Meekness

I. Notion of Meekness. Meekness is a moral virtue inclining man to moderate anger according to the prescription of reason illumined by faith. It is said to moderate anger, that is, the appetite for vengeance.

II. Object of Meekness. 1. The remote material object is constituted by all things from which the appetite for vengeance can break forth into act, for example words, deeds, or contraries which, by the aid of others, through one's own fault, or from elsewhere, happen to someone; the proximate object is the very movements of anger, insofar as they are, according to the rule of faith, either to be suppressed, or moderated, or aroused.

2. The remote formal object is the reason of debt of measuring the movements of anger according to the principle of faith; the proximate formal object is the special moral goodness shining forth in this measuring (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 157, aa. 1 and 2).

III. Opposed Vices. By excess there is opposed to meekness irascibility, by which someone indulges the movements of anger too much, whether as to object or as to manner (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 158, aa. 1-8); by defect, however, sluggishness, by which someone unduly is not angry, or is not angry enough (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 158, a. 8).

There are twelve Fruits of the Holy Ghost enumerated by St. Paul (Gal. v, 22-23). (a) Some of these acts grow out of the indwelling Spirit, and are delightful to the spiritual taste because they perfect the agent in himself. Charity, joy, and peace indicate that the soul is rightly disposed as to what is good; patience and longsuffering, that it is not disturbed by evils. (b) Others of these Fruits give spiritual delight because they perfect the agent in his relations to his fellows. Good will and kindness show that one is well-disposed towards others; meekness and fidelity, that injury does not overcome him, or make him deceitful. (c) Still other Fruits are delightful because they order a man’s life rightly as to external actions or internal passions, such as modesty, continency, chastity.

The Parts of Temperance.—(a) The subjective parts or species of temperance are two, since there are two distinct objects of the virtue. These objects are the two delights of touch that are ruled by the virtue, namely, those associated with the nutritive and those associated with the generative function. The first subjective part of temperance includes abstemiousness as to food and sobriety as to drink; the second part includes chastity, as regards the principal sexual act (copulation), and decency or pudicity, as regards the secondary acts (kisses, touches, embraces, etc).

(b) The integral parts are also two, since there are two conditions for the perfect exercise of temperance. These conditions are the fear and avoidance of what is disgraceful (shamefacedness, reserve, or delicacy) and the love of what is honorable (virtue of propriety or refinement). Shamefacedness is a passion, but, as physical fearlessness is a disposition for moral courage, so is the fear of incurring reproach a preparation for virtue. Hence, this delicacy is a laudable passion, and is ascribed chiefly to temperance, whose opposite is chief among things disgraceful. Propriety is also assigned to temperance, because it is an attraction towards that which is spiritually good and beautiful, a habit most useful for temperance, which must subordinate the delightful to the good, the carnal to the spiritual.

(c) The potential parts of temperance are its minor or servant virtues. They resemble temperance inasmuch as their chief praise is in moderation, but they are inferior to it inasmuch as that which is moderated by them is less recalcitrant than the sexual or gustatory appetites. First among these potential parts are those whose task of moderating, while not of the greatest difficulty, is yet more than ordinarily difficult; and here we have continence, which calms a will agitated by immoderate passion, and meekness, which governs the passion of anger. Next among the potential parts are those whose task of moderating offers less or ordinary difficulty, because they keep in order matters less removed from reason. All the virtues of this second group are given the common name of modesty. They are reduced to four: humility and studiosity, which moderate the internal appetites of excellence and of learning respectively; modesty of bearing and modesty of living, which regulate respectively the external acts of the body and the external goods of food, drink, clothing, furnishings, etc.

Meekness.—Meekness or mildness is the virtue that moderates anger.

(a) It is a virtue, since it consists in moderation according to right reason. Our Lord proclaims it blessed (Matt., v. 4). and St. Paul numbers it among the Fruits of the Spirit (Gal., v. 23). Illustrious models of mildness are Joseph (Gen., l. 20), Moses (Num., xii. 3), David (I Kings, xxiv), Christ (Luke, xv; John, i. 29, viii. 11), St. Paul (Acts, xx. 31).

(b) Its office is moderation, and hence in its manner, though not in its matter, it is like temperance. It follows the middle way between the extremes of sinful indignation and sinful indulgence.

(c) Its matter is the passion of anger, that is, the sensitive appetite that inclines one to avenge an evil by punishing its author. Like other passions (121), anger is indifferent in itself, but it is made good or evil by its reasonableness or unreasonableness. The meek man is angry at times, but only when and where and as he should be (Ps. iv. 5); his anger is not a blind impulse, but a righteous zeal that attacks a wrong only after reason has shown that this is the proper course.

What is temperance, what are its parts, and what vices are opposed to it? - R. To the first. Temperance is the virtue which moderates concupiscence and delight of sensible goods, especially in the delights of taste and touch, of which some regard conserving the individual, others conserving the species. Insensibility and intemperance are opposed to temperance. The former consists in this, that someone flees delight so much that he therefore omits even those things which are necessary for the conservation of nature. But the latter is the sin of excessive concupiscence. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 141 seqq.; Quodl. 12, a. 22.

R. To the second and third. The integral parts of temperance are shamefacedness and honorableness. Through shamefacedness someone flees shamefulness contrary to temperance. Through honorableness someone loves the beauty of temperance. - S. Th. 2. 2. q. 143; q. 144; q. 145.

The subjective parts of temperance are: Abstinence, which moderates delight in the use of foods and non-intoxicating drink; and gluttony is opposed to it, cf. 329. - Sobriety, which moderates delight in the use of drink able to intoxicate; and drunkenness is opposed to it, cf. 332. - Chastity, which moderates according to right reason the principal delight of coitus itself; and lust is opposed to it, cf. 325. Modesty, which moderates surrounding delights, for instance in kisses, touches, embraces, looks. Sometimes, however, one is put for the other. - S. Th. 2. 2. q. 143, 146 seqq.

The potential parts of temperance are: Continence, which contains man in the good of reason against the pleasures of touch, especially venereal pleasures; and incontinence is opposed to it, which impels toward those delights and yields to them. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 155, 156. Meekness, which moderates the passion of anger according to right reason; and anger is opposed to it by excess, cf. n. 341 seq.; by defect, lack of anger, which does not stir up anger when it is required by charity or justice, by correcting and punishing. It does not have malice diverse from that of the omitted office to be fulfilled from charity or justice. - S. Th. 2. 2. q. 143, 157, 158. Clemency, which is proper to Superiors, inclines one to impose lesser punishments than by right he could, because of kindness toward neighbor and the decorum of a Superior. Cruelty is opposed to it by excess, which from harshness of soul exacts punishments beyond measure; but by defect, excessive lenity, which mitigates punishments beyond measure or remits them altogether. Cruelty is distinguished from savagery, according to which someone in inflicting punishments does not consider any fault of the one who is punished, but only this, that he delights in the torment of men. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 143, 157, 159.

Modesty, by which someone moderates his internal and external motions and the arrangement of his things, by a measure fitting to him. Hence under modesty the following four virtues are numbered. Humility, which moderates the motions of the soul toward lofty things, and inclines us to profess our lowliness by internal and external signs. To humility is opposed by excess pride, cf. n. 321 seq.; and by defect excessive abjection of self, which inclines to immoderate self-abjection. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 143, 160 seqq. Studiousness, which moderates the zeal of knowing according to the dictate of right reason. To it by excess is opposed curiosity, by which someone is impelled to applying superfluous diligence of knowing, from affection for knowledge alone. But by defect negligence is opposed to it, by which someone omits to acquire owed knowledge. Curiosity and negligence per se are light, per accidens grave, for instance if the former impels you to extort a secret from another, the latter incites a confessor to omit the study of Moral Theology. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 166 seqq.

Modesty of manners, which moderates the external gestures and motions of the body according to the norm of reason, so that namely they agree with the person, both in himself and considered with all circumstances of things. To modesty of manners is opposed by excess petulance, by which a foreign mode is assumed, not agreeing with one's own condition, or an overly common mode is shown; but by defect rusticity of manners, which does not preserve a fitting mode. Each is per se light. A species of modesty of manners is eutrapelia, which imposes due mode on games and places. By excess and by defect one can also sin in play, by scurrility and excessive austerity. - S. Th. 2. 2. q. 168. Modesty of dress moderates the arrangement of external things according to the prescription of reason. For it is fitting that in human society each one wear clothing convenient to his own condition. Likewise by excess and by defect one can sin in this matter, which per se is only light. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 169.

The end of the precept is charity, through which we are induced to loving God and neighbor. Among the vices opposed to temperance, adultery seems especially to be opposed to love of neighbor, and therefore it is chiefly prohibited by the precepts of the Decalogue not only in deed, but also in heart, the sixth and ninth. - But virtues annexed to the virtue of temperance, as to their effects, can likewise rightly regard charity toward God and neighbor; as, for example, from anger, which is opposed to meekness, someone proceeds to blaspheming God, or to killing a man. And thus a precept is also present concerning these virtues, implicitly in the Decalogue, explicitly in other places of Scripture. As to the integral parts of temperance, shamefacedness and honorableness, cf. 1 Cor. 14:40; 1 Tim. 2:9. As to the subjective parts, abstinence, sobriety, chastity, cf. Num. 6:3; 1 Pet. 5:8; Col. 3:5. As to the potential parts, continence, clemency, meekness, modesty, humility, cf. Ecclus. 10:31; 30:24; Col. 3:12; 2 Tim. 2:24. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 170. Therefore the various precepts of the Decalogue contain precepts of moral virtues. But in the first precept, I am the Lord thy God, the precepts of the theological virtues, faith, hope, charity, are also presuppositively and implicitly contained.

1087. Meekness is a virtue which moderates anger according to right reason. It is born from humility and fortitude: for since the chief cause of anger is inordinate love of oneself, bearing with difficulty injuries received from others, he is easily meek who humbly acknowledges that he is worthy of many injuries on account of the sins which he has committed. On the other hand, for restraining anger, the greatest fortitude is required.

⁶ St. Francis de Sales, Introduction, p. III, ch. 8-9; Olier, op. cit., ch. 10.

(A) Meekness tempers anger especially in two ways: (a) it forbids us to be angry without sufficient cause; for anger is ordered to repelling evil, and therefore it is lawful only insofar as it is necessary for repelling some evil; (b) it prevents anger, when it is legitimate, from passing beyond just limits, lest, for example, it arise too quickly or last too long, or exceed as to mode.

But the perfectly meek not only temper anger, but generally abstain from it, even when it is otherwise legitimate. Christ indeed counsels this when He says:⁷ "But I say to you not to resist evil; but if one strike thee on thy right cheek, turn to him also the other. And if a man will contend with thee in judgment, and take away thy coat, let go thy cloak also unto him."

⁷ Matt. 5:39.

Concerning the means of restraining anger, and therefore of acquiring meekness, we have already spoken, n. 534-537.

1088. (B) Akin to this virtue is clemency, which inclines superiors to mitigate the punishment owed to offenders, insofar as justice permits, and therefore to spare when it is fitting. It arises from meekness and from a certain sweetness of affection, by which one recoils from everything that can sadden another;⁸ yet they differ from each other, insofar as clemency moderates exterior punishment, while meekness properly diminishes the passion of anger.⁹ To clemency are opposed cruelty and, by abuse, excessive leniency.

⁸ St. Thomas, II-II, q. 157, a. 2.

⁹ St. Thomas, ibid., a. 1.

709. Meekness is a moral virtue which moderates anger according to right reason.¹³⁸³

Anger is not an affection evil of itself, but is a passion indifferent of itself and can be defined: the appetite for vengeance. Anger through vice, which precedes the use of reason and disturbs it, is distinguished from anger through zeal, which follows deliberation and greatly assists the execution of an arduous work. Sinful anger or irascibility occurs in two ways: a) by reason of the object, when someone wills to take vengeance contrary to the order of right, or from hatred or another evil end; b) by reason of the mode, if, namely, anger boils up excessively, whether inwardly or outwardly. Inordinate anger on the part of the object is a mortal sin from its genus; but that which is inordinate on the part of the mode is only venial from its genus. The reason is that anger inordinate by reason of its object injures justice; but if the disorder is confined to the mode, it is an excess in a thing otherwise lawful; and this excess of itself is only a venial sin. In order to judge in practice concerning the sinfulness of anger, the degrees of anger and the scandal thence given must also be considered.

Anger is a capital vice, because many other vices are wont to arise from it, as was said above, I, n. 429.¹³⁸⁴ Meekness, which rightly moderates anger, is a very precious virtue; for it truly renders a man lovable to God and to his neighbors. Christ came to us as a "meek king"¹³⁸⁵ and was "as a meek lamb that is carried to be a victim."¹³⁸⁶ Wherefore St. Paul beseeches the Corinthians, writing: "I beseech you by the meekness and modesty of Christ."¹³⁸⁷ Meekness also renders us pleasing to men; whence it is said: "My son, perform thy works in meekness, and thou shalt be beloved above the glory of men,"¹³⁸⁸ and: "The meek ... shall inherit the land, and shall delight in abundance of peace."¹³⁸⁹ But meekness is especially necessary for priests; and therefore Christ said to his disciples: "Behold I send you as sheep in the midst of wolves."¹³⁹⁰ For acquiring meekness, humility, which makes us conscious of our own defects, and fortitude, which strengthens the will against sudden motions of anger, are very conducive.

Opposed to meekness by defect is sluggishness or failure to become angry in correcting and restraining vices; but by excess, anger, as has already been said. Among others, St. Thomas¹³⁹¹ and St. Francis de Sales¹³⁹² have written excellently concerning meekness.

¹³⁸³ Sanftmut, mansuétude [meekness].

¹³⁸⁴ Cf. S. theol. 2, 2, q. 158, a. 7.

¹³⁸⁵ Matt. 21:5.

¹³⁸⁶ Jer. 11:19.

¹³⁸⁷ 2 Cor. 10:1.

¹³⁸⁸ Ecclus. 3:19.

¹³⁸⁹ Ps. 36:11.

¹³⁹⁰ Matt. 10:16.

¹³⁹¹ S. theol. 2, 2, q. 157.

¹³⁹² Philothea, Part 3, chs. 8 and 9.

S. Th. II-II, q. 157.

1033. To moderate vengeance, two virtues annexed to temperance concur: meekness (douceur; zachtmoedigheid), which is the virtue moderating anger, or the very appetite of vengeance, according to right reason; and clemency (goedertierenheid), which is the virtue moderating punishments from mildness of affection insofar as the account of justice permits. For from mildness toward neighbor one is well affected and abhors his evil, and inclines the soul to imposing lesser punishments than can be imposed by right, with attention to the circumstances of the fact, person, cause, mode, etc.

These two virtues are distinguished: meekness directly moderates the very appetite or affection of vengeance and diminishes the passion itself of anger, and is in the irascible appetite; clemency directly moderates and diminishes the effect, namely exterior punishment, and therefore also the affection (of a superior) of using his whole power, and is in the will. Yet this does not prevent them from being able to concur in the same effect, when anger rises up in a superior who has the office of punishing: for then meekness, by moderating anger, brings it about that a graver punishment is not inflicted, which properly belongs to clemency, just as abstinence from theft, which belongs to justice, can be from liberality, which restrains the inordinate love of money. Nevertheless, even then they tend to the effect under a diverse formal motive: meekness inclines to it because of the honorableness which shines forth in moderating anger; clemency because of the honorableness which is in not using one's whole power on account of benignity; meekness moderates punishment as to be taken away from the impulse of anger, clemency as to be inflicted from legitimate power. Therefore meekness is not about an interior act and clemency about an exterior act; but clemency is a virtue proper to superiors, meekness common to all.

But meekness, for moderating anger, has two chief offices: a) it represses anger where a just cause of being angry is lacking; b) and if a just cause is present, it prevents anger from exceeding measure; hence it is a mean between irascibility and lack of anger.

1034. These virtues are annexed parts of temperance, because they imitate it in secondary matter as to mode: for as temperance consists in the restraint of more vehement concupiscence, of foods and venereal things, so meekness and clemency consist in a certain restraint of anger and punishments, namely in the restraint of a less vehement concupiscence, namely anger, and of the affection for inflicting punishments.

They are virtues because they moderate punishments and anger according to right reason; hence:

a) Meekness is not directly opposed to severity. For "meekness is about angers, but severity is considered about the exterior infliction of punishments"; nor is clemency opposed to severity, because each is according to right reason. "For severity is inflexible concerning the infliction of punishments when right reason requires this; but clemency diminishes punishments also according to right reason, namely when it is fitting and in those in whom it is fitting. And therefore they are not opposed, because they are not about the same thing" (a. 2, ad 1).

b) They hold the mean between excess and defect, although they diminish anger and punishments: "The virtue (of meekness) is named from the diminution of anger... because virtue is nearer to diminution than to superabundance, on account of the fact that it is more natural for man to seek vengeance for injuries inflicted than to be deficient in this, because injuries brought upon oneself scarcely seem too small to anyone... But clemency is diminutive of punishments, not indeed with respect to that which is according to right reason, but with respect to that which is according to the common law, which legal justice regards; but on account of certain particulars considered, clemency diminishes punishments, as it were judging that a man is not to be punished more... From this it is clear that clemency is compared to severity as epikeia to legal justice, of which severity is a part as to the infliction of punishments according to law. Yet clemency differs from epikeia" (ad 2): "In the diminution of punishments two things are to be considered. One of these is that the diminution of punishments be made according to the intention of the legislator, although not according to the words of the law; and according to this it pertains to epikeia. The other is a certain moderation of affection, so that a man does not use his power in inflicting punishments; and this properly pertains to clemency... And this moderation of soul proceeds from a certain sweetness of affection, by which one abhors everything which can sadden another" (a. 3, ad 1).

c) They also differ from piety and mercy "as to the motive: for piety removes the evils of neighbors from the reverence which it has toward some superior, for example toward God or a parent; but mercy removes the evils of neighbors from this, that one is saddened in them, insofar as he judges them to pertain to himself..., which proceeds from friendship, which makes friends rejoice and be saddened concerning the same things; but meekness does this insofar as it removes anger inciting to vengeance; but clemency does this from mildness of soul, insofar as it judges it equitable that someone should not be punished further" (a. 4, ad 3). And therefore "mercy and clemency agree in this, that each flees and abhors another's misery, yet differently and differently: for it belongs to mercy to relieve misery by the conferring of benefit; it belongs to clemency to diminish misery by the removal of punishments" (q. 159, a. 1, ad 2).

1035. They are not virtues simply the most perfect. - For they are praiseworthy and withdraw from evil insofar as they diminish anger or punishment; but it is more perfect to attain good than to lack evil. And therefore the theological virtues, prudence, and justice are simply greater. Yet under a certain respect they have a certain excellence among the virtues which resist passions. For "anger, which meekness mitigates, because of its impulse, especially impedes the soul of man from freely judging truth, and on account of this meekness especially makes man possessed of himself... But clemency, in this that it diminishes punishments, seems especially to approach charity, which is the most excellent of the virtues, through which we work goods for neighbors and impede their evils" (q. 157, a. 4).

MILDNESS is the virtue establishing moderation in the appetite for vengeance, that is, in anger, or in the bearing of injuries, as St. Bonavent. teaches in Hexaëmer. serm. 5. and lib. 5. Compend. Theol. ver. cap. 49., where he asserts it to be the same virtue as meekness, of which it is said Blessed are the meek, etc. It differs from patience, which is in the bearing of bodily troubles.

That this is a virtue is evident, because it is concerned with an arduous object morally good, which is the moderation of anger.

It is also proved because the prayer of the meek hath always pleased him, as is said Judith 9., and Numbers 12., where Moses is called the meekest among men, and is praised; and Matthew 5.: Blessed are the meek: for they shall possess the land. This the Holy Doctor in Diaeta, tit. 7. cap. 2., who adds that Christ also is praised as mild, Jerem. 11.: I was as a mild lamb, and Psalm 44.: For truth and mildness, etc.

On this see the splendid things there, especially concerning the nature of man, distinct from the wild beasts.

This gentleness, and instruction, and apt disposition of information in divine things, James 1. asserts:³ In mildness receive the ingrafted word. Then they are not assailed, but inherit the land, as is said Matthew 5. Third, they are exalted, as Christ, who came mild, Matthew 21., and Psalm 75.: God shall arise in judgment, to save all the mild of the earth. Fourth, they are honored the more, Psalm 146.: The Lord lifteth up the mild. This the Holy Doctor in Diaeta, tit. 8. cap. 4. ³ Editor's note: the print/OCR reads 'HANC vetitatem'; rendered as 'facilitatem' (docility/easiness), which fits the citation of James 1: 'in mansuetudine suscipite insitum verbum', since 'vetitatem' is not intelligible Latin.

Yet the Holy Doctor warns that this virtue is not always to be employed, but sometimes severity, on those words of John 6.: You seek me, because you saw signs, therefore he says that severity and discipline are sometimes necessary for a master, when the disciple has been slow and dull. Therefore in serm. 5. Hexaëmer. he says that mildness is against Irascibility and anger, not so that man should not be angry at all, but when he ought, and as much as he ought, as is said 2. Eth. cap. 7. and lib. 4. cap. 6.