Article I: On Meekness and Clemency in Themselves

S. Th. II-II, q. 157.

1033. To moderate vengeance, two virtues annexed to temperance concur: meekness (douceur; zachtmoedigheid), which is the virtue moderating anger, or the very appetite of vengeance, according to right reason; and clemency (goedertierenheid), which is the virtue moderating punishments from mildness of affection insofar as the account of justice permits. For from mildness toward neighbor one is well affected and abhors his evil, and inclines the soul to imposing lesser punishments than can be imposed by right, with attention to the circumstances of the fact, person, cause, mode, etc.

These two virtues are distinguished: meekness directly moderates the very appetite or affection of vengeance and diminishes the passion itself of anger, and is in the irascible appetite; clemency directly moderates and diminishes the effect, namely exterior punishment, and therefore also the affection (of a superior) of using his whole power, and is in the will. Yet this does not prevent them from being able to concur in the same effect, when anger rises up in a superior who has the office of punishing: for then meekness, by moderating anger, brings it about that a graver punishment is not inflicted, which properly belongs to clemency, just as abstinence from theft, which belongs to justice, can be from liberality, which restrains the inordinate love of money. Nevertheless, even then they tend to the effect under a diverse formal motive: meekness inclines to it because of the honorableness which shines forth in moderating anger; clemency because of the honorableness which is in not using one's whole power on account of benignity; meekness moderates punishment as to be taken away from the impulse of anger, clemency as to be inflicted from legitimate power. Therefore meekness is not about an interior act and clemency about an exterior act; but clemency is a virtue proper to superiors, meekness common to all.

But meekness, for moderating anger, has two chief offices: a) it represses anger where a just cause of being angry is lacking; b) and if a just cause is present, it prevents anger from exceeding measure; hence it is a mean between irascibility and lack of anger.

1034. These virtues are annexed parts of temperance, because they imitate it in secondary matter as to mode: for as temperance consists in the restraint of more vehement concupiscence, of foods and venereal things, so meekness and clemency consist in a certain restraint of anger and punishments, namely in the restraint of a less vehement concupiscence, namely anger, and of the affection for inflicting punishments.

They are virtues because they moderate punishments and anger according to right reason; hence:

a) Meekness is not directly opposed to severity. For "meekness is about angers, but severity is considered about the exterior infliction of punishments"; nor is clemency opposed to severity, because each is according to right reason. "For severity is inflexible concerning the infliction of punishments when right reason requires this; but clemency diminishes punishments also according to right reason, namely when it is fitting and in those in whom it is fitting. And therefore they are not opposed, because they are not about the same thing" (a. 2, ad 1).

b) They hold the mean between excess and defect, although they diminish anger and punishments: "The virtue (of meekness) is named from the diminution of anger... because virtue is nearer to diminution than to superabundance, on account of the fact that it is more natural for man to seek vengeance for injuries inflicted than to be deficient in this, because injuries brought upon oneself scarcely seem too small to anyone... But clemency is diminutive of punishments, not indeed with respect to that which is according to right reason, but with respect to that which is according to the common law, which legal justice regards; but on account of certain particulars considered, clemency diminishes punishments, as it were judging that a man is not to be punished more... From this it is clear that clemency is compared to severity as epikeia to legal justice, of which severity is a part as to the infliction of punishments according to law. Yet clemency differs from epikeia" (ad 2): "In the diminution of punishments two things are to be considered. One of these is that the diminution of punishments be made according to the intention of the legislator, although not according to the words of the law; and according to this it pertains to epikeia. The other is a certain moderation of affection, so that a man does not use his power in inflicting punishments; and this properly pertains to clemency... And this moderation of soul proceeds from a certain sweetness of affection, by which one abhors everything which can sadden another" (a. 3, ad 1).

c) They also differ from piety and mercy "as to the motive: for piety removes the evils of neighbors from the reverence which it has toward some superior, for example toward God or a parent; but mercy removes the evils of neighbors from this, that one is saddened in them, insofar as he judges them to pertain to himself..., which proceeds from friendship, which makes friends rejoice and be saddened concerning the same things; but meekness does this insofar as it removes anger inciting to vengeance; but clemency does this from mildness of soul, insofar as it judges it equitable that someone should not be punished further" (a. 4, ad 3). And therefore "mercy and clemency agree in this, that each flees and abhors another's misery, yet differently and differently: for it belongs to mercy to relieve misery by the conferring of benefit; it belongs to clemency to diminish misery by the removal of punishments" (q. 159, a. 1, ad 2).

1035. They are not virtues simply the most perfect. - For they are praiseworthy and withdraw from evil insofar as they diminish anger or punishment; but it is more perfect to attain good than to lack evil. And therefore the theological virtues, prudence, and justice are simply greater. Yet under a certain respect they have a certain excellence among the virtues which resist passions. For "anger, which meekness mitigates, because of its impulse, especially impedes the soul of man from freely judging truth, and on account of this meekness especially makes man possessed of himself... But clemency, in this that it diminishes punishments, seems especially to approach charity, which is the most excellent of the virtues, through which we work goods for neighbors and impede their evils" (q. 157, a. 4).