No light matter in impurity

All sins of impurity of whatever kind or species are of themselves mortal, ‘This doctrine is taught in such passages of Holy Scripture as the following: 1 Cor. vi 9-10; Gal. v 19; Matt. v 28. Moreover, as we saw above, those sins are grievous which cause great harm to society or to the individual; but there is scarcely any cause so prolific of public and private evil of all sorts as sins of impurity, so that we must conclude that they are grievous even by the light of reason. Furthermore, all sins of impurity, if voluntary in themselves and fully deliberate, are mortal; or in other words, it is grievously sinful directly to seek any even slight unlawful venereal pleasure, or to consent to it deliberately even when it has not been directly sought, This doctrine is the approved teaching of theologians, and it has a rational basis, inasmuch as the tendency of men to these sins is so strong and their weakness so great, that slight indulgence in venereal pleasure almost necessarily leads to grave excesses, so that even in light matter there is the whole reason of the prohibition, and so all sins of impurity, if fully deliberate and voluntary in themselves, are mortal, and there are none that are venial merely on account of parvity of matter.

On the other hand, if venereal pleasure is not voluntary in itself but only in its cause, nor deliberately consented to when it arises, although it was foreseen that it would follow from some other action, as from reading a lascivious book, or looking at an immodest object out of curiosity, it may be only venially or it may be mortally sinful, according to circumstances. In general, if in the case in question there is proximate danger of giving consent to the impure pleasure, or if its cause is of its nature such as to occasion great venereal pleasure, this will be mortally sinful even when only indirectly voluntary; in other cases it will be only venially sinful.¹ This same principle will guide us in questions concerning the greater or less malice of venereo-sensual pleasure.

¹ Cf. Book I, p. 8.

Non-Consummated Sins of Impurity.—These include all those preparatory sins in which unlawful sex pleasure is not carried to completion by coition or pollution. We shall speak first of the internal sins of thought, delight, and desire (see 232 sqq.), and next of the external sins of unlawful looks, words, kisses, and embraces.

351. - The notion and division.

1. Lust can be imperfect either because it is completed by no exterior act but is retained in some manner in the mind or will, or because an exterior act is not brought to its natural terminus.

We call lust imperfect in the latter sense any non-full satisfaction of the venereal appetite sought or admitted outside matrimony; or any venereal movement, not satiating of itself, effected or accepted by the will.

Above, no. 28, we described a venereal movement as a pleasurable exterior change of the sexual parts, and we warned that it must not be urged too strongly that the pleasure be felt in the sexual organs themselves; wherefore, one who suffers an erection from an obscene phantasm experiences a venereal movement, although the erection in itself seems to him to contain no pleasure.

2. Moreover, venereal satisfaction can be sought or voluntary, which the will has chosen or intended;

admitted or accepted, which, having arisen from elsewhere, the will embraces by its assent;

merely permitted, which arises neither chosen nor intended and to which the will does not positively adhere, although it does not impede or avoid it.

For permission can be passive or active: passive, indeed, when we allow it to flow from other extraneous causes; active, when we foresee that it will follow from our own action, apart, however, from our choice and intention, as an effect either certain or likely, and we do not therefore abstain from the action.

Connected with permission is the question of indirect lust, which must be treated in its proper place.

3. The division of an act according to and against nature, at least if there is question of an exterior act, recurs here. For the affection can comply with nature or oppose it; but an imperfect exterior act says neither of itself; rather, this will have to be estimated from the end of the agent, from the perfect act to which it is referred. Cf. Van Roey, Quaestio specialis, p. 17, at the end.

352. - The intrinsic malice of venereal pleasure directly sought or admitted outside matrimony is not disputed among Catholics: every venereal affection, every venereal movement directly sought or admitted, is lustful, that is, vicious or outside the mean of chastity.

But the celebrated question concerning its perpetual gravity has been raised; concerning it three opinions chiefly have arisen.

The first opinion, whose defenders belong rather to an earlier age, thinks that some venereal movements are grave, others light, according to the lesser or greater distance by which they are separated from perfect satisfaction. Thus Sanctius ¹, Cardenas ², and several others. In order to explain this opinion more closely, a certain author judged that a pleasure which did not attain an eighth part of the perfect pleasure was slight. St. Antoninus himself has certain words ³ because of which Thomas Sanchez judges that he was not alien to this opinion. Moreover, Sanchez admits that at one time the same opinion did not displease him. But, as he himself says: "The matter having been well considered and the reasons weighed, we judge it to be held as most certain that no slightness of matter is found in venereal pleasure ⁴."

¹ Selectae disputationes, disputation 21, no. 19, at the end.

² Crisis theologica, tract 5, De castitate, disputation 45, chapter 7.

³ Third Part, title 16, chapter 1, section 10, Notable 1.

⁴ De matrimonio, book 9, disputation 46, nos. 6 and 9. The retraction, however, first appeared in the Lyon edition in the year 1654. But since Sanchez died in 1610, this retraction was made by another hand. What is read in In Decalogum, book 5, chapter 6, no. 12, is not proved to have been spontaneous.

The second opinion, therefore, teaches that venereal pleasures are grave from their entire genus. Thus Sanchez ⁵, the Most Illustrious Dr. Waffelaert ⁶, and most moderns.

⁵ In Decalogum, book 5, chapter 6, no. 12.

⁶ De virtutibus cardinalibus, no. 191.

De Moya ⁷, section 9, renders and defends the third opinion in these words: "In venereal matters slightness of matter is not granted morally and practically, but, speaking physically and speculatively, it cannot be denied."

⁷ Tract 6, Miscellanea, disputation 2, De peccatis, question 2, section 3.

According to the testimony of the Most Illustrious Dr. Waffelaert, the first opinion has not yet been condemned by the Holy See or rejected as improbable.

Proposition 40 does indeed exist, proscribed by Alexander VII on March 18, 1666 "at least as scandalous": "The opinion is probable which says that a kiss given on account of the carnal and sensible pleasure which arises from the kiss is only venial, the danger of further consent and of pollution being excluded." But it could already have been proscribed because it made no distinction either between a momentary and a prolonged kiss, a single and a repeated kiss, or between a slight and a notable pleasure. Wherefore the force of this proposition, which, moreover, is rejected merely as scandalous, is easily escaped. Furthermore, in it there is speech only of sought pleasure. Merely admitted pleasure is not touched upon.

In the year 1612, Father Aquaviva, Superior General of the Society of Jesus, prohibited the religious of the Society of Jesus from admitting as tolerable, much less as true or probable, the opinion which asserts that, outside matrimony, light matter can be present in venereal pleasure deliberately sought. By decree 24 of the Ninth General Congregation, this precept was extended to deliberately admitted pleasure.

Nevertheless, afterward, on January 15, 1659, the Roman Revisers of the Society of Jesus answered the Gallo-Belgian province: "A learned man who accuses himself of venereal matters as sins which in his opinion, which he does not wish to abandon, are only venial because of slightness of matter, notwithstanding the cited decree, can and ought to be absolved by a confessor of the Society."

They answered thus because they could not then deny the extrinsic probability of the more benign opinion.

But from that time the opinion which admits no slightness of matter, at least in direct lust, has prevailed to such a degree that "that extrinsic probability which the opinion defending slightness of matter in venereal matters formerly had can plainly no longer exercise its force ⁸."

⁸ Lehmkuhl, I, 1028.

But the third opinion incurs no censure.

Come, then, the opinions having been heard, certain things must be noted concerning their arguments.

The more benign opinion, as is evident of itself, uses this easy rationale: there are small beginnings even of a gravely evil action which, willed in themselves, are customarily held to be venial. Thus anger is reproved by the Lord Himself as the beginning of homicide. Yet no one will contend that all anger must be avoided under grave sin.

For proving the more severe opinion, they are accustomed chiefly to use a twofold way.

Some adduce this argument, which they judge to be fortified by the authority of St. Thomas ⁹: Acts of imperfect lust are mortal because they contain consent to the pleasure of intercourse or of perfect lust.

⁹ II-II, question 154, article 4.

But if, with Lessius ¹⁰, you object that these acts, for example kisses, can be done from the intention of a lesser pleasure, they respond, with Cajetan ¹¹, that the force and efficacy of that intention are destroyed by the nature of the work, which of itself is the beginning of the perfect act. But one beginning can be remote, another proximate, another notable, another slight or small. By what right do you transfer the grave guilt of the consummated act to every beginning of it, even one remote and light?

¹⁰ Book 4, chapter 3, no. 57.

¹¹ On II-II, question 154, article 4.

The argument of Cajetan can also be proposed in this form. It is intrinsically and gravely evil to will, for example, kisses insofar as they are a part of unlawful intercourse. But one who outside wedlock seeks or admits venereal pleasure in kisses wills them insofar as they are a part of intercourse. For the venereal pleasure which they bring prepares for and surrounds intercourse. Everything there coheres; but a perspicuous proof of the major proposition is wanting.

Others, therefore, entering upon another way, think that speculative and abstract consideration must be abandoned, so that from concrete and practical observation they may elicit the gravity of all direct lust.

That argument can be proposed thus: "In direct lust, we cannot define the degree of future excitation, nor, after it has arisen, contain it within certain limits. Therefore, all direct lust entails the permission of a grave movement, and this without any just cause. But this is grave. Then, because of our greatest frailty and the vehemence of concupiscence, the will which deliberately embraces a lustful pleasure of a lesser degree goes as though down a slope toward seeking complete pleasure through an imperfect but grave act.

"If the Author of nature permitted this to be done without grave guilt, that weak moral sanction would of itself allure the will toward consummated sin, far from restraining it. But the immense danger of delusion prevents that law from being circumscribed by particular exceptions."

Lehmkuhl ¹², with not a few others, uses this genus of argument when he writes: "Every venereal pleasure is a certain beginning of the commotion and effusion of human semen, or at least bears with it the proximate danger of effusion; because, once excitation has occurred, it is not so within the power of man to stop and repel further progress; wherefore it participates in its malice."

¹² In the cited place, I, 1028, where, consistent with himself, he formally names the effusion and commotion of semen.

We admit that this rationale also is difficult. Do not the same writers, when they are not occupied by concern for the present question, for example when they treat of the mutual intimacy of spouses, spontaneously distinguish acts which introduce a grave or proximate danger of pollution from acts which introduce only a light and remote danger?

And, even if that connection is granted for sought lust, with what appearance of truth can the same be asserted of merely admitted lust, by which someone consents to a slight pleasure which has already arisen, without any effort to increase it? In their demonstration they are accustomed to pass over merely admitted imperfect pleasure in silence.

We do not, however, allege the difficulties which we experience in grasping these reasonings in order to weaken the force of the conclusion. On the contrary. These attempts were made to establish it upon invincible arguments; the ease with which arguments limping more or less have been accepted by the best minds, and this concordant opinion of Catholics - which is so great that already in his own age Sporer ¹³ suspected that no disagreement of consequence existed, and that Catholic doctors differed only in words or in the manner of speaking - bear luminous witness to that common perception of conscience by which all feel that nothing can be taken away from severity in venereal matters without so great a common harm arising that the error of the concession is detected in its very effect.

¹³ Theologia sacramentalis, p. 43, section 5, c.

This assuredly ought to be sufficient for persuasion.

Nevertheless, that we may weigh the matter intrinsically, let this be our conclusion:

353. - Every venereal pleasure deliberately sought or admitted outside matrimony is intrinsically and gravely evil.

We demonstrate it thus. As all admit, every venereal movement, as such, has an essential order to conjugal intercourse or to the legitimate perfect act, and indeed one defined by the venereal faculty itself: it is its natural beginning and preparation.

But by every venereal pleasure deliberately sought or admitted outside matrimony, this order of the faculty is taken away; and the use of venereal things is sought or accepted for an individual good alone, contrary to the relation to the species.

VI. All lust outside marriage which is directly and in itself voluntary, whether complete or incomplete, even the least, is mortally evil and does not admit lightness of matter.¹²

¹² Cf. Disputed Question XV De Malo, a. 2, ad 16 and 17; Disputed Question XV De Veritate, a. 4, and ad 8; I-II, q. 74, a. 8; II-II, q. 153, a. 3, and q. 154, a. 4.

It is proved: 1. The matter is evident for complete lust: the use of the genitals is essentially destined to the propagation of the human race through conjugal copulation. Therefore every such use outside marriage is inordinate, and indeed in such a way that it is directly against the greatest common good of society, namely its conservation and due propagation. But this is a matter of the greatest moment, and therefore the inordination is of itself and always grave. For if this were not so, men would care little about entering marriage.

Moreover, the special deformity in it is that the action and pleasure most necessary to the common good and immediately destined to the good of the species are sought for personal pleasure and referred to the individual; and thus that which regards only the good of the species immediately is ordered to an individual good. These things will be clearer from what will be said below concerning pollution and fornication, and from what follows here.

2. The same holds for incomplete lust, even the least, provided it is willed in itself. The general reason is that it is impossible for anyone to seek incomplete venereal pleasure without implicitly seeking and willing the complete pleasure, and incurring its disorder, or having an affection toward complete lust. For:

Every venereal act as such has a natural order to conjugal copulation, or to the perfect act legitimately exercised in marriage, of which it is the natural beginning and preparation. But every venereal pleasure sought outside marriage removes that order and orders to an individual good that which is destined to the good of the species. Therefore every venereal pleasure sought outside marriage unduly tends to an individual good and removes the natural order toward the human species. But such inordination is intrinsically and gravely evil, because it is an inversion of the natural order by which an act of the species is exercised as if it were the work of an individual man, and because, with respect to the greatest good, namely the conservation of society, the subordination by which man, who is a part of the species, is constituted under the species, is violated; since this order, in this matter, is altogether necessary to human society itself, it must be preserved under grave obligation. Therefore every venereal act sought outside marriage is intrinsically and gravely evil.

Or otherwise: in fornication and pollution there is grave sin because the act and pleasure destined to the good of the species are referred to the individual. But the same is present in imperfect lust, directly and in itself voluntary. Therefore in it there is mortal sin. The minor is proved: he who voluntarily posits, and directly and in itself wills, the beginning, already wills the complement in affection, not as to be executed, but he has an affection toward it.¹³ But imperfect lust and incomplete venereal pleasure by their nature are the beginning of consummated lust and of complete pleasure. Therefore he who voluntarily posits and directly and in itself wills imperfect lust has an affection toward complete lust, and thus sins mortally.

¹³ It is founded on the principle of Saint Thomas, I-II, q. 1, a. 6, that "the beginning of anything is always ordered to its consummation"; whence he who wills the beginning, by that very fact implicitly and necessarily wills the consummation, just as he who wills a participated good by that very fact wills it "as tending toward the perfect good."

Hence in whatever matter, even the least, there is always the same injury to the natural order altogether necessary to society, and the entire reason of disorder.¹⁴

¹⁴ On this matter Cajetan, Ill. Waffelaert, and P. Vermeersch may be consulted. The argument rests on the general principles by which mortal and venial sin are distinguished. Mortal sin is against charity; hence, since human society is a means necessary for man to arrive at his end, everything that is directly against society, or against that without which it cannot subsist, is also against charity, which unites us to God the last end. In other words: the means to the end imposed on man by God is that he preserve the natural order of things with respect to God, to neighbor, and in himself; therefore every substantial violation of order is grave matter. And indeed the law of nature does not merely say: avoid harm to neighbor or to society; but rather: preserve order lest harm arise. But lust, from its own nature, violates the natural order of things, because an act of the species is exercised as an individual act, and that which is destined solely to the good of society and is necessary to its conservation and propagation is ordered to an individual good. Therefore it is directly against society, in the mode stated above.

This is confirmed: a) according to Saint Thomas, the pleasure attached to an act exists on account of the act itself; hence consent to the pleasure is of the same malice as consent to the act: if the work is forbidden, the pleasure of the work is forbidden in the same way. But consent to the complete act of lust outside marriage is mortal sin. Therefore also any consent to the pleasure of this act. But every venereal pleasure is per se ordered to copulation, or to the complete act of which it is the beginning, as has been said, and thus it is pleasure of the complete act, because it is always of the same notion.¹⁵ Therefore every venereal pleasure sought for its own sake is mortal sin. "If consent to the pleasure of fornication thought about is mortal sin, a fortiori consent to the pleasure of fornication begun, or consent to the pleasure which is the principle or part of fornicary pleasure" - Cajetan on II-II, q. 154, art. 4.

¹⁵ This argument in no way has force to show that other pleasures, even those sought for their own sake, are mortal sin, because they are not proper to the genital act, and consequently do not touch the essential order to the species.

And surely no one is pleased except in that which seems to him good and conformable to his appetite; therefore he who seeks the pleasure of a mortally evil work holds that work as good for himself, and consequently his affection tends into a mortally evil work. And thus he sins mortally, because he deliberately wills that his affection be conformed to a mortally evil work.¹⁶

¹⁶ Thus Saint Thomas, in the places cited, especially I-II, q. 74, art. 8. Nor can it be objected that Saint Thomas there teaches only that morose consent to the complete pleasure of a consummated act is mortal sin. For in this case the question would concern only pleasure thought about spiritually, not pleasure really experienced in the genital organs, since complete pleasure perceived in the genital organ cannot be had without the complete exercise of the genital act and consummated lust. On the contrary, Saint Thomas:

b) On account of the vehemence of concupiscence of the flesh and the frailty common to men, it is morally impossible to contain concupiscence within fixed limits; hence consent itself to the least pleasure constitutes the proximate danger of consenting to further pleasure and to the complete act.¹⁷ Therefore such consent to the least pleasure is also mortal sin. Hence even if the opinion holding that there is smallness of matter in lust directly and in itself willed were speculatively probable, nevertheless it would be practically improbable; and this seems to be the reason why proposition 40 was condemned by Alexander VII,¹⁸ because it falsely supposes that a kiss had on account of carnal pleasure, that is, venereal pleasure, does not induce danger of consent to graver acts.

¹⁷ The argument is suggested by Saint Thomas, Disputed Question De Veritate XV, art. 4, who writes concerning the contrary opinion of certain ancients: "The common opinion of the moderns contradicts this opinion, and it seems to turn toward danger of souls, since from consent to such pleasure a man can most promptly fall into sin."

¹⁸ "There is a probable opinion which says that a kiss had on account of carnal and sensible pleasure which arises from the kiss is only venial, when the danger of further consent and pollution is excluded." Hence in the decree of the Holy Office, 4 February 1611, one reads: "Since in venereal matters there is no smallness of matter..."

Therefore all lust which is sought for its own sake outside marriage, by that very fact directly opposes the primary end of nature and the primary precept of the natural law, and therefore is a grave sin.

VII. Certain moderns have very recently sought a subterfuge, saying: only the consummated act is of itself gravely evil, but imperfect acts are of themselves venial, and are mortal only per accidens, whether on account of intention or affection, or on account of danger of further consent, or on account of scandal.¹⁹ Namely, they introduce a new member into the distinction of the various pleasures, and between sensible pleasure, or even sensual pleasure, and venereal pleasure, which is satiative, they posit an intermediate pleasure, which they call sexual,²⁰ as if by nature, and not only by degree, it were distinguished from venereal pleasure.

¹⁹ Before, they were only thinking this in mind, or even spreading it secretly and craftily; but now some writing has already been able to be published which defends this doctrine: Quaedam moralia quae ex doctrina D. Thomae selegit P. A. Eaarakkers, O.S.Cr. (1928). But when it had been reported by the bishops of the Netherlands to the Holy Office, the response was made to the archbishop of Utrecht that "the little work itself was to be withdrawn from commerce" (1 May 1929), at the same time asking the said archbishop that in due time he make the Holy Office more certain concerning the execution of the decree.

²⁰ Thus in the said little work, p. 49 and 50.

Yet this theory: 1. is a new doctrine. Although some theologians once affirmed lightness in the matter of lust - yet several of these recede from us only in manner of speaking²¹ - no one, so far as we know, has thus far taught that every imperfect pleasure is of itself venial, but all have regarded the graver carnal motions as mortal. But novelty, not indeed in some mere application of principles, but in the theological principles themselves, is always suspect; such is this novelty: that imperfect acts of lust are not of themselves mortal.

²¹ Several said this concerning lust voluntary in its cause, or concerning sensible or sensual pleasure.

2. By physiological experience anyone can feel that imperfect venereal pleasure is of the same species as perfect pleasure: it is found in one and the same line and physiologically is of the same nature. Hence it is not related to perfect pleasure as a separated means and a merely extraneous disposition to an extrinsic term, but as inception to consummation, as the beginning of a motion which intrinsically tends and strives to extend itself to its proper term, and as part of the consummated work.

3. Moreover, every sexual pleasure, insofar as it is sexual, is essentially and exclusively ordered and directed, just as sex itself is, to generation and to complete satiative pleasure; and therefore, from the very physical nature of the act, it is impossible to will and seek the imperfect pleasure without the affection implicitly tending to the perfect and seeking it. Hence it is false that "incomplete motions ... are only preliminaries; they touch the act of generation only remotely, mediately, accessorily ... and belong to it only accidentally."²² On the contrary, they express an essential order to it.

²² Thus in the said little work, p. 62.

4. Hence they are mortal by the same reason as acts of complete lust, provided that they are directly and in themselves voluntary: for they always implicitly include an affection toward the complete act.

Perhaps they think to object:

a) That a human act tends into the object as it is proposed by reason: but reason can abstract from complete pleasure, indeed the will can exclude it.

Reply. It cannot exclude it, because consummated pleasure is necessarily desired implicitly by him who seeks its inception, which by its nature necessarily tends to consummation. The abstraction of the intellect and the intention of the will cannot change the nature of things.

Therefore just as he truly remains superstitious who, intending to exclude the intervention of the devil, uses vain means which cannot have an effect without the intervention of the devil, since he thus implicitly and necessarily seeks his intervention and so acts against his own intention; so he who, wishing to exclude complete pleasure, desires incomplete pleasure, acts against his intention: for by that very fact he implicitly and necessarily desires the complete pleasure, not as to be executed, but as pleasurable, because the incomplete pleasure is not desirable except as the beginning and part of complete pleasure, and consequently except by reason of complete pleasure.

b) That theft admits lightness of matter, and yet light theft disposes to grave theft; likewise anger and envy are sometimes light and yet are a way to homicide.

Reply. Light theft is not the beginning of grave theft, but an act complete and consummated in itself and perfectly distinct from grave theft; nor does it immediately dispose to it, but through the facility caused by repeated acts. Likewise anger and envy are perfectly distinguished from homicide, indeed by complete species, so that they are only an occasion or cause, in no way the beginning or part of homicide itself.

c) That to become drunk for the pleasure of drink is mortal; and yet to drink wine from pleasure with a slight excess is only venial; therefore by parity concerning the pleasure of lust.

Reply. Drunkenness according to itself is not gravely evil by reason of the pleasure which is unduly sought in drink, but only because it has annexed to it deprivation of the use of reason. On the contrary, lust is that by which pleasure reserved to the good of the species is exclusively referred to the good of the individual.

d) That the moral virtues which concern the passions admit lightness of matter; therefore also the opposed sins, and consequently lust.

Reply. Chastity and lust not only concern the passions, but also express an immediate order to the common good and to justice. But the good of the human species and of society is grave matter, and therefore lust is gravely evil. Nevertheless it admits lightness of matter in marriage, when, with the primary end of due propagation preserved, sin is committed only against the due mode in the use of the genitals. Outside marriage, however, it is directly opposed to the very primary end of the genitals, and by this reason, when directly and for its own sake sought, it is always grave.

And so we can recognize no serious or solid probability in this new opinion.

Many call into doubt the efficacy of this argument; among them is Billuart, De Temperantia, diss. 5, a. 2, who brings forth many examples to overturn it. But those are not to the point, because in them the question concerns merely sensible pleasure voluntarily sought; or if carnal pleasure accompanies it, this is voluntary not directly and in itself, but only in its cause. Others object that lying is essentially a violation of order, and yet is not mortal. But the order which lust injures is, moreover, necessary to society. From this, therefore, that the natural order is violated, lust is intrinsically evil; from this, that a necessary order, and one essentially due to society itself, is violated, it is gravely evil.

And Billuart himself, diss. 6, a. 16, acknowledges this: "Pleasure is of the same notion," he says, "as that which is in copulation, to which it per se tends."

a. by the name of morose pleasure also understands "when reason does not repress an illicit motion of passion; as when someone, after he has deliberated that the motion of passion arising is inordinate, nevertheless dwells upon it and does not cast it out" (I-II, q. 74, art. 6), or "when after deliberation he does not restrain the inordinate act of the lower powers" (a. 5. Cf. Disputed Question De Veritate XV, a. 4, ad 10).

b. He applies his doctrine to acts of imperfect lust, which he a fortiori regards as mortal sins: "It was said above (I-II, q. 74, art. 7 and 8) that consent to the pleasure of mortal sin is mortal sin and not only consent to the act. And therefore, since fornication is mortal sin and much more the other species of lust, it follows that consent to the pleasure of such sin is mortal sin, and not only consent to the act. And therefore, since kisses and embraces of this sort are done on account of pleasure of this sort" - he does not say, as Ill. Waffelaert observes after Cajetan, "when or whenever they are done," because by their nature they have it that they are thus done; but, "since they are done," that is, are apt to be done - "it follows that they are mortal sins." He deduces the same conclusion from the same principle in Disputed Question De Veritate XV, art. 4: "From which it follows that whatever a man does from consent to such pleasure in order to nourish or hold such pleasure, as are base acts or libidinous kisses or other things of this sort, the whole is mortal sin." Hence to the objection: the acts of lust are touches, embraces, and kisses; but things of this sort do not seem to be mortal sin; he responds in Disputed Question De Malo XV, art. 2, ad 18: "Touches, embraces, and kisses, insofar as they are ordered to the act of fornication, follow consent to fornication; insofar as they are ordered to pleasure alone, they follow consent to pleasure, which is mortal sin. And therefore in either way they are mortal sins." But in these acts pleasure is sought not merely as thought, but as actually perceived and incomplete. Therefore, according to Saint Thomas, every pleasure is specifically, completely or incompletely, the pleasure of fornication or pollution, and therefore, when sought per se, is sought on account of the pleasure of mortal sin. Hence:

c. Saint Thomas expressly teaches that any pleasure whatever of lust outside marriage is mortal sin, namely in Disputed Question XV De Malo, art. 2: whether every act of lust is mortal sin; this doctrine he applies to internal lust (ad 16) and to imperfect acts (ad 18). Namely, he supposes that every pleasure of lust is of the same species and, by this reason, always mortal.

S. Th. II-II, q. 153; Q. D. de Malo 15, a. 2.

1000. Luxury (onkuischheid) is an inordinate appetite for venereal pleasure.¹ "Someone is called luxurious as if dissolved in pleasures. But venereal pleasures especially dissolve the mind of man; and therefore luxury is especially considered concerning venereal pleasures" (a. 1). Hence luxury properly signifies excess in venereal pleasure.

¹ We propose the doctrine on chastity and luxury briefly and summarily. Whoever desires more should go to our little work Quaestiones de Castitate et Luxuria, where he will also find physiological notions and an indicated congruent bibliography.

But the appetite, that is, the love and use, of venereal pleasure is excessive and inordinate if it is sought outside the legitimate use in conjugal copulation and the acts disposing to it. For pleasure, just as the use of the genitals, from its nature is essentially ordered to the propagation of the human race. But this cannot be done in a due manner except in a permanent matrimonial union, which is altogether necessary for the right education of offspring. Therefore the appetite and use of venereal things is inordinate if it is sought: 1) without order to the act of legitimate marriage; 2) in that act, but in an illegitimate and undue mode, apart from the rules prescribed by nature and reason.

1001. Internal and external, complete and incomplete luxury. - Just as venereal pleasure, which is proper to the genital organ in which it is perceived, restrained and ordered according to right reason, is the object of chastity, so inordinate and unrestrained venereal pleasure is the proper object of luxury.

Unduly to seek it, whether really, completely or incompletely, or by thinking to represent it to oneself and to take complacency in it mentally, is luxurious: as perceived completely and perfectly, it is complete or consummated luxury; as perceived imperfectly and incompletely, it is begun or incomplete luxury; as represented in the mind and thus mentally pleasing, it is internal luxury.

Hence by reason of the mode in which it happens, luxury is: A. merely internal, which consists in the mere affection or desire for venereal pleasure or use, and is prohibited by the ninth precept of the decalogue; or B. also external, which happens with the use and commotion of the genital organs, and is prohibited by the sixth precept. This latter can be:

1. Complete, perfect, and consummated, if the exterior act is brought to its natural terminus, that is, satiative pleasure, whether a) it is natural or according to nature and the act is apt for obtaining the natural end of generation, as fornication, adultery, incest; or b) it is unnatural or against nature and the act is not apt for its natural end, but this end is rendered impossible, as pollution, onanism, sodomy;

2. Incomplete, imperfect, and begun, if the exterior act is not brought to its natural terminus and does not attain the ultimate terminus of satiative pleasure. This stands to complete luxury as beginning to terminus, inception to consummation, and therefore it is not so much called luxury, which is more concerned with the pleasure itself of copulation, but rather immodesty concerning the surrounding pleasures.

1002. Principle I. Luxury is a mortal sin from its kind. - It is proved:

1. From Scripture, where the Apostle, Gal. 5:19-21, among the works which exclude from the kingdom of God, enumerates luxury.

2. By reason: Of the account of luxury it is that it exceeds the order and mode of reason concerning venereal things; but such an excess is mortal from its kind. For the more necessary something is, the more the order of reason must be preserved concerning it, and consequently, if the order of reason is passed over, it is gravely vicious. But the use of venereal things is very necessary for the common good, which is the conservation of the human race, just as food is necessary for the conservation of the individual. Therefore excess concerning venereal things, apart from that which the order of reason requires, is of itself mortal, as in a grave matter (a. 3).

This is confirmed: a) Luxury is contrary to legal justice, because from its nature it is apt directly to harm the common good, namely the conservation and due propagation of the human race; but this is of itself gravely vicious.

b) It violates the right of dominion which God has over our body, of which we have only the use, and indeed only for the due end. Hence "from the fact that someone uses his body inordinately through luxury, he does injury to God, who is the principal lord of our body" (ad 2). But to violate right is of itself gravely evil.

c) The special deformity of luxury consists in this: that the action and pleasure most necessary to the common good and immediately destined to the good of the species are deprived of this natural order to the species, since they are sought for merely personal pleasure and are referred only to the individual. But this is against the natural order of human nature itself.

1003. Principle II. Luxury directly and in itself voluntary, or venereal pleasure sought for its own sake, outside marriage, is a mortal sin from its whole genus; hence it does not admit lightness of matter, but of itself is always grave.

It is said:

1. Luxury or venereal pleasure arising from the commotion of the powers and organs serving generation: for merely sensible or sensual pleasure from the sensible perception of a fitting object, even if sought for its own sake, does not exceed venial fault, because, as was said concerning gluttony, it is only an inordination of a thing indifferent in itself. Hence just as one who hears a sonorous voice, or tastes savory food, precisely for the sensual pleasure arising from it, sins only venially, so one sins only venially who looks at a beautiful woman, or touches her hand or face, precisely for the merely organic or sensual pleasure consisting in a certain proportion and conformity of the thing seen or touched with the organ of sight or touch, so that it is nothing other than pleasure in a beautiful thing which is seen, or in a pleasant, soft, tender thing which is touched, without any other pleasure in a shameful thing.1 And this also holds in practice, though Cajetan and St. Alphonsus think otherwise. Nevertheless it is advisable for all not to linger over these organic pleasures, because from sensual pleasure to venereal pleasure, especially in the sense of touch or sight, progress is easy.

2. Luxury voluntary in itself, or pleasure sought for its own sake: for luxury only voluntary in the cause or indirectly voluntary admits lightness of matter. For, as is clear from the principles set forth in the treatise on Sins:

a) venereal pleasure voluntary in the cause, unless there is a proportionate reason for causing it, is grave or light according as the cause is of itself apt to influence it notably or lightly (I, n. 450);

b) venereal pleasure indirectly voluntary, namely which the will does not repress though it can repress it, is of itself only venial, unless accidentally there is proximate danger of consent (I, n. 449).

3. Outside marriage: for in marriage, luxury even voluntary in itself, or venereal pleasure sought for its own sake, is of itself venial, as being only the excess of a licit thing; unless, however, it happens against nature, in a mode which impedes generation, or includes a danger of this kind.

4. It is of itself always grave and does not admit lightness of matter; hence every luxury, whether complete or incomplete, even the least, provided it is willed in itself, is of itself mortally evil.

It is proved:

1. What is directly opposed to the ordination and primary intention of our nature and of the Creator of nature is a mortal sin (I, n. 539). But every venereal pleasure, by the primary intention and ordination of our nature and of the Creator of nature, is ordered only to procuring generation in legitimate marriage. Therefore every venereal pleasure sought for its own sake outside marriage is directly opposed to this intention and ordination, and is a mortal sin.

2. Incomplete venereal pleasure from its nature tends to the complete pleasure of which it is the beginning; and therefore he who seeks it for its own sake, by that very fact loves and seeks the complete, not indeed as to be executed but as delightful.2 But love of complete pleasure outside marriage is without doubt a mortal sin, because it is directly contrary to the common good, as is clear from the grave malice of fornication. Therefore also love of incomplete pleasure.

Nor should you say that a human act tends into an object as it is proposed by reason; but reason can abstract from complete pleasure, indeed the will can exclude it. - Resp.: It cannot validly exclude it, because consummated pleasure is necessarily implicitly desired by him who seeks its beginning, which by its nature necessarily tends to consummation. The abstraction of the intellect and the intention of the will cannot change the nature of things.

Therefore, just as he remains truly superstitious who, intending to exclude the intervention of the demon, uses vain means which cannot have effect without the intervention of the demon, since thus implicitly and necessarily he seeks that intervention and so acts against his intention (n. 777); so he who, wishing to exclude complete pleasure, desires incomplete pleasure, acts against his own intention. For by that very fact he implicitly and necessarily desires the complete, because the incomplete is not desirable except as the beginning and part of complete pleasure, and except by reason of complete pleasure.

3. He who voluntarily seeks venereal pleasure for its own sake exposes himself to grave danger of seeking further and complete pleasure, on account of the vehemence of the concupiscence of the flesh and common human frailty. Therefore he sins mortally.

Thus it is impossible for anyone to seek incomplete venereal pleasure without implicitly seeking and willing the complete pleasure, and incurring its inordination, or having an affection toward complete luxury and exposing himself to its danger.

Hence proposition 40 was condemned by Alexander VII: "The opinion which says that a kiss had for carnal and sensible pleasure which arises from the kiss is only venial, the danger of further consent and pollution being excluded, is probable"; because it falsely supposes that a kiss had for carnal, that is, venereal pleasure, does not induce the danger of consent to graver acts.

1. Billuart, diss. V, a. 2.

2. It is founded on the principle that "always the beginning of something is ordered to its consummation"; hence he who wills the beginning, by that very fact implicitly and necessarily wills the consummation, just as he who wills a participated good, by that very fact wills it "as tending into the perfect good." I-II, q. 1, a. 6.

1004. Remark. - Luxury is also a capital sin and very dangerous, as we said in the treatise on Sins (I, n. 505).

I say 1st. Every venereal pleasure, if it is directly voluntary, does not admit smallness of matter, and accordingly, however slight it may be, it will always be a mortal sin. The reason is that venereal pleasure is a certain begun emission of semen, or a natural and necessary motion toward it: but emission of semen, if it is sought outside the legitimate use of marriage, is a grave disturbance of the essential order, since from its own nature it tends to the destruction of the human race. Therefore. I said if it is directly voluntary, for all concede that smallness of matter can be given in venereal pleasure only indirectly willed, and the reason is evident; for the whole malice of this kind of pleasure must be taken from the cause; but that there can be a cause slightly base, e.g., curious reading of some less chaste book, no one has ever denied. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, nn. 415 and 484. - Viva, on prop. 40 condemned by Alexander VII. Baller., note (a), p. 396.

I say 2nd. Pleasure which is called sensible or natural of itself lacks every fault. For that pleasure properly consists in this, that the touch or sight of one's own body or another's pleases on account of proportion and connaturality with the organ of touch or sight, without any stirring of the genital spirits; not otherwise than if sometimes a soft thing were touched, e.g., a cat, silk, etc., or a beautiful thing were looked at, e.g., a horse, a meadow, and other things which naturally delight: but in touching or looking upon these things there is or can be no fault of itself. Therefore. I said of itself, for practically speaking there will always be some slight fault present, not only if those touches or gazes are done from curiosity, levity, or for the sole pleasure, according to those things which have been said elsewhere, but also on account of the danger of passing over to venereal pleasure. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 416. Viva, loc. cit. - Baller., note (a), p. 393.

Now one must treat of the sins of lust in particular, but only of external ones, because of internal ones enough has been said elsewhere.

I treated this question in my Disput. de Virtutibus Iustitiae adnexis, sect. 4. de Veritate, et Mendacio, quaest. 2. dubitatione 4. ad argumenta; where, with D. Bonaventure, I upheld the negative opinion, and there I laid down the rule for discerning when there is parvity of matter in sins. But again I find in the Compend. Theol. verit. lib. 3. cap. 28. that the Saintly Doctor openly upholds the negative opinion ex professo.

That parvity of matter exists in these matters was asserted by Sanchez de matrim. lib. 9. d. 46. Zanchus in the Directorium Confessariorum part. 1. de Sacram. matrim. cap. 41. quaest. 28. Salas, prima secundae d. 6. sect. 21. num. 149. Villalobos, tom. 2. tract. 40. dub. 9. See also Seraphinus Freitas in the addit. ad tract. de confess. sollic. quaest. 7. num. 33. Sanctius in select. d. 11. and Maldonatus says it is probable speculatively, p. 2. quaest. 74. art. 10.

Along with these go those who hold that touches and kisses, by reason of merely sensible delectation, without any other intrinsic circumstance, are not mortal. So Franciscus Sylvius, 2. 2. quaest. 154. art. 4. and others cited by him. I add Comitoli, resp. moral. lib. 4. quaest. 20. Ioannes Salas, prima 2. quaest. 74. tract. 13. dub. 6. sect. 20. num. 139. Lessius, lib. 4. cap. 3. d. 8. num. 58. Lublinus, verb. osculum.

But as to touches and kisses, Diana dissents, and deservedly, part. 4. Tract. 4. Miscell. resol. 136. with Filliuccius, tom. 2. tract. 30. cap. 9. num. 119. Sanchez, in summa, tom. 2. lib. 5. cap. 6. Rebellus, p. 2. lib. 3. quaest. 19. sect. 3. wherefore the other opinion was condemned by Alexander VII, as we saw in the place cited below.

And that in general there is no parvity of matter in these things the Saintly Doctor teaches, loc. cit. whom followed Tanner, prima 2. d. 4. quaest. 8. num. 109. Castro Palao, in opere moral. tom. 1. tract. 2. d. 1. part. 10. §. 2. Basil Ponce, de matrim. lib. 10. cap. 16. §. 2. Lessius, lib. 4. cap. 3. d. 15. num. 109. Rebellus, loco supra citato, and Claudius Acquaviva, the Father General, in the year 1612 commanded this opinion to be taught in the Society of Jesus.

Therefore Sanchez in summa, tom. 2. lib. 5. cap. 6. asserts this, singing his palinode, and Diana warns that it must be asserted outright, part. 3. tract. 5. resol. 1.

The reason used by Rebellus, Diana, and others is that of D. Bonaventure here; for these things are induced by nature as dispositions to the act of generation, to inflame the flesh with the fire of pleasure in order to copulation and semination: Therefore it is an enormous perversion when they are employed toward pleasure amid dissolutions.

Another reason is brought forward by the Saintly Doctor, because this is the difference between the nutritive and the generative power; the latter is more material, more corrupt, and so rushes headlong, not so the nutritive; whence in gluttony it is more easily venial.

I confess that I tremble with my whole being when I see the danger there is in touches and kisses: Therefore I teach that this opinion must altogether be held. Nor does the Spanish Emphasis move me, whereby Villalobos cries out Los tocamientos leves paruidad de materia.

As to kisses, it was defined by Alexander VII that they are mortal; as is clear from the Decree of 18 March 1666. and as I proved, tom. 4. disp. 17. quaest. 10. sect. 37.