X 4, 1.

52. • I. Notion.

a) Force can be defined: "the exterior impulse of a greater thing which cannot be repelled."

Fear is: "trepidation of mind by reason of an instant or future danger."

b) Fear is distinguished:

1° Into antecedent fear, i.e., that which is the cause of the operation which is said to be done from fear; and concomitant fear, which does not influence the operation but exists together with it. And such an operation is said to be done with fear.

2° Into fear from without, i.e., that which is inflicted by an external cause; and from within, i.e., that whose cause is internal to the one suffering fear.

3° Into just fear, namely when the evil which is feared can be inflicted by strict right, justice being uninjured; and unjust fear, when the infliction of that evil would injure justice.

4° Into grave fear, which is present when these two things concur at once: a grave evil, either absolutely or relatively to the person who suffers fear, and an imminent danger of that evil, at least in the opinion of the one fearing, without there being at hand another means of escaping than to choose that which he would not will; light fear, namely when the two things aforesaid are not verified; reverential fear, which is the fear of incurring the indignation of parents or superiors. Of itself it is light, but from circumstances it can become grave.

II. Concerning the influence of force and fear upon matrimonial consent.

53. • a) Absolute force renders matrimony contracted under its influence invalid by natural law itself.

The reason is that physical violence excludes every human act and therefore every consent of the will.

54. • b) "Matrimony entered into on account of... grave fear, inflicted from without and unjustly, is invalid." (Can. 1086 § 1.)

Therefore five conditions must be present in order that fear invalidate matrimonial consent:

1°) Fear must be grave, either absolutely or relatively.

In doubt it is reputed light, because matrimony enjoys the favor of law.

2°) It must have been brought from without, and indeed by a free cause.

It matters little what person is the one causing the fear.

3°) It must be unjust as to substance, or at least as to mode.

Fear is unjust as to substance when the threatened punishment is unjust. It is unjust as to mode when the punishment itself is just, but the order of law is not observed.

4°) It must be in order to matrimony, i.e., such that in order to free himself from it one is compelled to choose matrimony.

It matters little whether one is compelled by fear to a determinate matrimony or to matrimony in general.

But authors dispute whether there is required in the author of the fear an intention of extorting consent or not.

Most assert the necessity of this intention.¹

¹ De Smedt, De sponsalibus et matrimonio, n. 537. - Vlaming, Praelectiones de Jure matrimoniali, ed. alt. 1920, n. 539. - Marc-Gesterman, Institutiones morales Alphonsianae, ed. 18., t. II, n. 1979, 4°. - Prummer, op. cit., n° 795.

Others, and more truly, as it seems to us, deny that such an intention is required.² For the words of the Code, "fear from which, in order that one may free himself, he is compelled to choose matrimony" (Can. 1087 § 1), abstract from the aforesaid intention.

² Capello, De matrimonio, n° 606, 4°. - Vermeersch-Creusen, op. cit., n. 377 d).

Practically almost always an intention of this kind will be found in him who inflicts the fear. But it can also happen that fear is inflicted not precisely for extorting consent, and yet no other way lies open besides entering matrimony by which someone can free himself from a grave and unjust evil. In such consent the words of the canon seem altogether to be verified, and therefore the matrimony is invalid.

Whatever may be the case concerning that controversy, it is always necessary that, on the part of the one suffering threats, matrimony appear as the single means of freeing himself or his own from a grave and unjust evil.

5°) The fear must persevere in the act of the celebration of matrimony. Therefore if the party who suffered fear puts it aside before matrimony is celebrated and consents freely, the matrimony is valid.

55. • III. By what law fear dirimently impedes matrimony.

a) If the fear is so great that it takes away the use of reason and free choice, by natural law there is no matrimony.

b) All agree that grave fear, clothed with the other conditions stated above, dirimently impedes matrimony from ecclesiastical law.

c) But whether fear dirimently impedes matrimony also from natural law is disputed. St. Thomas affirms it. In fact, in the impediment of fear the Church never dispenses.

56. • IV. What concerning the matrimony of the non-baptized which is contracted from fear clothed as above.

a) If an unbeliever contracts with a faithful party, there is no matrimony, whether the faithful or the unbelieving party suffers the fear.

b) The same holds if civil law declares invalid matrimony contracted from fear.

c) Outside this twofold case, such matrimony contracted by unbelievers is doubtful, because probably that impediment is of natural law.

806. Force and fear impede the fully voluntary and perfectly free consent of the will. Force properly is physical coercion inflicted on one resisting, which indeed cannot be inflicted on the internal act of the will itself, but renders the external act wholly involuntary (I, n. 69-70). Fear, on the contrary, morally influences the internal act of the will itself, namely, by the apprehension of an imminent evil, to flee which it moves the will to willing that which otherwise it would not will. When inflicted by another, it is called force or moral violence, which diminishes the voluntary but does not take it away, except exceptionally if it takes away every use of reason (I, n. 71-73). Now:

1° Physical or absolute force, which cannot be resisted and which is inflicted on one wholly unwilling, invalidates matrimony, because internal consent is lacking: it compels to the external act with full dissent of the will; this very rarely happens in celebrating matrimony, but nevertheless it is possible.

2° Grave fear, if exceptionally it wholly takes away the use of reason, invalidates matrimony, because it impedes a human act and free consent.

3° Grave fear unjustly inflicted from outside invalidates consent, if someone, in order to free himself from it, is compelled to choose matrimony as the sole escape, whether the fear as to substance or as to mode was unjust, because consent is the fruit of injustice. - On the contrary, grave fear arising from within or from a natural cause, or justly inflicted, or unjust fear which can be avoided otherwise than by matrimony, does not invalidate matrimony, because the consent is simply voluntary and is not the effect of injustice; a fortiori light fear, such as reverential fear also is of itself, unless grave vexation is added.

Hence can. 1087: "§ 1. Matrimony entered by force or by grave fear inflicted from outside and unjustly, from which, in order that one may free himself, he is compelled to choose matrimony, is also invalid.

"§ 2. No other fear, even if it gives cause to the contract, brings with it the nullity of matrimony."

Before the code they said quite generally that matrimony is invalidated only when fear is unjustly inflicted for extorting consent. This now does not seem strictly necessary, so that fear, even inflicted for another end, invalidates the matrimony which someone is compelled to choose in order to free himself from fear; but the case will be rare, although not impossible.

Absolute force and fear taking away the use of reason invalidate matrimony from natural law; whether the same must be said of fear merely grave and unjust is disputed. Several, especially canonists, think it invalid from positive law alone; many others, such as St. Raymond of Penyafort and St. Thomas,¹ derive the nullity from natural law. For since the matrimonial contract is indissoluble, unjustly inflicted fear, which renders other onerous contracts rescindable, ought to render the irrevocable contract of matrimony null, so that the full liberty of the contracting party, necessary in assuming a perpetual burden, may be preserved.

¹ Suppl. q. 47, a. 3.

Hence the validity of a matrimony entered by an unbeliever from such fear is doubtful, unless civil law invalidated it. And the Church, by reason of her doubtful power, cannot dispense concerning force and fear, and in fact does not dispense; whence matrimony extorted by fear is not revalidated unless, once the fear has been removed, consent is renewed.

807. Corollary. - Therefore accidental error and fear that is not unjust, although they give cause to the contract, do not invalidate it, although the contracting party, if he had known or had not been moved by fear, would not have contracted. For the interpretative intention, namely, does not have force, but the existing intention; not what one would have willed or done, but what he willed and did.

808. Observations. - 1. "Matrimony enjoys the favor of law; wherefore in doubt one must stand for the validity of matrimony until the contrary is proved, saving the prescription of can. 1127: in a doubtful matter the privilege of faith enjoys the favor of law," can. 1014.

These things are to be understood of a positive and probable doubt remaining after inquiry. In such a doubt matrimony is presumed valid until the contrary is proved; unless the good of faith stands in the way, which is more excellent. Whence, on account of the good of faith, a doubtful matrimony can be declared null, provided nevertheless that scandal is not to be feared, nor there be danger of injuring a ratified and consummated matrimony, which by divine law is wholly indissoluble and from which the Church cannot dispense: as in the case of a consummated matrimony between two doubtfully baptized persons (cf. Holy Office, May 5-June 10, 1937). And in individual cases recourse must be made to the Holy Office (ibid. and can. 247, § 3), or to someone to whom the faculty of dispensing has perhaps been delegated.

2. "Knowledge or opinion of the nullity of matrimony does not necessarily exclude matrimonial consent," can. 1085: if nevertheless someone intends, as much as is in him is to consent; in which case the consent, although juridically invalid, nevertheless subsists physically.

3. Hence "even if matrimony was entered invalidly by reason of an impediment, the consent furnished is presumed to persevere until its revocation has been established," can. 1093.

I say 1°. § 1. A marriage entered on account of force or grave fear inflicted from outside and unjustly, from which, in order that someone may free himself, he is compelled to choose marriage, is also invalid (Can. 1087).

This is certainly established from many places of law. Marriage must enjoy full security.

I say 2°. § 2. No other fear, even if it gives cause to the contract, carries with it the nullity of marriage (Can. 1087).

The reason is: 1°. because light fear is not judged to influence consent gravely and efficaciously; 2°. because from positive law only grave fear makes Marriage invalid; 3°. because otherwise innumerable Marriages would become invalid with the greatest detriment to society.

Question 1. Does any grave fear whatsoever dirimently invalidate Marriage?

Resp. Negatively, but the following conditions are required, namely, that it be inflicted 1°. by an external and free cause; 2°. unjustly; 3°. that from it, in order to free himself, someone be compelled to choose marriage.

Question 2. By what law does grave fear dirimently invalidate Marriage?

Resp. Certainly by ecclesiastical law; but whether also by the law of nature is disputed among theologians, and S. Alphonsus, n. 1054, relates reasons on either side. Besides, no practical utility can be derived from the solution of this controversy. For either the discussion is of Marriage to be contracted or of one contracted. If the first, the Church will never dispense unless the cause of fear is first removed; if the other, that Marriage will never be declared invalid unless it has first been proved, in the external forum, that all the conditions which the Church requires for grave fear were verified. - Cf. Ballerini, note (c), p. 806.

Anna, converted to the Catholic faith some years ago, comes to Caius, a missionary, and says that while a Protestant in northern Ireland she married Titius, a Protestant, having been driven to this by continual entreaties and even by threats of expulsion from her father’s house. Afterwards she bore him two sons, but finally, because of his cruelty and because she had never loved him, she left her husband in Ireland and came to England. Now she cohabits as a wife with Titius, a Catholic, and each would like to enter marriage so that they may receive the sacraments. Caius, however, does not know whether it is lawful to admit them to marriage, and asks what he must do. Hence it is asked:

1. What is the impediment of fear, and by what law is it established?

2. Can a marriage invalid because of fear be validated, and how?

3. To whom does it belong to treat such matrimonial causes?

4. What is to be said of the case?

1. What is the impediment of fear, and by what law is it established?

Fear is a perturbation of mind arising from present or future danger. When marriage is contracted through grave fear caused unjustly by a free agent with a view to extorting marriage, ecclesiastical law makes the marriage null and void. Whether it is also void by natural law is a disputed point among divines.¹

1 Manual of Moral Theology, vol. ii, 320.

2. Can marriage, void through fear, be revalidated, and how?

Yes, such marriage may be revalidated when the fear ceases by expressing free matrimonial consent.²

2 Ibid., 321.

3. To whom does it belong to treat of such matrimonial causes?

To the bishop as judge of first instance in the external forum. “ Questions concerning the validity of marriages are called causes; these pertain solely to the external forum and must be juridically determined by the Ordinary. Therefore, recourse must be had to the ordinary when it is about entering into a new marriage where there is doubt regarding the validity of a marriage already contracted ... But as regards marriages already contracted, we most gravely admonish and command in the Lord all priests who have the care of souls that, although it may be most certainly established to them that some marriage was invalid, they openly declare to all concerned that they have no authority to pronounce judgment in a matter of this kind: but before they presume to proceed to a new marriage, they must recourse to the ordinary and await his legal judgment. ” (IV Cone. West., d. 15).

4. The case. Caius may not admit Ann to a fresh marriage until it has been proved that the former marriage was invalid. It is possible that it was invalid to begin with; whether it afterwards became revalidated by the expression of free marital consent on the part of the woman or not, does not appear from the case as stated. Caius should therefore question Ann with a view to finding this out, and so discovering whether there is a prima facie case for invalidity or not. If he finds that there is solid ground for thinking that the former marriage was and remained null and void, Caius should send all the particulars of the case to the bishop, who after examining the evidence will pass sentence in accordance with it. The case will then be sent to the higher ecclesiastical court if the bishop's sentence was in favor of invalidity. The woman will be free to marry again after two concordant sentences have been given in favor of the nullity of the marriage.