Question IV: Who share in prudence

FIRST a question arises: Whether Prudence is in subjects; for Aristotle 3. Eth. capit. 3. seems to deny it; but he speaks of subjects, as subjects are. For truly, since Prudence is connected with the other moral virtues, with which even subjects can be endowed, there is no doubt that prudence is in them. Aristotle therefore speaks of subjects formally, as subjects are, as D. Thomas says in article 12.

There is doubt also concerning sinners; for Aristotle 6. Ethic. cap. 12. says: It is manifest that no one can be prudent unless he be good. But on the contrary it stands strong, because in cap. 5. he says that even many wicked men are strong in counsel.

I SAY, first, that in sinners prudence is false; I speak of those sinning mortally: Of this Rom. 8. The prudence of the flesh is death. And Luke 16. The children of this world are more prudent than the children of light in their generation, as S. Bonaventure notes on this passage, and in the places adduced at the beginning of quest. 1.

I SAY, secondly, that infused prudence is not in those sinning lethally.

IT IS PROVED: For the moral virtues are infused, connected with Charity; as I showed in the first part of the second part, Treatise on the Virtues.

I ASSERT, thirdly, that acquired true Prudence is not in those who sin very frequently. For it is connected with the moral virtues, and is destroyed by frequently opposite acts.

I ASSERT, fourthly, that infused Prudence concerning one's own good is in the just.

IT IS PROVED, because it is connected with charity, as I showed in the place cited above.

I ASSERT, fifthly, that in the young there is no acquired prudence.

IT IS PROVED from Aristotle 6. Ethic. cap. 8. But the cause is, that prudence is of particular things, which become known to us by experience; but the young man is without experience; for experience is produced by length of time.