Question — Bontempi, Palladium Theologicum V · from Schola Thomistica
Question VI: On the parts of the virtue of prudence
UNANIMOUSLY the Philosophers acknowledge that Prudence has certain parts; of which Aristotle 6. Ethic. cap. 8. and following. Cicero lib. 2. de Invent. August. lib. 83. qq. quaest. 61. Macrobius lib. 1. in somn. Scipionis, cap. 8. relates them; from these the S. Doctor everywhere lib. 5. Compend. Theol. cap. 34. And 3. p. Centileg. sectione 41. and the opusc. de quatuor virtutibus Cardinalibus.
De partibus Virtutis PRUDENTIAE.
UNANIMES fatentur Philosophi, Prudentiae aliquas esse partes; de quibus Aristoteles 6. Ethic. cap. 8. et sequent. Cicero lib. 2. de Invent. August. lib. 83. qq. quaest. 61. Macrobius lib. 1. in somn. Scipionis, cap. 8. eas refert ex his S. Doct. passim lib. 5. Compend. Theol. cap. 34. Et 3. p. Centileg. sectione 41. et opusc. de quatuor virtutibus Cardinalibus.
The parts of Prudence are of THREE kinds. Some are integral, without which the perfect use of Prudence is not had: Others are subjective, in the manner in which species, subjected to a genus, are called subjective parts of the genus, as Man and Lion are parts of animal, because, namely, animal is predicated of them as of a subject. Others are potential parts of Prudence by similitude with the potential parts of the soul.
TRIPLICIS generis sunt partes Prudentiae. Aliae integrales, sine quibus non est perfectus usus Prudentiae : Aliae subiectivae ad modum, quo species, subiectae generi, dicuntur partes subiectivae generis, ut Homo, et Leo sunt partes animalis, quia, scilicet animal, de illis, tanquam de subiecto praedicatur. Aliae sunt Prudentiae partes potentiales per similitudinem partium potentialium animae.
The Integral Parts of Prudence, which integrate it as it were in the manner in which members integrate a body, are eight. Memory, which is cognition of past things; Understanding, which is cognition of present things; Docility, which is cognition through another's instruction; Solertia, which is cognition through one's own discovery; nem; Ratio of this, is because it is cognition by the inference of one thing from another; Providence, which is the ordination of means to an end; Circumspection, which is the consideration of the circumstances of the business; Caution, which is a certain contrivance against those things which can stand in the way and be an impediment.
PARTES Integrales Prudentiae, quae eam veluti integrant ad modum, quo membra integrant corpus, sunt octo. Memoria, quae est cognitio praeteritorum; Intelligentia quae est cognitio praesentium; Docilitas, quae est cognitio per alterius eruditionem; Solertia, quae est cognitio per propriam inventionem; Ratio huius, est quia est cognitio per illationem unius ex alio; Providentia, quae est ordinatio mediorum ad finem; Circumspectio, quae est animadversio circumstantiarum negotii; Cautio, quae est machinatio quaedam adversus ea, quae obstare, et impedimento esse possunt.
The perfect use of Prudence indeed depends on Memory, because it depends on experience; and this on many experiments, and experiments on many memories, as D. Thom. teaches quaest. 49. art. 1. ex Aristotle at the beginning of 1. Metaph.
A Memoria sane pendet usus perfectus Prudentiae, quia is pendet ab experientia; ea vero a multis experimentis, et experimenta a multis memoriis, ut docet D. Thom. quaest. 49. art. 1. ex Aristotele initio 1. Metaph.
It depends also on Understanding, which is the cognition of particulars with which Prudence is concerned, which cognition is from the intellect, partly through conversion to phantasms, partly also in the interior sense, or the cogitative power.
Ab Intelligentia etiam pendet, quae est cognitio particularium, circa quae versatur Prudentia, quae cognitio est ab intellectu, partim per conversionem ad phantasmata, partim etiam in sensu interiori, seu potentia cogitativa.
It DEPENDS on Docility, which Cicero praises Lib. 2. qq. Academ.; hence the S. Doctor defines it to be the power of instructing first oneself; then others.
PENDET etiam a Docilitate, quam laudat Cicero Lib. 2. qq. Academ. hinc definit S. Doctor, eam esse potentiam erudiendi prius se; deinde alios.
It DEPENDS on Solertia, which is swift conjecture, as Aristotle teaches 6. Eth. cap. 9. and D. Thom. quaest. 49. art. 4.
PENDET a Solertia, quae est celeris coniectatio, ut docet Aristoteles 6. Eth. cap. 9. et D. Thom. quaest. 49. art. 4.
It DEPENDS on reason, which is the cognition of one thing from another by inference; for Consultation, on which the decrees of Prudence depend, is altogether with ratiocination, as the Philosopher teaches 6. Eth. cap. 10. and D. Thomas art. 5.
PENDET a ratione, quae est cognitio unius ex alio per illationem; nam Consultatio, ex qua pendent decreta Prudentiae, omnino est cum ratiocinatione, ut docet Philosophus 6. Eth. cap. 10. et D. Thomas art. 5.
It DEPENDS on Prudence, which is the ordination of suitable means to an end; for Prudence is concerned with things to be done on account of an end, as the S. Doctor explains in the places alleged, and D. Thom. art. 6.
PENDET a Prudentia, quae est ordinatio mediorum idoneorum in finem; versatur enim Prudentia circa agibilia propter finem, ut explicat S. Doctor locis allegatis, et D. Thom. art. 6.
It DEPENDS on Circumspection; for prudence is concerned with particular things to be done, good on every side, consonant with reason; but the goodness of human actions depends on the circumstances, as I showed prima secundae, Treatise 1. disput. 9. question 5. and 10.
PENDET a Circumspectione; nam prudentia versatur circa particularia agibilia, undequaque bona, rationi consona; pendet autem bonitas actionum humanarum e circumstantiis, ut ostendi prima secundae, Tract. 1. disput. 9. quaest. 5. et 10.
It DEPENDS also on Caution, which is provision against contrary evils, which the S. Doctor calls the Prudence of discerning vices, bearing the appearance of virtues.
PENDET etiam ex Cautione, quae est provisio adversus mala contraria, quam S. Doctor vocat Prudentiam discernendi vitia, virtutum speciem prae se ferentia.
As to the subjective parts of Prudence, D. Thom. treats quaest. 50. It is divided into governing Prudence and the particular prudence of the one acting. Again, Gubernativa is divided into Legislative, which is in the Prince, or Republic; into Political, which is in subjects concerning the same good of the Kingdom, or city; into Oeconomical, which is concerning the domestic good; and Military, concerning which the good of the army is concerned. Of the Gubernativa the S. Doctor treats excellently de Eccl. Hierarchia. But particular prudence is one most special species.
Quo ad partes Prudentiae subiectivas, agit S. Thom. quaest. 50. Dividitur in Prudentiam gubernativam, et singularem operantis. Rursus Gubernativa dividitur in Legislativam, quae est in Principe, vel Republica; in Politicam, quae est in subditis circa idem bonum Regni, vel civitatis; in Oeconomicam, quae est circa bonum familiare; et Militarem, circa quae bonum exercitus versatur. De Gubernativa agit egregie S. Doctor de Eccl. Hierarchia. Prudentia vero particularis est una specie specialissima.
The potential Parts of Prudence are three intellectual virtues adjoined, serving prudence, namely, EUBULIA, which is rightly counseltative, as you have 6. Eth. cap. 9. SYNESIS is rightly judgmental by common rules; and GNOMES, which is rightly judgmental in natural reason beyond the common rules, when these fail because of the circumstances of a particular case. See D. Thomas quaest. 51., easily declaring these.
PARTES Prudentiae potentiales sunt tres virtutes Intellectuales adnexae, deservientes prudentiae, scilicet, EUBULIA, quae est recte consiliativa, ut habes 6. Eth. cap. 9. SYNESIS est recte iudicativa per communes regulas; et GNOMES, quae est recte iudicativa in naturali ratione praeter communes regulas, quando hae deficiunt ob circumstantias casus particularis. Vide D. Thomam quaest. 51. facile haec declarantem.
Of these S. Bonaventure also treats in the places everywhere adduced here.
DE his agit etiam S. Bonavent. locis passim hic adductis.