Reserved Vows

I. Notion of reservation. The reservation of a vow consists in this: that the power of dispensing and commuting, not of irritating, certain vows is reserved to the Supreme Pontiff, so that no one enjoys the said power unless he has received a special faculty.

II. Reserved vows. Private vows reserved to the Apostolic See are only the vow of perfect and perpetual chastity and the vow of entering a Religion of solemn vows, when these have been emitted absolutely and after the completion of the eighteenth year of age (can. 1309). Nevertheless, only the substance of the vow is reserved, not the time, for example, of entering Religion, or the circumstance, for example, of a stricter Religion; nor is the matter into which a reserved vow has legitimately been commuted reserved (St. Alphonsus, III, 258).

Besides the private vows just enumerated, public vows are also reserved to the Roman Pontiff. Such are: 1. the vow of chastity emitted in receiving the subdiaconate; 2. religious vows, solemn as well as simple, perpetual as well as temporary, emitted in a Religion approved by the Holy See.

III. Conditions of reservation. Reservation, since it is odious, is to be interpreted strictly. Hence for a vow to be reserved, it must be a true vow, absolute, not disjunctive, perfect as to act, obligation, and matter.

1. True, that is, a promise made to God. Therefore a promise made either to a man, or to a Saint while stopping at him, is not reserved; nor is an oath, unless it is confirmed by a vow (St. Alphonsus, III, 259).

2. Absolute, as can. 1309 expressly states. Hence it must not have been emitted under a condition concerning a future contingent thing;¹ nor is a vow of this kind reserved after the condition has been fulfilled, because it was not emitted absolutely, which canon 1309 requires. Hence a vow emitted in this way is not reserved: "I vow Religion, if I shall have sinned again"; or: "if I shall have been rescued from danger." Otherwise, however, one must speak "if someone has vowed Religion with a condition, for example, if his mother dies, because then the vow is rather absolute; although it does not oblige to execution while the mother is alive; for the particle if not rarely is equivalent to the particle when" (St. Alphonsus, cited place).

3. Not disjunctive, namely, in such a way that someone binds himself to reserved matter or to non-reserved matter; as if someone says: "I vow Religion or the reception of sacred order." Nor after the election of matter reserved in itself does the chosen part become reserved, unless someone confirms it by a new vow. The reason is that the one vowing, by choosing one part, does not deprive himself of the liberty of choosing the other (St. Alphonsus, III, 224, 258). Otherwise, however, one must speak if the vow indeed is disjunctive, but each part is reserved.

4. Perfect as to act, obligation, and matter. It is said perfect:

a) As to the act; hence a vow emitted from fear, even light fear, unjustly struck, is not reserved (St. Alphonsus, III, 258).

b) As to the obligation; therefore a vow emitted under light obligation is not reserved (St. Alphonsus, cited place).

c) As to the matter, that is, what is vowed must be perfectly that which is assigned as reserved.

Hence the following are not reserved: 1. a vow of not marrying, since not marrying is not the same as preserving perfect chastity; 2. a vow of conjugal chastity, or 3. of virginity, if it is taken for integrity of the flesh alone, because perfect chastity extends further than conjugal chastity and virginity so taken;² 4. a temporary vow of chastity; 5. a vow emitted by a married person, because it cannot be a vow of entire chastity; except if the spouse either has lost the right of asking the debt, for example by adultery, or has renounced it; likewise if each spouse by mutual consent has emitted a vow of chastity and has explicitly or implicitly renounced the right to the debt (St. Alphonsus, VI, 986); 6. a vow of receiving Sacred Order, since it is not a vow of chastity, but a vow of embracing a state which has a vow of chastity annexed to it; 7. a vow of entering a Religion of simple vows. Moreover, "if someone has vowed to enter a monastery, or if a girl has vowed to become a nun, and has not expressly thought of an order strictly so called, from present-day circumstances it must be judged that that vow is not reserved, since there are so many religious congregations or Orders in the broader sense, by entering which the one vowing must be judged to have fulfilled the vow."³

¹ Vows under a condition concerning the past or the present are immediately absolute or null, according as the condition exists or does not exist. Vows under a condition concerning a necessary future thing are immediately absolute (St. Alphonsus, cited place).

² A vow of virginity also, according to the mind of those vowing, often contains a vow of perfect chastity.

³ Lehmkuhl, Theologia Moralis, I, n. 627.

IV. Cessation of a reserved vow. First compare and apply what we have said about the cessation of a vow taken generally (n. 651). But as to the dispensation and commutation of a reserved vow, certain special things must be noted.

1. Dispensation. a) Bishops and those who have episcopal jurisdiction can dispense, but only insofar as it is necessary, "if access to the Pope is not easy and there is danger of grave harm in delay" (St. Alphonsus, cited place; VI, 987). I said insofar as it is necessary; "hence if it suffices that the vow be suspended, it cannot be dispensed. Likewise, if someone is dispensed from a vow of chastity with the restriction that he marry a certain woman to repair her honor, he cannot marry another" (St. Alphonsus, III, 258).

b) Regular confessors probably can do the same as Bishops, namely by a privilege which probably persists (cf. St. Alphonsus, III, 258; VI, 987, 1128), so that at least the Church supplies. Dispensation, however, can be granted even outside confession.

2. Commutation. Insofar as those mentioned under 1 can dispense in reserved vows, to that extent they can also commute them.

Warning. The people should be advised not to emit vows without consulting the confessor. But the confessor should not permit vows so easily, especially a vow of chastity, above all of perpetual chastity, because ecclesiastical authority is not accustomed to dispense in this vow, when it has been maturely emitted, unless a very great commutation has been attached. If that vow seems fitting, let a temporary vow be permitted the first time, or several times, from one feast of the Blessed Virgin to another, and so at last, after much and serious testing, a perpetual vow¹ (cf. St. Alphonsus, Praxis Confessarii, n. 93).

¹ Lehmkuhl, Theologia Moralis, I, n. 631.

6. Trepidantius, doubting about a vow of perfect chastity emitted, seeks and obtains dispensation from the bishop. Then, weighing the matter better, he becomes altogether certain concerning the vow made.

Q. Must he seek dispensation again from the Supreme Pontiff?

R. Negatively. The reason: for a doubtful vow of chastity is not reserved. Therefore the bishop could dispense from it, who legitimately used the power which he had of dispensing in doubtful vows. "This," says Lugo, "seems to me most true: because otherwise the dispensation would have been vain; for dispensation is not made under the condition, if there was not a vow; but rather under the condition, if it was truly a vow; for if it was not a vow, it is not dispensable. Therefore, if the bishop can then dispense, he can remove the obligation, in the case in which it existed." De Poenit., d. 20, s. 2, n. 22. Cf. also Sanchez, who holds the same doctrine, In Decal., l. 4, c. 44, n. 3, 11; I. M. 620.

424. On vows reserved to the Supreme Pontiff. The Supreme Pontiff has reserved to himself the faculty of dispensing from several vows, which are:

1. Almost all public vows.

Such public vows are: a) all solemn vows made in religious orders and in the reception of the subdiaconate. Although the Supreme Pontiff has sometimes dispensed so that priests who had attempted an invalid marriage could convalidate the marriage, e.g., at the time of the English schism and the first French Revolution, nevertheless no example (publicly known) exists in which the Supreme Pontiff granted to a priest of the Latin rite that he could enter a new marriage. b) All simple vows made in religious institutes approved by the Holy See. It makes no difference whether these vows are perpetual or temporary. Hence, e.g., a member of such a religious institute having vows lasting for three or five years can be dispensed from these vows before the time of obligation has elapsed by no one except the Supreme Pontiff or his special delegate.⁴⁶³ But when someone having temporary simple vows (whether in an order in which solemn vows are made or in a religious congregation) is legitimately dismissed from religion by the superiors,⁴⁶⁴ his simple vows cease by that very fact.⁴⁶⁵ But when someone simply professed and having perpetual vows is legitimately dismissed, he is not by that very fact dispensed from his vows, but must still seek a special dispensation from the vows. Thus at least by common law, whatever may be the case concerning privileges granted to some particular institute.⁴⁶⁶

Note. Public vows are sometimes not reserved to the Holy See. For with an indult of secularization, which in religious institutes of diocesan right can also be granted by the local Ordinary, public religious vows cease by that very fact.⁴⁶⁷ Likewise with the dismissal of a religious who has pronounced temporary (but not perpetual) vows,⁴⁶⁸ as was already said.

2. Two private vows, namely: a) of perfect and perpetual chastity; b) of entering an approved religious institute with solemn vows, provided these two vows were made absolutely and after the completion of the eighteenth year of age.⁴⁶⁹

Since reservation, which is considered in canon law an odious matter, is of strict interpretation, these two vows do not fall under reservation unless they are perfect both on the part of the matter and of the manner.

The matter of the vow is considered perfect if precisely that which is reserved in the two vows was promised. Hence there do not fall under reservation: a vow of virginity, a vow of not marrying, a vow of temporary chastity, a vow of receiving holy orders, a vow of entering some religious institute with simple vows only. The reason is that all these vows are neither a vow of perfect chastity nor of entering religion with solemn vows. In practice a doubt not rarely arises whether a member of the faithful made a vow of perfect chastity or only of virginity. Then it must first be investigated whether the person vowing principally intended the celibate life or rather perfect chastity of body and mind. If the former, the vow is not reserved; if the latter, the vow is of perfect chastity and therefore reserved.

The manner of these vows is considered perfect when they were made absolutely and with perfect liberty. Hence reservation is not present:

a) if such a vow was made with a condition concerning a future contingent event, e.g., I vow entrance into the Franciscan religious institute if I recover health. But when a condition concerning a necessary future event, or concerning the past or present, was attached, the vow is only apparently conditional and therefore in truth is absolute once the condition has been verified. Hence, e.g., once the condition has been verified, the following vow is absolute and reserved: I vow perfect chastity if my father perished in this shipwreck.

b) if the vow was disjunctive or penal; e.g., I vow either entrance into religion or the reception of holy orders; if I contract the habit of drunkenness again, I vow entrance into the order of Trappists.

c) if the vow was made under the influence of fear, even light fear;⁴⁷⁰ e.g., a girl vowed entrance among the Poor Clares in order to avoid a marriage into which her parents wished to compel her under light fear.

d) if the person vowing expressly intended to impose upon himself only a light obligation. The reason is evident, since the violation of such a light obligation is a light sin, which cannot be the matter of reservation. Hence, if someone vowed under a light obligation perpetual chastity or entrance into religion, his vow is not reserved.

e) if the person vowing had not yet completed eighteen years of age.

Note. When these two vows have been commuted by legitimate authority into other pious works, the matter thus commuted no longer falls under reservation. Hence, e.g., if a girl, after making a vow of perfect chastity and obtaining a commutation of this vow, is bound to say the Rosary daily, any confessor having the privileges of the Mendicants can now for a reasonable cause dispense from this obligation of saying the Rosary.⁴⁷¹

⁴⁶³ Const. Conditae II; Normae, art. 112.

⁴⁶⁴ The manner of this dismissal was newly determined by the Code of Canon Law, c. 647.

⁴⁶⁵ Code of Canon Law, c. 648.

⁴⁶⁶ Ib., c. 669.

⁴⁶⁷ Ib., cc. 638 and 640.

⁴⁶⁸ Ib., c. 648 and c. 669, § 1.

⁴⁶⁹ Ib., c. 1309.

⁴⁷⁰ Cf. St. Alphonsus, Theol. mor. l. 3, n. 258.

⁴⁷¹ Cf. St. Alphonsus, Theol. mor. l. 3, n. 260.

738 [printed 734]. Vows Reserved to the Supreme Pontiff. - Besides the vow emitted in ordination and the vows of profession in a religion approved by him, two private vows are reserved to the Supreme Pontiff, namely, of perfect and perpetual chastity, and of entering a religion of solemn vows, which have been emitted absolutely and after the completed eighteenth year of age (can. 1309).

This reservation is to be understood strictly, so that the vows must be perfect from every part: a) on the part of the act, that is, that they have been emitted with most perfect liberty, spontaneity, and discretion, without any fear inflicted by others or fraud; b) on the part of the obligation, that the vow has been emitted under grave obligation; c) on the part of the matter: namely, they are vows of perpetual and complete chastity, and of entering religion strictly so called; but not a vow of celibacy or of not marrying, of virginity alone, or of conjugal chastity, or of receiving orders, or of entering a congregation; d) on the part of the end, from love of the promised work alone, and consequently without any indetermination (as a disjunctive vow would be), or condition concerning the future (as a penal vow would be). It should be noted that the circumstances of a vow are not reserved, for example, the circumstance of time, entrance into an austere religion.

In doubt, a vow is not judged reserved.

Dispensation of a vow is its absolute condonation, made in the name of God by a legitimate superior.

I Say 1st. Non-reserved vows can be dispensed for a just cause, provided that the dispensation does not injure a right acquired by others:

1st. The Ordinary of the place, as regards all his subjects and also pilgrims;

2nd. The Superior of an exempt clerical religion, as regards the persons who are enumerated in can. 514, § 1;

3rd. Those to whom the power of dispensing has been delegated by the Apostolic See (Can. 1313). - Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 256. Canon 514 enumerates professed, novices, or others living day and night in a religious house by reason of service or education or hospitality or infirm health.

I Say 2nd. For the validity of dispensation, a just cause is always required, because since vows are made to God alone, man cannot dispense from them except as delegated; but a delegate cannot validly dispense without a just cause, as has been said in the tract on Laws, n. 101. Thus commonly with St. Alphonsus, n. 250.

Question 1. What are the just causes of dispensing in vows?

Response. The good of the Church, of society, of the family, and also of him who is bound by the vow; for example, if on account of the vow he is oppressed by scruples or grave temptations; if he experiences notable difficulty in fulfilling the vow; if the act of vowing was not perfectly deliberate, etc. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 252.

Question 2. In vows made for the utility of some third party, can a superior dispense without the consent of him in whose favor they were made?

Response. Affirmatively, if the vow was not accepted, as is clear of itself; indeed even if it was accepted, provided, however, that the vow is principally in honor of God, and the promise is not onerous, that is, imposes no burden which has already been accepted. The reason is that then God is the principal cause of the promise, and that third party in whose favor the vow was made, if he acquired any right, did not acquire it except dependently upon the good pleasure of God. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 254. Baller., note (a), p. 329.

Question 3. What vows are reserved to the Pope?

Response. Besides vows emitted in a religious community, the private vows reserved to the Apostolic See are only the vow of perfect and perpetual chastity and the vow of entering a religion of solemn vows, which have been emitted absolutely and after completion of the eighteenth year of age (Can. 1309). - But these are not reserved unless they are absolute, determinate, perfect by reason of matter and liberty. Therefore reservation does not obtain, 1st, if a vow is emitted from fear, even only light fear, unjustly inflicted; 2nd, if someone obliges himself to emit a reserved vow after ten years; 3rd, if the vow is conditional, even according to the more common opinion when the condition has been fulfilled, because a vow ought to be emitted from sole and perfect affection toward the promised thing; 4th, if the vow is penal, as, I vow to enter Religion if once I shall have become drunk; for the same reason as in a conditional vow; 5th, if it does not tend directly to the virtue to which the matter of the vow pertains; 6th, if the vow is disjunctive, as, I vow either to enter Religion or to fast for a month; 7th, if it is emitted with the mind of inducing only a light obligation. Besides, circumstances added to a vow are not reserved, as, I vow to enter Religion this year. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 258. - Lacroix, nn. 544 and following.

The vow of virginity or of mere integrity of the flesh and the vow not to marry are not reserved.

By whom and in what manner vows which are accustomed to be emitted in some diocesan institutes can be dispensed, you may see in Conc. Plen. Balt. III, n. 93.

X. Vows are called "reserved" in which immediate and inferior Prelates lack the power of dispensing; such power is reserved to a higher Prelate alone. Those are called "not reserved" whose relaxation belongs even to immediate, and inferior, Prelates. An "express," or "formal," vow is one made in set formulas of words; a "tacit," or "virtual," or "implicit" vow is one made not by express words, but is inferred from other things — namely, when something is performed to which a vow is attached; such is the vow of chastity which subdeacons of the Catholic Church make upon receiving holy orders. A vow is called "public" which is made openly; "secret," which is made privately. All this is easy, and common ground among all.

XVI. The opinion which grants Regulars the privilege of dispensing in all vows not reserved to the Supreme Pontiff is false. And this opinion appears improbable and false enough, first from what we have said — since the power of jurisdiction in the relaxation of vows ought by no means to rest on doubtful and uncertain privileges, but on certain and authentic documents. But no certain and authentic documents have yet been produced in favor of this same opinion. It must, therefore, be judged false.

I. Concerning the number of vows which are reserved to the Pope, there is not a single opinion among authors. Richard (Bk. IV, dist. 38, art. 9, q. 1) restricts these vows to three, namely, of chastity, of religious life, and of pilgrimage to Jerusalem. Others contend there are two — namely, the vow of chastity, and of religious life; for they judge the vows of pilgrimage to Jerusalem, Rome, and Compostela not to be absolutely reserved to the Pope, but only when they are made in aid of these same places; not so, if they are made for the sake of devotion. This they gather from the chapter "From much," and the chapter "Concerning this," on vows. Panormitanus, on the said chapter "From much," n. 4; Angles (s.v. Votum, 4, n. 6); the Gloss on the said chapter "From much," s.v. "Incumbit" — which Passerini also notes (q. 187, art. 1, inspect. 4, n. 6).

II. Others have declined to the other extreme, extending the vows reserved to the Pope beyond the number five. For Navarrus, to the vows of chastity, of religious life, and of the threefold pilgrimage, added the vow of taking up the cross in any expedition proclaimed by the Pontiff. Some have added the vow of converting one's own money, entrusted for the aid of the Holy Land, and lent, to another purpose; Rosella (s.v. Votum, 8, n. 3). Others have added the vow of never sinning, which Cajetan says would be an unbreakable and indispensable vow, if the discussion concerns the obligation arising from law; Hostiensis, in his Summa, tit. on vows, ch. "Qualiter," n. 12. Some, moreover, add the vow of the Loreto pilgrimage: commentary 1, n. 11, on... this is true; but not so, if the obligation is specifically that which a vow induces.

III. The most common opinion is that only five vows are reserved to the Supreme Pontiff — namely, the simple vow of perpetual continence, of religious life, and of the threefold pilgrimage, to Jerusalem, Rome, and Compostela. That these five vows are reserved to the Supreme Pontiff is gathered from the Extravagant "Etsi dominici," on penance and remission, §3, where those who presume to relax these vows are excommunicated. There they are held as reserved, though not expressly reserved. This reservation, as Passerini notes (loc. cit., n. 408), is by disposition of the Church, not by the intention of the one vowing. Wherefore, even if the one vowing made any vow whatsoever, beyond those assigned, or to be assigned, with this express intention, that it should be reserved to the Pope, it would not therefore be reserved — since the one vowing cannot restrict the ordinary power of Bishops. Hence it is inferred that no vow, other than the five mentioned, is reserved to the Supreme Pontiff — since it is gathered from no law, nor from legitimate custom, that either the vow of the Loreto pilgrimage, or any other of those we have reviewed, is reserved to the Supreme Pontiff. Except, however, those simple vows which are made in certain religious orders concerning not seeking, nor accepting, dignities — for these vows of Religious too are comprehended, as Passerini excellently notes (n. 609). Wherefore the vows reserved to the Pontiff are more than five.

IV. You will object: St. Thomas (II-II, q. 88, art. 12, ad 3) enumerates only two vows reserved to the Supreme Pontiff — namely, of chastity, and of the pilgrimage to Jerusalem. Response: There are those who answer that St. Thomas wished, in the vow of continence, to comprehend also the vow of religious life, and, in the vow of pilgrimage to Jerusalem, to comprehend simultaneously the vow of pilgrimage to Rome and Compostela. But this response seems to us altogether arbitrary. Cajetan, and Sylvius there, answer that the holy Doctor wrote thus because, in St. Thomas's time, only those two vows were reserved. But this response is not sufficiently solid either. Since, as is gathered from the following considerations, at least three were reserved even in St. Thomas's own time — namely, chastity, religious life, and pilgrimage to Jerusalem. Concerning the threefold pilgrimage, doubt can perhaps stand. We say, then, that St. Thomas did not enumerate all the reserved vows. This is openly established from his manner of speaking: "The greater vows (namely, of continence, and of pilgrimage to the Holy Land) are reserved to the Supreme Pontiff." By these two vows he gives an example. Elsewhere he lists the vow of religious life. Nowhere, however, does he expressly enumerate all five. Wherefore it is probable enough that, at that time, the threefold pilgrimage was not yet reserved.

V. It is also customarily objected that all perpetual vows are reserved to the Supreme Pontiff — which seems to be gathered from St. Thomas (Bk. IV, dist. 38, q. 1, art. 4, qc. 2): "In those vows which do not easily admit dispensation, nor frequently, but rarely — such as the vow of religious life, and other such perpetual vows — only the Pope can dispense." Which he repeats (II-II, q. 184, art. 6, and q. 189, art. 7): "It pertains to the Pope alone," he says, "to dispense in perpetual vows." Response: The common opinion of theologians is that not all perpetual vows are reserved to the Pontiff — such as perpetual vows of abstaining from wine, from meat, and the like. Commentators commonly answer this authority of St. Thomas by saying that he is speaking of those vows which, by their own kind, have perpetuity almost annexed to them — such as the vows of religious life, and of chastity, and those which Bishops make, when they undertake the burden of the Episcopate, of caring for their subjects. This is established clearly enough from what he writes (II-II, q. 185, art. 4): "Only the Pope can dispense in a perpetual vow, by which someone, undertaking the Episcopate, has bound himself..."

VI. Question I. Are oaths made to God, in the same manner as vows, reserved to the Supreme Pontiff — those, namely, of chastity, of religious life, and of the threefold pilgrimage? Response: Ledesma denies this (tract. 11, ch. 4, dub. 8), Tabiena (s.v. Iuramentum, q. 20, n. 21), López de Texeda (Bk. III, controv. 6, n. 229), Antonio a Spiritu Santo (in the Directorium, tract. 2, disp. 3, sect. 2, n. 16), and several others. The more probable opinion holds that the aforesaid oaths are reserved, no less than vows — either because it includes the same thing... , or the same is reserved to the Supreme Pontiff — since a promissory oath, as will be said in its proper place, is reckoned a vow; for it is a sworn promise made to God, just as an oath made to a man is a sworn promise offered to him. St. Antoninus (Part II, tit. 11, ch. 2, §2), Cajetan (II-II, q. 89, art. 9), Sotus (Bk. VIII, q. 1), Leander (tract. 1, n....).

VII. Question II. Can Bishops, and Prelates having quasi-episcopal jurisdiction, dispense in the aforesaid five vows? Response: The common opinion affirms this, urgent necessity pressing. A distinction, however, is needed. Bishops can dispense in the aforesaid vows when danger exists of violating the vow, of infamy, of scandal, or of some other grave harm, whether temporal or spiritual, all of which are rare enough. You have violated a virgin, bound by a vow of chastity: for the sake of that honor, and to repair it, marriage is necessary, lest the dispensation be delayed. Impediments to be raised by some parties are to be feared, if you should delay the marriage. Likewise, a man near death, bound to chastity by vow, cannot otherwise, in view of a woman's honor — who enjoys the best reputation, and with whom you have had shameful relations — provide for her, except by contracting marriage. In these and similar cases, grave necessity presses. Wherefore the Bishop can dispense with his subjects in reserved vows. This is indeed expedient for the governance of the Church; nor is it to be presumed, since it would come with such danger to souls, that the Pontiffs wished to reserve the aforesaid vows to themselves even when urgent necessity, and danger from delay, exist. It must be judged otherwise of regular Prelates. For just as they do not have the faculty of dispensing in vows not reserved absolutely, much less will they be able to dispense in reserved vows. Theologians commonly teach the first part: Sylvester (s.v. Votum, 4, q. 40, dub. 18, n. 126), Suárez (Bk. VI, on vows, ch. 26), Lessius (Bk. II, ch. 40, n. 44), Sánchez (Bk. IV, ch. 8), Prado (ch. 31, q. 14, n. 92), Layman (Bk. IV, tract. 4, ch. 8, n. 15), Barbosa (on the power of the Bishop, Part II, alleg. 37, n. 5), Leander (tract. 1, disp. 17, q. 117), the theologians of Salamanca (tract. 17, ch. 3, punct. 12, n. 110), and others commonly.

VIII. This same privilege the theologians of Salamanca (loc. cit.) and Croix ascribe to Regular Prelates in Rule of St. Francis, ch. 7, sect. 29. But when the said five vows are true, and perfect, and consequently altogether reserved, that regular Prelates cannot dispense in them, even given any case of necessity whatsoever, is manifest from our teaching above set forth. This opinion is held by Suárez (Bk. VI, ch. 26, n. 18), Sánchez (Bk. IV, ch. 43, n. 5), Barbosa (on the power of the Bishop, alleg. 37, n. 16), Passerini (q. 187, art. 1, inspect. 4, n. 618), La Croix (Bk. III, tract. 2, part 2, n. 463), and others commonly — since, by virtue of privileges, no faculty is granted them over reserved vows. Excluding privileges, then, they have no faculty at all either of commuting, or of dispensing, in vows. This holds all the more forcefully in our own opinion — for we have demonstrated that Regulars can, by virtue of privileges, only commute vows, and by no means dispense in them. In the five reserved vows, then, they have the power neither of commuting, nor of dispensing.

IX. In the aforesaid cases of necessity, however, in which we have taught that Bishops can dispense, it is worth noting that the dispensation ought not to exceed the limits of necessity. Wherefore, if the harm can be prevented by suspending the execution of the vow, only this should be granted — not an absolute and full dispensation from the vow. Whence, when, on account of the aforesaid grave necessity, dispensation is granted from a vow of chastity, so that marriage may be contracted, the bond of the vow is not absolutely removed; for, the marriage being dissolved on account of the necessity for which it was contracted, the vow would revive, and would again oblige. Likewise, if, during the time of the marriage contracted, one who had made a vow of chastity should pollute himself, or commit fornication or adultery, he would sin against the vow.

X. In the aforesaid cases, moreover, of true and grave necessity, the Bishop can dispense, even if a Legate or Nuncio of the Pontiff were in the province — since these, by ordinary right, do not have greater power than the Bishops themselves, as Suárez, Sánchez, and Layman teach in the places cited. It must be judged otherwise, if the Legate or Nuncio had a special power delegated by the Pontiff over the aforesaid vows; for then access to the Pontiff would be easy through his own ministers, and therefore the Bishop would possess no faculty of dispensing or commuting such vows, as the cited authors teach.

XI. Question III. Is this reservation of vows to be interpreted broadly, or strictly? Response: That it is to be interpreted strictly, since it is full of odium, and contrary to the ordinary power of Bishops, authors commonly and rightly hold. Wherefore, in order for the said vows to be reserved, they must be absolute, certain, express, and perfect. Whatever falls short in any respect, and admits doubt, whether concerning consent, or perpetuity, or some attached condition, is not reserved; and thus Bishops will have the power of dispensing in them, and privileged Regulars will be able to commute them. And here matters are common ground.

XII. Question IV. Do vows of chastity, or of religious life, made with the express intention of binding oneself only under venial fault, need to be reserved to the Pontiff? Response: They need not — for they would not be whole and perfect vows. Indeed, I showed above that such vows cannot be made in this manner. That they would not, then, be reserved, is clear from the teaching given. This is the common opinion.

XIII. Question V. If the aforesaid vows were made out of fear, even light fear, would they still be called reserved? Response: Whether they were made out of grave fear, falling upon a steadfast man, or out of light fear, they would not be reserved in either case — since they would not be entirely perfect.

XIV. Question VI. If there is doubt about some such vow, or its reservation, must it be judged that the vows are not reserved? Response: Authors commonly teach that they are not reserved. For, although in doubtful matters the absolutely safer part is to be chosen, in the present question a peculiar reason applies: since only perfect and certain vows are reserved to the Pontiff; but a doubtful vow is not a perfect vow. If, however, the vow is certain, and subject to no doubt, and it is only doubted whether it is reserved or not, even then it is not to be held reserved — because the reservation is odious, and injurious to ordinary power; and therefore it is strictly to be interpreted. When, then, it is doubted, whether by reason of consent, or by reason of the whole matter, or for any other reason, whether a vow is reserved, it must always be judged, by the general rule, not to be reserved. This is the most common opinion; from which, however, nothing can be inferred in favor of Probabilism.

XV. Question VII. Is a vow of not contracting marriage reserved? Response: It is plain that this vow is not reserved, on account of a defect of the whole matter — for it does not exclude fornication, pollution, and other acts contrary to chastity. For a vow to be reserved, it must be whole, such that it comprehends and exhausts the whole matter. Wherefore vows of not fornicating, of not receiving sacred orders, and the like, are not reserved — since these vows are not whole and perfect as regards the matter, although they may be such as regards the deliberation. The former are not reserved, since they do not exhaust the universal matter. The vow, however, of receiving sacred orders...

XVI. Question VIII. Can a Bishop, by force of custom, grant the faculty of requesting the conjugal debt to one who, bound by a vow of not touching a woman, of not requesting the debt, or of preserving chastity for a defined time, contracts marriage — this not being a vow of chastity already made, but one to be made? Response: They commonly affirm that such a custom holds. Since this, being a matter of fact, cannot otherwise be proven except by usage itself, it must be seen whether Bishops actually do grant such a dispensation.

XVII. Question IX. Is a vow of conjugal chastity reserved? Response: It is certain, first, that the vow is not reserved, if made by one spouse without the other's knowledge. The difficulty presses when the spouses have made the vow by mutual consent. Sánchez affirms this to be reserved (Bk. VIII, on marriage, disp. 11, n. 12), with others whom he cites, and consequently that the spouses are then bound to separate from each other, so that whatever... danger of incontinence would arise, if they continued to live together. Others teach that the Bishop can always dispense, since the danger of incontinence would always be present, even if they lived apart. They add, moreover, that a custom prevails, by force of which Bishops dispense in such a vow. If this custom really holds, there is no difficulty. This opinion seems to me probable enough, on account of the danger of incontinence. Nor is a vow of preserving chastity between spouses reserved, since it is not absolute.

XVIII. Question X. Is a vow of an unapproved religious order reserved? Response: The common opinion is negative — since it is not a true vow of religious life absolutely. Just as the vow of poverty, and of obedience, outside the religious state, is not reserved. Concerning the vows of the Knights of Alcántara, Calatrava, St. James, St. Stephen, and the like, there are two opinions. In the opinion of those who maintain that these are true Religious, the vow is reserved; not so in the other opinion, which teaches that they are not true Religious.

XIX. Question XI. How are the reserved vows of the threefold pilgrimage to be understood? Response: They are reserved when made not absolutely out of devotion, but toward the aforesaid places themselves. If someone, out of his own indefinite devotion, made a vow of going to Rome, Compostela, Jerusalem, so as to visit some particular Church, or image, or to converse with a man of exceptional piety — the vow would not be reserved: because the cause of such a vow would not have been a special devotion toward those sacred places. When, then, someone makes a vow of going to Rome, to visit the church of St. Peter, to Jerusalem, to visit the places consecrated by Christ the Lord, to Compostela, to visit and venerate the body of St. James — then the vow is reserved. This is the common opinion.

XX. Question XII. If a vow made with some circumstance is reserved, does it remain whole once the circumstance is removed? Response: The common opinion affirms this. You vowed a pilgrimage to Rome on foot. The Bishop can dispense in the circumstance of the manner of performing the journey — namely, on foot; but not in the vow of pilgrimage itself, which you can carry out otherwise than on foot, or dressed in a sack, or begging alms by request. The same is commonly said of a vow of entering a stricter religious order, since the Bishop can dispense so that the one vowing may embrace a laxer one. This holds true, if by "laxer" is meant a milder religious order, which otherwise keeps its own Rule exactly; not so, if it is understood as a religious order collapsed from regular observance, which is customarily called relaxed, or lax. For no one can grant anyone license to enter such a religious order. A vow of not seeking dispensation from anyone but the Supreme Pontiff is not reserved, as is clear from what has been said.

XXI. Question XIII. Is a disjunctive vow reserved? Response: Before either part is chosen, the matter remaining whole, it is common opinion that it is not reserved — since it is within your will to choose either part; therefore the Bishop can dispense in the whole disjunctive vow. The difficulty is whether the part selected by the one vowing becomes reserved, and subject to episcopal jurisdiction. You vowed religious life, or alms; chastity, or fasting: you chose chastity. Leander (tract. 1, disp. 18, q. 108), Tamburini (Bk. III, on the Decalogue, ch. 16, §4 and 5), and others teach that the vow becomes dispensable by the Bishop. Sánchez denies this, on the contrary (Bk. VIII, on marriage, disp. 12, n. 14; Bk. IV, ch. 21, n. 43), Castropalao (disp. 2, punct. 12, n. 6). The theologians of Salamanca (n. 107) report both opinions as probable, neither affirming nor denying — which manner of treating rules of morals, adopted after the birth of Probabilism, and used everywhere, displeases us. Patritius Sporer (sect. 3, ch. 3, n. 60) says that it is reserved, if the one vowing determined himself to the reserved part by a new vow; not so, if he chose the same by a simple determination. This distinction is empty; for the reservation cannot be called into doubt, when, by a new absolute vow, the one vowing promises the reserved matter. It seems to us, then, more probable that the vow is reserved — since the one vowing, with deliberate mind, chooses the reserved part which he had vowed under a disjunctive vow; for then the vow becomes absolute, and whole.

XXII. Question XIV. Are the following vows reserved: "If I fall into sin, I vow chastity"; "If my father dies, I will enter religious life"? Response: Concerning the third vow, it is fairly agreed among authors that it is reserved — since the vow is, in its object, absolute, and only apparently expresses a condition; for the sense is: "When my father dies, I will enter religious life." Concerning the first two, which are called penal, there is difficulty. Some absolutely affirm that they are reserved, the condition having been fulfilled. Others maintain that vows joined with a condition are not reserved, whether before or after the condition is fulfilled. Others hold that they are dispensable by the Bishop, whether before or after the fulfilled condition. The more probable, and more common, opinion is that, the condition fulfilled, they are reserved; not so, before the condition is fulfilled. The reason which Leander (loc. cit.) adduces to the contrary is of no weight at all. For he says that such vows are penal, and do not arise from love of chastity, or of religious life. This supposition is false. For, unless an affection toward chastity and religious life had preceded, he would not have vowed this rather than something else — say, alms, fasting, prayers. But he vowed chastity, because, more than other things, it pleased him equally well. The same must be said of the other vow: "I vow religious life, if I recover from this illness"; the condition fulfilled, it is reserved; not so before.

XXIII. The contrary opinion is defended at length by the theologians of Salamanca (loc. cit., n. 114). I will dispatch everything in a few words. They preface many things about conditional vows, all of which, however, are clear from what has been said above. For when the condition is either necessary, or concerns the present, or the past, or is general, and inseparably attached to the thing — as, "If I live," "if my father dies," "if I complete my course of studies" — the vow is absolute, since the whole condition consists in mere words. The aforesaid theologians of Salamanca further maintain that whatever vows are truly conditional, concerning a future contingent matter, whether before or after the condition is fulfilled, are not reserved — provided the one vowing has not, by new and deliberate consent, confirmed it once the condition is fulfilled: for then it would be a new absolute vow of chastity and religious life, which would undoubtedly be reserved. They prove their opinion: both because in conditional vows the consent is quite imperfect, as depending on a condition, which always remains imperfect, even the condition fulfilled, since it always remains the same; and because, whether the vow be penal or conditional, it does not arise from love of chastity, or of religious life.

XXIV. This second reason has already been exploded above against Leander, and is again refuted. The vow of chastity, and the vow of approved religious life, are absolutely reserved, when they are whole and perfect, for whatever reason they are made. It was indeed said above that, if someone made a vow of going to Rome, or Compostela, or Jerusalem, for some particular reason of the one vowing, and not for the cause of visiting the sacred places themselves, or the church of St. Peter, or of St. James — the vow would not be reserved; because in that case the vow would not have, as its object, the reserved matter, which is the true subject of the reservation — for those sacred places are the true matter of reserved vows. For this reason, if someone should vow to visit such sacred places, led by whatever affection, the vow would be reserved. But the vow of chastity, or of religious life, is absolutely reserved. Therefore, by whatever reason moved, the one vowing utters it, provided it is whole and perfect, it will be reserved. The condition fulfilled, moreover, the vow becomes absolute, and perfect. The first reason they oppose is of no weight at all. For the consent of a conditional vow includes, with respect to the promised matter, no other imperfection than the suspension of execution, until the condition is fulfilled. Therefore, this imperfection removed, the vow is perfect in every respect. For the attached condition does not infect the consent; nor indeed does it directly regard it at all, but only its execution. Wherefore what the aforesaid theologians of Salamanca urge is altogether false — namely, that a conditional vow arises from an imperfect and diminished consent, an imperfection which is not removed even when the condition is fulfilled. False, I say, is this teaching. For, the cause removed, the effect is removed. The whole cause of the imperfection found in a conditional vow is the condition which suspends the execution of the vow. Therefore, the condition removed, or fulfilled, the vow becomes most perfect. Do not all conditional contracts, once the conditions are posited, become absolute, and produce the same effects which absolutely unconditional contracts produce? This opinion is defended by Sotus (Bk. VII, on justice, q. 3, art. 1, ad 4), Azor (Bk. XI, ch. 19, q. 13), Pontius (Bk. VIII, on marriage, ch. 9, n. 130), Bonacina (disp. 4, punct. 5, §4, n. 53), Layman (Bk. IV, tract. 4, ch. 8, n. 10), Pietro Passerini (q. 187, art. 1, dub. 18, n. 651 and following), Lessius (Bk. II, ch. 4, n. 7), and several other authors not a few.

XXV. Question XV. When the Supreme Pontiff commutes a reserved vow into another pious work — say, of chastity into a fast — does that fast become reserved? Response: The common opinion denies this, and rightly. Since the aforesaid five vows are not absolutely reserved, but only insofar as they present the generic character of that matter. Therefore, the matter having been commuted, the Bishop will be able to dispense in the fast... by reason of chastity; but the fast, on this account, will not be reserved, and privileged Regulars will be able to commute it.

XXVI. Question XVI. When the aforesaid five vows are not reserved, because they fall short in some respect, whether of consent, or of condition, or of the whole matter, are they subject to the power of regular Confessors? Response: When the said five vows are not reserved on some ground, privileged regular Confessors can relax them, by commuting, not by dispensing, for the reasons already given above.

XXVII. Question XVII. Can one who receives the faculty, by a bull, or jubilee, of dispensing, or of commuting, all vows, relax even reserved ones? Response: The common opinion denies this, unless the faculty over reserved matters is expressly stated — since this is openly gathered from the Extravagant "Etsi dominici," on penance and remission, where it is established that the said vows can be relaxed by no one, save the Roman Pontiff, except by special license, and by our certain knowledge. And in the same title, in the chapter "Si Episcopus," a general rule is assigned, both for vows and for reserved cases, in these words: "For in a general grant, those things are not included which one would probably not have granted" (on the rules of law in the Sixth Book, rule 81). If the faculty is granted indefinitely over reserved matters, all reserved matters are comprehended; if one or another is excepted, all the rest can be relaxed — since the exception confirms the rule as to the contrary. Wherefore, if some of the reserved matters are excepted, those not excepted can be relaxed. The faculty of relaxing the vow of chastity does not comprehend the vow of religious life, or the reverse. All this is common ground among nearly all authors.

II. The vows of chastity and of religious life, which are excepted both in the bull and in the jubilee, are understood to be perfect and absolute vows, as has been said above. Wherefore vows of not marrying, of not fornicating, of conjugal chastity, of chastity for a limited time, are not understood to be reserved; nor are vows uttered under deceit, fear, or error. All such vows can be commuted by force of the bull, or of the jubilee, whether they were made before the promulgation of the jubilee, or after, or even in the hope of obtaining the commutation through the jubilee, as authors commonly teach.

V. Question III. Can the vows of religion and of chastity be commuted by force of the jubilee, or of the bull, necessity pressing? Response. This difficulty too has been disputed above. Those who maintain that Regulars can, by force of their privileges, dispense in the vow of chastity, necessity pressing, as the Bishop can, defend also that they can do it by force of the jubilee, or of the bull. This opinion we have disapproved, and now too we reject it, denying that, even with necessity pressing, the reserved vows of chastity or of religion can be commuted by force of the jubilee.

XXIII. Question XX. What must be said of vows reserved to the Supreme Pontiff? Answer. The common opinion is that there are five vows reserved to the supreme Pontiff, namely the simple vow of perpetual continence, of Religion, and of a threefold pilgrimage — to Jerusalem, to Rome, and to Compostela. No other vow, besides these five, is reserved to the supreme Pontiff. Except, however, simple vows made in certain Religious Orders of not seeking, nor accepting, dignities. That these vows be reserved to the supreme Pontiff, they must be certain, express, absolute, and perfect. If there be doubt about them, they are not reserved. For this reservation, since it is odious, must be interpreted strictly. Wherefore if someone made one of these five vows with the express intention of binding himself only under venial sin, it would not be a perfect vow, and therefore not reserved either.

XXV. The Salmanticenses grant this same faculty of dispensing from reserved vows to Regular Prelates...

But this opinion is false: because even the privileges admitted, which are commonly alleged, and which we have rejected as apocryphal, grant Regular Prelates no faculty in reserved vows. These privileges being excluded, Regulars have no power even of commuting the vows of Seculars. A vow of not contracting marriage is not reserved, because it is not perfect in this kind. For it does not exclude fornication, pollution, and other acts contrary to chastity. By force of custom a Bishop can grant the faculty of asking the conjugal debt to one who, bound by a vow of chastity, has contracted marriage. A vow of an unapproved Religion is not reserved.

XXVI. Question XXI. How are the reserved vows of the threefold pilgrimage understood? Answer. They are reserved when they were made on account of a peculiar devotion toward the aforesaid places. These vows, made with some circumstance, remain whole and reserved when the circumstance is removed. You vowed a pilgrimage to Rome on foot: the Bishop can dispense in the circumstance of the journey on foot, but not in the vow of pilgrimage, which can be made by carriage. A disjunctive vow is not reserved before one part is chosen by the one vowing. You vowed Religion, or alms; chastity, or fasting, without having chosen either part. In this case a Bishop can dispense. But once a reserved part has been selected by the one vowing — say, perpetual chastity — then it seems to us more probable that it is reserved.

XXVII. These vows: "If I gamble, I vow chastity"; "If my father dies, I will enter Religion" — this second the authors commonly teach to be reserved, because the vow is in very deed absolute, and only expresses an apparent condition: namely, when my father dies, I will enter Religion. This other vow, and similar ones, once the condition is fulfilled, seem more probably to be reserved. Thus this is reserved: "I vow Religion, if I come off unharmed" — once the condition is fulfilled, not before. The opposite opinion the Salmanticenses defend at length, whose reasons I exploded in the place cited.

¶ INDEED Bishops, the reservation set aside, could dispense in those vows, since in relaxing they succeed the Pope; because as the Pope in the whole world is the Prince of the Church, so the Bishop in his diocese — excepting those things which touch the universal government of the Church, as to define matters of faith, etc. And so he can do in his diocese everything that the Pope can in the city, unless it is specially reserved to him. For he is ordinary in his diocese, as the Pope in the world, as D. Bonaventure notes, in 4. dist. 20. part. 2. quaest. 3. in corpore.

You will say: the Parish Priest also is ordinary in his parish: Therefore he can dispense in vows, and whatever the Pope can in the world.

D. Bonaventure answers that the reason is different; for the full power over the Church was granted by Christ in a certain spiritual marriage, through consecration; now the bridegroom ought to have the power of begetting sons imperfect and perfect — such are Bishops, who can both regenerate neophytes by Baptism, and not only make the imperfect perfect by penance, but recreate sons perfect by Orders, etc., and strengthen them by Confirmation — not so Parish Priests. Therefore the Bishop in consecration receives the ring, as a bridegroom. On this reason the Doctors commonly rely, as cited with Sanchez, lib. 1. de matrimonio, disp. 61, and disp. 9 of the eighth book, and lib. 4. summae, chapter 40.

From these things very many Corollaries follow. For since dispensations of chastity and religion are reserved to the Pope only absolutely, and that law is odious to Bishops, it follows that it must be restricted.

¶ FIRST, therefore, it follows that a Bishop can dispense in a vow of chastity made for a time. So D. Thom., 2. 2. quaest. 88. art. 11. ad 2, and it is gathered from D. Bonavent., loc. cit., whom others follow, as cited with Sanchez, lib. 8. disp. 9. num. 6.

SECOND it follows that he can dispense in the conjugal vow of chastity, since it falls short of absolute chastity, and likewise from the vow of not entering marriage; for the vow of chastity is greater, obliging to more. So the Doctors commonly, as related by Sanchez, num. 11.

THIRD it follows that he can dispense in the vow of taking sacred orders, for it is not simply of chastity, but of the thing to which the vow of chastity is annexed. So very many Doctors, as cited with Sanchez, numero 13, and Bassaeus, numero 14.

FOURTH it follows that he can dispense in a disjunctive vow, which promises the alternative of a thing reserved or not reserved, as of religion or of sacred orders, since in alternatives the choice belongs to the one bound, and it suffices that one be fulfilled: Rule on alternatives, de regul. iuris, in 6. So Azorius, Tom. 1, lib. 11. cap. 19. quaestio 10. Sanchez, loc. cit. num. 14.

¶ FIFTH it is inferred that he can dispense with a religious in a vow concerning a stricter religion, since he does not vow the substance of religion but an excess; or if a secular vows a stricter religion, he will be able to enter a looser one. So many Doctors, as cited with Sanchez, num. 17.

SIXTH, that one who has a vow of entering religion can be dispensed from perseverance in it, if the entrance, for just causes, leads to not persevering. So Sanchez, num. 18.

SEVENTH, he will be able to dispense in deferring the execution of his entrance into religion. So Sanchez, num. 19.

EIGHTH, he will be able to dispense in the matter into which a reserved vow, for instance of religion, has been changed by the Pope. So many, with Sanchez, num. 20. And this separately, even if one has vowed in simple vows the individual parts of chastity, e. g. by one to abstain from fornication, by another not to enter marriage, which comprise the whole matter of chastity.

NINTH, in all those in which only a part of the matter of chastity is vowed, as in the vow of a spouse.

They ASSERT besides that Bishops can, in a case of necessity — for instance the gravest danger of incontinence, and difficult access to the Pope — dispense in a vow of integral chastity. So Sanchez, lib. 2. matrim. disp. 40, and lib. 8. dub. 6, relating very many. The reason is, because the Pontiff is not to be presumed to will to reserve these cases to himself, casting nooses around himself. The same concerning other Pontifical laws very many teach, as cited with Sanchez, lib. 2. cited above. Indeed even to absolve from a case reserved to the Pope, besides the article of death, when access to the Pontiff is an impediment. The common reason is, because Pontifical laws proceed for the good of the Christian commonwealth, for the salvation of souls, according to the rules of charity; but it would be against charity so to bind the impotent. But the Church uses censures for salvation, not for destruction. So also S. Bonaventure runs, in 4. dist. 17. part. 1. quaest. 1. Say the same of the other reserved vows, if it be necessary. See Bassaeus, num. 15.

By the same reason very many say that even the Parish Priest can dispense in vows, when access to the Bishop is not easy. These are related by Sanchez, num. 27. They rely on this, that dispensation in a vow is like dispensation in a law, as D. Thom. teaches, 2. 2. quaest. 88. art. 10, and D. Bonavent., in 4. dist. 38. quaest. 3, argument 4, first place, and argument 2, sed contra: where he mixes and compares the obligation of the natural law of lying, and of the species to be kept, with the vow. But all follow them, as Sanchez notes, num. 27 of the disputation cited. Now indeed, since the matter stands thus, and the Parish Priest can dispense in the law of fasting when access to his Bishop is not easy, as very many teach, cited there, indeed with no necessity pressing, as many there affirm; it follows that he can also in the other things said above.

Indeed Manuel goes further, Tomo 2, quaestionum regularium, quaest. 46. art. 9. — that the Parish Priest can dispense even in vows which belong to the Bishop; not by ordinary law, but by the sole presumed will of the supreme Pontiff, of which above, when access to the Bishop is not easy. He proves it by the reason given above, because the Parish Priest, although by the law of parishes he has not the power of dispensing in the law of fasting, yet dispenses by custom, even if the Bishop could be approached, and this by custom, because custom gives jurisdiction, cap. cum contingat, de foro competenti, with many texts which the Gloss heaps up there; this is not to be denied of the vow, which is put on a level with law. Some say that a Bishop can dispense in a vow of chastity emitted from perturbation, when the one vowing is young or suspect; they rely on cap. veniens, qui cleric. vel vovent: but the dispenser there is the Pontiff himself, not a simple Bishop, as is clear in the title, Idem, namely Alexander III, as above.

SOME ADD that a Bishop can dispense for asking the debt in a vow of chastity, marriage having been entered before. And Sanchez adds, lib. 4. summae, cap. 40. num. 63, that custom is equivalent to law.]

I suppose, with Sanchez cap. 52., that Prelates can change all those vows which have power to dispense. But which these are, I said in question 26.

VOTA: but that the Pope's reserved vows, reserved to him as regards dispensation, are reserved to him also as regards commutation, all acknowledge. For in the Extravagant Et si Dominicus, la 2. de paenitentia, et remissi., where the reservation of these vows is supposed, there is speech of their commutation. This reservation of commutation extends even to their not being able to be changed for the better; So Suarez Tract. de voto, lib. 6. cap. 21., Sanchez lib. 4. cap. 52., although others hold the opposite.

IN the vow of religion, however, all things can be changed into it, as is had in cap. Scriptura de voto. See Sanchez loc. cit. Unless, however, such a vow has been accepted by the Supreme Pontiff or a Bishop. See Diana part. 3. tract. 6. miscell. resol. 65. Wherefore if a prince should vow the liberation of the Holy Land, it would not suffice for him to change it into a vow of Religion. Hence the Supreme Pontiff must be consulted, as Bassaeus notes V. Votum 6. num. 1., with D. Thomas quaest. 88. artic. 12., Suarez tom. 3. de relig. lib. 6. cap. 14., Lessius lib. 2. cap. 40. dubio 16., Vecchio disp. 13. dub. 4.

SI: Yet if they are changed evidently for the better, it is not an act of jurisdiction. So Bonacina Tom. 2. d. 4. quaest. 7. puncto 7. §. 3. num. 9., Tolet. lib. 4. cap. 18., Faustus lib. 4. quaest. 5., and Bassaeus cit. num. 5.

THIS faculty is delegable even by those having the privilege.

But to the confessors of the Society of Jesus, and, by communication, to other Mendicant confessors approved by the Ordinary for hearing the confessions of seculars, Paul III granted the faculty of changing all Vows. And Gregory XIII extended it even to the oath-bound, except the five reserved, which Eugenius IV had previously granted in the Congregation of Saint Justina, in the year of the Lord 1437. See Sanchez lib. 8. de matr. d. 16., Compend. Privil. Mendic. V. Absolutio quoad saeculares 2., Crousers on cap. 7. Reg. min. lec. 29., and Bassaeus num. 5.