How a mortal sin becomes venial and a venial mortal

Mortal sin may in certain circumstances become venial, and, on the contrary, venial sin may become following paragraphs will make this clear: mortal. The (a) Mortal sin may become venial on account of an erroneous conscience which wrongly judges a grave sin to be only venial.

(b) The same may happen on account of imperfect advertence or imperfect consent to an act which in itself is gravely sinful.

On the other hand, a venial sin may become mortal:

(a) On account of an erroneous conscience which falsely judges a venial sin to be mortal.

(b) On account of a gravely sinful intention with which a venial sin is committed, as when a lie is told in order to commit adultery.

(c) On account of the proximate danger to which one is exposed of committing grave sin, as when one reads a slightly indecent book, but foreseeing that it will be the proximate occasion of grave sin.

(d) On account of grave scandal caused by venial sin.

(e) When light matter coalesces and becomes grave by additions, as when one who is bound to fast frequently in the day takes small quantities of food, which are notable in the aggregate; or when a considerable amount of money is stolen in small thefts.

Although no mere multiplication of venial sins can ever amount to a mortal sin, yet venial sin frequently committed disposes the soul to commit mortal sin both directly and indirectly. Directly, by forming a habit which becomes stronger and stronger, continually requiring greater indulgence for its satisfaction, and finally leads to mortal sin. This is often seen in such sins as theft and lust. Indirectly, because venial sin familiarizes the soul with wrongdoing, lessens the fear of God in the soul, diminishes the fervour of charity, and causes God to withhold those more abundant graces which he would otherwise give, and which would preserve the soul from sin, but without which the soul falls grievously.

Mortal Sin.—A sin is mortal or deadly, when by it a person turns away from God, his Last End, and prefers to Him some created good, thereby incurring the debt of eternal punishment.

The first condition necessary in order that a sin may be judged mortal is that the matter of the sin be grave, either in itself or in the opinion of him who commits it; it must include turning away from God and the substitution of some created good as the Last End.

The matter of a sin is known to be grave: (a) when the law of God or of the Church declares that it is seriously displeasing to God, or that it will separate one from His favor or rewards; (b) when right reason shows that it does great injury to the rights of God, of society, of one’s neighbor, or of oneself.

The matter of a sin is grave in two ways. (a) It is grave from the character of the act and without exception, when the good which is injured is infinite, or is a finite good of greatest importance and indivisible, Thus, heresy, despair, and simony against divine law are always serious, because they offend against an infinite good; while murder, though it injures only a finite good, is nevertheless always grave matter because earthly life is of highest importance among finite goods, and if taken away is taken entirely. (b) The matter of a sin is grave from the character of the act but with exceptions, when the good that is injured is of grave importance, but finite and divisible. Thus, the worship we give to God is finite and admits of more and less; and hence a sin against worship, though serious from the nature of the offence, may be slight on account of the smallness of the irreverence. Similarly, though theft injures a grave right, it is not grave matter when the amount stolen is small.

The second condition required that a sin be mortal is that there be full advertence to the grave malice of the act, for one cannot be said to separate oneself from God unless one has made the same amount of deliberation that is required for any temporal affair of great moment.

Advertence is the act by which the mind gives attention to something. It is of two kinds: (a) full advertence, when there is nothing to impede perfect attention, as when a person is wide awake, in full possession of his faculties, and not distracted; (b) partial advertence, when there is something that, prevents entire attention, as when a person is only partly awake; or not entirely conscious, or distracted with many things.

Hence in the following cases, even though there be serious matter, a sin is not mortal, on account of lack of full advertence. (a) When without one’s will there is no full advertence to the act itself, as happens with those who are half-asleep, or who are under the influence of drugs, or who are mentally confined by anxiety or physical pain, etc. (see on Human Acts, 24 sqq.). (b) A sin is not mortal when there is no full advertence to the sinfulness or to the gravity of the act. Those who through no fault of their own are unaware that an act is sinful, or that it is a mortal sin (e.g., children, the half-witted, or the uninstructed), have no full advertence to the malice of the act; likewise, those who, without being responsible for their inadvertence, do not think at the moment of the sinfulness or seriousness of what they do (e.g., those who think out plans for revenge before they have taken second thought on its immorality).

Signs that indicate that there was no full advertence are: (a) if afterwards one can scarcely recall what happened; (b) if shortly afterwards one cannot be sure what was one’s state of mind at the time.

Though full advertence is required for a mortal sin, it is not required that this advertence be the most perfect. (a) It is not necessary that the advertence be preceded by long deliberation, for advertence can be full even when the consideration is only momentary, (b) It is not necessary that advertence be continued during the commission of a sin, for what follows is foreseen if adverted to at the beginning. (c) It is not necessary that advertence to the malice of the sin be clear or exact. One who perceives that there is some special malice in robbing a church, even though he does not understand just what the malice is, has sufficient advertence to become guilty of sacrilege. Likewise, one who has doubts as to whether a certain sin is mortal, or who suspects that it is mortal, has sufficient advertence for grave guilt if he commits that sin. (d) It is not necessary that advertence to the malice of the sin be reflex (i.e., that one advert to the fact that one is conscious of the gravity of the sin); for to will the malice, it suffices that one be conscious of the malice. (e) It is not necessary that advertence to the malice of the sin be explicit (i.e., that one have in mind the precise nature of sin as an offense against God, which produces a stain on the soul and incurs the debt of punishment); for to will evil and its gravity, it suffices that one perceive the evil and its gravity, even though one does not analyze the meaning or seek out the ultimate reasons.

The third condition required that a sin be mortal is that full consent of the will be given it, for no one separates him self from God except through his own free choice. (a) Consent is not full, when there has not been full advertence, or when an act has been done under violent compulsion; (b) consent is full when there has been full advertence and no forceful compulsion (see above on Violence, 52).

Indications that consent was not full are: (a) if before the sin the person was of tender conscience and had habitually a horror of grave sin; (b) if at the time of the sin the person recoiled from the sinful suggestion—e.g., if he had a hatred for it as soon as it was fully perceived, or if he was saddened at the temptation, or if he kept from an external act that could have been easily performed; (c) if after the sin the person was conscientious, and yet had doubts as to whether consent was given.

Venial Sin.—A sin is venial, or more easily pardonable, when by it one turns inordinately towards some created good, not so, however, as to forsake God as one’s Last End or to prefer self-will to the divine friendship.

The first condition required that a sin be called venial is that its matter be light, either in reality, or in the invincible belief of him who commits it. The criteria by which we may know what matter is light are authority and right reason (see above, 171).

The matter of a sin is light in two ways. (a) From the character of the act, the matter is light when the good which is injured is finite and of minor importance. Thus, truth about trivial things is of less importance among finite goods, and consequently a small lie about some unimportant matter, which helps and does not harm the neighbor, is light matter. (b) From the quantity of the matter, the matter is light when the good injured is of major importance but divisible. An example here is a theft that works only small harm (see above, 172).

The second condition for a venial sin is that there be some advertence to the malice of the act. (a) The advertence is not full when the matter is grave, and the act done without compulsion, for else the sin would not be venial but mortal. (b) The advertence may be full or partial when the matter is light.

The third condition for a venial sin is that there be some consent of the will to the malice of the act. (a) The consent is not full when the matter is grave, for else the sin would be mortal. (b) The consent may be either full or partial when the matter is light.

153. • QUESTION 5. How does sin mortal from its genus become venial, and vice versa?

I answer: 1. Sin mortal from its genus can become venial in four ways, namely by reason 1. of smallness of matter; - 2. of imperfect advertence; - 3. of imperfect consent; - 4. of erroneous conscience. - Thus St. Thomas, 1.2, qu. 88, art. 1 and 2. - St. Lig., no. 54.

I answer: 2. But sin venial from its genus can become mortal 1. by reason of erroneous conscience; - 2. by reason of scandal; - 3. by reason of a depraved end gravely evil; - 4. by reason of formal contempt of the law, or of the authority commanding; - 5. by reason of a depraved affection for a thing otherwise lightly evil, so that one is prepared even to transgress a precept gravely obliging; - 6. by reason of danger or proximate occasion of falling into mortal sin. - Thus all ⁵.

⁵ Here the doctrine of St. Thomas must not be passed over, that sin venial from its genus cannot become mortal unless a circumstance accedes changing the species, and therefore this never happens because of a merely aggravating circumstance. Thus the Holy Doctor (1.2, q. 88, art. 5): It is manifest that a circumstance cannot make mortal sin from venial sin, while the circumstance remains; but only then, when it transfers into another species, and becomes in some way a specific difference of the moral act. Confer also De malo, q. 2, art. 8.

154. • QUESTION 6. Whether he would sin gravely who wished to avoid only mortal sins, and cared not at all about omitting venial ones?

I answer: No, more probably, speaking of itself and speculatively. The reason is that an intention so constituted does not induce a proximate danger of sinning gravely ⁶. - But in practice the matter is difficult and very arduous, since facility in sinning venially is the cause why the soul is gradually weakened, and finally is more easily conquered by grave temptations, according to that saying of Eccli. 19.1: He who despises small things shall fall little by little.

⁶ This response is taken from St. Alphonsus (book 4, no. 12); but St. Alphonsus makes the question not about mere negligence in avoiding venial sins, but about the proposal of committing all venial sins, nor does he merely say that opinion is speculatively more probable, as though in practice a grave obligation were present of avoiding a remote danger of this kind.

Card. De Lugo well says (On Penance, disp. 15, no. 49): No one will say that from this head there is an obligation under mortal sin to avoid venial sins.

And Suarez (On Religion, treat. 8, book 1, ch. 4, no. 18): It is necessary to advert that rarely or never is there mortal sin because of danger of this kind...; because otherwise it is not a proximate occasion, but a remote one.

QUESTION 7. Whether it is a grave sin, without cause to expose oneself probably to the danger of falling into mortal sin?

I answer: Yes, if it is a matter of a proximate occasion of sin, as the matter is clear of itself; but not in other cases. - Sanchez, On the Decalogue, book 4, ch. 8, no. 1.

2. PRACTICAL HINTS. —a) A venial sin can become mortal, ( I ) by the action of an erroneous conscience that wrongly judges a venial sin to be mortal; (2) through a gravely sinful intention (finis pravus), as when a lie is told in order to enable one to commit adultery; (3) on account of the proximate danger of mortal sin; (4) because of formal contempt of the law or the lawgiver, and (5) by reason of grave scandal entailed.

In a similar way, an objectively mortal sin may become subjectively venial, (i) on account of the smallness of the matter involved (parvitas materia); (2) through imperfect advertence or consent to an act in itself gravely sinful (excusable ignorance, extreme haste, weakness); (3) because of failure to consummate an intended sinful action, though it would have been easy to do so. b) When positive doubt exists as to whether an act was mortally sinful or not, this doubt may be resolved in favor of the person concerned if he was so disposed that he would not have committed a mortal sin even though it was easy for him to do so, but would have preferred to die rather than grievously offend God; or if, without his own fault, he was not entirely master of his actions; or if he is uncertain whether he consented to the sinful act or remembers that he proceeded timidly or in doubt.

Though, strictly speaking, no mortal sin can become venial, and no venial sin mortal, because of the essential difference existing between the two, a person who constantly commits venial sins with full deliberation thereby forms evil habits, which will sooner or later precipitate him into mortal sin and rob his soul of sanctifying grace. It is in this sense that the Scholastics say that venial sin disposes the soul to mortal sin.⁶

⁶ Cfr. Ecclus. XIX, 1; Luke XVI, 10. —St. Augustine, Tract, in loa., 12, n. 14: "Many small sins, if neglected, kill. Drops are small, yet they fill rivers; grains of sand are small, yet if much sand is piled on, it presses and crushes. A neglected bilge does what an onrushing wave does: it enters gradually through the bilge, but by entering for a long time and not being pumped out, it sinks the ship. What is pumping out except acting by good works so that sins do not overwhelm us—by groaning, fasting, giving, and forgiving?" (Migne, P. L., XXXV, 1492).—IDEM, Serm., 56, c. 9, n. 12: "If all these things are gathered against us, do they therefore not weigh us down because they are small? What difference does it make whether lead or sand presses you? Lead is one mass; sand is small grains, but by their multitude they press you. Sins are small. Do you not see rivers filled from tiny drops and foundations swept away? They are small, but they are many." (P. L., XXXVIII, 383)-—IDEM, Serm., 58, c. 9, n. 10: "Let sins be forgiven; let past sins be forgiven; let future sins cease. But you cannot live here without them, whether they are lesser, small, or light. Yet let those light and small sins not be despised. Rivers are filled from tiny drops. Let not even lesser things be despised. Through narrow cracks water seeps into the ship, the bilge is filled, and if the bilge is neglected the ship sinks." (P. L., XXXVIII, 398).—Pseudo-Augustine, Append. Serm., 292 (a/. 244 de tempore), n. 6: "Do not despise your sins because they are small, but fear because they are many. For drops of rain too are small, but they fill rivers, carry off great masses, and uproot trees with their roots." (P. L., XXXIX, 2999).—St. Gregory the Great, Moral., |. 10, c. 11, n. 21: "From vanity we are led to iniquity." (P. L., LXXV, 933).— St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 1a 2ae, q. 88, art. 3: "Venial sin can by a certain consequence dispose toward a sin that is mortal on the part of the agent. For when the disposition or habit is increased by acts of venial sins, the desire of sinning can grow to such a degree that the sinner will place his end in a venial sin. For to everyone who has a habit, insofar as he has it, the end is operation according to the habit; and thus by sinning venially many times he will be disposed toward mortal sin." —IDEM, ibid., art. 4: "Not all the venial sins in the world can have as much guilt as one mortal sin. But if it is understood that many venial sins make one mortal sin dispositively, this is true according to the two modes of disposition by which venial sin disposes toward mortal sin." —IDEM, ibid., 2a 2ae, q. 186, art. 9: “Venial sin is a disposition toward mortal sin insofar as it hinders those things by which one is disposed to observe the principal precepts of the law of Christ, which are the precepts of charity.” —Cfr. J. P. Gury, Comp. Theol. Mor., Vol. i, n. *53: "Venial sins, however much multiplied, can never of themselves and by reason of multiplication coalesce into a mortal sin, because each remains in the inferior species. Sometimes, however, by reason of matter accumulating they attain to mortal sin, as happens especially in matters of justice."

371. Change of malice. Although venial sin can never become mortal by multiplication, as was said above in n. 367, nevertheless an action objectively evil venially can become subjectively mortally sinful, and conversely an action objectively gravely evil can become subjectively lightly evil. In this sense authors are accustomed to say briefly: venial sin becomes mortal, and conversely mortal sin becomes venial.

a) Venial sin considered objectively becomes subjectively mortal in the following ways:

1. From erroneous conscience. Thus, for example, if someone, firmly believing that every lie committed in the tribunal of penance, even about those things which do not pertain to the integrity of confession, is a mortal sin, nevertheless lies in the confessional, he truly sins mortally. This is clear from what was said above in n. 307 concerning erroneous conscience.

2. From a gravely evil end of the one acting. Thus, for example, if someone lies with the intention of fornicating, he sins gravely. The reason is that the end of the one acting specifies the act. This is clear from what was said above in n. 121.

3. From multiplied matter coalescing. But the matters of sins coalesce if a) they fall under the same precept and b) they are morally united. Thus, for example, several light parts omitted from the same Divine Office coalesce, as do several light eatings done on the same day of fasting; on the contrary, parts pertaining to diverse Offices do not coalesce, nor do light eatings done on diverse days. The matter of small thefts can so coalesce that at last, at some time, it becomes grave; and then the thief sins mortally by each following small theft, because in any following theft he is judged to hold ratified all the preceding takings, which, taken together, assuredly constitute grave matter.⁹⁵

4. From formal contempt. Theologians are accustomed to distinguish a twofold formal contempt: one perfect, the other imperfect. - The first is total rebellion against the superior commanding, so that the subject now refuses to obey in any matter whatever. It is clear that contempt of this kind is always a mortal sin, whenever it is repeated even in a light matter. For it is a grave wound to the virtue of obedience. - The other formal contempt, namely imperfect contempt, is refusal of obedience in some determined matter, yet together with readiness to obey in other matters. Authors do not agree whether even this imperfect contempt, even if it is objectively light, renders any disobedience gravely evil. There seems to be only an apparent disagreement among authors. For if such contempt is material rather than formal, it certainly admits smallness of matter; but if it is strictly formal, so that the superior himself as superior is spurned, it seems always to be gravely sinful according to that saying of St. Luke: "He who spurns you, spurns me,"⁹⁶ because it is a grave injury inflicted upon a lawful superior.

5. From grave detriment (whether of material damage, or scandal, or danger of sinning), which is foreseen as going to follow from venial sin. Thus, for example, he sins mortally who foresees that grave quarrels will arise from jocose words; he sins gravely who is so addicted to play that he omits hearing Mass on a day of precept, that he neglects the duties of his state; he sins gravely who from curiosity reads rather free things with proximate danger of falling into grave sin.⁹⁷

b) Mortal sin considered objectively becomes subjectively venial in the following ways:

1. From erroneous conscience. This is clear from what was said above in n. 307.

2. From imperfection of the act,⁹⁸ when namely sufficient advertence or full consent is lacking. From imperfection of the act any mortal sin whatever, even that which is mortal ex toto genere suo, from its whole genus, such as lust, blasphemy, etc., can become venial. But the reason is that for mortal sin, to which such enormous punishments are inflicted, such as the privation of sanctifying grace, the eternal punishment of gehenna, etc., a human act perfectly deliberated and voluntary is deservedly necessary. For it would be too harsh if such punishments were inflicted on account of an act not perfectly imputable to the agent.

3. From smallness of matter. As is manifest from what was said above, grave matter is required for mortal sin; if this is lacking, mortal sin also must be lacking. Sins mortal from their whole genus do not admit smallness of matter, but only sins mortal from their genus, such as theft, detraction, disobedience, etc.

⁹⁵ Cf. below II in the treatise on justice.

⁹⁶ Luc. 10, 16.

⁹⁷ Cf. Billuart, De pecc. diss. 8, a. 3, § 2.

⁹⁸ S. theol. 1, 2, q. 88, a. 6.

St. Thomas, I-II, q. 88, a. 4, 5, 6; De Malo q. 2, a. 8; q. 7, a. 3 and 4.

547. The conversion of mortal sin into venial, and vice versa, is not to be understood as if the same act in number of mortal sin which now exists in the concrete with all its circumstances could become venial; but that an act of sin which from the genus, by reason of itself, in the abstract is mortal, can be only venially evil according as in the concrete here and now it exists with its circumstances; and vice versa.

548. Mortal sin per se or from the genus can become venial, not indeed per accidens from a venially evil circumstance added to the act, because a light deformity added rather increases sin than diminishes it; but:

a) If it is mortal from the whole genus, it becomes venial only from a disposition of the agent which subtracts something from the act: 1. from an erroneous conscience which without grave negligence judges to be venial what is mortal; 2. from imperfect deliberation; and 3. from imperfect consent.

b) If it is mortal from its own genus, it becomes venial from the three aforesaid modes, and besides 4. from lightness of matter or on the part of the object, for example, theft.

Venial sins from imperfect deliberation or imperfect consent are called venial from imperfection of the act: for they are imperfect human acts. According to St. Thomas, imperfect deliberation and imperfect consent are possible in every matter.

549. Venial sin according to itself becomes mortal, whether a) on the part of the agent on account of a circumstance or disposition mortally evil, - or b) on the part of the act on account of a circumstance which changes the species and adds grave malice distinct in species; - or c) from coalescence, multiplication, or aggravation of matter. And indeed:

1. from an erroneous conscience which judges or doubts that what is only venial is mortal;

2. by reason of the ultimate end, when the sinner constitutes his ultimate end in venial sin, that is, when he is prepared to sin mortally on account of that sin which of itself is venial, for example, to omit Mass in order to play excessively or to steal a small thing;

3. by reason of an adjoined end, as if someone says a light lie or a lightly dishonest word in order to fornicate, or commits a light theft for homicide;

4. from formal and perfect contempt of the precept or the one commanding, by which man violates the precept precisely because it is a precept, whatever it may be, whether grave or light, - or because the superior insofar as he is superior commands, whatever he commands;¹

¹ Not, however, because the superior commands only something light or something inept, or because he himself is imprudent or wicked.

5. by reason of grave scandal, as if you foresee that through a dishonest word you are an occasion to another of sinning gravely;

6. by reason of proximate danger of falling into mortal sin, to which the sinner would expose himself without sufficient caution or necessity, for example, conversation with a woman for a fragile man: furthermore, to danger of which mortal sin he exposes himself must be declared in confession;

7. by reason of notable harm which is foreseen to follow from the sin for neighbor, for example, if a light theft would place another in extreme necessity, or a quarrel would arise from excessive loquacity;

8. by reason of coalescing or multiplied matter, as must be explained specially.

The first seven modes are also valid for venial sin from its own genus; the last only concerning venial sin from lightness of matter.

550. The rule for discerning whether venial sin from lightness of matter becomes mortal from aggravation and multiplication of matter is the following: Several small matters can coalesce and are morally united into one grave matter when they pertain to the same precept in number and to one transgression of the precept.

Thus small thefts coalesce into one gravely unjust detention or damaging; likewise several small eatings, or omissions in the hours, had on the same day into one violation of the fast, or grave omission of the breviary; - on the contrary, several small eatings or omissions had on different days do not coalesce because they do not pertain to the same precept in number, nor do several light excesses in drink had on the same day coalesce: for since they do not consist in a permanent thing, they do not pertain to one and the same transgression; nevertheless they can coalesce into one harm to health or to the family, because in the account of harm they are something permanent.

He who by several light transgressions arrives at grave matter, if he intended this from the beginning, commits one mortal sin; but if he did not intend this, he commits as many venial sins as there were light transgressions, except the last, which is mortal, because through it grave matter is completed: for by this act he wills the small matter insofar as it is united with the others for composing grave matter.

Light transgressions following upon grave matter already completed, if they were intended from the beginning, constitute one mortal sin with the prior ones but aggravate it externally; - but if they were not intended, they do not constitute a new mortal sin unless they again attain a new grave quantity: but if nevertheless they were considered as one thing with the preceding grave matter, they include the mortal sin of joy or approval concerning it.

128. Question 4. In what way does a sin mortal from its genus become venial, and vice versa?

Response. A sin mortal from its genus can become venial in a fourfold way, namely by reason of: 1st. smallness of matter; 2nd. imperfect advertence; 3rd. imperfect consent; 4th. erroneous conscience. But a sin venial from its genus can become mortal: 1st. by reason of erroneous conscience; 2nd. by reason of scandal; 3rd. by reason of an end gravely evil; 4th. by reason of formal contempt of the law, or of the authority commanding; 5th. by reason of an evil affection toward a thing otherwise slightly evil, so that one is prepared to transgress even a precept obliging gravely; 6th. by reason of danger or of a proximate occasion of falling into mortal sin; 7th. finally by reason of any circumstance which contains mortal malice in itself and accedes to the act, as St. Thomas well observes, in such a way that it changes its species. - Cf. St. Thom. 1-2, q. 88, art. 1, 2, and 5. - St. Alphonsus, n. 54.

Note. Venial sins are of a threefold kind. 1° Some are venial from genus or from object, as an idle word, immodest laughter. 2° Some are venial from lightness of matter, as slight theft. 3° Some are venial from imperfection of the act which is not fully deliberate, as motions second of first, concerning an object mortally evil.

I say 1°: Venial sin from genus disposes indirectly to mortal from genus, not directly; but to mortal on the part of the agent it disposes directly ¹. ¹ Here q. 88, a. 3, c.

The first part is proved. 1° From that Eccli., XIX, 1 : He that despiseth small things shall fall by little and little ². 2° Indirect disposition is by way of one removing and preventing. But venial sin from genus diminishes the subjection of the will under God and the fervor of charity, and at the same time places an obstacle to divine helps, whereby man is contained and preserved from mortal sin. Therefore. ² Ibid., in arg. Sed contra.

The second part is proved. Direct disposition is toward the form of the same species, or is per se subordinated to it. But venial sin from genus is of different species from mortal sin from genus, nor is it per se subordinated to it, as is evident, e.g., in an idle word with respect to homicide. Therefore.

The third part is proved ¹. From venial sins frequently committed in some genus, e.g., from habit of playing, the love of play can grow so much that finally on account of it one sins mortally, e.g., Mass be omitted on a feast day. Therefore. ¹ Ibid.

I say 2°: Venial sin from imperfection of act, or from lightness of matter, disposes directly to mortal. Thus, e.g., small theft disposes directly to great theft; semi-plenary consent to homicide disposes directly to it; because, although they are of different formal species, they are nevertheless of the same material species, since they turn about the same material object.

I say 3°: An act remaining the same in number in natural being can become from venial mortal. Thus consent imperfectly deliberated concerning a mortal object is venial sin; if it continue physically with full deliberation, it becomes mortal ². But an act remaining the same in number in moral being cannot become from venial mortal; because sin principally consists in the act of the will, as every moral act: whence an act is not called one in number morally, if the will is morally changed, even though the action in natural being be continuous. But, while the act which was before venial becomes mortal, the will is morally changed; for if it were not changed, it would not become from venial mortal. Therefore. ² Here a. 4, c; q. 7 de Malo, a. 3, c, and elsewhere.

It is confirmed. What is of a lower order, however much it be increased within its order, cannot attain to what is of a higher order: thus, however much silver be perfected in its order, it cannot attain the grade of gold. But venial act is of a lower order in moral being than mortal sin; for this is aversive from the last end, not that. Therefore the same in number remaining in moral being cannot become mortal.

I say 4°: Sin which would be venial from its genus can become mortal in several ways on the part of the agent and circumstances:

1° By reason of mortal end: as if anyone should tell an officious lie with the intention of fornicating. Yet since that lie draws its mortal malice from the deadly intention, it suffices to accuse that intention, or the fornication, if it followed, saying: « I had the intention of fornicating, » or: « I have fornicated ».

2° By reason of erroneous conscience: as if you think that to which you set your hand is mortal when it is venial.

3° By reason of grave detriment, whether spiritual (which is scandal) or temporal, which is foreseen or can easily be foreseen as about to follow.

4° By reason of proximate danger of sinning morally.

5° If the last end be constituted in venial sin; which happens when the sinner, by a sin venial of itself, is actually disposed in mind to transgress a precept binding under mortal sin rather than abstain from his venial sin.

6° By reason of formal contempt. Formal contempt is twofold: one perfect, when anyone refuses in all things to submit to a superior. Any sin whatever, even in a light matter, from such contempt is mortal; for to contemn the whole superiority is a grave thing: The other is imperfect, when anyone refuses to submit to a superior in some matter only, whether grave or light, being ready to obey him in other things; and such contempt in a grave matter is mortal, in a light matter venial; unless perhaps the contempt were of God himself or his precept, because then it would be blasphemous. So distinguish Cajetan and Sylvius.

You will ask whether he would sin mortally who had the resolve of committing all venial sins.

I answer. Sanchez and others affirm it, with this reason, that, as St. Thomas teaches, venial sins of themselves dispose to mortal. More probably however it is denied with the Salmanticenses and St. Alphonsus, contempt or proximate danger of falling into mortal being set aside, regard being had to past experience. The reason is because such a resolve leads only remotely to mortal.

I say 5°: However much venial sins be multiplied, they can never effect one mortal sin, nor be equivalent to it ¹. It is common doctrine against the gloss in cap. Tres sunt, de Poenit., dist. 1, which was deleted by pontifical authority as erroneous. ¹ Lib. V, de Praeceptis partic., n. 12.

The reason is, because however much venial sins be multiplied, they cannot turn away from the last end; for neither does the first turn away, nor yet the second, which is of the same account, and so of the rest. Nor can they inflict guilt of eternal punishment, which infinitely differs from temporal punishment, which venial sin merits.

It is confirmed. The Church teaches that all mortal sins must necessarily be confessed, not venial ones, even multiplied: otherwise, since it is not known how far they must be multiplied so as to effect one mortal sin, as soon as anyone had committed more, he would be bound to confess in doubt; which is false and against the practice of the Church.

I say 6°: Sin which of itself would be mortal can become venial from two heads ² : 1° from imperfection of act, which may not be fully deliberate; 2° from lightness of matter. ² Here a. 6, c.

The reason of the first part is, because for mortal sin, whereby man is turned away from God and incurs guilt of eternal punishment, there is required no less an act perfectly voluntary and free than is the meritorious act of eternal life. Such however it is not without perfect deliberation on the part of the intellect, and without full consent on the part of the will.

The reason of the second part is, because laws regularly bind according to the condition of matter, gravely where matter is grave, lightly where it is light. Consequently transgression in a light matter is a light offense.

To be specially observed for practice.

You will ask 1° what is perfect, what imperfect deliberation.

I answer. Perfect deliberation is when the intellect without disturbance or impediment fully and distinctly apprehends and adverts, or can and ought to advert, to the act and its malice. To this perfect deliberation on the part of the intellect follows, on the part of the will, full consent, if it be given. I say: If it be given; because while the intellect perfectly deliberates and adverts to the evil act, not rarely the will denies consent: which regularly happens in fearful men.

Imperfect deliberation is when someone half asleep or half drunk, or almost half asleep, distracted by various thoughts, or assailed by vehement passion, apprehends or can apprehend the evil act not fully and distinctly, but only confusedly, and the obligation of avoiding it. And then the consent of the will following is necessarily imperfect and semiplenary.

The signs of imperfect consent are: 1° If, as already said, it follows from imperfect deliberation. 2° If anyone, fully adverting to the temptation, immediately repels it, or is so disposed in mind that, if he could easily execute the sin, he would not will to, or would rather choose death than offend God lethally, it is more probable that he did not fully consent; because full and firm affection is not easily changed, and when it is changed, it is easily adverted to. 3° He who is of fearful conscience, and is wont to resist temptation while he fully adverts to it, can prudently judge in doubt that he did not fully consent. Otherwise, if he be of freer conscience, and is wont to consent, because judgment is prudent from commonly occurring circumstances. 4° He who doubts whether in sleep or waking he suffered disordinate motions, can judge that he did not consent fully and deliberately; because, if deliberation had been full, he would know himself to have been perfectly aroused from sleep. 5° Long duration of temptation is not sufficient argument of perfect, nay not even of imperfect consent; for temptation can long endure, the will resisting.

You will ask 2° in what sins lightness of matter excusing from mortal is given or not given.

I answer. Lightness of matter excusing from mortal is not given in sins in which, notwithstanding the apparent lightness of matter, there is found entire irreverence of the divine Majesty and grave violation of the charity of God and neighbor; because gravity of sin is drawn from the gravity of irreverence of divine Majesty, or of violation of charity. Therefore, where grave irreverence or violation of charity is found in small as in great quantity of matter, the gravity of sin remains.

But in those sins in which from diminution of matter the gravity of irreverence toward God or of violation of charity is diminished, lightness of matter excusing from mortal is given; because matter can be so diminished and decreased that it suffice only for light irreverence or light violation of charity.

Hence you will infer 1° that parvity of matter excusing from mortal is not given in sins which are committed directly against God, as are all sins against the theological virtues; because, although in a most light matter you deny faith to God, or despair of him, or hold him in hatred or contempt, or formally blaspheme him, you gravely offend his truth, power, goodness, majesty.

You will infer 2° In sins which are against Religion, sometimes parvity of matter excusing from mortal is given, sometimes not. It is not given in superstition of worshipping false deity, as idolatry, divination and vain observance. I say the same of magic and maleficium; because to worship false deity in even the smallest thing, or to hold society, whether explicitly or implicitly, with the devil, is the gravest injury offered to true deity.

There can however be given in divination and vain observance lightness, not of matter, but of act, excusing from mortal: as if anyone attempt divination without express invocation of the demon, out of jest or levity, not believing it useful, but altogether vain and useless, or knowing not that there is any invocation of the demon therein, he does not sin mortally. Let the same judgment be, if from a dream, augury and similar things he conceive some fear of things future, but nevertheless do not believe it; or if once and again he do or omit something free to him from such fear, yet do not direct his life and actions according to the norm of such divinations. I say the same of vain observance of healths or events: as if anyone out of simplicity or non-culpable ignorance, or out of excessive timidity, leave the table because thirteen sit there, fearing thence someone's death; or if because in going out of the house in the morning he strike his foot, or a hare run across him, he fears an unlucky journey, and therefore returns home; or if he promise himself certainly and infallibly a good death, if he honor such a saint, recite daily such a prayer.

But in superstition of undue worship, especially superfluous, of true deity, lightness of matter excusing from mortal seems able to be given: as if anyone pray before sunset, or with a certain number, position, color of candles, or will to hear Mass from a priest called John, or repeat Alleluia, or make more crosses than is ordained by the Church, or abstain from certain servile work, put sewing, on Saturdays, in honor of the Blessed Virgin, while he indulges in other servile works. For in these and similar things, contempt and scandal set aside, no grave injury seems to be done.

In simony parvity of matter excusing from mortal is not given; because, however little the thing be in degree of spirituality, it is always a great injury to value it at an earthly price; and the less price is paid for a spiritual thing, the less it seems to be valued. Nor is it given in assertory oath; because it is always grave irreverence and injury to will God to be witness of a falsehood, as if he could be deceived or deceive, even in the smallest matter. Otherwise, according to the opinion more probable to us, of promissory oath, in which God is invoked not as witness of truth or falsehood, but is taken as quasi-sponsor of the obligation of the swearer, which obligation does not consist in an indivisible, but is greater or lesser, according to the account of matter of greater or lesser moment, of which I spoke at length in tract. de Religione, dissert. V, a. 6, § 1.

Likewise lightness of matter is given in vow, whether it be total matter or part of the total matter of the vow, concerning which see also ibid., dissert. IV, a. 3, concl. 3. In sacrilege which is done from direct intention of dishonoring sacred things, lightness of matter is not given, on account of formal contempt of the sacred thing, which is reduced to God. But done for another end, it admits lightness of matter excusing from mortal: thus slight theft in a sacred place is venial sin.

You will infer 3° that lightness of matter excusing from mortal is given in sins which are against the precepts of the second table, or which are against neighbor and self and against ecclesiastical precepts, as in theft, beating, wounding, detraction, insult, cursing, anger, vengeance, avarice, ambition, gluttony, ecclesiastical fast, etc.; because in these the less the matter, the less the injury done to self or neighbor.

You will ask 3° whence is to be estimated the gravity or levity of matter in those sins which admit it.

I answer. That it is to be estimated from this, that, according to the judgment of prudent men and doctors, it conduces gravely or lightly to the grave end of the law; so that matter is grave which conduces gravely to the end of the law; light, which lightly, whether it be a third part, or a fourth, or a twentieth, or a hundredth part of the whole. I said, according to the judgment of prudent men and doctors, because upon it chiefly depends discerning what matter conduces gravely or lightly to the end of the law.