Article I: On the Subject of Prudence

St. Thomas, II-II, q. 47, a. 1, 2, 3.

7. Prudence is not in the appetite, nor in the senses, but in reason. - For a prudent man is, as it were, one seeing far ahead (verre- or vooruit-zichtigheid) or foreseeing; whence men call those prudent who, from past or present things, conjecture and judge future things to be provided for. But the appetite does not see nor judge; and the senses do not compare past things with future things, but only know present things which are offered to them. Therefore (a. 1).

1. Isidore, Etymologies, book 10: "Prudent is said as if seeing far ahead: for one who is perspicacious foresees even the events of uncertain things." And St. Thomas in the present question 47, a. 1.

2. Cicero, De divinatione, I, 49: "Prudent, that is, foreseeing?"; and frag. apud Nonius, XLI, 31: "For this belongs to the wise man, to foresee, from which prudence has been named." And St. Thomas, q. 55, a. 1, ad 1, and q. 49, a. 6.

3. Cf. I, q. 22, a. 1; II-II, q. 49, a. 6 and ad 1; III Sent., d. 33, q. 3, a. 1, qc. 1, and ad 3.

8. Corollaries. - Several things can be deduced from this, which are noted by St. Thomas:

1. The prudent man has memory of past things and conjectures future things in order to acting, namely, he "considers those things which are far off, insofar as they are ordered to helping or impeding those things which presently are to be done." Whence the things which prudence considers it orders to other things as to an end (ad 2), and it applies them to the work to be done (ad 3). Cf. III Sent., d. 33, q. 3, a. 1, qc. 1, ad 2 and 3.

2. Concerning those things which are to be done for the end, there are several acts, among which are counsel or deliberation in reason, and election in the will. Of these, counsel, because it is in reason, properly pertains to prudence, whence Aristotle says: The prudent man is one who deliberates well. But election presupposes counsel, and therefore to choose can also be attributed to prudence insofar as it directs election through counsel (ad 2).

3. Since no one takes counsel about necessary things, or about past things, which by that very fact are necessary, but only about contingent and future things which are in our power and at the same time have uncertainty (cf. q. 49, a. 6), and since it belongs to prudence to apply to the work to be done, hence it is said to know particular and singular and contingent things: for operations are concerned with particular and singular contingent things. "To providence," says St. Thomas, "there pertains not only the consideration of reason, but also application to the work, which is the end of practical reason. But no one can fittingly apply something to another unless he knows both, namely, that which is to be applied and that to which it is to be applied. But operations are in singulars. And therefore it is necessary that the prudent man know both the universal principles of reason and the singular things concerning which operations exist" (a. 3).

4. Cf. treatise On Human Acts, I, n. 107.

9. Prudence is only in practical reason. - For it belongs to the prudent man to deliberate well; but counsel is about those things which are to be done by us in order to the end. But those things which are not only to be known but to be done in order to the end pertain to reason not speculative but practical. Therefore (a. 2).

10. Observations. - 1. Since prudence is concerned with particular and singular things to be done, and the cogitative faculty knows particulars, hence prudence, while it is principally in reason, which applies universal principles to particular and singular things and therefore knows both together, nevertheless secondarily reaches to the cogitative power through a certain application: namely, in that power there is a habit (of memory and experience), which is subordinated to and serves reason and prudence for an easy estimation of particulars (a. 3, ad 3). Therefore prudence is in reason using the cogitative power, says Cajetan; and therefore secondarily and ministerially it is in the cogitative power insofar as this cooperates dispositively with the intellect.

2. It belongs to prudence to order other things to an end; whence according to various ends various prudence is distinguished: prudence in order to a particular end, for example, victory or good trading, is prudence in this genus and in a qualified and imperfect way; prudence simply will be that which is in order to the end of the whole human life, or to the whole of living well (a. 2, ad 1).

3. Prudence, simply so called, since it is concerned with things to be done for the ultimate end, is sometimes called human wisdom. For wisdom considers the highest causes; whence wisdom, simply so called, is that which considers the highest cause of every being. But in the genus of human acts the highest cause is the ultimate end. Therefore, just as wisdom, simply so called, knows the highest cause of all things, so prudence is called wisdom in human affairs because it considers the supreme good of man (a. 2, ad 1).

4. Prudence and art are both ordered to work; but prudence applies right reason to doing, which is the end of practical reason, not so art. For the perfection of art consists only in judging how the work is to be made; the perfection of prudence consists not only in judging how one must act, but also in acting. Whence art gives only the faculty of making a good work, but not the use; on the contrary, prudence also gives good use. And therefore an artisan who sins against art willingly is praised more than one who does so unwillingly; but he is more imprudent who sins willingly than one who sins unwillingly.

Hence prudence applies itself to acting; but art must be applied to the work through the command of reason and will, for which, so that it may be done rightly, moral virtue is required, for example justice, and prudence. And therefore the operation of art (as also of science), insofar as it is voluntary, can be from prudence, not as to the species, namely as the making of such an artful work (thus it is from art), but as to exercise and use, namely so that it may also be done honorably from a good will and man may rightly and honorably use his art (a. 1, ad 3; a. 2, ad 2; a. 4, ad 2; a. 8; I-II, q. 57, a. 3 and 4).