Potential Parts

The Potential Parts of Prudence.—As was explained in 1636, the potential parts of a virtue are certain annexed virtues, usually inferior ones, that have to do with the secondary acts of a virtue to which they are subordinated. The principal act of prudence is direction, its secondary acts are deliberation and decision (1633). Hence, we have the following potential parts of prudence:

(a) wise deliberation (eubulia), which is a habit of debating with oneself according to correct methods the means to be employed for virtuous choice;

(b) wise decision, which is an habitual state of the mind which makes it ready to draw right conclusions about the means to be chosen for virtuous conduct.

Wise deliberation and wise decision differ from prudence, which is wise direction, and they are subject to it just as counsellors are subject to a commander. But is it possible for these three virtues to exist apart?

(a) If there is question only of natural dispositions to these virtues, they may exist apart. Thus, we find that certain persons have an imagination ready to discover ways and means; that others are not so inventive, but are remarkable for common sense in choosing the most suitable means; and that still others are so inclined to some virtue that they will promptly make use of means that tend to it. The first class are readily listened to in deliberations, the second in decisions, while the third are usefully employed in executing matters that suit their natural bent (e.g., the naturally generous in dispensing alms).

(b) If there is question of the virtues themselves, they do not exist apart; for a man is not prudent if he does not deliberate as he should (e.g., if he searches for evil means to effect his good purpose), or if he does not decide as he should (e.g., if he concludes to prefer evil means to the good ones his deliberation had shown him), or if he does not direct his actions as he should (e.g., if he neglects to carry out what he had decided on as a necessary duty or performs it in a careless or improper way). True prudence, then, is wise in deliberation, in decision, in direction. A good man may be excused if he is not resourceful, or if he lacks sound judgment in worldly matters, but one who is imprudent in the matter of a virtuous life is not a good man.

1055. 3. Concerning the various species of prudence. Prudence assumes various names, and is distributed into various species, according to the various objects about which it is concerned. It is customarily called personal prudence, or monastic, by which a man governs himself; domestic, or economic, by which someone rightly orders whatever regards the good of the family; social, or political, when it regards the common good of the state; military, when it is concerned with military affairs, etc. But in all these, the same essential elements which we have described are found; but those things which are particular to each species are set forth in various treatises.

1057. (B) To the virtue of prudence there are opposed, by a false likeness, prudence of the flesh, craftiness, and excessive solicitude for future things.

(a) Prudence of the flesh, which seeks ways of living according to the desires of corrupt nature, and therefore tends to an end which is not truly good, but apparent. Concerning this the Apostle says:² "For the prudence of the flesh is death; but the prudence of the spirit is life and peace. Because the wisdom of the flesh is an enemy to God; for it is not subject to the law of God, neither can it be. And they who are in the flesh cannot please God."

² Rom. 8:6-8.

(b) Craftiness, which is not necessarily concerned with an evil end, but uses simulated and fallacious means for attaining the intended end, whether good or evil. It is, as it were, a practical lie, and is opposed to Christian simplicity. Exteriorly it is manifested by deceit and fraud, of which there is treatment where Contracts are discussed, n. 630.

(c) Excessive solicitude for future things, which is vicious when it preoccupies a man outside the opportune time, or in an immoderate way. Christ reproves this as a defect of trust in God:³ "Be not solicitous for your life, what you shall eat, nor for your body, what you shall put on... Behold the birds of the air, for they neither sow, nor do they reap, nor gather into barns; and your heavenly Father feedeth them. Are not you of much more value than they?" St. Thomas explains this more fully,⁴ by setting forth that this excessive solicitude is illicit in three ways: if we seek temporal things as an end, - or if we so set our heart upon temporal things that we are drawn back from spiritual things, which we ought more principally to serve, - or if we fear that, by doing what we ought, necessary things may fail us, which is opposed to divine providence: "Seek ye therefore first the kingdom of God and His justice, and all these things shall be added unto you."⁵

³ Matt. 6:25-26.

⁴ St. Thomas, II-II, q. 55, a. 6.

⁵ Matt. 6:33.

These sins indeed are grave when the last end is constituted in creatures, or when means gravely culpable in themselves are assumed.

St. Thomas, I-II, q. 57, a. 6; II-II, q. 48 and 51.

29. Potential parts are annexed virtues which are ordered to certain secondary, preparatory, and easier acts, and do not have the whole power of prudence, but fall short of it in something. The principal virtue uses them in the manner by which the soul uses its powers (q. 51, a. 2, ad 1; I-II, q. 57, a. 6, ad 1): for just as in the individual powers of the soul the force and condition of the soul shines forth, although not fully, so in these faculties and their functions the nature and condition of prudence shines forth, although not adequately. There are three:

1. Eubulia (eu-boule, good counsel; goede raad, welberadenheid), which is concerned with counsel: namely, it is the habit of counseling well or of finding means suitable to the end. Moreover, "for counseling well there is required not only the discovery or devising of those things which are opportune for the end, but also other circumstances, namely the congruous time, so that one be neither too slow nor too swift in counsels, and the manner of counseling, namely so that one be firm in his counsel, and other due circumstances of this sort" (q. 51, a. 1, ad 3).

2. Synesis (synesis, composition of two = judgment: bon sens; gezond oordeel; eusynetoi = persons well-sensed), concerning judgment of those things which are done according to law: it is the habit of judging well concerning things to be done according to common rules, namely laws and their particular ends.

3. Gnome (gnome = reason, judgment: sens de l'exception; gematigd, milddadig, getemperd oordeel), concerning judgment of those things in which one must depart from the law and judge from a higher principle of reason: for there are unusual cases which the law does not know, or in which it does not oblige because of special circumstances, for the determination of which a special perspicacity is required. Whence it is the habit of judging well according to higher principles concerning things to be done beyond the common law. Hence gnome directs epikeia (équité; rechtmatigheid, billijkheid), that is, equity in the application and observance of laws according to the equitable and the good (cf. treatise on Laws, I, n. 296).

1. The reason why one virtue suffices for counsel, while two are required for judgment, St. Thomas hands down in I-II, q. 57, a. 6, ad 3: "Judgment concerning each thing is made through its proper principles. But inquiry is not yet through proper principles (but through common ones), because once these were had there would be no need of inquiry, but the thing would already have been found. And therefore one virtue alone is ordered to counseling well, but two virtues to judging well; because distinction is not in common principles but in proper ones. Whence also in speculative matters dialectic, which inquires concerning all things, is one; but the demonstrative sciences, which are judgmental, are diverse concerning diverse things. But synesis and gnome are distinguished according to the diverse rules by which judgment is made. For synesis is judgmental concerning things to be done according to common law; but gnome according to natural reason itself in those things in which common law fails." Cf. II-II, q. 51, a. 4, ad 2.

30. Potential parts are true virtues, but annexed. - They are virtues, because they render perfect an act proper to man, namely to counsel or judge.

They are virtues distinct from prudence, because they are concerned with acts which are distinguished from the act of prudence according to a diverse notion of goodness, indeed are even separated from it; for he who counsels well does not always judge well, and he who judges well does not always command well, but sometimes delays or acts negligently or inordinately. But if they were not distinct from prudence, prudence would not be a cardinal virtue, because it would not be the foundation of others.

They are annexed virtues, because their acts, to counsel well and to judge, are ordered to commanding well as to a more principal and more difficult act, whence the whole power of the virtue of prudence does not inhere in them. "And just as to counsel (or to judge) is ordered to commanding as to the more principal thing, so also eubulia (likewise the others) is ordered to prudence as to the more principal virtue, without which it would not even be a virtue," just as neither would the moral virtues be virtues without prudence (q. 51, a. 2). And thus prudence is the cardinal virtue in which the others are founded, which it commands, which it uses, and through the mediation of which it acts (ibid. ad 1; I-II, q. 57, a. 6, ad 1).

1. If prudence did not command good counsel, man would not always counsel well.

2. Therefore the annexed virtues are commanded by prudence, which acts mediately through them. According to Lessius they are commanded by love of the end(!), and are not really distinguished from prudence. Thus prudence would not be a cardinal virtue.

31. Observation. - Inquiry and counsel pertain to reason, which compares the means with the end and among themselves, and discourses through individual, many, and diverse things. Judgment properly pertains to the intellect, which sees and considers that which is to be done: "for consideration imports an act of the intellect beholding the truth of the thing." Command looks to reason because it orders the means to the end; but to order belongs to reason. Cf. q. 53, a. 4; q. 51, a. 3.

UNANIMOUSLY the Philosophers acknowledge that Prudence has certain parts; of which Aristotle 6. Ethic. cap. 8. and following. Cicero lib. 2. de Invent. August. lib. 83. qq. quaest. 61. Macrobius lib. 1. in somn. Scipionis, cap. 8. relates them; from these the S. Doctor everywhere lib. 5. Compend. Theol. cap. 34. And 3. p. Centileg. sectione 41. and the opusc. de quatuor virtutibus Cardinalibus.

The parts of Prudence are of THREE kinds. Some are integral, without which the perfect use of Prudence is not had: Others are subjective, in the manner in which species, subjected to a genus, are called subjective parts of the genus, as Man and Lion are parts of animal, because, namely, animal is predicated of them as of a subject. Others are potential parts of Prudence by similitude with the potential parts of the soul.

The Integral Parts of Prudence, which integrate it as it were in the manner in which members integrate a body, are eight. Memory, which is cognition of past things; Understanding, which is cognition of present things; Docility, which is cognition through another's instruction; Solertia, which is cognition through one's own discovery; nem; Ratio of this, is because it is cognition by the inference of one thing from another; Providence, which is the ordination of means to an end; Circumspection, which is the consideration of the circumstances of the business; Caution, which is a certain contrivance against those things which can stand in the way and be an impediment.

The perfect use of Prudence indeed depends on Memory, because it depends on experience; and this on many experiments, and experiments on many memories, as D. Thom. teaches quaest. 49. art. 1. ex Aristotle at the beginning of 1. Metaph.

It depends also on Understanding, which is the cognition of particulars with which Prudence is concerned, which cognition is from the intellect, partly through conversion to phantasms, partly also in the interior sense, or the cogitative power.

It DEPENDS on Docility, which Cicero praises Lib. 2. qq. Academ.; hence the S. Doctor defines it to be the power of instructing first oneself; then others.

It DEPENDS on Solertia, which is swift conjecture, as Aristotle teaches 6. Eth. cap. 9. and D. Thom. quaest. 49. art. 4.

It DEPENDS on reason, which is the cognition of one thing from another by inference; for Consultation, on which the decrees of Prudence depend, is altogether with ratiocination, as the Philosopher teaches 6. Eth. cap. 10. and D. Thomas art. 5.

It DEPENDS on Prudence, which is the ordination of suitable means to an end; for Prudence is concerned with things to be done on account of an end, as the S. Doctor explains in the places alleged, and D. Thom. art. 6.

It DEPENDS on Circumspection; for prudence is concerned with particular things to be done, good on every side, consonant with reason; but the goodness of human actions depends on the circumstances, as I showed prima secundae, Treatise 1. disput. 9. question 5. and 10.

It DEPENDS also on Caution, which is provision against contrary evils, which the S. Doctor calls the Prudence of discerning vices, bearing the appearance of virtues.

As to the subjective parts of Prudence, D. Thom. treats quaest. 50. It is divided into governing Prudence and the particular prudence of the one acting. Again, Gubernativa is divided into Legislative, which is in the Prince, or Republic; into Political, which is in subjects concerning the same good of the Kingdom, or city; into Oeconomical, which is concerning the domestic good; and Military, concerning which the good of the army is concerned. Of the Gubernativa the S. Doctor treats excellently de Eccl. Hierarchia. But particular prudence is one most special species.

The potential Parts of Prudence are three intellectual virtues adjoined, serving prudence, namely, EUBULIA, which is rightly counseltative, as you have 6. Eth. cap. 9. SYNESIS is rightly judgmental by common rules; and GNOMES, which is rightly judgmental in natural reason beyond the common rules, when these fail because of the circumstances of a particular case. See D. Thomas quaest. 51., easily declaring these.

Of these S. Bonaventure also treats in the places everywhere adduced here.