Article I: On Violence

68. Violence, which is called coercion when it is exercised toward a being that has knowledge, is properly a motion which proceeds from an extrinsic principle, with the patient resisting, that is, with that which suffers force resisting. It is said:

From an extrinsic principle, and thus the violent differs from the natural and the voluntary, which are from within: for nothing properly inflicts violence on itself, for otherwise it would at the same time tend and not tend toward the same thing;

With the patient resisting, that is, while the one suffering resists with every effort. For if something is naturally or voluntarily disposed, or not indisposed but indifferent, to suffering that which is from without, the passion will be natural or voluntary or permitted, not violent.

Hence violence is distinguished as a) violence strictly so called, or absolute and perfect, when the patient resists as much as he can, for example death inflicted on one who defends his life; and b) violence broadly so called, imperfect and in a certain respect, when he resists but not as much as he can, for example death inflicted on a martyr.

It differs a) from the necessary, to which it adds that it is from an extrinsic principle, while the necessary can also be from within;

b) from the involuntary, because this can be from within, from the knowledge of evil or defect of knowledge of the end. Indeed, every violent thing is necessary, and, if there is question of a knowing being, involuntary; but not conversely;

c) from that which is called moral violence: with properly so called physical violence (which by St. Thomas, II Sent. d. 25, q. 1, a. 2, is called sufficient and compelling) there is not to be confused the improperly so called or moral (it is called insufficient and impelling), which is inflicted by threatening and rebuking and which coincides with grave fear instilled, especially when something would not be impeded by resisting but would then be effected by external force, e.g., departure from a house made by someone who otherwise is expelled by military hand.

69. Can Violence Be Inflicted on the Will? - There is a twofold act of the will: one immediately elicited by it, namely, to will; the other commanded by it, exercised through another power, for example voluntarily to think, to walk, to speak. As to the former, violence cannot be inflicted on the will: for an elicited act is the very inclination of the will to something, proceeding from an intrinsic knowing principle; but a violent act proceeds from an extrinsic principle. Therefore it is impossible for an act of the will to be violent. And indeed, the violent is against the inclination of the patient; but the elicited act of the will, since it is the inclination of the will itself, cannot be against its own inclination. Hence Anselm says, De libero arbitrio, chapter 6: "No one can unwillingly will something, because he cannot will while unwilling to will." - But as to commanded acts, it can suffer violence, insofar as by violence our external or internal powers are moved against the command of the will, or are impeded lest they execute it, for example the foot lest it make a step, the eye, by closing it, lest it see, etc. Hence:

a) No one can coerce the will itself, not even God Himself.

b) God alone, as cause both of the will and of the act itself, can change it, that is, transfer it from one thing into another and make the unwilling willing, and the one willing this to be willing that; nevertheless He then does not inflict violence, or coerce the will against its inclination, but makes one inclination of the will succeed another.

c) God, angels, and the devil can, against the will, move the intellect, imagination, and sensitive appetite toward some object; in this case that movement with respect to these faculties is not violent, but it is violent with respect to the will.

d) All these, and men, can move the exterior members and external senses against the will.

70. Principles. The violent is directly opposed to the voluntary, and therefore makes the involuntary: for the violent (when it is inflicted on a knowing being) is from an extrinsic principle against the inclination of the willing subject; but the voluntary is from within, that is, from the proper inclination of the will (cf. can. 2205, § 1).

"Common to the voluntary and the natural," says St. Thomas, a. 5, "is that each is from an intrinsic principle" (i.e., from the proper inclination of the agent); "but the violent is from an extrinsic principle" (against the inclination of the subject). "And because of this, just as in things which lack cognition violence makes something be against nature" (unnatural), "so in knowing things it makes something be against the will... which is called involuntary."

Hence that which happens from an extrinsic principle:

If the subject resists externally and internally as much as he can, is absolutely violent and altogether involuntary;

If he resists externally, but consents internally, it is not voluntary nor involuntary, but willed;

If he does not consent nor resist, or does not resist as much as he can, but bears himself passively, while he ought not to resist or to resist more, it is not voluntary but permitted;

If he does not consent, but neither does he resist as much as he ought, it is indirectly voluntary (no. 60, II);

If he does not resist as much as he can but consents, it is violent in a certain respect but simply voluntary, yet less so the greater the violence was or the more he resisted. For the voluntary is "in one way according to action, when someone wills to do something; in another way according to passion, when someone wills to suffer something from another. Hence when an action is inflicted by someone exterior, while there remains in him who suffers the will of suffering, it is not simply violent, because although he who suffers does not contribute by acting, nevertheless he contributes by willing to suffer; hence it cannot be called involuntary" (a. 5, ad 2).

A girl oppressed by force, if she resists as much as she can, is oppressed involuntarily; if she does not resist as much as she ought or if she consents, voluntarily and culpably; if she does not resist as much as she can but as much as she ought, not involuntarily but permissively. Danger of consent being excluded, she is not bound to resist by useless means, or extraordinary means (the killing of the aggressor), or even by shouting if there is danger of notable harm, e.g., death, excessive shame: in these cases the oppression is not voluntary. But if internally she consents, externally she resists as much as she ought, the external oppression is not therefore truly voluntary, but only willed.