528. Which persons are capable. 1. By natural law all who possess the use of reason are capable of contracting: for for a valid contract on the part of the contracting party nothing else is required except that he be able to show sufficient consent, that is, consent which is a perfectly human act.

Therefore of themselves incapable are those who lack the use of reason, as infants and the perpetually insane, the drunk and the furious at the time at which they are incapable of a perfectly human act. Besides, the half-witted, half-drunk, half-asleep, half-delirious are incapable, because they do not have perfect use of reason. But minors are not incapable, nor are those who labor under monomania, provided they use sound reason concerning the matter about which they contract.

2. By positive law all are capable of contracting who by natural law can contract validly, unless they are declared incapable by law. Now generally those are declared incapable of contracting by law who do not have the free administration of their goods; but in particular minors, interdicted persons, namely those who by the sentence of a judge are declared incapable of exercising civil acts, and wives. What these persons can and cannot do as to contracts must be taken from the civil code.¹

a. Positive law, while it weakens the contracts of certain persons, limits and restricts the right innate to each person from nature, and this justly on account of the common good, both lest less experienced persons be deceived and suffer damage, and that peace of families may be provided for. Wherefore the disposition of law which is founded in common danger has force, even if in a particular case no inconvenience follows.

b. By this disposition of law, in modern codes the contract of a person legally incapable is generally not constituted invalid unless it is made void by a sentence of a judge, but only infirm, namely one which at the discretion of the incapable person, but not of the other contracting party, can be rescinded within the time determined by law. Wherefore, when the condition prescribed by law accedes, a contract of this kind becomes altogether firm; thus the contract of a minor son or wife, when the consent of the father or husband accedes, or a contract which is not rescinded in the time determined by law, becomes firm.

c. For confirming contracts of lesser moment the presumed consent of the father or tutor suffices. Therefore those contracts are firm by which minors give, buy, sell, or spend small things in play.

¹ C.A. Sections 865, 270. From C.A. Section 1237 ss., a wife can freely enter contracts concerning her own goods. C.G. Section 106 ss.

529. Whether minors (interdicted persons, wives) can in conscience use the benefit of civil law. The benefit conceded by civil law to minors, etc., is twofold: a. that their contracts, if they lack the condition required by law, are rescindable; b. that minors, if the contract is rescinded, are not bound to restore the thing accepted unless it still exists either in itself or in the equivalent.¹

If they acted without fraud, they can use each benefit, because both the firmness of the contract and the obligation of restoring (if the thing no longer exists) have been removed by law for the common good. Indeed, lest the law be rendered altogether void, they can use this benefit even if they gave a special promise of paying in every hypothesis or of renouncing the benefit of the law.

alpha. Therefore if a minor without the consent of the father buys something, the seller, before the merchandise has been handed over, cannot compel him to give the price; yet if the minor wishes to stand by the contract, he can compel the seller to hand over the merchandise for the established price: for the seller must preserve the contract, but the minor buyer can rescind it. If the thing has been handed over, the seller can be compelled to receive the thing and return the price. But if the minor uselessly consumed the purchased thing while the price had not yet been paid, the seller cannot demand payment of the price.

beta. A minor who, without the consent of the father or curator, received money as a loan for consumption and consumed it for useless purposes, once the rescission of the contract has been made, is not obligated to restitution, even if afterward, having become of age, he could restore. For those who contract with minors, even in good faith, must impute to themselves the damage if they suffer any from this. But he is bound to restitution if he spent the money on necessary and useful purposes, because then he has become richer by it.²

gamma. If a minor seeks before a judge the rescission of a contract which by law he can rescind, charity requires that the other party rescind the contract without waiting for the sentence of a judge, lest the minor be forced to make useless expenses.

Article Fourth. On the Consent of Contracting Parties

Concerning the consent of contracting parties it must be set forth: a. what the qualities of valid consent are; b. what the vices of consent are.

¹ C.A. Section 865; C.G. Section 108. Other codes declare these contracts rescindable not simply, but only when the minor has been injured, as C. Gall. and C. Angl.

² Cf. Reuter III, n. 151; St. Alphonsus, n. 757.

The Persons Who Possess Prudence.—Political prudence, if understood of the ability to rule well, is not found in all persons, not even in all the good.

(a) Thus, those who are imprudent in their own affairs are not fitted to rule, and hence a man who is unjust, or intemperate, or cowardly, lacks political prudence: “If one knows not how to govern his own house, how will he be able to take care of the Church of God?” said St. Paul in discussing the qualifications of prelates (I Tim., iii. 5). He who does not know how to obey well does not know how to rule well.

(b) Those who have infused prudence on account of the state of grace are not necessarily fitted to govern, for even children have the grace of prudence through Baptism and there are many grown-up persons of saintly lives who are not a success in office and administration. Thus, Pope Celestine V, though a most holy man, resigned from the Papacy, because he felt himself unequal to the task of ruling in troublous times.

(c) Those who have acquired prudence through reason and experience, and who are therefore just, temperate and strong, are morally well fitted in natural endowments to rule. He who has learned to obey well is prepared to learn to rule well.

Political prudence pertains to subjects as well as to rulers, although not in the same manner.

(a) Thus, rulers in the civil community should have political prudence in a supreme degree, or statesmanship, so that they may be able to discharge well the function of sovereignty entrusted to them, whether as legislators by deliberating wisely and choosing suitable laws, or as judges by correctly interpreting and applying the law, or as executives by maintaining the government and enforcing its laws.

(b) The citizens who exercise the power of suffrage should be gifted with no small degree of political prudence: they should be loyal to the institutions, laws, and welfare of the country, able to form a good judgment about men and measures that are the issues in a campaign, and ready to vote according to conviction rather than prejudice or personal interest.

(c) The people can also exercise political prudence when obeying the laws, as when they act from a sense of duty and as rational beings, not unwillingly or blindly; for thus they rule themselves as freemen and enlightened beings, deliberating and deciding with themselves how they may cooperate for the common good and directing their acts according to law.

The principles just given concerning political prudence will apply also, due proportion being observed, to domestic prudence.

(a) Hence, it is the duty of those who have authority over a family or a similar community to cultivate domestic prudence, without which they cannot discharge rightly the duties of their position of parent, rector, superior, manager, etc. Confessors and directors of souls need especially to be prudent; for even though a priest is thoroughly grounded in the principles of a moral system of conscience and in the teachings of ascetical theology, he will have to be guided by prudence in making use of his knowledge, so as to apply it well in the great variety of cases that will come before him, and to decide what will be most useful for the spiritual welfare of each individual subject.

(b) It is the duty of those who elect or appoint others to positions of authority (such as the positions of guardian, teacher, superintendent, etc.) to be assured beforehand of the fitness of the person chosen as regards prudence, namely, that he is devoted to the welfare of those whom he will rule, that he has acquired sufficient knowledge and experience, and that his habits are temperate, resolute, just.

Relations between Prudence and Other Virtues.—In the preceding paragraphs the possession of prudence has been joined with the moral virtues. Hence the question presents itself: Can one who lacks the moral virtues possess prudence?

(a) Evil prudence, which chooses ways and means well adapted to some nefarious scheme, and imperfect prudence, which means and judges well but does not strongly resolve, are of course found in sinners. Evil prudence is called after the virtue, because it is a counterfeit of the latter’s goodness, but it is more properly named astuteness or cunning. Its sinfulness is strongly expressed in Rom., viii. 6, which declares that the prudence of the flesh is death. Imperfect prudence is also sinful, for it permits a right judgment to remain ineffectual and is thus recreant to conscience. Examples of evil prudence are the unjust steward mentioned in the Gospel (Luke, xvi. 1), who was wise enough to cheat his master and serve his own interests, and artful swindlers who know how to lure their victims and then escape without detection. Instances of imperfect prudence are persons who deliberate well on the means to overcome assaults of temptation or to escape occasions of sin, but whose resolutions never last.

(b) Indifferent prudence is resourceful in finding ways to accomplish purposes that are good, but that are not necessarily referred to moral aims. Thus, certain men seem to have an uncanny instinct in business or industry of hitting on the methods that lead to success and of acting at the right time, and a similar fact is observed in the fields of science, medicine, art, etc. This kind of ability of knowing and doing the right thing is variously described as insight, discrimination, tact, and is variously explained as luck, genius, industry, etc. But, morally speaking, it is neither virtuous nor sinful, since we find, for example, that men endowed with business acumen or a practical sense of the uses of some art or science devote their talents sometimes to good, sometimes to evil, according to the difference of their characters.

(c) Good prudence is that which in thought and in act functions well with regard to the means for leading a good life. It is only this prudence that receives the name of virtue; and, since it is clear from its concept that it supposes a good life, we must conclude that the virtue of prudence is not found in sinners. It may happen, therefore, that a man is most sagacious in managing temporal affairs, or most skillful in administering the spiritual interests of others, and withal most imprudent, because he neglects his own salvation.

Sins that Cause One to Forfeit the Virtue of Prudence.—(a) Infused prudence is lost by any and every act of mortal sin, whether the sin be against the knowledge had through faith or the knowledge had through reason. (b) Acquired prudence is lost by repeated acts of mortal sin opposed to the knowledge had through reason, but not by one sole act. Thus, a person who through experience and practice has become prudent in overcoming past vices, loses this prudence if he disregards the lessons of the past and exposes himself to the old dangers of mortal sin (see 138).

We may sum up as follows regarding sinners and the possession of the virtue of prudence:

(a) sinners guilty of venial sin only have infused prudence, and also the habit of natural prudence, if they have acquired it by their own efforts;

(b) sinners guilty of mortal sin against supernatural light (e.g., those who sin against faith or hope) have not the infused virtue of prudence, though they may have the acquired virtue;

(c) sinners guilty of habitual mortal sin against natural light (e.g., those who are accustomed to sin against temperance or justice) have neither the infused nor the acquired virtue of prudence. Even one mortal sin, though it will not take away the inclination of the habit of prudence, will deprive one of the perfection of the virtue of prudence, for which it is required that in every act there be a judgment agreeable to a good will.

The Virtue of Infused Prudence in Those Who Are in the State of Grace.—(a) Infants in the state of grace through Baptism possess this virtue in an habitual, but not in an actual manner—that is, on account of their sanctification they have the power, but on account of their want of reason they have not the use of the power.

(b) All adults in the state of grace have this virtue both habitually and actually, as far as the need of salvation requires its exercise. Grace enables them either to perceive what they should do to live well, or to seek counsel from the better instructed and to distinguish between good and bad advice.

(c) Some adults in the state of grace have good judgment in a superior degree and are able to direct not only themselves but others, and to deliberate and decide rightly, not only in matters necessary for salvation, but in all kinds of affairs pertaining to the direction of human life.

Can the Acquired Virtue of Prudence Exist in Young People?—(a) If there is question of a formed habit of prudence, the virtue is not in the young, but in those who are advanced in years. Acquired prudence is originated by deliberation on particular cases and by habit, and these are not had without experience and time. Hence, this virtue is to be looked for in the elderly, both because the passions that disturb calm deliberation are no longer so impetuous in them, and because their years have taught them many lessons and given them the opportunity to acquire fixed ways of acting: “In the ancient is wisdom, and in length of days prudence” (Job, xii. 12; cfr. III Kings, xii).

(b) If there is question of a formative prudence, this is found in the young, for they deliberate and decide at times with judgment and firmness, and, if such acts are frequently repeated, they will eventually proceed from a settled moral inclination. It is necessary, therefore, that the moral training of the young begin early, that instruction, counsel and direction be given them by parents and other guides, so that the way of virtue may be made more easy. The young are in duty bound to listen frequently, willingly and reverently to the admonitions of their elders, and hence the modern tendency of youth to act as critics of morals is as foolish as it is presumptuous.

Is There Such a Thing as an Instinctive or Native Prudence?—(a) If we speak of the knowledge of universal principles of right and wrong which are applied by prudence, those principles that are most general are known naturally (i.e., even without instruction or inference), but not so the less general principles that follow from them (see 320 sqq.). Broadly speaking, therefore, one might say that prudence is natural, for in respect of its first principles it has a natural evidence; but it is more correct to say that knowledge of first principles belongs to intuitive reason or understanding, which is also called synteresis in reference to practical truths (see 145), and which is a gift of nature.

(b) If we speak of the particular knowledge of virtuous aims that is presupposed to prudence, one may possess naturally a right judgment about those aims, inasmuch as the right objectives of human life are not variable but determinate, and accordingly may be the centers of attraction to nature, which is drawn to the invariable and determinate, as is seen in irrational creatures. In fact, certain persons are by nature disposed to certain virtues (e.g., temperance), and readily form accurate judgments as to what concerns these virtues. Broadly speaking again, we may say that prudence is natural in the sense that nature disposes some persons to judge rightly about moral ends.

(c) If we speak of the particular knowledge concerning ways and means to fulfill virtuous purposes, there is no natural knowledge of this kind, for the ways and means to moderation are infinitely varied according to the differences of affairs, persons, and circumstances. And since prudence strictly understood is concerned, not with universal principles or the ends of virtues, but with individual cases and the particular means to be employed, it follows that in the strict sense prudence is not natural. But just as we find that some men are better fitted by nature to judge correctly in speculative matters, so also some persons are superior to others in the ability to reason about practical cases and the means conducive to morality.

St. Thomas, II-II, q. 47, a. 1, 2, 3.

7. Prudence is not in the appetite, nor in the senses, but in reason. - For a prudent man is, as it were, one seeing far ahead (verre- or vooruit-zichtigheid) or foreseeing; whence men call those prudent who, from past or present things, conjecture and judge future things to be provided for. But the appetite does not see nor judge; and the senses do not compare past things with future things, but only know present things which are offered to them. Therefore (a. 1).

1. Isidore, Etymologies, book 10: "Prudent is said as if seeing far ahead: for one who is perspicacious foresees even the events of uncertain things." And St. Thomas in the present question 47, a. 1.

2. Cicero, De divinatione, I, 49: "Prudent, that is, foreseeing?"; and frag. apud Nonius, XLI, 31: "For this belongs to the wise man, to foresee, from which prudence has been named." And St. Thomas, q. 55, a. 1, ad 1, and q. 49, a. 6.

3. Cf. I, q. 22, a. 1; II-II, q. 49, a. 6 and ad 1; III Sent., d. 33, q. 3, a. 1, qc. 1, and ad 3.

8. Corollaries. - Several things can be deduced from this, which are noted by St. Thomas:

1. The prudent man has memory of past things and conjectures future things in order to acting, namely, he "considers those things which are far off, insofar as they are ordered to helping or impeding those things which presently are to be done." Whence the things which prudence considers it orders to other things as to an end (ad 2), and it applies them to the work to be done (ad 3). Cf. III Sent., d. 33, q. 3, a. 1, qc. 1, ad 2 and 3.

2. Concerning those things which are to be done for the end, there are several acts, among which are counsel or deliberation in reason, and election in the will. Of these, counsel, because it is in reason, properly pertains to prudence, whence Aristotle says: The prudent man is one who deliberates well. But election presupposes counsel, and therefore to choose can also be attributed to prudence insofar as it directs election through counsel (ad 2).

3. Since no one takes counsel about necessary things, or about past things, which by that very fact are necessary, but only about contingent and future things which are in our power and at the same time have uncertainty (cf. q. 49, a. 6), and since it belongs to prudence to apply to the work to be done, hence it is said to know particular and singular and contingent things: for operations are concerned with particular and singular contingent things. "To providence," says St. Thomas, "there pertains not only the consideration of reason, but also application to the work, which is the end of practical reason. But no one can fittingly apply something to another unless he knows both, namely, that which is to be applied and that to which it is to be applied. But operations are in singulars. And therefore it is necessary that the prudent man know both the universal principles of reason and the singular things concerning which operations exist" (a. 3).

4. Cf. treatise On Human Acts, I, n. 107.

9. Prudence is only in practical reason. - For it belongs to the prudent man to deliberate well; but counsel is about those things which are to be done by us in order to the end. But those things which are not only to be known but to be done in order to the end pertain to reason not speculative but practical. Therefore (a. 2).

10. Observations. - 1. Since prudence is concerned with particular and singular things to be done, and the cogitative faculty knows particulars, hence prudence, while it is principally in reason, which applies universal principles to particular and singular things and therefore knows both together, nevertheless secondarily reaches to the cogitative power through a certain application: namely, in that power there is a habit (of memory and experience), which is subordinated to and serves reason and prudence for an easy estimation of particulars (a. 3, ad 3). Therefore prudence is in reason using the cogitative power, says Cajetan; and therefore secondarily and ministerially it is in the cogitative power insofar as this cooperates dispositively with the intellect.

2. It belongs to prudence to order other things to an end; whence according to various ends various prudence is distinguished: prudence in order to a particular end, for example, victory or good trading, is prudence in this genus and in a qualified and imperfect way; prudence simply will be that which is in order to the end of the whole human life, or to the whole of living well (a. 2, ad 1).

3. Prudence, simply so called, since it is concerned with things to be done for the ultimate end, is sometimes called human wisdom. For wisdom considers the highest causes; whence wisdom, simply so called, is that which considers the highest cause of every being. But in the genus of human acts the highest cause is the ultimate end. Therefore, just as wisdom, simply so called, knows the highest cause of all things, so prudence is called wisdom in human affairs because it considers the supreme good of man (a. 2, ad 1).

4. Prudence and art are both ordered to work; but prudence applies right reason to doing, which is the end of practical reason, not so art. For the perfection of art consists only in judging how the work is to be made; the perfection of prudence consists not only in judging how one must act, but also in acting. Whence art gives only the faculty of making a good work, but not the use; on the contrary, prudence also gives good use. And therefore an artisan who sins against art willingly is praised more than one who does so unwillingly; but he is more imprudent who sins willingly than one who sins unwillingly.

Hence prudence applies itself to acting; but art must be applied to the work through the command of reason and will, for which, so that it may be done rightly, moral virtue is required, for example justice, and prudence. And therefore the operation of art (as also of science), insofar as it is voluntary, can be from prudence, not as to the species, namely as the making of such an artful work (thus it is from art), but as to exercise and use, namely so that it may also be done honorably from a good will and man may rightly and honorably use his art (a. 1, ad 3; a. 2, ad 2; a. 4, ad 2; a. 8; I-II, q. 57, a. 3 and 4).

FIRST a question arises: Whether Prudence is in subjects; for Aristotle 3. Eth. capit. 3. seems to deny it; but he speaks of subjects, as subjects are. For truly, since Prudence is connected with the other moral virtues, with which even subjects can be endowed, there is no doubt that prudence is in them. Aristotle therefore speaks of subjects formally, as subjects are, as D. Thomas says in article 12.

There is doubt also concerning sinners; for Aristotle 6. Ethic. cap. 12. says: It is manifest that no one can be prudent unless he be good. But on the contrary it stands strong, because in cap. 5. he says that even many wicked men are strong in counsel.

I SAY, first, that in sinners prudence is false; I speak of those sinning mortally: Of this Rom. 8. The prudence of the flesh is death. And Luke 16. The children of this world are more prudent than the children of light in their generation, as S. Bonaventure notes on this passage, and in the places adduced at the beginning of quest. 1.

I SAY, secondly, that infused prudence is not in those sinning lethally.

IT IS PROVED: For the moral virtues are infused, connected with Charity; as I showed in the first part of the second part, Treatise on the Virtues.

I ASSERT, thirdly, that acquired true Prudence is not in those who sin very frequently. For it is connected with the moral virtues, and is destroyed by frequently opposite acts.

I ASSERT, fourthly, that infused Prudence concerning one's own good is in the just.

IT IS PROVED, because it is connected with charity, as I showed in the place cited above.

I ASSERT, fifthly, that in the young there is no acquired prudence.

IT IS PROVED from Aristotle 6. Ethic. cap. 8. But the cause is, that prudence is of particular things, which become known to us by experience; but the young man is without experience; for experience is produced by length of time.