Perseverance

IV. The daughters of pride are:

1. Presumption, "which is the inordinate appetite of undertaking something beyond one's powers. It is commonly only venial. It becomes mortal, however, if it brings harm to God or one's neighbor; for example, if you presume ecclesiastical jurisdiction, the power of sacred Order, likewise the office of physician, advocate, confessor, etc., without due skill" (St. Alphonsus, V, 66).

2. Ambition, "which is the inordinate appetite for dignity and honor not owed, or greater than is owed; as if you seek a benefice or office of which you are unworthy; or by an illicit manner and means, for example, by simony. It is per se a venial sin. But it becomes mortal either by reason of the means through which honor is sought, or by reason of the harm which is brought upon one's neighbor. Finally, if honor is sought moderately for an honorable end, it will be an act of magnanimity" (St. Alphonsus, cited place).

3. Vain glory, which is the inordinate appetite of praise and fame to be obtained by the manifestation of one's own excellence. "It is called vain when it is sought from a bad, false, or fictitious thing; or from something which is not worthy of glory, or not of so much glory, as from riches, trifles, etc.; or among those who do not judge rightly about the thing; or without a due end. It is per se a venial sin; often mortal by accident, as was said concerning ambition" (St. Alphonsus, cited place).

By vain glory one sins in two ways:

a) "Directly; and this either by words, and it is boasting, which is venial per se, if it is about good things, for example, fasting, prayer, etc., although by accident, often by reason of harm, if it is false, it becomes mortal; as also: 1. If one says something against the glory of God, as in Ezekiel 28: 'I am God.' 2. If he breaks forth into insults; for example, 'I am not as the rest of men, an adulterer, etc., or even as this man.' 3. From an evil end. 4. If it is done with notable harm to one's neighbor. 5. If it is about a mortally evil matter... Or by deeds, which, if they are true and have something of admiration, is called the invention of novelties, for the common people are accustomed to admire these, such as foreign garments, opinions, etc.; mortal, if it notably corrupts youth or morals. But if the deeds are false, it is hypocrisy; for example, if someone does some good thing so that he may seem good, although he is not" (St. Alphonsus, V, 66; St. Thomas, II-II, q. 132, a. 5).

b) "Indirectly, insofar as someone does not wish to be less than another. This happens in four ways: 1. Through the intellect; and it is pertinacity, by which someone adheres too tenaciously to his own opinion, which is mortal if truth of great moment is opposed, or if it is joined with danger to a third party, for example, if a physician remains in his opinion with danger to the sick person. 2. Through the will; and it is discord, by which one sins mortally when it concerns the good of God or of one's neighbor, in which they ought to be concordant. 3. Through words; and it is contention, which is mortal when, with a mind to contradict, you wrangle about truth pertaining to the faith or to the salvation of soul or body. 4. Through deeds, when someone does not wish to carry out what he ought; and it is disobedience" (St. Alphonsus, cited place; St. Thomas, cited place).

I. Notion of Perseverance. Perseverance is a moral virtue inclining man to persist in good works up to the limit prescribed by reason, notwithstanding the difficulty which arises from their duration. It is said: notwithstanding the difficulty which arises from their duration: by these words is indicated the matter of this virtue, as distinct from the matter of patience.

II. Object of Perseverance. 1. The remote material object is all good works insofar as they are lasting; but the proximate object is the difficulty which flows from duration.

2. The remote formal object is the reason of debt by which we are not overcome by the difficulty of duration; but the proximate formal object is the special moral goodness shining forth in overcoming difficulty of this sort.

III. Opposed Vices. By defect there is opposed softness, by which someone, on account of the difficulty of the work's duration, withdraws from it against reason (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 138, a. 1); by excess, pertinacity, by which someone persists in a work undertaken, adhering to his own judgment against reason (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 138, a. 2).

Steadfastness.—Steadfastness is a virtue which is so devoted to the goodness of continuing in the right that it is not fatigued by the length of time or the repeated effort required for a good work (virtue of persistence or perseverance), nor disheartened by the opposition which a good work encounters (virtue of manliness or constancy), but goes on unmoved until the conclusion which right reason calls for has been arrived at.

(a) The Virtue.—Steadfastness belongs to fortitude, since the essence of both is a struggle against difficulty; but steadfastness is the inferior, since it is nobler and more heroic to be undismayed by the peril of death than to be unconquered by strain of monotony or opposition. Steadfastness is a most important virtue, for it avails one little to begin a work well if it is not carried to a successful conclusion. Without it one puts hand to the plow but looks back (Luke, ix. 62), or begins to build but does not finish (Like, xiv. 30); with it the work begun is crowned, the harvest will be reaped (Gal., vi. 9, 10), and salvation secured (Matt., x. 22). Scripture abounds with exhortations to steadfastness (I Cor., xv. 58; Phil., iv. i; II Tim., iii. 13; Ecclus., xi. 21, 22, v. 12; John, viii. 31; Heb., xii. 7); but final perseverance is a special gift of God (I Peter, v. 10).

(b) The Opposite Vices.—Opposed to steadfastness by deficiency is the vice of effeminacy or weakness, by excess the vice of pertinacity. The effeminate person, lacking stamina to go on in a necessary good, surrenders to weariness or opposition by abandoning the undertaking or by taking up with evil (Matt., xi. 7, 8). The pertinacious person continues in the course he has begun when right reason bids him to discontinue, as when one has taken a vow and does not wish to accept the dispensation which a change of circumstances necessitates. These sins are venial unless they go counter to a grave duty, as when an effeminate person gives up the resolution to avoid a very dangerous occasion of sin, or the headstrong person determines to fast during the remainder of Lent when this will seriously injure his health.

What are the daughters of pride and vainglory? "Those vices which of themselves are apt to be ordered to the end of some capital vice are called its daughters." S. Th. 2. 2. q. 132, a. 5. The daughters of pride are three: 1. Presumption, which is an inordinate appetite of undertaking something above one's powers. It is commonly only venial. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 130, a. 1; q. 134, a. 2 ad 4; q. 21, a. 4. Nevertheless it becomes mortal if it brings grave harm, e.g., if someone presumes to obtain ecclesiastical jurisdiction, the office of physician, etc., without due knowledge. But insofar as presumption is a special sin, opposed to theological hope, it is always a mortal sin, unless imperfection of act excuses. 2. Ambition, which is the inordinate appetite of dignity and honor not owed, or in an undue way and by an undue means. It is per se a venial sin. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 131, a. 1. But it becomes mortal by reason of the matter from which; or by reason of the means by which; or by reason of the end for which honor is sought; or by reason of the harm which is inflicted on one's neighbor. 3. Vainglory, namely the desire of empty glory, whose end is the inordinate manifestation of one's own excellence, whether true or fictitious. It is per se a venial sin. It is often mortal per accidens, as was just said concerning ambition. But to perform even sacred things on account of vainglory, e.g., to preach, does not exceed venial sin. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 132, aa. 3, 4; q. 162, a. 7; L. 66. Pusillanimity corresponds by opposition to the three daughters of pride, by which someone, distrusting himself too much, refuses honors, glory, or an office for which he is worthy. It is venial from its genus; and it becomes mortal if you refuse that to which you are bound under mortal sin. L. 67.

Moreover, the daughters of vainglory, which St. Thomas constitutes as a capital vice, are assigned thus by the same Holy Doctor, 2. 2. q. 132, a. 5. A man can tend to the manifestation of his own excellence in two ways: "in one way directly, either by words, and thus there is boasting; or by deeds, and thus, if they are true things having some admiration, there is presumption of novelties, which men are accustomed to admire more; but if they are false, thus there is hypocrisy. In another way someone strives to manifest his own excellence indirectly, by showing himself not to be less than another, and this in four ways. First indeed as to the intellect, and thus there is pertinacity, by which a man cleaves too much to his own opinion, being unwilling to believe a better opinion. Second as to the will, and thus there is discord, while he does not wish to depart from his own will so that he may agree with others. Third as to speech, and thus there is contention, when another by words quarrels noisily against another. Fourth as to deed, and thus there is disobedience, namely while someone does not wish to execute the precept of a superior." And thus these vices are fittingly called the daughters of vainglory.

Boasting is a certain vain proclamation of one's own excellence, and is per se venial if it is concerning good things; and it can be grave per accidens. If it is concerning lightly evil things, it is likewise per se light, grave per accidens, if, for example, it proceeds from a grave cause against God or neighbor. But if it is concerning gravely evil things, it is grave, because the approval of a work has the same species as the work, which therefore must be expressed in confession, at least when complacency concerning the same sin was joined with the boasting. At least when, etc.; because, if it was without that complacency, many hold that it is not necessarily to be explained. For any boasting concerning mortal sin, abstraction made from complacency in it, is of the same species, namely that someone glories in this, that he has offended God. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 112; L. 26, 66, 67; l. 3, n. 426; Lugo, de Poenit., d. 16, n. 266 seqq.

Presumption of novelties, which is also called ostentation, if those deeds have nothing of admiration, is also per se venial. And thus it is light to be dressed in foreign garments, or to adorn oneself too much from lightness of mind, vanity, etc.; but grave if it is such as notably to corrupt morals. L. 66, 67. Presumption of novelties can be in opinions, in a mode of speaking, in a mode of acting, etc.

Hypocrisy, by which someone "does not care to have holiness, but only to appear holy... is a mortal sin.... To simulate holiness from which one is deficient through mortal sin... is not always a mortal sin, but sometimes venial," according as it happens to oppose charity or not. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 111, a. 4. Likewise to simulate improbitity is a sin, and can be mortal. S. Th. ibid., a. 1; L. 66, 67.

Pertinacity. "Someone is called pertinacious who is imprudently holding, as if wholly tenacious." Hence pertinacity is opposed to perseverance; for the persevering person persists in his own opinion "according as he ought"; but the pertinacious person perseveres in it "more than he ought." And therefore it is a sin because of excess. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 138, a. 2.

Discord is a dissent of wills concerning the good which we ought to will from charity. Moreover, since certain goods can be owed to one's neighbor not only from charity, but also from justice, discord and dissent from the rendering of similar goods is opposed both to charity and to justice. Discord is per se from its genus a mortal sin. For it directly repugns to charity. But per accidens it can become venial, from the smallness of the owed good in the rendering of which we do not wish to consent. Indeed, sometimes it will be no sin, if it arises, namely, from a probable judgment, from which one person judges this, another that, for the honor of God and the utility of neighbor, and if the mode of dissenting is not opposed to charity. - Struggl, tr. 4, q. 5, n. 38; S. Th. 2. 2. q. 37.

Contention is the impugnation of truth with confidence of shouting. Contention is from its genus a mortal sin. The reason: because by charity we ought to will and communicate to others truth necessary or useful for the salvation of the soul, or even of the body; and therefore to impugn it, and to wish to defeat it, is opposed to the virtue of charity, and is from its genus a mortal sin. - Struggl, tr. 4, q. 5, n. 39; S. Th. 2. 2. q. 38.

Disobedience, properly and speaking per se, or formal disobedience, is had only when "someone contemns a precept, because moral acts have their species from the end. But when he does something against a precept, not on account of contempt of the precept, it is disobedience only materially, but formally pertains to another species of sin," according to various motives, e.g., to the species of theft, homicide, etc. Therefore disobedience by its nature is a grave sin. For not to obey the precepts of God and of Superiors is contrary to charity. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 105, a. 1.

What is fortitude, what are its parts, and what vices are opposed to it? - R. To the first. Fortitude is the virtue which moderates and strengthens the soul against grave dangers, especially of death. - No precept per se of this virtue is given, but only by reason of some special precept to be fulfilled, e.g., even martyrdom to be undergone, lest faith be denied. But whether and when there is an obligation of observing the law even with danger to life was said in the treatise on Laws, and is explained in the individual treatises, when it is asked whether it is licit to do something at least to avoid death. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 140.

There is a twofold act of fortitude, to attack and to sustain: to attack distinguished and arduous things; to sustain adversities. For the act of attacking two things are required. The first is preparation of soul, namely that someone have a prompt soul for undertaking great things, which magnanimity provides. The other regards execution of the work, namely that someone not fall short in the execution of those things which he began magnanimously, which magnificence provides. For the act of sustaining two things also are required. The first is that by the difficulty of imminent evils the soul not be broken through sadness, and fall away from its greatness; and for this patience is posited, by which someone bears evils with an even soul, without disturbance of sadness. The other is that from long-lasting suffering of difficult things man not be wearied up to the point that he desists; and for this perseverance is posited.

R. To the second. These four virtues, magnanimity, magnificence, patience, perseverance, are integral parts of fortitude if they are concerned with dangers of death; but they are potential parts of fortitude if they are concerned with lesser dangers. But fortitude does not have subjective parts, because it is not divided into many virtues differing in species, since it concerns a very special matter, namely dangers of death, which are all of the same genus, although some are greater than others.

R. To the third. Timidity, fearlessness, and audacity are opposed to fortitude. Timidity is a vice exceeding in fearing; for it fears what one ought not, when one ought not, or more than one ought, whence one does not dare to attack when reason dictates, or as it dictates. If it stands in itself, it is a light sin; but if it impels to sin, it will be grave or light according to the condition of that to which it impels. - Fearlessness is a vice deficient in fearing; for one does not fear when he ought to fear, or the things that ought to be feared. It is not a sin distinct from that to whose danger someone exposes himself; for it is a sin only insofar as it is the cause of that, tacitly containing consent to that danger.

Audacity is that which rashly casts itself into dangers. Rashly, namely without just reason. It is a sin according to the account of the evil and danger to which one exposes himself.

Presumption, ambition, vainglory, pusillanimity are opposed to magnanimity. - Presumption is excessive confidence in one's own powers, by which it happens that someone undertakes something, or is prepared to undertake something, above his powers. It is a deadly sin when it occurs with danger or injury of another, as the presumption of a physician, judge, confessor; or when it proceeds from error against the faith, as the presumption of heretics. Outside these cases it is almost always a venial sin. Ambition is an inordinate appetite of honor, by desiring more honor than is fitting. It is a light sin, unless honor is desired either with injury and harm of another, or from a gravely illicit thing, or in a gravely illicit mode or end. Vainglory is desire of vain glory. Vain, if glory is sought from simulated excellence or reputation, if greater than is fitting, or from an illicit thing, or among those who cannot judge rightly about things, or by referring it to an undue end. Per se it is a venial sin, nor does it become a mortal sin except by reason of another sin, which is sometimes involved in its effect. Pusillanimity is a sin by which someone from smallness of soul does not attempt those things which are commensurate with his natural virtue. It is grave or light according to the goods from which he recedes.

Small-magnificence and consumption or excessive profusion are opposed to magnificence. - Small-magnificence is the vice by which man falls short of the proportion which ought to be between expense and work. Consumption or excessive profusion is the vice by which someone exceeds the said proportion, namely so that he spends more than is proportioned to the work. Each is per se a light sin; it can be grave by reason of scandal, or notable harm then following to others, or by another extrinsic reason, e.g., of a vow, testament, etc., by which someone is bound to that magnificent work and ought to be contained within due expenses.

Insensibility and impatience are opposed to patience, but softness and pertinacity to perseverance. - Insensibility is had when someone is touched by no evils, neither his own nor those of neighbors. It is a sign either of brutish stupidity or of inhuman hardness. Insensibility or hardness is rarely a mortal sin; certainly per se it is only venial. - Impatience is had when someone grieves too much, or even from grief departs from the right. Impatience per se is only a venial sin, because it is only an excess in grief, or in a movement of anger, expressed by an external sign; nevertheless it can be deadly by reason of scandal or of the evil which someone does from impatience. - Softness is if someone easily recedes from good because of certain difficulties which he cannot sustain; for that is called soft which easily yields to one touching it. But it is manifest that fear of dangers impels more gravely than desire of pleasures; and the desire itself of pleasures moves more strongly than sadness concerning the lack of pleasure withdraws, because lack of pleasure is a pure defect. And therefore he is properly called soft who recedes from good because of sadness caused by the defect of delights, as if yielding to a weak mover. This is a grave sin in a venereal matter or in another matter of great moment, to which someone is bound by law, precept, vow, or oath; but it is light in a light matter. Pertinacity is perseverance in one's own opinion more than one ought; and it is venial or mortal according to the gravity of the matter, e.g., if someone is unwilling to embrace the Catholic religion lest he seem inconstant; if a Prince is unwilling to revoke pernicious laws. - S. Th. 2. 2. q. 123 seqq.; Theol. Wirceb., de Virt. Card. de Fortit.

1071. 4. Constancy, or perseverance, is a virtue confirming the mind against fear of impending evils, and for overcoming difficulties which arise from the long exercise of virtue. - Therefore it regards future difficulties, while patience regards present evils; moreover, it is ordered to overcoming that special difficulty which generally proceeds from long practice of virtues: for many experience a certain fatigue and weariness from the fact that the same efforts must often be repeated; for overcoming this, the special virtue of constancy is desired. - Of how great a moment it is to cultivate this virtue is established from this, that only by often-repeated efforts, carried through to the end of life, is solid virtue acquired and the crown of justice obtained: "But he that shall persevere unto the end, he shall be saved."³

³ Matt. 10:22.

To this virtue there is opposed: (a) by defect, inconstancy, or softness of soul, which easily withdraws from a good proposal on account of occurring difficulties, or from weariness of duration; this disposition indeed arises partly from natural temperament, partly from the custom of indulging pleasures and from horror of difficulties; (b) by excess, or abuse, pertinacity, or inclination to persist in a proposal where right reason dictates that one must desist; for, although we ought to persevere in a proposal as long as it appears good to right reason, one must withdraw from it when it is certainly detected as having been undertaken from erroneous judgment, or when circumstances so change that what before was good and opportune now becomes evil or at least less good.

637. Notion. The fourth and last virtue which is joined to fortitude as a potential part is perseverance,¹¹⁵⁷ which nevertheless is not taken here for that great gift by which man perseveres in the state of sanctifying grace until death; for this gift of perseverance is not a virtue, but a special assistance of divine grace which cannot be merited even by the justified. But perseverance, insofar as it is a special virtue, can be defined: a habit inclining one to persist in the exercise of the virtues according as right reason dictates, notwithstanding the annoyance arising from the duration of the work.¹¹⁵⁸ Certainly every virtue persists in its work until the end, but from its own motive; whereas, on the contrary, perseverance causes this constancy precisely on account of the honorableness which is found in continuing the work until the end, despite the weariness arising from that duration. Perseverance accepted in this manner is a virtue annexed to fortitude, because fortitude preserves firmness in very difficult matter, namely, in dangers of death; but perseverance preserves firmness in less difficult matter, which, namely, arises from the duration of the work.

Relation to constancy. According to St. Thomas there is some, but a small, difference between perseverance and constancy:¹¹⁵⁹ for "perseverance and constancy indeed agree in their end, because it pertains to each to persist firmly in some good; but they differ according to those things which introduce difficulty in persisting in the good; for the virtue of perseverance properly makes man persist firmly in the good against the difficulty which arises from the duration of the act; but constancy makes him persist firmly in the good against the difficulty which arises from any other exterior impediments whatsoever."¹¹⁶⁰ St. Bernard says beautifully:¹¹⁶¹ "Perseverance is the sister of patience, the daughter of constancy ... the bulwark of holiness."

¹¹⁵⁷ Ausdauer [perseverance].

¹¹⁵⁸ Cf. Billuart, De fortitud. diss. 2, a. 6.

¹¹⁵⁹ Festigkeit, Stetigkeit [firmness, steadfastness].

¹¹⁶⁰ S. theol. 2, 2, q. 137, a. 3.

¹¹⁶¹ Ep. 129, n. 2 (Migne, Patr. lat. 182, 284).

642. 5. Two vices are likewise opposed to perseverance, namely, one by defect, which is softness or inconstancy, when someone, on account of difficulties which occur in the continuation of a good work, easily withdraws from it contrary to the right dictate of reason. This inconstancy is called softness by St. Thomas,¹¹⁸⁰ which nevertheless is not to be confused with softness which is a sin against chastity. Inconstancy of itself is not a grave sin; nevertheless, it is the cause of many evils and impedes very many goods; for it renders the soul of man weak and almost powerless to accomplish any great work, since difficulties arise in every great work. By way of excess there is opposed to perseverance pertinacity,¹¹⁸¹ which is an inclination to persist in a resolution contrary to the dictate of right reason, as if someone wills to persist in a false religion which he clearly knows to be false. This pertinacity is a mortal or light sin according to the quality of the obligation and virtue which is injured through it.

¹¹⁸⁰ S. theol. 2, 2, q. 138, a. 1.

¹¹⁸¹ Hartnäckigkeit [obstinacy].

S. Th. II-II, q. 137 and 138.

928. Perseverance (volharding) in the present matter is not taken for the great gift of perseverance, by which someone remains in the state of grace until the end of life and dies in it: this is not a virtue but a special help of divine grace, which we cannot merit; but it is taken for the habit of continuation in a good work unto the end, and thus it is a virtue strengthening the soul for overcoming the difficulties which arise from prolonged exercise of virtue, or a virtue inclining one to persist in the exercise of virtues according as right reason dictates, notwithstanding the weariness which may arise from the duration of the work. [The original prints "918" here.]

Hence a) it regards future difficulties, while patience looks at present evils. b) Moreover it is ordained to overcoming that special difficulty which very often proceeds from prolonged practice of virtues: for many experience a certain weariness and tedium from the fact that the same efforts must often be repeated; to conquer this the special virtue of perseverance is given, which from this motive strengthens the appetite because to persevere against tedium is good, from the intention of persisting, and by reason of the special honesty which is in this, that it overcomes weariness arising from duration. c) It imitates fortitude because it sustains a lesser difficulty, just as fortitude sustains danger of death. d) It is in the irascible appetite because it restrains fear of fatigue and tedium or of defect arising from the duration of the work (a. 2, ad 2).

929. Two vices are opposed to perseverance: a) by defect, softness of soul, which easily recedes from a good proposal on account of difficulties occurring in the continuation of the work or from the tedium of duration: this disposition arises partly from natural temperament, partly from the custom of indulging pleasures and from horror of difficulties; b) by excess or abuse, obstinacy (entetement), or an inclination to persist in a proposal when right reason dictates that one must desist. For, if we ought to persevere in a proposal as long as the good appears to right reason, one must recede from it when it is certainly detected to have been undertaken from erroneous judgment, or when circumstances change in such a way that what before was good and opportune now becomes evil or at least less good.

They are grave or light sins according to the matter.

930. Constancy (standvastigheid) is a habit by which we firmly persist in the good against difficulties which arise from any exterior impediments whatsoever. It partly agrees with perseverance and partly differs. They agree in the end, because each firmly persists in good; they differ according to those things which bring difficulty to this persistence: the virtue of perseverance is against the difficulty which arises from the very duration of the act and which is more essential to the act of virtue; constancy is against difficulty from any extrinsic impediments whatsoever which bring sadness. Hence, although according to matter it agrees with patience, according to the end it pertains to perseverance; and because the end is more powerful, therefore constancy pertains more to perseverance than to patience.

Constancy (Aristotle calls it perseverance) is not a virtue strictly so called, because it does not render man perfect, since it makes him persist in good notwithstanding impediments arising from an inordinate and superabundant passion; but perfection exists if the sensitive appetite is perfectly subjected and conformed to reason. Hence it is in the will, which resists passions, especially the sadnesses which withdraw from good, particularly those which arise from the privation of pleasures of touch, just as continence resists pleasures and concupiscences which entice toward evil.¹

¹ Cf. q. 137, a. 1, ad 1; a. 2, ad 1 and 2; q. 53, a. 5, ad 3; I-II, q. 58, a. 3, ad 2.

S. Th. II-II, q. 139 and 140.

931. The gift of fortitude. - A special gift of the Holy Spirit is necessary for conferring supernatural fortitude, because the virtue of fortitude does not suffice.

This indeed confers firmness of soul in doing goods and bearing evils, especially in arduous goods or evils, so that man according to his proper and connatural mode may sustain dangers, and not fail from the good because of the difficulty either of fulfilling some arduous work or of bearing some grave evil; but it does not suffice to give confidence of escaping any imminent dangers whatsoever, which exceeds human nature. This, however, is precisely what the gift of fortitude supplies.

To the gift of fortitude there fittingly corresponds the fourth beatitude: Blessed are they who hunger and thirst for justice. For "fortitude consists in arduous things. But it is very arduous that someone not only do virtuous works, which commonly are called works of justice, but do them with a certain insatiable desire, which can be signified by hunger and thirst for justice" (a. 2).²

² Dionysius the Carthusian, De donis, tr. III, a. 18.

Justice therefore is not to be taken in the strict sense as a particular virtue, but in the broad and universal sense which consists in the works of all the virtues, in which fortitude, which is a gift, intends the arduous (ad 1). To this gift correspond two among the fruits of the Holy Spirit, namely, patience, which regards the sustaining of evils, and longanimity, which can regard the long expectation and operation of goods (ad 3).

932. Precepts of fortitude. - Since fortitude is very necessary for firmly and constantly persisting in the way of salvation, of faith, justice, and virtue, even when great difficulties of this life or the very danger of death stand in the way, therefore it was necessary to give explicit precepts concerning fortitude. And indeed:

1. The end of divine law is that man cleave to God; and therefore the precepts of divine law concerning fortitude are given according as it agrees with the order of the mind toward God. Hence in Deut. XX, 3, it is said: "Do not fear,... because the Lord your God is in the midst of you, and will fight for you against your adversaries" (cf. Jos. VIII, 1; Is. VII, 4; q. 140, a. 1).

But since "the Old Testament has temporal promises, but the New has spiritual and eternal ones,... therefore it was necessary that in the old law the people be instructed how they ought to fight even corporeally, in order to acquire an earthly possession. But in the New Testament men had to be instructed how by fighting spiritually they might arrive at possession of eternal life, according to that saying of Mt. XI, 12: The kingdom of heaven suffers violence, and the violent bear it away. Hence also Peter commands, I Pet. V, 8: Your adversary the devil, as a roaring lion, goes about seeking whom he may devour; resist him, strong in faith; and James IV, 7: Resist the devil, and he will flee from you. Yet because men tending toward spiritual goods could be withdrawn from them by corporeal dangers, precepts of fortitude also had to be given in the new law for sustaining temporal evils bravely, according to that saying of Mt. X, 28: Fear not those who kill the body" (ad 1).

But the precepts had rather to be given negatively, because "law in its precepts has common instruction. But those things which are to be done in dangers cannot be reduced to some common good, as those things which are to be avoided can. And therefore the precepts of fortitude are given more negatively than affirmatively" (ad 2).

2. "Divine law perfectly informs man concerning those things which are necessary for living rightly. But man needs for living rightly not only principal virtues, but also secondary and annexed virtues; and therefore in divine law, just as fitting precepts are given concerning the acts of the principal virtues, so also fitting precepts are given concerning the acts of the secondary and annexed virtues" (a. 1).

These precepts concern patience (Eccli. II, 4; Rom. XII, 12; Jas. V, 7; Hebr. X, 36) and perseverance (Hebr. XII, 7; I Cor. XV, 58), which respectively are concerned with the afflictions and labors of the present life, and therefore pertain to all; but not with magnanimity or magnificence, which have a certain excellence of greatness, and therefore fall more under counsels of perfection than under precepts of necessity (ad 1).

3. Human laws are ordained to some temporal goods, and therefore according to the fittingness of these goods precepts of fortitude are found in human laws (a. 1), for example, concerning labor not to be deserted or concerning the defense of the republic even with danger of life.

But the means for acquiring fortitude must be diligently employed, the more so because there is less occasion for exercising it than for the virtues of justice and temperance or their annexed virtues. The timidity of the just in external and public life is to be lamented, which harms the common good much; and a defect of fortitude brings many disasters in individual and domestic life. The principal means are customarily enumerated:

a) Frequent meditation on the fragility and vileness of temporal goods, when they are compared with eternal goods; from which it will come about that a good man does not fear evils but rather desires them as means of acquiring and increasing eternal happiness, contemns pleasures and honors, and is moved neither by human threats nor flatteries.

b) Foresight of evils, so that against them we may strengthen the will lest we be overcome by them, but may be able to overcome them.

c) The custom of acting strenuously in lesser things occurring daily, so that we may already be prepared to sustain graver things bravely and to approach them manfully: thus like a good soldier giving himself to daily exercise of arms. Wherefore let educators provide a virile formation for young people and propose noble and brave actions to them as an example.

d) Great esteem and love of fortitude on account of its own proper excellence.

e) Fervent love of God, which adds the greatest strength to the will: love is strong as death (Cant. VIII, 6); love joined to the imitation of Christ in heroic fortitude, and to fervent prayer with full confidence in the help of the Holy Spirit, who will grant the gift of fortitude, for we have promised to us the Holy Spirit himself, "the spirit of counsel and fortitude."

Fortified by these things, we can conclude with the Apostle, Rom. VIII, 35 sq.: "Who then shall separate us from the charity of Christ? tribulation? or distress? or hunger? or nakedness? or danger? or persecution? or the sword?... But in all these things we overcome because of him who loved us. For I am certain that neither death, nor life, nor angels, nor principalities, nor virtues, nor things present, nor things future, nor fortitude, nor height, nor depth, nor any other creature will be able to separate us from the charity of God, which is in Christ Jesus our Lord."

Perseverance is defined by Bl. Bonaventure, 3 part. Centil. sect. 43., from Tully, lib. 2. de Invent.: "it is a stable and weighed continuance by well-considered reason." But he says it is defined masterfully thus: "Perseverance is a lasting, or final, permanence in good." Thus it is defined also in the opuscule Declaratorio terminorum Theologiae. He repeats the same definitions in the Opusc. de septem donis; de Dono fortitudinis, cap. 3.

¶ In compend. Theol. verit. lib. 5. cap. 36. he thus defines it: "It is the virtue of a stable and perpetual continuance in well-considered reason." It is thus defined almost by Bl. Thomas, quaest. 137. art. 1., and by Tanner, disp. 3. quaest. 2. dub. 5.

I assert, that this is a special virtue.

It is proved from that, by the reason of Bl. Bonaventure, de perfectione vitae ad sorores, cap. 8. and de septem donis, lo.. cit.

That is a virtue which promotes the good necessary by removing some special difficulty: Perseverance removes the difficulty resulting from the lasting continuance in the good necessary for salvation: Therefore. The major is Aristotle's, 2. Eth. cap. 3. The minor is Christ's, Matth. 10. "But he that shall persevere to the end, he shall be saved." Weigh the particle (hic): for it implies that anyone else, not persevering, will lack salvation. It is confirmed from Bl. Bernard, epist. 129.: "Without perseverance, neither does he who fights obtain victory, nor the victor the palm: for it is itself the nurse to merit, the mediatrix to reward, the sister of patience, the daughter of constancy, the friend of peace, the knot of friendships, the bond of unity, the bulwark of sanctity. Take away perseverance, and obedience has no reward, nor beneficence grace, nor fortitude praise. For it alone is that to which eternity is rendered, or rather which renders itself to eternity," the Lord saying, Matth. 10. "He that shall persevere to the end, he shall be saved."

This perseverance, which we treat of, is that whereby one, out of purpose, and therefore out of the special intention of actual perseverance itself, as it were a special end in the proposed good begun, persists immovably.

For Perseverance can be taken in three other ways, so that it is not some special virtue, as Bl. Thomas noted, quaest. 137. art. 1. ad 2. First, as it is the general condition of grace and of the virtues with which a man departs from this life. Of which I treated in prima secunda, Trac. de Gratia.

Second, as it signifies the immobility of persisting, arising from the habit of virtue, which follows upon every habit of virtue, as it is a quality difficult to move, as St. Thomas says, loc. cit. ad 3.

Third, it is taken by Bl. Thomas, ad 1., from Aristotle 7. Eth. cap. 7. and 4. Eth. toward the end, whereby one persists in good with vehement struggle, enduring the perils of life and the difficulties of resisting pleasures, especially those of the flesh.

I assert second, that Perseverance is a potential part of fortitude. For it agrees with fortitude in sustaining difficulties in good. But it declines, because fortitude is concerned with overcoming the difficulties of death: but Perseverance with other lesser ones, namely, with lastingness in good works, which is not so grave, infused.^{1 1} N. Editor's note: the print reads 'quod non est adeò grave, infusas.' — 'infusas' dangles with no noun to modify; kept as printed in the Latin, since no certain correction exists (possibly 'infusas' depended on a word lost in the print).

The necessity, fruits, and praises of Perseverance, see in Bl. Bonaventure, locis adductis, and lib. 2. Pharetrae, cap. 34., where he brings forth many things from the Fathers.

I assert third; Perseverance needs a special help of God. So Bl. Thomas, art. 4. For Perseverance is taken in two ways with respect to purpose. First, for the habit of virtue; and in this way it needs the habit of grace, like the other infused moral virtues. Second, it is taken for the act of persevering in grace unto death; and in this way it needs not only habitual grace, but the special help of God preserving man in good, as Bl. Augustine teaches, lib. de bono perseverantiae, and it was defined in the holy Council of Trent.

With regard to the virtue of Constancy, it agrees with Perseverance, in that it persists in some good. It differs, for Perseverance makes one persist in good against the difficulty that arises from the length of the undertaking: but Constancy makes one persist against difficulty from any other impediment. And therefore Perseverance is a more principal part of fortitude than Constancy, because the difficulty that arises from the lastingness of the act is more essential to the act of virtue than that which is from exterior impediments. So Bl. Thomas, art. 3. Therefore this also needs a special help of God.