Question Two: Concerning Chastity and Lust in General — Theological Principles

I. Chastity has an affinity with the word "to chastise," because according to the dictate of right reason it represses or restrains concupiscence, which most of all needs to be restrained. It is, namely, a special moral virtue, a species of temperance, which inclines one to the honesty of moderating the sexual appetite and venereal pleasure. This pleasure is perceived in the genital organ and is ordered to generation; hence it is called venereal, because the gentiles made the goddess Venus the patroness of this pleasure.

It is said to be: 1. a special virtue, because it has a special object, the concupiscence of venereal pleasure to be moderated. Hence it regards the sexual appetite immediately and per se; the other senses mediately and per accidens, insofar as they concur in exciting venereal pleasure.

2. A species of temperance: temperance moderates the sensitive appetite in those things which most strongly allure; but among these, the pleasures of the flesh in the use of the genital organs are more vehement; therefore the virtue which moderates them is a species of temperance.¹

¹ Saint Thomas, Summa Theologiae, II-II, q. 151, a. 2 and 3.

3. One which inclines to the honesty of moderating the sexual appetite: for its material object it has the appetite of venereal pleasure; its primary material object, or formal quod, is the moderation of right reason to be placed in venereal pleasure; its formal object quo is the special honesty which consists in moderating the pleasures of the flesh according to the norm of right reason.

To chastity is joined modesty (schaamachtigheid, eerbaarheid): the former is ordered to the principal pleasures of copulation itself; the latter concerns the accompanying pleasures which are more apparent and are signs of venereal things, for example looks, kisses, touches, and so forth, concerning which man is especially ashamed before others, because they are more often detected. It is not a really distinct virtue, but a circumstance of chastity in general.²

² Ibid., a. 4.

II. Pleasure is the repose or complacency of the appetite in a present or possessed good: for whenever a human power, by acting, attains or possesses its proper object, pleasure arises in the appetite. But there are several human powers tending toward diverse goods; hence diverse pleasures also arise. And indeed there is:

a. spiritual pleasure in the will, from the possession of an intellectual or spiritual good;

b. sensible pleasure in the sensitive appetite and in the senses alone, from the possession of a sensible good proportioned to itself;

c. carnal or sexual and venereal pleasure in the same sensitive appetite, and also in the genital organs from the exercise or use of these, which per se pertain to the vegetative powers. But since the human powers are intimately connected with one another, it often happens that one pleasure draws another with it; and thus two intermediate pleasures arise between the three aforesaid pleasures. Hence five pleasures are distinguished by theologians:

1. Purely spiritual pleasure is that which arises either from the intellectual knowledge of some thing, for example when someone rejoices in the knowledge of some truth long sought, or arises from the thing known itself, for example if someone rejoices in God, or in virtue, whose beauty he considers. It is morally good or evil according as that which pleases is good or evil, for example to rejoice in the knowledge of the existence of God, or in a new means of stealing or of inflicting injury on another.³

³ It is called purely spiritual by reason of the faculty, not by reason of the object, for "everything that we desire according to nature, we can also desire with pleasure of reason, but not conversely" (St. Thomas, I-II, q. 31, a. 3). Hence it can also be about a sensible or venereal object: concerning which see I-II, q. 31, a. 3, 4, 5; cf. q. 34, a. 1. Spiritual pleasure of itself follows the nature of rational love, whence per se it is good or evil according to the object. By Saint Thomas it is called intelligible pleasure (q. 31, a. 5), pleasure of reason, or that which follows reason (a. 3). Hence, unlike sensible pleasure, one cannot act on account of spiritual pleasure alone: for this is per se joined to a good either honest or dishonorable.

2. Spiritual-sensible pleasure is that which arises from a more vivid representation, especially from the sight or touch of a person tenderly but honestly loved, especially on account of spiritual qualities. This pleasure also per se resides in the will, but is so vehement that it redounds into the sensitive appetite and is joined with a commotion of the heart and blood.⁴ Such pleasure is accustomed to accompany the love of a mother for a son, of a spouse for a spouse, of a friend for a friend. Per se it is separated from carnal pleasure, and therefore on this side is morally indifferent.

⁴ By Saint Thomas it is called spiritual pleasure with a redounding into the lower appetite (I-II, q. 31, a. 5).

3. Merely sensible pleasure is that which arises from some sensible thing other than a venereal one. It is, namely, a grateful and pleasant affection which is perceived in the very organs of the senses from the conformity or proportion of the sensible object with the sense, for example from the sight or touch of a thing that pleases, the sight of a beautiful thing, the touch of a soft thing, the taste of savory food.⁵ Per se it is without venereal commotion, and therefore such pleasure per se is indifferent. If it is sought according to the order of nature, that is, with and on account of its natural end, it is good, for example when food and drink are thus taken with pleasure of taste; but if the pleasure is turned away from its proper end, or if it is sought for its own sake, it is evil.

⁵ By Saint Thomas it is called sensible or animal pleasure according to knowledge, I-II, q. 31, a. 5 and 6.

4. Sensual or sensible-carnal pleasure is a pleasure which of itself is merely sensible, because it arises from a merely sensible, not venereal, thing, which nevertheless is apt to excite venereal pleasure, for example the look, touch, kiss, or merely sensible conversation of a person loved with sensitive affection on account of beauty. This pleasure as a whole resides per se in the sensitive appetite; nevertheless the more vehement pleasure is joined with a commotion of the heart and blood, and then it easily excites carnal commotion and redounds into the venereal appetite. Such pleasure, if by reason of the agent it involves the proximate danger of consenting to an inordinate venereal appetite, is a sin grave by its genus; if such danger is not present, nor on the other hand a reason fully excusing, such as the custom of the country, friendship not sensual but conformable to reason, and so forth, it is a light sin.

5. Venereal or carnal⁶ or genital pleasure, which arises from the commotion of the organs and humors serving generation: by its nature it is an act of the sensitive appetite to which the voluptuous sense, or pleasurable alteration existing in the genital organs, is pleasing. For the man it consists in the pleasurable erection⁷ of the virile member and the agitation of the same which pours forth semen; for the woman, in the pleasurable erection of the clitoral organ and in the contraction of the female genital canal with distillation. Therefore not every pleasure of the genitals is venereal: for in them also a merely sensible pleasure can be perceived; but that alone is venereal which is proper to these organs and can be perceived only in them. This is the proper matter of chastity and lust.

⁶ The pleasure which is taken in food and drink, not indeed from taste but from the very touch of foods or drinks, is also bodily, and therefore with Saint Thomas can be called carnal, because it is perfected in the touch of the body (I-II, q. 72, a. 2). Yet this pleasure does not regard the present matter; and therefore in the present matter we take carnal pleasure in a stricter sense, for pleasure from venereal touch alone (ibid., ad 4). Both carnal pleasures are called by Saint Thomas sensible by reason of utility, namely for the conservation of animal nature; they are perfected in touch (I-II, q. 31, a. 6).

⁷ From venereal and pleasurable erection must be distinguished a purely natural and quasi-mechanical erection: the former is from venereal phantasy or with pleasure; the latter is accustomed to arise from a merely physical cause and is had without any sense of pleasure. Cf. for example Aertnijs, Theologia Moralis, I, n. 219; Vermeersch, cited work, n. 28.

It is twofold: complete, perfect, or consummated; and incomplete, imperfect, or begun, according as it proceeds to the final natural term of the act and satiates nature, or arises from carnal commotion which does not proceed to the final term and does not satiate nature.

Therefore this pleasure, ordered and restrained according to right reason, is the object of chastity; inordinate and unrestrained, it is the object of lust. Unduly, either really to seek that pleasure, completely or incompletely, or by thinking to represent it to oneself and to have complacency in it in the mind, is lust.

III. Chastity in some moderates venereal pleasure, in others excludes it, by reason of the diverse state; hence it is usually distinguished as threefold:

1. youthful chastity, which abstains from every venereal pleasure until the time of nuptials;

2. conjugal chastity, which moderates the appetite of sexual pleasure in spouses and excludes whatever is illicit in the use of marriage;

3. widowed chastity, which after the dissolution of marriage abstains from every carnal pleasure, whether in perpetuity or until second nuptials.

By reason of the mode in which it is preserved, it is distinguished as imperfect, which abstains only from illicit pleasures of the flesh, and perfect, which abstains from all pleasures, even those licit in marriage.

IV. Virginity is taken in a twofold sense:

1. In a quasi-physical sense it signifies only the integrity of the flesh or of the genital organ, which is lost in men by voluntary pollution or effusion of semen, and in women by voluntary breaking of the membrane hymen, or virginal enclosure,⁸ which occurs through carnal copulation with a man or through another touch.

⁸ Because that hymen can also be absent by nature and is not always broken in the first copulations, since sometimes the membrane is so elastic and soft that it permits the introduction of the virile member without being torn, therefore some place the enclosure of virginity in a certain contraction and compression by which the parts of the orifice of the female canal are constricted until they have been dilated by carnal copulation. But we follow the common opinion.

In this sense virginity is not a virtue but a good of nature bestowed on all from birth; more specifically, women are accustomed to be called virgins because they alone have been endowed by nature with the seal of virginity. Thus, therefore, a virgin is a woman who has never had copulation, although she may have sinned against chastity by internal or external solitary acts. Likewise she remains a virgin as long as the integrity of the flesh is preserved, although she may intend afterward to pass to nuptials.

2. In the moral sense, virginity, or virginal chastity, is the virtue which signifies a firm proposal of the will of preserving the integrity of the flesh and of abstaining perpetually from all venereal pleasures, both illicit and licit, in a subject never corrupted by libido. In this sense virginity differs from perfect chastity in that it is joined to integrity of the flesh, while perfect chastity can also be preserved by one who previously has already been corrupted by libido. And so two things are required for virginity taken in the full sense: a. integrity of the flesh, which is the material element of virginity; it consists in voluntary immunity from complete or satiative carnal pleasure and in voluntary preservation of the virginal enclosure; b. the proposal of the will, which is the formal element of virginity: without this proposal of preserving chastity perpetually, neither properly the virtue nor the accidental reward of the virtue, the aureole, can be had.⁹

⁹ On the notion of virginity, cf. Saint Thomas, II-II, q. 152, art. 1; on the aureole promised to it, Supplement, q. 96, art. 5.

According to Saint Thomas,¹⁰ virginity is a special virtue distinct from common chastity, because it has a special excellence. It is named from greenness, because it imports immunity from corruption, or from the burning of concupiscence, concerning venereal pleasures; and it differs from chastity because it abstains not only from illicit pleasures but from all venereal pleasures, and therefore proposes youthful chastity to be preserved perpetually.

¹⁰ II-II, q. 152, art. 3.

But corruption can be threefold: a. bodily only, that is, the involuntary¹¹ breaking of the virginal seal or involuntary resolution of semen; b. corruption of the mind alone, that is, consent in a venereal matter without the work, whether it occurs by incomplete venereal pleasure or by revocation of the proposal; c. both at once, namely voluntary complete pleasure, or the voluntary or libidinous breaking of the seal of virginity.

¹¹ Various causes are assigned: jumping, riding in the manner of men, a fall, the attempt of the first menses, ulcers, and so forth.

In the third case virginity is lost irreparably; in the second, reparably; in the first, in no way.

V. Lust is the inordinate appetite, that is, love and use, of venereal pleasure; but it is inordinate if, outside legitimate use in conjugal copulation and in acts disposing toward it, pleasure is sought. For pleasure, just as also the use of the genitals, by its nature is essentially ordered to the propagation of the human race. But this cannot occur in due mode except in the permanent matrimonial union, which is altogether necessary for the right education of offspring. Therefore the appetite and use of venereal things is inordinate if it is sought: first, without order to the act of legitimate marriage; secondly, in that act, but in an illegitimate and undue mode, beyond the rules prescribed by nature and reason.

By reason of the mode in which it occurs, lust is one thing when it is A. merely internal, which consists in the mere affection for or desire of pleasure or of the use of venereal things, and is prohibited by the ninth precept of the Decalogue; B. another when it is also external, which occurs with the use and commotion of the genital organs, and is prohibited by the sixth precept. This latter can be:

1. complete, perfect, and consummated, if the exterior act is brought to its natural term, that is, to satiative pleasure; whether a. it be natural or according to nature, and the act is apt for obtaining its natural end of generation, as fornication, adultery, incest; or b. it be unnatural or against nature, and the act is not apt for its natural end, but this is rendered impossible, as pollution, onanism, sodomy;

2. incomplete, imperfect, and begun, if the exterior act is not brought to its natural term and does not attain the final term of satiative pleasure. This stands to complete lust as beginning to term, means to end, inception to consummation; and therefore it is not so much called lust, which concerns the very pleasure of copulation, but rather immodesty concerning the accompanying pleasures.

By reason of the diverse intention of the will by which lust is committed, and therefore of diverse gravity and imputability:

1. one kind is directly and in itself willed, when someone intends and procures venereal pleasure itself for its own sake;

2. another is voluntary in the cause, when someone voluntarily places a cause which procures venereal pleasure, without willing and intending that pleasure in itself;

3. another is indirectly voluntary, when someone neither intends nor procures venereal pleasure, but does not prevent it, though it has arisen involuntarily, when he can and ought to prevent it.

Concerning the gravity of these outside marriage we must now speak.

VI. All lust outside marriage which is directly and in itself voluntary, whether complete or incomplete, even the least, is mortally evil and does not admit lightness of matter.¹²

¹² Cf. Disputed Question XV De Malo, a. 2, ad 16 and 17; Disputed Question XV De Veritate, a. 4, and ad 8; I-II, q. 74, a. 8; II-II, q. 153, a. 3, and q. 154, a. 4.

It is proved: 1. The matter is evident for complete lust: the use of the genitals is essentially destined to the propagation of the human race through conjugal copulation. Therefore every such use outside marriage is inordinate, and indeed in such a way that it is directly against the greatest common good of society, namely its conservation and due propagation. But this is a matter of the greatest moment, and therefore the inordination is of itself and always grave. For if this were not so, men would care little about entering marriage.

Moreover, the special deformity in it is that the action and pleasure most necessary to the common good and immediately destined to the good of the species are sought for personal pleasure and referred to the individual; and thus that which regards only the good of the species immediately is ordered to an individual good. These things will be clearer from what will be said below concerning pollution and fornication, and from what follows here.

2. The same holds for incomplete lust, even the least, provided it is willed in itself. The general reason is that it is impossible for anyone to seek incomplete venereal pleasure without implicitly seeking and willing the complete pleasure, and incurring its disorder, or having an affection toward complete lust. For:

Every venereal act as such has a natural order to conjugal copulation, or to the perfect act legitimately exercised in marriage, of which it is the natural beginning and preparation. But every venereal pleasure sought outside marriage removes that order and orders to an individual good that which is destined to the good of the species. Therefore every venereal pleasure sought outside marriage unduly tends to an individual good and removes the natural order toward the human species. But such inordination is intrinsically and gravely evil, because it is an inversion of the natural order by which an act of the species is exercised as if it were the work of an individual man, and because, with respect to the greatest good, namely the conservation of society, the subordination by which man, who is a part of the species, is constituted under the species, is violated; since this order, in this matter, is altogether necessary to human society itself, it must be preserved under grave obligation. Therefore every venereal act sought outside marriage is intrinsically and gravely evil.

Or otherwise: in fornication and pollution there is grave sin because the act and pleasure destined to the good of the species are referred to the individual. But the same is present in imperfect lust, directly and in itself voluntary. Therefore in it there is mortal sin. The minor is proved: he who voluntarily posits, and directly and in itself wills, the beginning, already wills the complement in affection, not as to be executed, but he has an affection toward it.¹³ But imperfect lust and incomplete venereal pleasure by their nature are the beginning of consummated lust and of complete pleasure. Therefore he who voluntarily posits and directly and in itself wills imperfect lust has an affection toward complete lust, and thus sins mortally.

¹³ It is founded on the principle of Saint Thomas, I-II, q. 1, a. 6, that "the beginning of anything is always ordered to its consummation"; whence he who wills the beginning, by that very fact implicitly and necessarily wills the consummation, just as he who wills a participated good by that very fact wills it "as tending toward the perfect good."

Hence in whatever matter, even the least, there is always the same injury to the natural order altogether necessary to society, and the entire reason of disorder.¹⁴

¹⁴ On this matter Cajetan, Ill. Waffelaert, and P. Vermeersch may be consulted. The argument rests on the general principles by which mortal and venial sin are distinguished. Mortal sin is against charity; hence, since human society is a means necessary for man to arrive at his end, everything that is directly against society, or against that without which it cannot subsist, is also against charity, which unites us to God the last end. In other words: the means to the end imposed on man by God is that he preserve the natural order of things with respect to God, to neighbor, and in himself; therefore every substantial violation of order is grave matter. And indeed the law of nature does not merely say: avoid harm to neighbor or to society; but rather: preserve order lest harm arise. But lust, from its own nature, violates the natural order of things, because an act of the species is exercised as an individual act, and that which is destined solely to the good of society and is necessary to its conservation and propagation is ordered to an individual good. Therefore it is directly against society, in the mode stated above.

This is confirmed: a) according to Saint Thomas, the pleasure attached to an act exists on account of the act itself; hence consent to the pleasure is of the same malice as consent to the act: if the work is forbidden, the pleasure of the work is forbidden in the same way. But consent to the complete act of lust outside marriage is mortal sin. Therefore also any consent to the pleasure of this act. But every venereal pleasure is per se ordered to copulation, or to the complete act of which it is the beginning, as has been said, and thus it is pleasure of the complete act, because it is always of the same notion.¹⁵ Therefore every venereal pleasure sought for its own sake is mortal sin. "If consent to the pleasure of fornication thought about is mortal sin, a fortiori consent to the pleasure of fornication begun, or consent to the pleasure which is the principle or part of fornicary pleasure" - Cajetan on II-II, q. 154, art. 4.

¹⁵ This argument in no way has force to show that other pleasures, even those sought for their own sake, are mortal sin, because they are not proper to the genital act, and consequently do not touch the essential order to the species.

And surely no one is pleased except in that which seems to him good and conformable to his appetite; therefore he who seeks the pleasure of a mortally evil work holds that work as good for himself, and consequently his affection tends into a mortally evil work. And thus he sins mortally, because he deliberately wills that his affection be conformed to a mortally evil work.¹⁶

¹⁶ Thus Saint Thomas, in the places cited, especially I-II, q. 74, art. 8. Nor can it be objected that Saint Thomas there teaches only that morose consent to the complete pleasure of a consummated act is mortal sin. For in this case the question would concern only pleasure thought about spiritually, not pleasure really experienced in the genital organs, since complete pleasure perceived in the genital organ cannot be had without the complete exercise of the genital act and consummated lust. On the contrary, Saint Thomas:

b) On account of the vehemence of concupiscence of the flesh and the frailty common to men, it is morally impossible to contain concupiscence within fixed limits; hence consent itself to the least pleasure constitutes the proximate danger of consenting to further pleasure and to the complete act.¹⁷ Therefore such consent to the least pleasure is also mortal sin. Hence even if the opinion holding that there is smallness of matter in lust directly and in itself willed were speculatively probable, nevertheless it would be practically improbable; and this seems to be the reason why proposition 40 was condemned by Alexander VII,¹⁸ because it falsely supposes that a kiss had on account of carnal pleasure, that is, venereal pleasure, does not induce danger of consent to graver acts.

¹⁷ The argument is suggested by Saint Thomas, Disputed Question De Veritate XV, art. 4, who writes concerning the contrary opinion of certain ancients: "The common opinion of the moderns contradicts this opinion, and it seems to turn toward danger of souls, since from consent to such pleasure a man can most promptly fall into sin."

¹⁸ "There is a probable opinion which says that a kiss had on account of carnal and sensible pleasure which arises from the kiss is only venial, when the danger of further consent and pollution is excluded." Hence in the decree of the Holy Office, 4 February 1611, one reads: "Since in venereal matters there is no smallness of matter..."

Therefore all lust which is sought for its own sake outside marriage, by that very fact directly opposes the primary end of nature and the primary precept of the natural law, and therefore is a grave sin.

VII. Certain moderns have very recently sought a subterfuge, saying: only the consummated act is of itself gravely evil, but imperfect acts are of themselves venial, and are mortal only per accidens, whether on account of intention or affection, or on account of danger of further consent, or on account of scandal.¹⁹ Namely, they introduce a new member into the distinction of the various pleasures, and between sensible pleasure, or even sensual pleasure, and venereal pleasure, which is satiative, they posit an intermediate pleasure, which they call sexual,²⁰ as if by nature, and not only by degree, it were distinguished from venereal pleasure.

¹⁹ Before, they were only thinking this in mind, or even spreading it secretly and craftily; but now some writing has already been able to be published which defends this doctrine: Quaedam moralia quae ex doctrina D. Thomae selegit P. A. Eaarakkers, O.S.Cr. (1928). But when it had been reported by the bishops of the Netherlands to the Holy Office, the response was made to the archbishop of Utrecht that "the little work itself was to be withdrawn from commerce" (1 May 1929), at the same time asking the said archbishop that in due time he make the Holy Office more certain concerning the execution of the decree.

²⁰ Thus in the said little work, p. 49 and 50.

Yet this theory: 1. is a new doctrine. Although some theologians once affirmed lightness in the matter of lust - yet several of these recede from us only in manner of speaking²¹ - no one, so far as we know, has thus far taught that every imperfect pleasure is of itself venial, but all have regarded the graver carnal motions as mortal. But novelty, not indeed in some mere application of principles, but in the theological principles themselves, is always suspect; such is this novelty: that imperfect acts of lust are not of themselves mortal.

²¹ Several said this concerning lust voluntary in its cause, or concerning sensible or sensual pleasure.

2. By physiological experience anyone can feel that imperfect venereal pleasure is of the same species as perfect pleasure: it is found in one and the same line and physiologically is of the same nature. Hence it is not related to perfect pleasure as a separated means and a merely extraneous disposition to an extrinsic term, but as inception to consummation, as the beginning of a motion which intrinsically tends and strives to extend itself to its proper term, and as part of the consummated work.

3. Moreover, every sexual pleasure, insofar as it is sexual, is essentially and exclusively ordered and directed, just as sex itself is, to generation and to complete satiative pleasure; and therefore, from the very physical nature of the act, it is impossible to will and seek the imperfect pleasure without the affection implicitly tending to the perfect and seeking it. Hence it is false that "incomplete motions ... are only preliminaries; they touch the act of generation only remotely, mediately, accessorily ... and belong to it only accidentally."²² On the contrary, they express an essential order to it.

²² Thus in the said little work, p. 62.

4. Hence they are mortal by the same reason as acts of complete lust, provided that they are directly and in themselves voluntary: for they always implicitly include an affection toward the complete act.

Perhaps they think to object:

a) That a human act tends into the object as it is proposed by reason: but reason can abstract from complete pleasure, indeed the will can exclude it.

Reply. It cannot exclude it, because consummated pleasure is necessarily desired implicitly by him who seeks its inception, which by its nature necessarily tends to consummation. The abstraction of the intellect and the intention of the will cannot change the nature of things.

Therefore just as he truly remains superstitious who, intending to exclude the intervention of the devil, uses vain means which cannot have an effect without the intervention of the devil, since he thus implicitly and necessarily seeks his intervention and so acts against his own intention; so he who, wishing to exclude complete pleasure, desires incomplete pleasure, acts against his intention: for by that very fact he implicitly and necessarily desires the complete pleasure, not as to be executed, but as pleasurable, because the incomplete pleasure is not desirable except as the beginning and part of complete pleasure, and consequently except by reason of complete pleasure.

b) That theft admits lightness of matter, and yet light theft disposes to grave theft; likewise anger and envy are sometimes light and yet are a way to homicide.

Reply. Light theft is not the beginning of grave theft, but an act complete and consummated in itself and perfectly distinct from grave theft; nor does it immediately dispose to it, but through the facility caused by repeated acts. Likewise anger and envy are perfectly distinguished from homicide, indeed by complete species, so that they are only an occasion or cause, in no way the beginning or part of homicide itself.

c) That to become drunk for the pleasure of drink is mortal; and yet to drink wine from pleasure with a slight excess is only venial; therefore by parity concerning the pleasure of lust.

Reply. Drunkenness according to itself is not gravely evil by reason of the pleasure which is unduly sought in drink, but only because it has annexed to it deprivation of the use of reason. On the contrary, lust is that by which pleasure reserved to the good of the species is exclusively referred to the good of the individual.

d) That the moral virtues which concern the passions admit lightness of matter; therefore also the opposed sins, and consequently lust.

Reply. Chastity and lust not only concern the passions, but also express an immediate order to the common good and to justice. But the good of the human species and of society is grave matter, and therefore lust is gravely evil. Nevertheless it admits lightness of matter in marriage, when, with the primary end of due propagation preserved, sin is committed only against the due mode in the use of the genitals. Outside marriage, however, it is directly opposed to the very primary end of the genitals, and by this reason, when directly and for its own sake sought, it is always grave.

And so we can recognize no serious or solid probability in this new opinion.

Many call into doubt the efficacy of this argument; among them is Billuart, De Temperantia, diss. 5, a. 2, who brings forth many examples to overturn it. But those are not to the point, because in them the question concerns merely sensible pleasure voluntarily sought; or if carnal pleasure accompanies it, this is voluntary not directly and in itself, but only in its cause. Others object that lying is essentially a violation of order, and yet is not mortal. But the order which lust injures is, moreover, necessary to society. From this, therefore, that the natural order is violated, lust is intrinsically evil; from this, that a necessary order, and one essentially due to society itself, is violated, it is gravely evil.

And Billuart himself, diss. 6, a. 16, acknowledges this: "Pleasure is of the same notion," he says, "as that which is in copulation, to which it per se tends."

a. by the name of morose pleasure also understands "when reason does not repress an illicit motion of passion; as when someone, after he has deliberated that the motion of passion arising is inordinate, nevertheless dwells upon it and does not cast it out" (I-II, q. 74, art. 6), or "when after deliberation he does not restrain the inordinate act of the lower powers" (a. 5. Cf. Disputed Question De Veritate XV, a. 4, ad 10).

b. He applies his doctrine to acts of imperfect lust, which he a fortiori regards as mortal sins: "It was said above (I-II, q. 74, art. 7 and 8) that consent to the pleasure of mortal sin is mortal sin and not only consent to the act. And therefore, since fornication is mortal sin and much more the other species of lust, it follows that consent to the pleasure of such sin is mortal sin, and not only consent to the act. And therefore, since kisses and embraces of this sort are done on account of pleasure of this sort" - he does not say, as Ill. Waffelaert observes after Cajetan, "when or whenever they are done," because by their nature they have it that they are thus done; but, "since they are done," that is, are apt to be done - "it follows that they are mortal sins." He deduces the same conclusion from the same principle in Disputed Question De Veritate XV, art. 4: "From which it follows that whatever a man does from consent to such pleasure in order to nourish or hold such pleasure, as are base acts or libidinous kisses or other things of this sort, the whole is mortal sin." Hence to the objection: the acts of lust are touches, embraces, and kisses; but things of this sort do not seem to be mortal sin; he responds in Disputed Question De Malo XV, art. 2, ad 18: "Touches, embraces, and kisses, insofar as they are ordered to the act of fornication, follow consent to fornication; insofar as they are ordered to pleasure alone, they follow consent to pleasure, which is mortal sin. And therefore in either way they are mortal sins." But in these acts pleasure is sought not merely as thought, but as actually perceived and incomplete. Therefore, according to Saint Thomas, every pleasure is specifically, completely or incompletely, the pleasure of fornication or pollution, and therefore, when sought per se, is sought on account of the pleasure of mortal sin. Hence:

c. Saint Thomas expressly teaches that any pleasure whatever of lust outside marriage is mortal sin, namely in Disputed Question XV De Malo, art. 2: whether every act of lust is mortal sin; this doctrine he applies to internal lust (ad 16) and to imperfect acts (ad 18). Namely, he supposes that every pleasure of lust is of the same species and, by this reason, always mortal.

VIII. Lust voluntary in its cause, from which it is foreseen to follow, is sin to the extent that the cause, insofar as it influences it, is sin. Hence it is a sin grave by its genus, which admits lightness of matter.

It is proved: in venereal pleasure willed in the cause, the consent of the will is borne only toward the cause which provokes the pleasure; therefore it is evil only to the extent that the cause itself is evil. Hence the malice is to be determined from the influence on venereal pleasure; and besides this it must be seen whether perhaps there is a just and proportionate reason for placing the cause on account of a good effect and permitting the evil effect.

Now there are actions which cause a base motion per se, others per accidens, according as they are apt to cause it, or on the contrary are not apt to cause it although nevertheless they can cause it. Actions which by their nature are apt to excite venereal pleasure, and thus are ordered to generation, cause it per se, for example a base look, touch, or imagination. Moreover, of these actions some influence that effect proximately and notably, namely those from which the base effect always or almost always follows, for example a repeated touch on the obscene parts of another person;²³ others influence the base motion only remotely and lightly, from which therefore the evil effect rarely arises, for example a touch made in passing on the immodest parts of one's own body.²⁴ Their influence must also be considered relatively, because by its nature it depends somewhat on the varying inclination and disposition of the subject, as in childhood, youth, or old age, in affection or habit of mind, in a warm or cold bodily constitution; hence certain causes are more vehement with respect to one such person, which are light with respect to another, for example a continued look at a naked person of the same sex, or a continued touch of one's own body.

²³ Actions gravely exciting, according to Lehmkuhl, Theologia Moralis, I, n. 864, are: "a more vivid practical thought concerning venereal matters; touch exercised on the obscene parts of another person, unless perhaps it is done entirely in passing in a person of the same sex without depraved affection; a voluntarily continued look at a completely naked person of the other sex; indeed also the look of a man at the naked chest of a woman, or the look at an obscene picture, at least if it is continued after commotion has already arisen."

²⁴ Actions lightly exciting, according to Lehmkuhl, ibidem, are: "touch or look on the immodest parts of one's own body made in passing; a non-immodest and light touch of a woman made in passing; taking her hand; a light kiss from an honorable cause; vain conversation with a woman; a non-fixed look at the chest; a fortiori other lighter looks."

Actions which of themselves pertain in no way to generation and are outside the genus of immodesty cause a base motion per accidens, for example to eat or drink immoderately, to use a bath, to ride, to sit or lie in a certain position, to exercise sight or touch on honorable parts on account of merely sensible pleasure. Indeed there are persons who, from actions which in no way relate to the venereal matter, are vehemently excited by a hidden force. Among causes per accidens are counted those actions which remotely and lightly influence the base effect, even if sometimes they influence it gravely, because this proceeds not from their nature but from the intervention of another cause, for example from the subject's infirmity, custom, obsession, weakness, heredity, and so forth.²⁵

²⁵ From the preceding things those opinions can be reconciled which at first sight seem opposed, while some deny that the influence of the cause is to be determined from the disposition of the agent, while others on the contrary affirm it, or assert that it depends principally on the nature of the cause, secondarily on the disposition of the agent. Noldin says, for example, cited work, n. 35: "He who, on account of peculiar disposition and infirmity, suffers frequent pollutions from actions licit in themselves, which by their nature influence them only lightly, is not bound to abstain from those actions, provided consent to the pleasure is excluded: for in placing them he uses his own right." Namely, this is valid concerning causes per accidens, not concerning causes per se. On the contrary, Genicot, Theologia Moralis, I, n. 377: "For determining which causes influence gravely and which lightly, attention must principally be paid to the nature of the cause; secondarily to the disposition of the agent. Whether a cause by its nature influences gravely or lightly often appears easily enough to each one. But in many cases the matter is not so clear: in these especially one must attend to the condition from the disposition of the agent. For the influence of the same causes is very much diminished or increased according to age, constitution, force of imagination, education, degree of virtue, custom of hearing, seeing, handling base things, and so forth." Indeed Aertnijs, Theologia Moralis, I, n. 260, conformably to the doctrine of Saint Alphonsus: "He who, from inclination toward venereal things, has experienced frequent pollution from causes not indeed gravely immodest by their nature, nor on the other hand altogether light, but which in him more vehemently arouse pollution, is bound, when no reason is given for placing them, to abstain from them, and indeed under grave obligation: because with respect to such a person, on account of his inclination, causes of this sort excite not lightly but gravely." Namely, these things are valid concerning causes per se, not concerning causes per accidens.

With these things posited we say:

a. It is a mortal sin without sufficient reason to place a cause which per se proximately or gravely influences carnal motions or venereal pleasure, even if these by accident do not follow; for example very obscene reading, or a prolonged touch or look at an immodest part. One case is excepted: when someone from his own experience knows certainly that he is not gravely moved by an action of this sort.

Practically, however, for mortal sin two things are often required: first, that the cause influence grave motions, that is, vehement ones, or those sufficiently proximately disposing to pollution, or causing great pleasure; for since light and transitory motions are most frequent, to avoid the causes of all of these would be very troublesome, indeed morally impossible, and therefore not to be urged under grave obligation, because often there is present a reason excusing in some measure, not from the whole, namely, but from so much; secondly, moreover, that the cause influence those grave motions proximately or gravely. Therefore Saint Alphonsus rightly notes²⁶ that even pollution itself is not mortal unless it proceeds from a cause per se mortal in the genus of lust or immodesty. It must be mortal, because since pollution is not willed in itself but only in the cause, it will be evil to that degree to which the cause itself is evil, that is, to which the cause is evil insofar as it is a cause or insofar as it influences; but every and only a cause which of itself gravely influences motions prohibited under grave obligation, unless there is present a reason excusing from a good effect which compensates the evil, is mortal insofar as it is a cause. It must be in the genus of lust, because otherwise it would influence pollution not gravely but only lightly, for example drunkenness or immoderate eating of meat.

²⁶ Theologia Moralis, book III, treatise IV, n. 484.

b. It is a venial sin without a just cause to place an action influencing lightly or remotely or per accidens into even vehement motions and complete venereal pleasure, provided those things do not please and no proximate danger of consent is present. For a light influence on a grave thing is a light thing.²⁷ Such things are a conversation not prolonged with a girl, a look, a touch, reading that is not very base. A sufficient reason is any reasonable cause of necessity, utility, or fittingness.

²⁷ And so an act which would influence only lightly into grave commotion, indeed into pollution, would for this reason be only venially evil. And in this there is a great difference from lust voluntary in itself: for direct intention toward venereal pleasure, even a small one, manifests a disposition of soul very different from that which is found in him who does not seek, indeed does not will, that pleasure. The first per se incurs proximate danger of consenting to further pleasure on account of his own propensity; not so necessarily the other.

c. It is no sin to place from a just cause an action from which inordinate motions are foreseen to follow, even pollution, provided the proximate danger of consent is always absent. A just cause is, for a priest, to hear confessions and to study base matters; for a surgeon, to look at and touch immodest parts; likewise for one serving the infirm or in baths; for all, to kiss women according to the custom of the country, to touch oneself from necessity, to ride for the sake of recreation or utility, to perform gymnastic exercises, to lie down in a more comfortable position, while sitting to put leg over leg according to custom, and to take warm foods and drinks moderately.²⁸

²⁸ You will find the whole doctrine concerning lust voluntary in its cause expounded in Billuart, diss. 6, a. 12. P. Vermeersch proposes the matter otherwise and speaks of disguised lust, cited work, n. 374 and 388, in place of lust voluntary in its cause. Yet our mode seems clearer and more open, more conformable to principles and older. Moreover, although at first sight the distinguished theologian may seem to dissent, nevertheless in fact he teaches the same. "For observe," he says, "that the sin of imperfect lust is committed directly, not only when it is sought by express intention, but also when, without another immediate cause, acts are exercised which directly excite the flesh: for then you are judged to effect the venereal motion" (n. 374). Behold the principle; if now you want an example: "Kisses too frequently repeated, especially on the mouth or lips, too prolonged embraces, because they gravely move the flesh and have no cause among unmarried persons, are argued to be grave unless the carnal motion is positively repressed and, if pollution more strongly threatens, one ceases from these" (n. 401). Genicot-Salsmans has the right doctrine concerning lust voluntary in its cause as regards pollution voluntary in this way (Theologia Moralis, I, n. 401), but not as regards venereal motions, which are not proved to be grave, since in them, he says, there is no evident affection toward complete pleasure (n. 403). But this reason is null, for he who seeks incomplete pleasure by that very fact implicitly seeks complete pleasure, and he who wills the cause of pleasure implicitly wills the effect. Moreover this doctrine is new and is not found in the first editions made under the care of P. Genicot himself; it is not founded in tradition: the traditional doctrine holds that to place a cause per se gravely influencing grave motions is of itself a grave sin; nor is it sustained according to principles: for if something is in itself gravely evil, as venereal motions outside marriage are, it is also gravely evil perfectly to cause it, in the case at hand to place a cause per se gravely influencing such motions. Others state more practically: if the motions are grave and excited without just cause, there is great danger, and the sin is grave; on the contrary, if the motions are light, the danger is small and the sin light. But this is said according to presumptions, according to that which often or ordinarily occurs. For if the motions are grave, danger is not always and for all persons grave, nor is it grave to place a cause lightly influencing such motions. On the contrary, if the motions are only light, nevertheless sometimes grave danger can be present. And so it must be said in principle: to place a cause per se gravely influencing venereal motions is of itself a grave sin; to place a cause influencing lightly or per accidens is of itself a light sin.

IX. Lust indirectly voluntary, which the will does not procure nor intend, to which it neither positively consents nor resists, but toward which it behaves negatively, and which it only permits because it does not repress it when it can and ought to repress it, is of itself venially evil; per accidens, sometimes mortal on account of danger of consent.

It is proved: in this a man sins, because reason and will are lacking in their office of directing and repressing the motions of the lower powers, nor can he bear himself indifferently to whether his motions and acts are inordinate or not; but:

a. per se he does not sin mortally, because positive consent of the will is lacking;

b. per accidens he would sin mortally if from this there were a proximate danger of consenting to venereal pleasure.

Hence man is bound to resist those motions positively, insofar as is necessary and morally possible for not consenting and for repressing the motions:

1. ordinarily not directly, that is, by contrary or violent acts, such as suppression of imagination, compression of the members, chastisement of the body, and so forth, because this is not necessary for the aforesaid end, or is too difficult, or even excites more;

2. but indirectly, by applying the mind to other incompatible things, especially those which more strongly affect the mind, for example by interrupting the work, pursuing business, an external occupation requiring special attention, praying, and so forth; indeed:

3. sometimes, if there is a just cause for not resisting otherwise and for not repressing the motions, positive resistance by a simple act of displeasure, at least implicit, suffices. This act is not to be frequently repeated, since until it is retracted it is judged morally to persevere. Thus if someone has experienced that other resistance is useless for checking the motions, or excites and increases them more; or if the motions have their origin from a necessary cause or from a useful action, as was said in the preceding number, c, and it is too troublesome to repel them, for example on account of duration; or if the motions are light and transitory, both because the causes exciting such motions are very frequent and therefore the obligation of repressing them would be too difficult, and because they are repressed better and more effectively by contempt: for solicitude about impeding them is accustomed to excite imaginations and increase the motions. All these things are easily verified in the scrupulous person, who therefore will show sufficient displeasure by simply despising the motions.

X. They object: 1. Anyone can licitly use, as he pleases, that which is his own. But in lust, adultery excepted, man uses nothing except what is his own, namely, his own body. Therefore.

Reply. Man does not have dominion over his own body, which he did not give to himself, but which was granted to him by God; he has only useful dominion or use, however, according to divine ordination. Hence, "from the fact that someone uses his body inordinately through lust, he does injury to God, who is the principal lord of our body" - II-II, q. 153, art. 3, ad 2. Namely, he usurps the dominion of God.

2. What nature does cannot be evil. But nature expels semen and effects pollution.

Reply. Distinguish: insofar as it is done by nature, conceded; insofar as it is done voluntarily by man, denied. Otherwise it could also be said: nature inflicts death; therefore it is licit voluntarily to inflict death on oneself or on others!

3. Natural tendencies and pleasures are good or ordered.

Reply A. Natural tendencies and pleasures are good or ordered - distinguish: pleasures of integral nature, conceded; of fallen or pure nature, denied, or subdistinguish: of nature considered completely, or of nature as rational, to which the lower tendencies must be subjected, conceded; of nature as animal, denied. Rational nature does not tend toward venereal pleasures except in order to the propagation of the human race in marriage.

Or B. Natural pleasures of themselves are not morally good or evil, except insofar as they are chosen conformably to right reason or not conformably to it.

4. The pleasures of foods are licit; therefore also those of venereal things.

Reply. Pleasures are licit if the operations to which they are joined are licit and are done rightly for a good end; hence the pleasures of foods are not licit unless they are sought in operations which, according to the order of reason, tend to preserving the life of the individual; and carnal pleasures are not licit except in order to preserving the human species in legitimate marriage.