Article III: On the Potential Parts

St. Thomas, I-II, q. 57, a. 6; II-II, q. 48 and 51.

29. Potential parts are annexed virtues which are ordered to certain secondary, preparatory, and easier acts, and do not have the whole power of prudence, but fall short of it in something. The principal virtue uses them in the manner by which the soul uses its powers (q. 51, a. 2, ad 1; I-II, q. 57, a. 6, ad 1): for just as in the individual powers of the soul the force and condition of the soul shines forth, although not fully, so in these faculties and their functions the nature and condition of prudence shines forth, although not adequately. There are three:

1. Eubulia (eu-boule, good counsel; goede raad, welberadenheid), which is concerned with counsel: namely, it is the habit of counseling well or of finding means suitable to the end. Moreover, "for counseling well there is required not only the discovery or devising of those things which are opportune for the end, but also other circumstances, namely the congruous time, so that one be neither too slow nor too swift in counsels, and the manner of counseling, namely so that one be firm in his counsel, and other due circumstances of this sort" (q. 51, a. 1, ad 3).

2. Synesis (synesis, composition of two = judgment: bon sens; gezond oordeel; eusynetoi = persons well-sensed), concerning judgment of those things which are done according to law: it is the habit of judging well concerning things to be done according to common rules, namely laws and their particular ends.

3. Gnome (gnome = reason, judgment: sens de l'exception; gematigd, milddadig, getemperd oordeel), concerning judgment of those things in which one must depart from the law and judge from a higher principle of reason: for there are unusual cases which the law does not know, or in which it does not oblige because of special circumstances, for the determination of which a special perspicacity is required. Whence it is the habit of judging well according to higher principles concerning things to be done beyond the common law. Hence gnome directs epikeia (équité; rechtmatigheid, billijkheid), that is, equity in the application and observance of laws according to the equitable and the good (cf. treatise on Laws, I, n. 296).

1. The reason why one virtue suffices for counsel, while two are required for judgment, St. Thomas hands down in I-II, q. 57, a. 6, ad 3: "Judgment concerning each thing is made through its proper principles. But inquiry is not yet through proper principles (but through common ones), because once these were had there would be no need of inquiry, but the thing would already have been found. And therefore one virtue alone is ordered to counseling well, but two virtues to judging well; because distinction is not in common principles but in proper ones. Whence also in speculative matters dialectic, which inquires concerning all things, is one; but the demonstrative sciences, which are judgmental, are diverse concerning diverse things. But synesis and gnome are distinguished according to the diverse rules by which judgment is made. For synesis is judgmental concerning things to be done according to common law; but gnome according to natural reason itself in those things in which common law fails." Cf. II-II, q. 51, a. 4, ad 2.

30. Potential parts are true virtues, but annexed. - They are virtues, because they render perfect an act proper to man, namely to counsel or judge.

They are virtues distinct from prudence, because they are concerned with acts which are distinguished from the act of prudence according to a diverse notion of goodness, indeed are even separated from it; for he who counsels well does not always judge well, and he who judges well does not always command well, but sometimes delays or acts negligently or inordinately. But if they were not distinct from prudence, prudence would not be a cardinal virtue, because it would not be the foundation of others.

They are annexed virtues, because their acts, to counsel well and to judge, are ordered to commanding well as to a more principal and more difficult act, whence the whole power of the virtue of prudence does not inhere in them. "And just as to counsel (or to judge) is ordered to commanding as to the more principal thing, so also eubulia (likewise the others) is ordered to prudence as to the more principal virtue, without which it would not even be a virtue," just as neither would the moral virtues be virtues without prudence (q. 51, a. 2). And thus prudence is the cardinal virtue in which the others are founded, which it commands, which it uses, and through the mediation of which it acts (ibid. ad 1; I-II, q. 57, a. 6, ad 1).

1. If prudence did not command good counsel, man would not always counsel well.

2. Therefore the annexed virtues are commanded by prudence, which acts mediately through them. According to Lessius they are commanded by love of the end(!), and are not really distinguished from prudence. Thus prudence would not be a cardinal virtue.

31. Observation. - Inquiry and counsel pertain to reason, which compares the means with the end and among themselves, and discourses through individual, many, and diverse things. Judgment properly pertains to the intellect, which sees and considers that which is to be done: "for consideration imports an act of the intellect beholding the truth of the thing." Command looks to reason because it orders the means to the end; but to order belongs to reason. Cf. q. 53, a. 4; q. 51, a. 3.