Negligence

If I am not justified, according to the foregoing principle, in performing an action which causes some evil effect, that evil effect is imputable to me though I did not intend it in itself; it is not indeed voluntary in itself, but it is voluntary in its cause, and I am bound to avoid evil even though only voluntary in its cause.

When, however, evil is not voluntary in itself, but only voluntary in its cause, a question arises concerning the degree of moral guilt which is contracted when such a cause of evil is posited unwarrantably. The case arises especially when grave evil is the result of an action which in itself is only venially sinful, as when grave harm is the result of slight negligence. Of course, great evil arising from grave negligence is seriously sinful even though only voluntary in the cause; and so a doctor who through grave negligence kills his patient is guilty of a great sin, though he did not intend the homicide.

But supposing that in passing through a gate in the country I leave it open, owing to slight negligence, and in consequence a neighbour’s crop is seriously damaged by his cows getting among the corn; do I commit a grave sin in that case¹ Of course, if owing to the circumstances I clearly foresaw that the damage was certain to follow and I could easily have closed the gate if I chose, I certainly sin grievously in not closing it; the negligence is then grave. But our case supposes circumstances to be such that the negligence is only slight, partly on account of the uncertainty of harm following, partly because I had frequently seen the gate standing open, and for other reasons. Will the neglect to close the gate after me in such circumstances be grievously sinful on account of the serious harm to my neighbour which was the consequence² ‘The answer must be ‘“‘ No.”’ For the harm did not follow necessarily and exclusively from my neglect; my action was not the immediate and necessary cause of the damage done to the crop; other agents intervened; my action was only slightly responsible for what followed. Inasmuch, then, as the malice of the cause is only slight, and this alone is voluntary in itself, the evil effect which is only voluntary in the cause will be imputed only as a venial sin.

¹ Rom. iii 8.

² Summa, 2-2, q. 64, a. 7.

In order that such an obligation may be imposed, certain conditions must be fulfilled which it will be well to state more explicitly.

(a) The damage must be inflicted voluntarily, with knowledge and the will to do the wrong. For a man is only responsible in the forum of conscience for his free and voluntary actions. There must be theological fault, as theologians express it, otherwise there will be no obligation in conscience to make good any damage, at any rate before lawful sentence of a judge competent to impose such an obligation. For the law sometimes imposes the obligation of making good damage which has been done, even though it was not foreseen or intended. This is especially the case when there has been legal negligence or the omission of that diligence which the law requires in the circumstances. There are three degrees in this negligence: “ Ordinary neglect has been defined to be the omission of that care which every man of common prudence, and capable of governing a family, takes of his own concerns; gross neglect is defined to be the want of that care which every man of common sense, however inattentive soever, takes of his own property; and slight neglect to be the omission of that diligence which very circumspect and thoughtful persons use in securing their own goods and chattels.”¹ In some cases the law punishes even slight neglect, in others ordinary, in others only gross neglect. The omission of that care which the law requires in the case is called juridical fault, and after sentence there will be an obligation in conscience to make good damage caused through juridical fault, for the laws prescribing this are just, inasmuch as they make men more careful and conduce to the public good.

If something has been done without foreseeing that it would cause damage to another, but this danger was noticed before the damage actually took place, there will be an obligation in justice for him who performed the action to prevent the damage as far as he can; if he does not do this, he will be bound to restitution. For as long as he can prevent the evil consequences of his action, this is under his control, and may, from the point of view of morals, be considered as continuing, and thus, unless he prevents the evil when he can do so, the agent is the voluntary cause of it. If, however, he cannot prevent the damage without relatively serious inconvenience to himself, there is just cause for excusing him. And so, if I inadvertently throw a lighted match on the ground, and then notice that it may probably cause a conflagration with loss to others, I am bound in justice to extinguish the light, otherwise I must repair the damage done.

If slight negligence caused slight damage to another, there will be an obligation of repairing it under pain of venial sin. If slight negligence caused serious loss to another, there is a difficulty as to whether before any judicial sentence there be an obligation to make restitution. Many theologians deny that there is, for no grave obligation can arise from a slight fault, and a light obligation has no proportion to serious matter; there cannot be a light obligation to avoid homicide, for example.²

(b) In order that there may be an obligation to make restitution for causing damage to another, the damage must be really and objectively unjust. If damage to another follows from the lawful exercise of my rights, I am not bound to make it good. If I dig a well in my property and thereby deprive my neighbour of his supply of water, I am not bound to make restitution for the damage. Similarly, I may sell a new machine or invention, though it may indirectly cause loss to many who had on sale machines of older pattern for which now there will be no market.

I may lawfully use persuasion to induce a rich relative to leave his money to me, though others who would have had it thereby suffer loss, If, however, I make use of unjust means such as threats, violence, or calumny, and so prevent another from getting what he otherwise would have got, I commit a sin against justice and am bound to make restitution to the injured party. This is true even though he had no strict right to what he would have got, for at least he had a right not to be balked of his expectations by unjust means, And so in a competitive examination or concursus where something of value is the prize at stake, one who secures the prize by unjust means must make restitution to him who would otherwise have secured it. If there were no certainty of his securing it, restitution as far as possible must be made according to the degree of probability of his success.

(c) The unjust action must be the cause, not merely the occasion, of damage being done to another, in order that there may be an obligation of making restitution. For we are only responsible in justice for damage which we have caused. And so if I commit theft and others are induced to do the same by my bad example, I am indeed bound to make restitution for what I have stolen, and I commit a sin against charity by giving bad example to others; but probably at least, according to many theologians, I am not bound to make restitution for what others stole through my bad example. Similarly, I am not bound to make restitution for damage which was caused accidentally by my action, when there was antecedently no probable connection between my action and the damage caused. As, for example, if I lit a fire in my property, and there was no probable danger of its causing damage to my neighbour, I am not in conscience before judicial sentence bound to make good damage which it caused him on account of an unforeseen change in the direction of the wind. Some theologians would bind the man who lit the fire to restitution in this case if he hoped for the change of wind and intended the damage. They say that the wrongful intention supplies the want of physical causation and puts him under the obligation of making restitution. This opinion is probable, but the opposite also is probable, for although the evil intention makes the man guilty of affective injustice, he is not guilty of effective injustice, for his evil intention makes no difference in the physical sequence of cause and effect, and if he was not the cause of the damage prescinding from his evil intention, that evil intention could not make him the cause.

In the same way, if the theft of one servant is wrongly imputed to another, and this one is dismissed in consequence, the thief is not bound to make restitution to the injured man unless in some way he caused the false imputation.

One who is not sure whether any harm was caused by his action is not bound to make restitution, for a certain obligation cannot arise from an uncertain source. Whether there is any obligation of making restitution for damage which was certainly caused, but it is uncertain whether the author was A or B, is a disputed point among theologians. Many teach that there is an obligation on all the probable authors in common to make good the damage, and each will be bound to make good the whole in default of the rest. This is certainly true in case of conspiracy; but if each acted independently, and it is not certain which one caused the damage, it is hard if the burden of restitution is imposed on someone who perhaps did not cause the harm.³

If an incendiary intended to set fire to the house of A, and by mistake he destroyed the house of B, it would seem that he is bound to make restitution, for all the requisite conditions are present. His action was voluntary, really, and effectively unjust. Some theologians, however, deny that the obligation of making restitution can be imposed in such cases. For the injury should be formal, and they deny that it is formal in this case. He did not intend to injure B; it was purely by mistake that his house was burnt down. Some weight must be allowed to this opinion on account of the authority of those who maintain it, but it would seem to be over-subtle and against the common sense of mankind. The injury was formal, inasmuch as it was voluntary and knowingly unjust. This is sufficient to induce the obligation of making restitution; it is not necessary that the wrongdoer should intend to injure a definite person.

¹ Chitty, The Law of Contracts, p. 412.

² St Alphonsus, 3, n. 552.

³ Bucceroni, 1, n. 1369.

VI. Opposed Vices. Vices opposed to prudence are some by defect, others by excess.

1. Vices by defect are called by the common name of imprudence, and they are four: precipitation, inconsideration, inconstancy, and negligence.

a) Precipitation is directly opposed to eubulia, and by it man is borne to acting by an impulse of will or passion, sufficient counsel of reason being omitted (cf. St. Thomas, II-II, q. 53, a. 3).

b) Inconsideration is a vice by which man is inclined to contemning or neglecting those things from which right judgment proceeds; and therefore synesis and gnome are opposed to it (cf. St. Thomas, II-II, q. 53, a. 4).

c) Inconstancy is a vice inclining one to withdraw from a defined good proposal; by it reason fails in commanding those things which right counsel and right judgment dictate must be commanded. Hence it is directly opposed to prudence (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 53, a. 5).

d) Negligence is a vice by which man is inclined to neglecting right command, through a defect of solicitude and promptness of will; for this reason it too is directly opposed to prudence (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 54, a. 2, corpus and ad 3; ibid., a. 1).

From these points it is clear that imprudence has under itself as many species as there are potential parts of the virtue of prudence (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 53, a. 2). St. Thomas alleges lust as the origin of these vices (II-II, q. 53, a. 6). But imprudence considered in this way constitutes a special sin, because it is contrarily opposed to the virtue of prudence; and just as prudence is a special virtue, so also its contrary is a special sin. But if by the name of imprudence there is indicated not so much the contrary as the lack of prudence, imprudence does not constitute a special sin, but rather a general one, insofar, namely, as it participates in the nature of the sin which is committed against that virtue for whose exercise the act of prudence was being commanded. "For just as prudence is in some way participated in all virtues, insofar as it directs them, so also imprudence is in all vices and sins; for no sin can happen unless there is a defect in some act of reason directing, which pertains to imprudence" (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 53, a. 2).

2. Vices by excess have some likeness with prudence itself, but they apply its offices to an undue object, namely to a dishonorable matter; hence they bear before themselves a false species of prudence. These vices are: prudence of the flesh or of the world, craftiness, guile, fraud, excessive solicitude for temporal things, and excessive solicitude for future things.

a) Prudence of the flesh or of the world is a vice "according as someone has the goods of the flesh as the ultimate end of his life" (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 55, a. 1); and it obtained this name because "prudence is concerned with those things which are toward the end of the whole of life" (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 55, a. 2).

b) Craftiness is a vice by which someone, "for attaining some end, whether good or evil, uses not true ways, but simulated and apparent ones" (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 55, a. 3).

c) Guile is the execution of those things which craftiness thinks out, whether it is done by words or by deeds; and therefore it pertains to craftiness (cf. St. Thomas, II-II, q. 55, aa. 4 and 5).

d) Fraud differs from guile in this, "that guile pertains universally to the execution of craftiness, whether it is done by words or by deeds; but fraud more properly pertains to the execution of craftiness insofar as it is done by deeds" (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 55, a. 5).

e) Excessive solicitude for temporal things is had either by seeking temporal things as an end, the spiritual end being excluded; or when superfluous effort is applied to procuring them, "on account of which man is drawn back from spiritual things, which he ought principally to serve" (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 55, a. 6); or when "someone fears that, by doing what he ought, necessary things will fail him" (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 55, a. 6).

f) Excessive solicitude for future things is had when someone is solicitous about future things before the opportune time (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 55, a. 7).

St. Thomas assigns avarice as the principal source of these vices (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 55, a. 8).

III. Opposed Vices. By excess, curiosity is opposed to studiosity, which inclines one to satisfy the appetite for knowing too much, by applying oneself to useless or harmful studies (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 167, a. 1). By defect, negligence, inclining one to omit or to do slackly the studies of those things which one is bound to learn and know.¹

¹ Arb. praed., n. 152 (t. 6, p. 499). Cf. Salmanticenses, Arb. praed., n. 153 (p. 499); Billuart, diss. 7, a. 4, § 3; St. Augustine, Epistula 118 (ed. G., t. 2, col. 490 sqq.), Sermo 355, c. 6, n. 6 (ibid., t. 5, col. 2041), and Epistula 218 (ibid., col. 1227 sqq.); St. Bernard, Sermo 36 on the Canticle (M.P.L. 183, col. 907 sqq.).

III. Opposed Vices. By excess there is opposed luxury, inclining one to adornment of the body and arrangement of external things beyond the measure of right reason; by defect, negligence, by which someone in the adornment of the body and arrangement of external things remains below the measure owed to his condition (cf. St. Thomas, II-II, q. 169, a. 1).¹

¹ Cf. Salmanticenses, cited place, n. 160 end (p. 503).

Laziness, as distinct from the capital vice of sloth, is a generic name given to a number of sins or circumstances of sin, and hence it will be treated in several places.

(a) Thus, negligence is a want of prompt decision about duties to be performed. It is opposed to the virtue of diligence or solicitude, which pertains to prudence. Hence, negligence will be considered among the sins against prudence.

(b) Sluggishness (pigritia) is a tardy performance of duty, and will be considered among the sins opposed to diligence.

(c) Carelessness (torpor) is a perfunctory discharge of duties, without thought or love. It is one of the consequences of sloth given above (see 1324), and hence it is a sin against charity.

(d) Indolence is an excessive dislike of labor or exertion, caused by an inordinate love of recreation or bodily rest. It will be considered when we treat the sin of softness or delicacy, which is opposed to fortitude.

(e) Idleness is the actual omission of one’s duty on account of indolence, and hence it is considered among the sins against the various precepts. Thus, under the precepts of charity and of justice will be discussed the omission of labor to which one is bound.

The Sin of Negligence.—The sin of negligence is opposed to carefulness or diligence, and consists in the failure of the reason to direct properly an act, or some circumstance of an act, to which one is obliged.

(a) Negligence is a general sin in the sense that it has no special matter of its own, such as a passion to be moderated (as is the case with temperance and fortitude) or an action to be regulated (as is the case with justice). The acts of reason should extend to every kind of matter, and hence a person may be negligent (and likewise inconstant, thoughtless, hasty) with reference to any kind of action or passion.

(b) It is properly a special sin, as being the opposite of carefulness, which is a special act of prudence.

Negligence is distinct from the following sins: (a) from laziness and lukewarmness, which are defects of the external act, while negligence is a defect of the internal act (see 1326, 1327); (b) from sins of omission, which pertain to external acts and are results of negligence, and are opposed to some other virtue than prudence (e.g., negligence in paying debts is against justice); (c) from inconstancy, which fails to command an act to which one is bound, as though one were impeded, while negligence fails because there is a want of promptness in the will. The inconstant man is easily diverted from his course; the negligent man is slow in getting under way.

The Sinfulness of Negligence.—(a) It is a mortal sin when some act or circumstance necessary for salvation is omitted on its account (e.g., when a debtor puts off from day to day the payment of a bill, and in consequence causes a great injury), or when it proceeds from contempt or preference of the creature to God. (b) It is a venial sin when the act or circumstance omitted is not necessary for salvation (e.g., when a judge causes a slight injustice by reason of his procrastination), or when it proceeds from a want of fervor.

What is prudence, what are its parts, and what vices are opposed to it? R. To the first. It is a certain special virtue of the practical intellect, by which in any business occurring we know what is honorable, what shameful. And thus prudence is the right reason of things to be done, or the virtue rightly ordering those things which are toward the end of the whole of life. But every virtue is in the mean; the mean is to do those things which virtue commands, when one ought, where one ought, as one ought; and accordingly the office of prudence is to find a mean of this sort, which is one thing as a mean of reason, another as a mean of the thing. - The acts of prudence are: 1. To take counsel, namely by inquiring what means and what circumstances are necessary, so that the work may be done honorably. 2. To judge concerning the things found, i.e., after diligent consideration, to conclude what is to be done, in what way, in what place and time, and with what other circumstances. 3. To command, namely by prescribing what and when it is to be done, by applying to operation those things which have been counseled and judged. 4. To operate solicitously the things commanded. For solicitude is that moderated speed by which, by the cleverness and vigilance of the soul, that which has been consulted and defined is quickly committed to execution.

Hence a precept of prudence is not given by reason of itself, but only by reason of another thing, namely of a virtue to be exercised and a sin to be avoided. Therefore as all precepts pertain to prudence, because it is directive of all virtuous acts, so universal Moral Theology pertains to prudence, and especially the treatise on Conscience; since the whole of Moral Theology and the aforesaid treatise in particular hand down rules so that we may act prudently and rightly. S. Th. 1. 2. q. 64; 2. 2. q. 47; q. 56.

R. To the second. The integral parts of prudence, which concur toward its perfect act, are: 1. Memory, which is knowledge of past things. For since experience is required for prudent persons, and experience is from many memories, the memory of many things is required for prudence. 2. Understanding or intelligence, not as it is a certain power, but as it is a certain right estimation of some ultimate principle. For every deduction of reason is from some principle, and prudence is the right reason of things to be done. 3. Docility, by which someone is prompt and easy in receiving instruction from others and acquiring knowledge from them. For prudence consists about particular things to be done, which someone cannot always know all by himself alone. 4. Shrewdness, which is an easy and prompt conjecturing, by which, when something occurs unexpectedly, someone quickly by himself finds what is fitting. 5. Reason. For it belongs to a prudent man to be good at taking counsel; but counsel is a certain inquiry proceeding from certain things to others, which is the work of reason. 6. Foresight, which imports a respect of something distant, or future, to which those things which occur in the present are to be ordered. Therefore foresight is the right ordering of suitable means to the end, and accordingly includes rectitude of counsel, judgment, and command. 7. Circumspection, by which that which is ordered to the end is compared with the things which surround it, and therefore is an accurate consideration of all circumstances. For something is good in itself and fitting to the end, which nevertheless, from certain concurrent things, is rendered either evil or not opportune to the end. 8. Caution, which is consideration of evils and extrinsic impediments, through which it happens that they are avoided, lest good be impeded by evil, lest evil be mixed with good. Of these eight parts, the first five pertain to prudence according as it is cognitive; but the three later according as it is preceptive, applying knowledge to work. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 49.

The subjective parts of prudence are: 1. Prudence simply so called, which is ordered to one's own good. 2. Royal prudence, which is the prudence of the king himself, which rules a city or kingdom. For it belongs to prudence to rule and fittingly to command. And therefore to the king, to whom it pertains to rule a city or kingdom, a more special prudence belongs. For a rule is so much the more perfect, the more universal it is, extending itself to more things and reaching a further end beyond itself. 3. Political prudence, and this is that by which men rule themselves in obeying Princes in order to the common good of the city or kingdom. 4. Economic prudence, by which men direct themselves toward living well according to domestic intercourse, for the common good of the house or family. 5. Military prudence, by which harms from enemies are repelled. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 47, aa. 10, 11, 12; q. 48, 50.

The potential parts of prudence are: 1. Eubulia, or the virtue of taking counsel well, whose office is to suggest good counsel. 2. Synesis, which is the virtue of judging well concerning particular things to be done, according to common rules. 3. Gnome, which is the virtue of judging about things to be done beyond common principles; and consequently it imports a certain perspicacity of judgment. These parts are potential parts of prudence, because the principal act of prudence is to command execution, to which taking counsel well and judging well are directed. S. Th. 1. 2. q. 57, aa. 4-6; 2. 2. q. 48; q. 51.

R. To the third. Imprudence is opposed to prudence. It is either such privatively, or contrarily. "But negatively it is not properly so called, namely so that it properly imports only the lack of prudence, which can be without sin. Privatively, indeed, imprudence is so called insofar as someone lacks prudence which he is naturally apt and ought to have; and according to this, imprudence is a sin by reason of negligence, by which someone does not apply effort to having prudence. But contrarily imprudence is taken according as reason is moved or acts in a contrary mode to prudence; for instance, if the right reason of prudence acts by taking counsel, the imprudent person spurns counsel; and so concerning the other things which must be considered in the act of prudence. And in this way imprudence is sin according to the proper account of prudence. For this cannot happen, that man acts against prudence, except by turning aside from the rules by which the reason of prudence is rectified. Hence, if this happens by aversion from divine rules, it is a mortal sin; for instance when someone, as if contemning and repudiating divine documents, acts precipitately. But if he acts beside them without contempt and without detriment of those things which are of the necessity of salvation, it is a venial sin." S. Th. 2. 2. q. 53, a. 1.

Generally speaking, every sin is against prudence, as follows from the very nature of prudence and imprudence. But specifically one sins against prudence by excess and by defect. By defect: by precipitation, inconsideration, inconstancy, negligence. By excess, or rather by a certain species of prudence: by prudence of the flesh, cunning, deceit, fraud, solicitude about temporal things, solicitude about future things.

Precipitation is that which, some end having been proposed, immediately undertakes the work, or at least judges concerning the means and mode of executing it, deliberation being omitted, against the office of prudence to take counsel. It is not grave except by reason of the danger of grave sin. - Inconsideration is that which judges while diligent inspection of things from which right judgment proceeds has been omitted, against the office of prudence to judge well. Likewise it is not grave except by reason of the danger of grave sin. - Inconstancy is that by which, without just cause, one's opinion is changed, and one contemns commanding those things which according to right reason had previously been judged and proposed, against firmness of judgment. It is not grave unless from some extrinsic circumstance, e.g., of scandal, precept, vow, someone is bound to persist in the opinion. - Negligence is that which imports defect of due solicitude, and omits to commit to execution at the opportune time a thing deliberated and judged, against the vigilance of reason in executing. It is not grave except in a grave matter.

Prudence of the flesh is that which thinks out suitable means for accomplishing the works of the flesh, so that one may follow the instinct and motions of corrupted flesh. The sin is grave or light by reason of the depraved affection, grave or light, which underlies it. Under prudence of the flesh is comprehended the prudence of the age and of the world, because we also desire the exterior things of the world on account of the flesh. - Cunning generally is the manner of doing something in a hidden mode. But here it is taken specifically for knowledge of depraved means suitable for deceiving, joined with an affection of executing them. It has place in those things which regard the neighbor. For no one hides something from himself. Therefore cunning is a sin by which someone uses not true ways, but false and simulated ways, for obtaining some end, whether good or evil. It is a grave or light sin according to the account of the affection which underlies it, and the harm which follows for the neighbor. - Deceit is the execution of cunning, whether by words or deeds; for it is a general name. Therefore deceit is the assumption of ways that are not true, but simulated and apparent ways, according to the execution of the work. It differs from cunning because cunning is the assumption of ways of this sort, not in execution, but only in the thinking out of them. Fraud is the execution of cunning through deeds, as when someone spends adulterated coin, and is something more restricted than deceit. Deceit and fraud are used especially in contracts, and they are a grave or light sin according to grave or light harm of neighbor. Concerning fraud and deceit the Rules of Law are: "Fraud and deceit ought to patronize no one," C. Ex tenore 16, de Rescr.; "Fraud is not done to him who knows and consents," L. Nemo de Reg. Iur.

Solicitude about temporal things is excessive occupation of mind, proceeding from inordinate love of having, or fear of losing. For solicitude imports a certain effort applied to obtaining something. - Solicitude about future things is excessive occupation of soul concerning future things, especially so that the necessities of life may be had, joined with anxiety and little confidence in Providence. Each solicitude is a grave or light sin, according as by it someone is prepared to violate a precept in a grave or light matter. S. Th. 2. 2. qq. 53-55; Theol. Wirceb., de Virt. Card. de Prud.

St. Thomas, II-II, q. 53 and 54.

36. Imprudence is taken 1. negatively, for the mere absence of prudence, and thus it can be without sin, as is clear in children; 2. privatively, for the lack of prudence which someone can and ought to have, and thus it is an indirectly voluntary sin, by reason of negligence or omission, because someone does not sufficiently strive to have prudence; nevertheless it is not a special sin but a general one, that is, any sin whatever or the condition of every sin: for it is included in every sin, since none occurs without defect in the act of directing reason; 3. contrarily, for imprudence directly and in itself intended, by which, namely, reason is directly moved and acts against prudence, by despising and repudiating counsel (judgment, command) of reason or divine rules; which rarely occurs. This is a special sin of commission according to the proper notion of prudence, mortal from its genus, and therefore to be declared in confession if there is grave contempt of divine rules; otherwise it is venial.

1. Cf. q. 53, a. 2, and q. 51, a. 1, ad 3. Hence it seems to be a sin of omission, although some, such as Cajetan, say that it is reduced to commission; but this is a question of name. It is a sin against the affirmative precept of prudence; this is not a special precept but a general one; whence that is a general sin, not by essence insofar as it is predicated of every sin, but by participation insofar as it is included in every sin, just as in every sin there is that it is against charity of God and of oneself.

2. It is a sin of commission against the negative precept of not contemning divine counsels and rules; special, because directly and in itself voluntary, just as to will the rectitude of prudence is a special act of virtue. Several, such as Lessius and generally the Jesuits who copy him, say that imprudence is venial from its genus and only mortal per accidens; whence precipitation and inconsideration are only mortal by reason of the danger of mortal sin; inconstancy only if someone is bound by vow or precept to persist in a judgment, or from something extrinsic, for example because of scandal; negligence only if that is omitted which obliges under mortal sin or if there is danger of mortal sin. Their reason is that the defect of prudence alone, without defect of another virtue, is defect in the act of reason alone, which is not great: for the rectitude of reason is not sought for its own sake, but on account of the work to be directed; thus perversity is to be estimated from the work which follows.

But no defect of practical reason exists alone; therefore always and per se there is present the defect of another virtue, just as prudence alone is also never exercised, but always together with some other virtue, which consequently is the proper matter of prudence; and therefore the defect of prudence is not mortal per accidens, but per se and from its genus, because a great defect in another virtue is a defect in the proper matter of prudence. Otherwise prudence, which is called the virtue most necessary (I-II, q. 57, a. 5), would oblige only under slight sin!

They object a) the example of a lie, which of itself is venial. But this does not prove the point, because a lie can exist without injury to another virtue.

b) They also allege St. Thomas, who, q. 54, a. 3, says that negligence is mortal either by reason of necessity for salvation or by reason of the cause: both per accidens, because not only the sin of imprudence distinct in species is considered, but at the same time with the work which is omitted from negligence, and this is per accidens. But this is false: negligence is always considered with the omitted work, and thus it is considered according to itself, because the work to be placed is the proper matter of prudence. And even if it were true concerning negligence, it would not yet be true concerning imprudence: the former is by omission, the latter by commission.

37. Various species of imprudence. - Imprudence is divided into various species:

1. By opposition to the annexed virtues and the diverse acts of reason, there is distinguished

a) against counsel and eubulia: precipitation (overhaasting, voorbarig oordeel), by which, with the various modes of inquiry neglected and necessary things to be considered passed over, someone through impulse of will or passion immediately undertakes the work or judges concerning the means of executing it. Whence there is a defect in the inquiry of reason, insofar as reason does not descend in an ordered way to the execution of the work through means according to the required grades, which are five integral parts, namely memory of past things, understanding of present things, shrewdness in considering future events, docility by which someone acquiesces in the judgments of elders, and reasoning comparing one thing with another: for when all these, or several of them, are neglected, there is disorder of counsel. But if this happens from contempt of counsel, it is called temerity (vermetelheid);

b) against judgment and synesis and gnome: inconsideration (onbedachtzaamheid, onbezonnenheid), by which someone, with diligent inspection omitted, contemns or neglects to attend to those things from which right judgment proceeds; whence there is a defect in the judgment of the practical intellect;

c) against command and prudence properly so called: inconstancy (wankelmoedigheid, onbestendigheid, onstandvastigheid), which is a retreat from a good established proposal, whereby reason, because of slight motives, and without any cause or without a just cause, repudiates what it had before rightly dictated;

d) against solicitude (watchfulness in executing), required for prudence strictly so called and for command: negligence (nalatigheid).

2. By opposition to the integral parts required in prudence. But because all those are ordered to directing the aforesaid three acts of reason, concerning which under 1, thence the opposed imprudences are reduced to the sins enumerated above.

3. By opposition to the diverse species of prudence, it is divided into personal, regnative, political, economic, and military imprudence.

1. Cf. q. 53, a. 4, ad 2: "Consideration of those things which are attended to in counsel is ordered to judging rightly. And therefore consideration is perfected in practical judgment. Whence also inconsideration is most of all opposed to the rectitude of judgment."

38. The cause of imprudence. - Precipitation, inconsideration, and inconstancy arise especially from luxury, which most of all impedes the use of reason, because it absorbs the soul and draws it to sensible delight, while the perfection of intellectual virtue consists in abstraction from sensible things. And although envy, anger, avarice, ambition, etc., also draw reason away to something else, luxury extinguishes the very judgment of reason.

39. Negligence is taken in two ways: 1. generally, for the omission of any due act whatever, and thus it is not opposed to prudence but to the virtue in whose matter it is concerned, for example, negligence in counsel, in restitution, or in prayer is opposed to eubulia, justice, or religion; 2. for the defect of solicitude in commanding efficaciously, required, namely, in the act of reason for exciting and directing the will in the execution of the work; and thus it is opposed to prudence strictly so called: namely, it is an act of reason not commanding when it ought or in the way in which it ought. Therefore it differs from inconstancy: this latter is from weakness of reason which does not hold itself firmly in the good proposal conceived, and denotes lightness of soul in a judgment once prudently received. On the contrary, negligence is the omission of judgment and command: reason is deficient in commanding the things which were counseled and judged.

Negligence can be a mortal sin (Prov. XIX, 16): a) per se, on the part of that which is neglected, if it is something of the necessity of salvation; b) per accidens, on the part of the cause, if it comes from a mortally evil will, for example from perfect contempt. Otherwise it is venial, as if it is concerned with something small, and comes from defect of fervor.

40. Observation. - Billuart notes from St. Thomas: Negligence strictly is distinguished from omission, sloth, torpor, and inconstancy. Negligence consists in the defect of an interior act of reason not commanding what it ought or in the way in which it ought. Omission properly pertains to an exterior act; sloth and torpor to execution, yet in such a way that sloth imports slowness in executing, while torpor imports a certain remissness in execution. Finally the inconstant man is deficient in commanding as if impeded by something; the negligent man, through defect of prompt will (q. 54, a. 2, ad 1, 2, 3). For "negligence comes from a certain remissness of the will, through which it happens that reason is not solicited to command those things which it ought, or in the way in which it ought" (a. 3).

NEGLIGENCE in the purpose is a delay, or slowness, of reason and appetite in promoting what has already been well counseled and judged. And so it is opposed to Prudence by reason of due solicitude. Hence D. Bonau. p. 1. Centil. sect. 8. describes it: It is the dereliction of a due circumstance in a good work.

But Gregory of Valentia OBSERVES that these sins are specifically distinct, and are to be specified in confession, when they have been directly willed, as they are against Prudence, but not when indirectly, in order to the work; for then it is enough to say the work of sin, for instance theft, etc. But if, from negligence of grave examination, you omit a mortal thing, it will have to be said, as D. Bonau. says in spec. animae, cap. 3. at the end: So also if you neglect to learn by heart the things necessary for salvation.

He OBSERVES secondly that these sins, since they are of reason, arise especially from Lust, as D. Gregor. 31. Moral. cap. 31. teaches, although they arise also from other sins, especially Sloth, as the Saintly Doctor says.

But they are MORTAL, either on the part of the object and matter, if they are about something necessary for salvation under a mortal [aspect]: or on the part of the cause, if they are committed from such carelessness, or neglect of salvation, that one makes nothing of the friendship of God; otherwise, if from negligence some things not necessary for salvation are omitted, it will be venial, as D. Thom. quaest. 54. art. 3. teaches, and universally concerning all the vices opposed to Prudence teach Sylvester under the word negligentia, Valentia quaest. 5. p. 1., Tannerus num. 54., with D. Bonau. in spec. animae, cap. 3.

Nor indeed are they necessarily to be explained distinctly in confession, unless when they have been directly willed, otherwise they are only the conditions of sins. So D. Thom. Valentia, Caiet. Tannerus with D. Bonau. loc. cit. Centil. and more clearly in speculo animae, cap. 3.; and Prov. 19. brings it forward: He who neglects his own life shall be killed: He adds that negligence properly is the omission of a circumstance; but that sloth is a desistence from the work.